From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:4830:134:3::10]:45727) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1fQZJ7-0003I2-Er for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 06 Jun 2018 10:21:02 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1fQZJ3-0005Tz-Ch for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 06 Jun 2018 10:21:01 -0400 Received: from mx3-rdu2.redhat.com ([66.187.233.73]:43396 helo=mx1.redhat.com) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:32) (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1fQZJ3-0005Tl-79 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 06 Jun 2018 10:20:57 -0400 Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2018 15:20:52 +0100 From: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= Message-ID: <20180606142052.GG3064@redhat.com> Reply-To: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= References: <20180601145921.9500-1-konrad.wilk@oracle.com> <20180601153809.15259-1-konrad.wilk@oracle.com> <20180601153809.15259-2-konrad.wilk@oracle.com> <20180604200701.GB3184@localhost.localdomain> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 1/2] i386: define the AMD 'amd-ssbd' CPUID feature bit List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: Tom Lendacky Cc: Eduardo Habkost , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , pbonzini@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, rth@twiddle.net On Tue, Jun 05, 2018 at 08:31:41AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > On 6/4/2018 3:07 PM, Eduardo Habkost wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 11:38:08AM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote: > >> AMD future CPUs expose _two_ ways to utilize the Intel equivalant > >> of the Speculative Store Bypass Disable. The first is via > >> the virtualized VIRT_SPEC CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f) and the second > >> is via the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48). The document titled: > >> 124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf > >> > >> gives priority of SPEC CTRL MSR over the VIRT SPEC CTRL MSR. > >> > >> A copy of this document is available at > >> https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889 > >> > >> Anyhow, this means that on future AMD CPUs there will be _two_ ways to > >> deal with SSBD. > > > > Does anybody know if there are AMD CPUs where virt-ssbd won't > > work and would require amd-ssbd to mitigate vulnerabilities? > > The idea behind virt-ssbd was to provide an architectural method for > a guest to do SSBD when amd-ssbd isn't present. The amd-ssbd feature > will use SPEC_CTRL which is intended to not be intercepted and > will be fast. The use of virt-ssbd will always be intercepted and > therefore will not be as fast. So a guest should be presented with > amd-ssbd, if available, in preference to virt-ssbd. Can you clarify whether 'amd-ssbd' is also an architectural method or not ? ie is it safe to use 'amd-ssbd' in a guest which can be live migrated between different generations/families of AMD CPU, or must be use virt-ssbd in that case ? Regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|