From: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com> To: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: "qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>, "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>, "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>, "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 02/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 16:10:01 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190424160942.13567-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190424160942.13567-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the encryption context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> --- .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 23 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 ++ 3 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index 340ac4f87321..a0208e171489 100644 --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -262,6 +262,29 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error __u32 amd_cert_len; }; +11. KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA +---------------------------- + +The KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to encrypt the +outgoing guest memory region with encryption context creating using KVM_SEV_SEND_START. + +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_update_data + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + +:: + + struct kvm_sev_launch_send_update_data { + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */ + __u32 hdr_len; + + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the source memory region to be encrypted */ + __u32 guest_len; + + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the destition memory region */ + __u32 trans_len; + }; + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 4c2a225ba546..a1cfd36d6195 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -418,6 +418,7 @@ enum { static unsigned int max_sev_asid; static unsigned int min_sev_asid; +static unsigned long me_mask; static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap; #define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT) @@ -1216,15 +1217,21 @@ static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag) static __init int sev_hardware_setup(void) { struct sev_user_data_status *status; + int eax, ebx; int rc; - /* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */ - max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F); + /* + * Query the memory encryption information. + * EBX: Bit 0:5 Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption (aka Cbit). + * ECX: Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously. + * EDX: Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest. + */ + cpuid(0x8000001f, &eax, &ebx, &max_sev_asid, &min_sev_asid); if (!max_sev_asid) return 1; - /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */ + me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f); min_sev_asid = cpuid_edx(0x8000001F); /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmap */ @@ -7053,6 +7060,118 @@ static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_send_update_data *data; + struct kvm_sev_send_update_data params; + void *hdr = NULL, *trans_data = NULL; + struct page **guest_page = NULL; + unsigned long n; + int ret, offset; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data))) + return -EFAULT; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* userspace wants to query either header or trans length */ + if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len) + goto cmd; + + ret = -EINVAL; + if (!params.trans_uaddr || !params.guest_uaddr || + !params.guest_len || !params.hdr_uaddr) + goto e_free; + + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundry */ + ret = -EINVAL; + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) + goto e_free; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + hdr = kmalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!hdr) + goto e_free; + + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + trans_data = kmalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!trans_data) + goto e_free; + + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans_data); + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; + + /* Pin guest memory */ + ret = -EFAULT; + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); + if (!guest_page) + goto e_free; + + data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(guest_page[0]) + offset; + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; + + /* + * The SEND_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. + * The __sme_page_pa() takes care of setting the C-bit only when SME + * is enabled on the host. But we need to set the C-bit regarless of + * the SME state. + */ + data->guest_address |= me_mask; + + /* flush the caches to ensure that DRAM has recent contents */ + sev_clflush_pages(guest_page, 1); + +cmd: + data->handle = sev->handle; + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error); + + /* userspace asked for header or trans length and FW responded with data */ + if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len) { + params.hdr_len = data->hdr_len; + params.trans_len = data->trans_len; + goto done; + } + + if (ret) + goto e_unpin; + + /* copy transport buffer to user space */ + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.trans_uaddr, + trans_data, params.trans_len)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto e_unpin; + } + + /* copy packet header to userspace */ + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.hdr_uaddr, hdr, params.hdr_len)) + ret = -EFAULT; + +e_unpin: + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n); +done: + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data))) + ret = -EFAULT; +e_free: + kfree(data); + kfree(trans_data); + kfree(hdr); + + return ret; +} + static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -7097,6 +7216,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_SEND_START: r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: + r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index f425418bec13..0bee91bba329 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1532,6 +1532,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_send_start { __u32 session_len; }; +struct kvm_sev_send_update_data { + __u64 hdr_uaddr; + __u32 hdr_len; + __u64 guest_uaddr; + __u32 guest_len; + __u64 trans_uaddr; + __u32 trans_len; +}; + #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com> To: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>, "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>, "qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>, "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de> Subject: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 02/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 16:10:01 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190424160942.13567-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw) Message-ID: <20190424161001.OXcfzj7SrctiKkyCi2N_6ZxmV9P8s2ujAvY0czYVeCE@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190424160942.13567-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the encryption context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> --- .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 23 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 ++ 3 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst index 340ac4f87321..a0208e171489 100644 --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -262,6 +262,29 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error __u32 amd_cert_len; }; +11. KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA +---------------------------- + +The KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to encrypt the +outgoing guest memory region with encryption context creating using KVM_SEV_SEND_START. + +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_update_data + +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error + +:: + + struct kvm_sev_launch_send_update_data { + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */ + __u32 hdr_len; + + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the source memory region to be encrypted */ + __u32 guest_len; + + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the destition memory region */ + __u32 trans_len; + }; + References ========== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 4c2a225ba546..a1cfd36d6195 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -418,6 +418,7 @@ enum { static unsigned int max_sev_asid; static unsigned int min_sev_asid; +static unsigned long me_mask; static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap; #define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT) @@ -1216,15 +1217,21 @@ static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag) static __init int sev_hardware_setup(void) { struct sev_user_data_status *status; + int eax, ebx; int rc; - /* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */ - max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F); + /* + * Query the memory encryption information. + * EBX: Bit 0:5 Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption (aka Cbit). + * ECX: Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously. + * EDX: Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest. + */ + cpuid(0x8000001f, &eax, &ebx, &max_sev_asid, &min_sev_asid); if (!max_sev_asid) return 1; - /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */ + me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f); min_sev_asid = cpuid_edx(0x8000001F); /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmap */ @@ -7053,6 +7060,118 @@ static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + struct sev_data_send_update_data *data; + struct kvm_sev_send_update_data params; + void *hdr = NULL, *trans_data = NULL; + struct page **guest_page = NULL; + unsigned long n; + int ret, offset; + + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) + return -ENOTTY; + + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data))) + return -EFAULT; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* userspace wants to query either header or trans length */ + if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len) + goto cmd; + + ret = -EINVAL; + if (!params.trans_uaddr || !params.guest_uaddr || + !params.guest_len || !params.hdr_uaddr) + goto e_free; + + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundry */ + ret = -EINVAL; + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) + goto e_free; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + hdr = kmalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!hdr) + goto e_free; + + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + trans_data = kmalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!trans_data) + goto e_free; + + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans_data); + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; + + /* Pin guest memory */ + ret = -EFAULT; + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); + if (!guest_page) + goto e_free; + + data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(guest_page[0]) + offset; + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; + + /* + * The SEND_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. + * The __sme_page_pa() takes care of setting the C-bit only when SME + * is enabled on the host. But we need to set the C-bit regarless of + * the SME state. + */ + data->guest_address |= me_mask; + + /* flush the caches to ensure that DRAM has recent contents */ + sev_clflush_pages(guest_page, 1); + +cmd: + data->handle = sev->handle; + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error); + + /* userspace asked for header or trans length and FW responded with data */ + if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len) { + params.hdr_len = data->hdr_len; + params.trans_len = data->trans_len; + goto done; + } + + if (ret) + goto e_unpin; + + /* copy transport buffer to user space */ + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.trans_uaddr, + trans_data, params.trans_len)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto e_unpin; + } + + /* copy packet header to userspace */ + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.hdr_uaddr, hdr, params.hdr_len)) + ret = -EFAULT; + +e_unpin: + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n); +done: + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data))) + ret = -EFAULT; +e_free: + kfree(data); + kfree(trans_data); + kfree(hdr); + + return ret; +} + static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -7097,6 +7216,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) case KVM_SEV_SEND_START: r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); break; + case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: + r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); + break; default: r = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index f425418bec13..0bee91bba329 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1532,6 +1532,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_send_start { __u32 session_len; }; +struct kvm_sev_send_update_data { + __u64 hdr_uaddr; + __u32 hdr_len; + __u64 guest_uaddr; + __u32 guest_len; + __u64 trans_uaddr; + __u32 trans_len; +}; + #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) -- 2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-24 16:10 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-04-24 16:09 [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/10] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:09 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:09 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 01/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:09 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 14:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-26 14:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-26 14:29 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 14:29 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 20:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-26 20:43 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-29 15:01 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-29 15:01 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-29 16:36 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-29 16:36 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-04-29 16:43 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-29 16:43 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh [this message] 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 02/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 20:31 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-26 20:31 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-29 16:54 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-29 16:54 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 03/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 04/10] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 21:08 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-26 21:08 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 05/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 21:11 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-26 21:11 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 06/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 21:11 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-26 21:11 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 07/10] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 08/10] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-26 21:39 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-04-26 21:39 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-05-03 14:25 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-05-03 14:25 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 09/10] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/10] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 16:10 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 19:15 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/10] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Steve Rutherford 2019-04-24 19:15 ` Steve Rutherford via Qemu-devel 2019-04-24 21:32 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-24 21:32 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-25 0:18 ` Steve Rutherford 2019-04-25 0:18 ` Steve Rutherford via Qemu-devel 2019-04-25 2:15 ` Singh, Brijesh 2019-04-25 2:15 ` Singh, Brijesh
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