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From: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>,
	amit@kernel.org, rjones@redhat.com, armbru@redhat.com,
	stefanha@redhat.com
Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2] VirtIO-RNG: Update default entropy source to `/dev/urandom`
Date: Fri, 10 May 2019 10:15:25 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190510081526.15507-1-kchamart@redhat.com> (raw)

When QEMU exposes a VirtIO-RNG device to the guest, that device needs a
source of entropy, and that source needs to be "non-blocking", like
`/dev/urandom`.  However, currently QEMU defaults to the problematic
`/dev/random`, which is "blocking" (as in, it waits until sufficient
entropy is available).

Why prefer `/dev/urandom` over `/dev/random`?
---------------------------------------------

The man pages of urandom(4) and random(4) state:

    "The /dev/random device is a legacy interface which dates back to a
    time where the cryptographic primitives used in the implementation
    of /dev/urandom were not widely trusted.  It will return random
    bytes only within the estimated number of bits of fresh noise in the
    entropy pool, blocking if necessary.  /dev/random is suitable for
    applications that need high quality randomness, and can afford
    indeterminate delays."

Further, the "Usage" section of the said man pages state:

    "The /dev/random interface is considered a legacy interface, and
    /dev/urandom is preferred and sufficient in all use cases, with the
    exception of applications which require randomness during early boot
    time; for these applications, getrandom(2) must be used instead,
    because it will block until the entropy pool is initialized.

    "If a seed file is saved across reboots as recommended below (all
    major Linux distributions have done this since 2000 at least), the
    output is cryptographically secure against attackers without local
    root access as soon as it is reloaded in the boot sequence, and
    perfectly adequate for network encryption session keys.  Since reads
    from /dev/random may block, users will usually want to open it in
    nonblocking mode (or perform a read with timeout), and provide some
    sort of user notification if the desired entropy is not immediately
    available."

And refer to random(7) for a comparison of `/dev/random` and
`/dev/urandom`.

    - - -

Given the above, change the entropy source for VirtIO-RNG device to
`/dev/urandom`.

Related discussion in these[1][2] past threads.

[1] https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-06/msg08335.html
    -- "RNG: Any reason QEMU doesn't default to `/dev/urandom`?"
[2] https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg02724.html
    -- "[RFC] Virtio RNG: Consider changing the default entropy source to
       /dev/urandom"

Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
---
v2:
 - Update commit message to mention justification for preferring
   `/dev/urandom` over `/dev/random` [stefanha]
---
 backends/rng-random.c | 2 +-
 qemu-options.hx       | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/backends/rng-random.c b/backends/rng-random.c
index e2a49b0571d79eab335d5a74841d92c50a727b6a..eff36ef14084bccaad1eabe952e2cf6ffa9a2529 100644
--- a/backends/rng-random.c
+++ b/backends/rng-random.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void rng_random_init(Object *obj)
                             rng_random_set_filename,
                             NULL);
 
-    s->filename = g_strdup("/dev/random");
+    s->filename = g_strdup("/dev/urandom");
     s->fd = -1;
 }
 
diff --git a/qemu-options.hx b/qemu-options.hx
index 51802cbb266a208d70989c4f0ab3317a76edc1ea..a525609149e4d0e4bb60959f029a1a16eb36900d 100644
--- a/qemu-options.hx
+++ b/qemu-options.hx
@@ -4276,7 +4276,7 @@ Creates a random number generator backend which obtains entropy from
 a device on the host. The @option{id} parameter is a unique ID that
 will be used to reference this entropy backend from the @option{virtio-rng}
 device. The @option{filename} parameter specifies which file to obtain
-entropy from and if omitted defaults to @option{/dev/random}.
+entropy from and if omitted defaults to @option{/dev/urandom}.
 
 @item -object rng-egd,id=@var{id},chardev=@var{chardevid}
 
-- 
2.17.2



             reply	other threads:[~2019-05-10  8:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-10  8:15 Kashyap Chamarthy [this message]
2019-05-10  8:28 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2] VirtIO-RNG: Update default entropy source to `/dev/urandom` Kashyap Chamarthy
2019-05-10  9:00 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2019-05-10  9:36 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2019-05-10 12:03 ` Markus Armbruster
2019-05-10 12:11   ` Daniel P. Berrangé

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