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From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
Cc: armbru@redhat.com, rjones@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	stefanha@redhat.com, amit@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2] VirtIO-RNG: Update default entropy source to `/dev/urandom`
Date: Fri, 10 May 2019 10:00:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190510090028.GF7671@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190510081526.15507-1-kchamart@redhat.com>

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:15:25AM +0200, Kashyap Chamarthy wrote:
> When QEMU exposes a VirtIO-RNG device to the guest, that device needs a
> source of entropy, and that source needs to be "non-blocking", like
> `/dev/urandom`.  However, currently QEMU defaults to the problematic
> `/dev/random`, which is "blocking" (as in, it waits until sufficient
> entropy is available).
> 
> Why prefer `/dev/urandom` over `/dev/random`?
> ---------------------------------------------
> 
> The man pages of urandom(4) and random(4) state:
> 
>     "The /dev/random device is a legacy interface which dates back to a
>     time where the cryptographic primitives used in the implementation
>     of /dev/urandom were not widely trusted.  It will return random
>     bytes only within the estimated number of bits of fresh noise in the
>     entropy pool, blocking if necessary.  /dev/random is suitable for
>     applications that need high quality randomness, and can afford
>     indeterminate delays."
> 
> Further, the "Usage" section of the said man pages state:
> 
>     "The /dev/random interface is considered a legacy interface, and
>     /dev/urandom is preferred and sufficient in all use cases, with the
>     exception of applications which require randomness during early boot
>     time; for these applications, getrandom(2) must be used instead,
>     because it will block until the entropy pool is initialized.
> 
>     "If a seed file is saved across reboots as recommended below (all
>     major Linux distributions have done this since 2000 at least), the
>     output is cryptographically secure against attackers without local
>     root access as soon as it is reloaded in the boot sequence, and
>     perfectly adequate for network encryption session keys.  Since reads
>     from /dev/random may block, users will usually want to open it in
>     nonblocking mode (or perform a read with timeout), and provide some
>     sort of user notification if the desired entropy is not immediately
>     available."
> 
> And refer to random(7) for a comparison of `/dev/random` and
> `/dev/urandom`.
> 
>     - - -
> 
> Given the above, change the entropy source for VirtIO-RNG device to
> `/dev/urandom`.
> 
> Related discussion in these[1][2] past threads.
> 
> [1] https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-06/msg08335.html
>     -- "RNG: Any reason QEMU doesn't default to `/dev/urandom`?"
> [2] https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-09/msg02724.html
>     -- "[RFC] Virtio RNG: Consider changing the default entropy source to
>        /dev/urandom"
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
> ---
> v2:
>  - Update commit message to mention justification for preferring
>    `/dev/urandom` over `/dev/random` [stefanha]
> ---
>  backends/rng-random.c | 2 +-
>  qemu-options.hx       | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>


Regards,
Daniel
-- 
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-05-10  9:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-10  8:15 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2] VirtIO-RNG: Update default entropy source to `/dev/urandom` Kashyap Chamarthy
2019-05-10  8:28 ` Kashyap Chamarthy
2019-05-10  9:00 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2019-05-10  9:36 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2019-05-10 12:03 ` Markus Armbruster
2019-05-10 12:11   ` Daniel P. Berrangé

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