From: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: "qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>
Cc: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 09/12] target/i386: sev: add support to encrypt the outgoing page
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 18:03:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190620180247.8825-10-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190620180247.8825-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
The sev_save_outgoing_page() provide the implementation to encrypt the
guest private pages during the transit. The routines uses the SEND_START
command to create the outgoing encryption context on the first call then
uses the SEND_UPDATE_DATA command to encrypt the data before writing it
to the socket. While encrypting the data SEND_UPDATE_DATA produces some
metadata (e.g MAC, IV). The metadata is also sent to the target machine.
After migration is completed, we issue the SEND_FINISH command to transition
the SEV guest state from sending to unrunnable state.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 1 +
target/i386/sev.c | 229 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
target/i386/sev_i386.h | 2 +
target/i386/trace-events | 3 +
4 files changed, 235 insertions(+)
diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
index 0654d9a7cd..85d6508e7f 100644
--- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
+++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
@@ -1784,6 +1784,7 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data = sev_encrypt_data;
kvm_state->memcrypt_sync_page_enc_bitmap = sev_sync_page_enc_bitmap;
+ kvm_state->memcrypt_save_outgoing_page = sev_save_outgoing_page;
}
ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 2c7c496593..b5aa53ec44 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
#include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
#include "trace.h"
#include "migration/blocker.h"
+#include "migration/qemu-file.h"
+#include "migration/misc.h"
#define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */
#define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev"
@@ -718,6 +720,39 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state)
}
}
+static void
+sev_send_finish(void)
+{
+ int ret, error;
+
+ trace_kvm_sev_send_finish();
+ ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH, 0, &error);
+ if (ret) {
+ error_report("%s: LAUNCH_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error));
+ }
+
+ sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING);
+}
+
+static void
+sev_migration_state_notifier(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
+{
+ MigrationState *s = data;
+
+ if (migration_has_finished(s) ||
+ migration_in_postcopy_after_devices(s) ||
+ migration_has_failed(s)) {
+ if (sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_SEND_UPDATE)) {
+ sev_send_finish();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static Notifier sev_migration_state_notify = {
+ .notify = sev_migration_state_notifier,
+};
+
void *
sev_guest_init(const char *id)
{
@@ -804,6 +839,7 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
ram_block_notifier_add(&sev_ram_notifier);
qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify);
qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, s);
+ add_migration_state_change_notifier(&sev_migration_state_notify);
return s;
err:
@@ -863,6 +899,199 @@ void sev_set_migrate_info(const char *pdh, const char *plat_cert,
s->amd_cert = g_base64_decode(amd_cert, &s->amd_cert_len);
}
+static int
+sev_get_send_session_length(void)
+{
+ int ret, fw_err = 0;
+ struct kvm_sev_send_start *start;
+
+ start = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_send_start, 1);
+
+ ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_SEND_START, start, &fw_err);
+ if (fw_err != SEV_RET_INVALID_LEN) {
+ ret = -1;
+ error_report("%s: failed to get session length ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, ret, fw_err, fw_error_to_str(fw_err));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = start->session_len;
+err:
+ g_free(start);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sev_send_start(SEVState *s, QEMUFile *f, uint64_t *bytes_sent)
+{
+ gsize pdh_len = 0, plat_cert_len;
+ int session_len, ret, fw_error;
+ struct kvm_sev_send_start *start;
+ guchar *pdh = NULL, *plat_cert = NULL, *session = NULL;
+
+ if (!s->remote_pdh || !s->remote_plat_cert) {
+ error_report("%s: missing remote PDH or PLAT_CERT", __func__);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ start = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_send_start, 1);
+
+ start->pdh_cert_uaddr = (unsigned long) s->remote_pdh;
+ start->pdh_cert_len = s->remote_pdh_len;
+
+ start->plat_cert_uaddr = (unsigned long)s->remote_plat_cert;
+ start->plat_cert_len = s->remote_plat_cert_len;
+
+ start->amd_cert_uaddr = (unsigned long)s->amd_cert;
+ start->amd_cert_len = s->amd_cert_len;
+
+ /* get the session length */
+ session_len = sev_get_send_session_length();
+ if (session_len < 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ session = g_new0(guchar, session_len);
+ start->session_uaddr = (unsigned long)session;
+ start->session_len = session_len;
+
+ /* Get our PDH certificate */
+ ret = sev_get_pdh_info(s->sev_fd, &pdh, &pdh_len,
+ &plat_cert, &plat_cert_len);
+ if (ret) {
+ error_report("Failed to get our PDH cert");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ trace_kvm_sev_send_start(start->pdh_cert_uaddr, start->pdh_cert_len,
+ start->plat_cert_uaddr, start->plat_cert_len,
+ start->amd_cert_uaddr, start->amd_cert_len);
+
+ ret = sev_ioctl(s->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_SEND_START, start, &fw_error);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ error_report("%s: SEND_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ qemu_put_be32(f, start->policy);
+ qemu_put_be32(f, pdh_len);
+ qemu_put_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)pdh, pdh_len);
+ qemu_put_be32(f, start->session_len);
+ qemu_put_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)start->session_uaddr, start->session_len);
+ *bytes_sent = 12 + pdh_len + start->session_len;
+
+ sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_SEND_UPDATE);
+
+err:
+ g_free(start);
+ g_free(pdh);
+ g_free(plat_cert);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sev_send_get_packet_len(int *fw_err)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct kvm_sev_send_update_data *update;
+
+ update = g_malloc0(sizeof(*update));
+ if (!update) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, update, fw_err);
+ if (*fw_err != SEV_RET_INVALID_LEN) {
+ ret = -1;
+ error_report("%s: failed to get session length ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, ret, *fw_err, fw_error_to_str(*fw_err));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = update->hdr_len;
+
+err:
+ g_free(update);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sev_send_update_data(SEVState *s, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, uint32_t size,
+ uint64_t *bytes_sent)
+{
+ int ret, fw_error;
+ guchar *trans;
+ struct kvm_sev_send_update_data *update;
+
+ /* If this is first call then query the packet header bytes and allocate
+ * the packet buffer.
+ */
+ if (!s->send_packet_hdr) {
+ s->send_packet_hdr_len = sev_send_get_packet_len(&fw_error);
+ if (s->send_packet_hdr_len < 1) {
+ error_report("%s: SEND_UPDATE fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ s->send_packet_hdr = g_new(gchar, s->send_packet_hdr_len);
+ }
+
+ update = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data, 1);
+
+ /* allocate transport buffer */
+ trans = g_new(guchar, size);
+
+ update->hdr_uaddr = (unsigned long)s->send_packet_hdr;
+ update->hdr_len = s->send_packet_hdr_len;
+ update->guest_uaddr = (unsigned long)ptr;
+ update->guest_len = size;
+ update->trans_uaddr = (unsigned long)trans;
+ update->trans_len = size;
+
+ trace_kvm_sev_send_update_data(ptr, trans, size);
+
+ ret = sev_ioctl(s->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, update, &fw_error);
+ if (ret) {
+ error_report("%s: SEND_UPDATE_DATA ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ qemu_put_be32(f, update->hdr_len);
+ qemu_put_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)update->hdr_uaddr, update->hdr_len);
+ *bytes_sent = 4 + update->hdr_len;
+
+ qemu_put_be32(f, update->trans_len);
+ qemu_put_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)update->trans_uaddr, update->trans_len);
+ *bytes_sent += (4 + update->trans_len);
+
+err:
+ g_free(trans);
+ g_free(update);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int sev_save_outgoing_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr,
+ uint32_t sz, uint64_t *bytes_sent)
+{
+ SEVState *s = sev_state;
+
+ /*
+ * If this is a first buffer then create outgoing encryption context
+ * and write our PDH, policy and session data.
+ */
+ if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_SEND_UPDATE) &&
+ sev_send_start(s, f, bytes_sent)) {
+ error_report("Failed to create outgoing context");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return sev_send_update_data(s, f, ptr, sz, bytes_sent);
+}
+
static void
sev_register_types(void)
{
diff --git a/target/i386/sev_i386.h b/target/i386/sev_i386.h
index 258047ab2c..38893fb1fa 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev_i386.h
+++ b/target/i386/sev_i386.h
@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ struct SEVState {
size_t remote_plat_cert_len;
guchar *amd_cert;
size_t amd_cert_len;
+ gchar *send_packet_hdr;
+ size_t send_packet_hdr_len;
};
typedef struct SEVState SEVState;
diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events
index 789c700d4a..b41516cf9f 100644
--- a/target/i386/trace-events
+++ b/target/i386/trace-events
@@ -15,3 +15,6 @@ kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session
kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64
kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s"
kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) ""
+kvm_sev_send_start(uint64_t pdh, int l1, uint64_t plat, int l2, uint64_t amd, int l3) "pdh 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d plat 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d amd 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d"
+kvm_sev_send_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len) "guest %p trans %p len %d"
+kvm_sev_send_finish(void) ""
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-20 18:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-20 18:03 [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/12] Add SEV guest live migration support Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 01/12] linux-headers: update kernel header to include SEV migration commands Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 02/12] kvm: introduce high-level API to support encrypted guest migration Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 03/12] migration/ram: add support to send encrypted pages Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 04/12] kvm: add support to sync the page encryption state bitmap Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 05/12] doc: update AMD SEV API spec web link Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 06/12] doc: update AMD SEV to include Live migration flow Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 07/12] target/i386: sev: do not create launch context for an incoming guest Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 08/12] target.json: add migrate-set-sev-info command Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 19:13 ` Eric Blake
2019-06-20 19:18 ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` Singh, Brijesh [this message]
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/12] target/i386: sev: add support to load incoming encrypted page Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 11/12] migration: add support to migrate page encryption bitmap Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 12/12] target/i386: sev: remove migration blocker Singh, Brijesh
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