From: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: "qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>
Cc: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/12] target/i386: sev: add support to load incoming encrypted page
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 18:03:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190620180247.8825-11-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190620180247.8825-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
The sev_load_incoming_page() provide the implementation to read the
incoming guest private pages from the socket and load it into the guest
memory. The routines uses the RECEIVE_START command to create the
incoming encryption context on the first call then uses the
RECEIEVE_UPDATE_DATA command to load the encrypted pages into the guest
memory. After migration is completed, we issue the RECEIVE_FINISH command
to transition the SEV guest to the runnable state so that it can be
executed.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 1 +
target/i386/sev.c | 126 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
target/i386/trace-events | 3 +
3 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
index 85d6508e7f..fe65c8eb5d 100644
--- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
+++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
@@ -1785,6 +1785,7 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data = sev_encrypt_data;
kvm_state->memcrypt_sync_page_enc_bitmap = sev_sync_page_enc_bitmap;
kvm_state->memcrypt_save_outgoing_page = sev_save_outgoing_page;
+ kvm_state->memcrypt_load_incoming_page = sev_load_incoming_page;
}
ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index b5aa53ec44..b7feedce7d 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -708,13 +708,34 @@ sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s)
}
}
+static int
+sev_receive_finish(SEVState *s)
+{
+ int error, ret = 1;
+
+ trace_kvm_sev_receive_finish();
+ ret = sev_ioctl(s->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH, 0, &error);
+ if (ret) {
+ error_report("%s: RECEIVE_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING);
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
static void
sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state)
{
SEVState *s = opaque;
if (running) {
- if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) {
+ if (sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE)) {
+ sev_receive_finish(s);
+ } else if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) {
sev_launch_finish(s);
}
}
@@ -1092,6 +1113,109 @@ int sev_save_outgoing_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr,
return sev_send_update_data(s, f, ptr, sz, bytes_sent);
}
+static int
+sev_receive_start(QSevGuestInfo *sev, QEMUFile *f)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+ int fw_error;
+ struct kvm_sev_receive_start *start;
+ gchar *session = NULL, *pdh_cert = NULL;
+
+ start = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_receive_start, 1);
+
+ /* get SEV guest handle */
+ start->handle = object_property_get_int(OBJECT(sev), "handle",
+ &error_abort);
+
+ /* get the source policy */
+ start->policy = qemu_get_be32(f);
+
+ /* get source PDH key */
+ start->pdh_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
+ pdh_cert = g_new(gchar, start->pdh_len);
+ qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)pdh_cert, start->pdh_len);
+ start->pdh_uaddr = (unsigned long)pdh_cert;
+
+ /* get source session data */
+ start->session_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
+ session = g_new(gchar, start->session_len);
+ qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)session, start->session_len);
+ start->session_uaddr = (unsigned long)session;
+
+ trace_kvm_sev_receive_start(start->policy, session, pdh_cert);
+
+ ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START, start, &fw_error);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ error_report("Error RECEIVE_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ object_property_set_int(OBJECT(sev), start->handle, "handle", &error_abort);
+ sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE);
+err:
+ g_free(start);
+ g_free(session);
+ g_free(pdh_cert);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_receive_update_data(QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+ int ret = 1, fw_error = 0;
+ gchar *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL;
+ struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data *update;
+
+ update = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data, 1);
+
+ /* get packet header */
+ update->hdr_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
+ hdr = g_new(gchar, update->hdr_len);
+ qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)hdr, update->hdr_len);
+ update->hdr_uaddr = (unsigned long)hdr;
+
+ /* get transport buffer */
+ update->trans_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
+ trans = g_new(gchar, update->trans_len);
+ update->trans_uaddr = (unsigned long)trans;
+ qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)update->trans_uaddr, update->trans_len);
+
+ update->guest_uaddr = (unsigned long) ptr;
+ update->guest_len = update->trans_len;
+
+ trace_kvm_sev_receive_update_data(trans, ptr, update->guest_len,
+ hdr, update->hdr_len);
+
+ ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA,
+ update, &fw_error);
+ if (ret) {
+ error_report("Error RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
+ goto err;
+ }
+err:
+ g_free(trans);
+ g_free(update);
+ g_free(hdr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int sev_load_incoming_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+ SEVState *s = (SEVState *)handle;
+
+ /* If this is first buffer and SEV is not in recieiving state then
+ * use RECEIVE_START command to create a encryption context.
+ */
+ if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE) &&
+ sev_receive_start(s->sev_info, f)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return sev_receive_update_data(f, ptr);
+}
+
static void
sev_register_types(void)
{
diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events
index b41516cf9f..609752cca7 100644
--- a/target/i386/trace-events
+++ b/target/i386/trace-events
@@ -18,3 +18,6 @@ kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) ""
kvm_sev_send_start(uint64_t pdh, int l1, uint64_t plat, int l2, uint64_t amd, int l3) "pdh 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d plat 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d amd 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d"
kvm_sev_send_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len) "guest %p trans %p len %d"
kvm_sev_send_finish(void) ""
+kvm_sev_receive_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p"
+kvm_sev_receive_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len, void *hdr, int hdr_len) "guest %p trans %p len %d hdr %p hdr_len %d"
+kvm_sev_receive_finish(void) ""
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-20 19:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-20 18:03 [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/12] Add SEV guest live migration support Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 01/12] linux-headers: update kernel header to include SEV migration commands Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 02/12] kvm: introduce high-level API to support encrypted guest migration Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 03/12] migration/ram: add support to send encrypted pages Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 04/12] kvm: add support to sync the page encryption state bitmap Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 05/12] doc: update AMD SEV API spec web link Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 06/12] doc: update AMD SEV to include Live migration flow Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 07/12] target/i386: sev: do not create launch context for an incoming guest Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 08/12] target.json: add migrate-set-sev-info command Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 19:13 ` Eric Blake
2019-06-20 19:18 ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 09/12] target/i386: sev: add support to encrypt the outgoing page Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` Singh, Brijesh [this message]
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 11/12] migration: add support to migrate page encryption bitmap Singh, Brijesh
2019-06-20 18:03 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 12/12] target/i386: sev: remove migration blocker Singh, Brijesh
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