From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, renzhen@linux.alibaba.com,
eguan@linux.alibaba.com, ganesh.mahalingam@intel.com,
m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com, mszeredi@redhat.com,
misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com, tao.peng@linux.alibaba.com,
piaojun@huawei.com, stefanha@redhat.com, vgoyal@redhat.com,
mst@redhat.com, berrange@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 18/25] virtiofsd: move to a new pid namespace
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2019 12:27:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191024112718.34657-19-dgilbert@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191024112718.34657-1-dgilbert@redhat.com>
From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
virtiofsd needs access to /proc/self/fd. Let's move to a new pid
namespace so that a compromised process cannot see another other
processes running on the system.
One wrinkle in this approach: unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) affects *child*
processes and not the current process. Therefore we need to fork the
pid 1 process that will actually run virtiofsd and leave a parent in
waitpid(2). This is not the same thing as daemonization and parent
processes should not notice a difference.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
---
contrib/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/contrib/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/contrib/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 58cf82a89f..c027db64e6 100644
--- a/contrib/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/contrib/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
#include "passthrough_helpers.h"
@@ -1835,6 +1837,63 @@ static void setup_net_namespace(void)
}
}
+/*
+ * Move to a new pid namespace to prevent access to other processes if this
+ * process is compromised.
+ */
+static void setup_pid_namespace(void)
+{
+ pid_t child;
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new pid namespace for *child* processes. We'll have to
+ * fork in order to enter the new pid namespace. A new mount namespace
+ * is also needed so that we can remount /proc for the new pid
+ * namespace.
+ */
+ if (unshare(CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNS) != 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNS): %m\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ child = fork();
+ if (child < 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "fork() failed: %m\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (child > 0) {
+ pid_t waited;
+ int wstatus;
+
+ /* The parent waits for the child */
+ do {
+ waited = waitpid(child, &wstatus, 0);
+ } while (waited < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+
+ if (WIFEXITED(wstatus)) {
+ exit(WEXITSTATUS(wstatus));
+ }
+
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the mounts have shared propagation then we want to opt out so our
+ * mount changes don't affect the parent mount namespace.
+ */
+ if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_REC|MS_SLAVE, NULL) < 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/, MS_REC|MS_SLAVE): %m\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* The child must remount /proc to use the new pid namespace */
+ if (mount("proc", "/proc", "proc",
+ MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NOSUID | MS_RELATIME, NULL) < 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc): %m\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+
/* This magic is based on lxc's lxc_pivot_root() */
static void setup_pivot_root(const char *source)
{
@@ -1898,20 +1957,10 @@ static void setup_proc_self_fd(struct lo_data *lo)
/*
* Make the source directory our root so symlinks cannot escape and no other
- * files are accessible.
+ * files are accessible. Assumes unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) was already called.
*/
static void setup_mount_namespace(const char *source)
{
- if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) != 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_NEWNS): %m\n");
- exit(1);
- }
-
- if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_REC|MS_SLAVE, NULL) < 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/, MS_REC|MS_PRIVATE): %m\n");
- exit(1);
- }
-
if (mount(source, source, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(%s, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n", source, source);
exit(1);
@@ -1926,6 +1975,8 @@ static void setup_mount_namespace(const char *source)
*/
static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo)
{
+ setup_pid_namespace();
+ setup_proc_self_fd(lo);
setup_net_namespace();
setup_mount_namespace(lo->source);
}
@@ -2046,9 +2097,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
fuse_daemonize(opts.foreground);
- /* Must be after daemonize to get the right /proc/self/fd */
- setup_proc_self_fd(&lo);
-
setup_sandbox(&lo);
/* Block until ctrl+c or fusermount -u */
--
2.23.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-24 12:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-24 11:26 [PATCH 00/25] virtiofs daemon (security) Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:26 ` [PATCH 01/25] virtiofsd: passthrough_ll: create new files in caller's context Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:26 ` [PATCH 02/25] virtiofsd: passthrough_ll: add lo_map for ino/fh indirection Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:26 ` [PATCH 03/25] virtiofsd: passthrough_ll: add ino_map to hide lo_inode pointers Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:26 ` [PATCH 04/25] virtiofsd: passthrough_ll: add dirp_map to hide lo_dirp pointers Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:26 ` [PATCH 05/25] virtiofsd: passthrough_ll: add fd_map to hide file descriptors Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:26 ` [PATCH 06/25] virtiofsd: passthrough_ll: add fallback for racy ops Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 07/25] virtiofsd: validate path components Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 08/25] virtiofsd: Plumb fuse_bufvec through to do_write_buf Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 09/25] virtiofsd: Pass write iov's all the way through Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 10/25] virtiofsd: add fuse_mbuf_iter API Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 11/25] virtiofsd: validate input buffer sizes in do_write_buf() Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 12/25] virtiofsd: check input buffer size in fuse_lowlevel.c ops Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 13/25] virtiofsd: prevent ".." escape in lo_do_lookup() Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 14/25] virtiofsd: prevent ".." escape in lo_do_readdir() Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 15/25] virtiofsd: use /proc/self/fd/ O_PATH file descriptor Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 16/25] virtiofsd: sandbox mount namespace Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 17/25] virtiofsd: move to an empty network namespace Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git) [this message]
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 19/25] virtiofsd: add seccomp whitelist Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 20/25] virtiofsd: Parse flag FUSE_WRITE_KILL_PRIV Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 21/25] virtiofsd: Drop CAP_FSETID if client asked for it Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 22/25] virtiofsd: set maximum RLIMIT_NOFILE limit Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 23/25] virtiofsd: add security guide document Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 24/25] virtiofsd: add --syslog command-line option Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
2019-10-24 11:27 ` [PATCH 25/25] virtiofsd: print log only when priority is high enough Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
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