From: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: [PULL 39/48] target/arm: Move arm_excp_unmasked to cpu.c
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2020 14:33:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200207143343.30322-40-peter.maydell@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200207143343.30322-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org>
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
This inline function has one user in cpu.c, and need not be exposed
otherwise. Code movement only, with fixups for checkpatch.
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200206105448.4726-39-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
---
target/arm/cpu.h | 111 -------------------------------------------
target/arm/cpu.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 111 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h
index 2ed2667a170..0b3036c484f 100644
--- a/target/arm/cpu.h
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.h
@@ -2709,117 +2709,6 @@ bool write_cpustate_to_list(ARMCPU *cpu, bool kvm_sync);
#define ARM_CPUID_TI915T 0x54029152
#define ARM_CPUID_TI925T 0x54029252
-static inline bool arm_excp_unmasked(CPUState *cs, unsigned int excp_idx,
- unsigned int target_el)
-{
- CPUARMState *env = cs->env_ptr;
- unsigned int cur_el = arm_current_el(env);
- bool secure = arm_is_secure(env);
- bool pstate_unmasked;
- int8_t unmasked = 0;
- uint64_t hcr_el2;
-
- /* Don't take exceptions if they target a lower EL.
- * This check should catch any exceptions that would not be taken but left
- * pending.
- */
- if (cur_el > target_el) {
- return false;
- }
-
- hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
-
- switch (excp_idx) {
- case EXCP_FIQ:
- pstate_unmasked = !(env->daif & PSTATE_F);
- break;
-
- case EXCP_IRQ:
- pstate_unmasked = !(env->daif & PSTATE_I);
- break;
-
- case EXCP_VFIQ:
- if (secure || !(hcr_el2 & HCR_FMO) || (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE)) {
- /* VFIQs are only taken when hypervized and non-secure. */
- return false;
- }
- return !(env->daif & PSTATE_F);
- case EXCP_VIRQ:
- if (secure || !(hcr_el2 & HCR_IMO) || (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE)) {
- /* VIRQs are only taken when hypervized and non-secure. */
- return false;
- }
- return !(env->daif & PSTATE_I);
- default:
- g_assert_not_reached();
- }
-
- /* Use the target EL, current execution state and SCR/HCR settings to
- * determine whether the corresponding CPSR bit is used to mask the
- * interrupt.
- */
- if ((target_el > cur_el) && (target_el != 1)) {
- /* Exceptions targeting a higher EL may not be maskable */
- if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_AARCH64)) {
- /* 64-bit masking rules are simple: exceptions to EL3
- * can't be masked, and exceptions to EL2 can only be
- * masked from Secure state. The HCR and SCR settings
- * don't affect the masking logic, only the interrupt routing.
- */
- if (target_el == 3 || !secure) {
- unmasked = 1;
- }
- } else {
- /* The old 32-bit-only environment has a more complicated
- * masking setup. HCR and SCR bits not only affect interrupt
- * routing but also change the behaviour of masking.
- */
- bool hcr, scr;
-
- switch (excp_idx) {
- case EXCP_FIQ:
- /* If FIQs are routed to EL3 or EL2 then there are cases where
- * we override the CPSR.F in determining if the exception is
- * masked or not. If neither of these are set then we fall back
- * to the CPSR.F setting otherwise we further assess the state
- * below.
- */
- hcr = hcr_el2 & HCR_FMO;
- scr = (env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_FIQ);
-
- /* When EL3 is 32-bit, the SCR.FW bit controls whether the
- * CPSR.F bit masks FIQ interrupts when taken in non-secure
- * state. If SCR.FW is set then FIQs can be masked by CPSR.F
- * when non-secure but only when FIQs are only routed to EL3.
- */
- scr = scr && !((env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_FW) && !hcr);
- break;
- case EXCP_IRQ:
- /* When EL3 execution state is 32-bit, if HCR.IMO is set then
- * we may override the CPSR.I masking when in non-secure state.
- * The SCR.IRQ setting has already been taken into consideration
- * when setting the target EL, so it does not have a further
- * affect here.
- */
- hcr = hcr_el2 & HCR_IMO;
- scr = false;
- break;
- default:
- g_assert_not_reached();
- }
-
- if ((scr || hcr) && !secure) {
- unmasked = 1;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* The PSTATE bits only mask the interrupt if we have not overriden the
- * ability above.
- */
- return unmasked || pstate_unmasked;
-}
-
#define ARM_CPU_TYPE_SUFFIX "-" TYPE_ARM_CPU
#define ARM_CPU_TYPE_NAME(name) (name ARM_CPU_TYPE_SUFFIX)
#define CPU_RESOLVING_TYPE TYPE_ARM_CPU
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.c b/target/arm/cpu.c
index 1ecf2adb6a9..b81ed44bd2b 100644
--- a/target/arm/cpu.c
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.c
@@ -410,6 +410,125 @@ static void arm_cpu_reset(CPUState *s)
arm_rebuild_hflags(env);
}
+static inline bool arm_excp_unmasked(CPUState *cs, unsigned int excp_idx,
+ unsigned int target_el)
+{
+ CPUARMState *env = cs->env_ptr;
+ unsigned int cur_el = arm_current_el(env);
+ bool secure = arm_is_secure(env);
+ bool pstate_unmasked;
+ int8_t unmasked = 0;
+ uint64_t hcr_el2;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't take exceptions if they target a lower EL.
+ * This check should catch any exceptions that would not be taken
+ * but left pending.
+ */
+ if (cur_el > target_el) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
+
+ switch (excp_idx) {
+ case EXCP_FIQ:
+ pstate_unmasked = !(env->daif & PSTATE_F);
+ break;
+
+ case EXCP_IRQ:
+ pstate_unmasked = !(env->daif & PSTATE_I);
+ break;
+
+ case EXCP_VFIQ:
+ if (secure || !(hcr_el2 & HCR_FMO) || (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE)) {
+ /* VFIQs are only taken when hypervized and non-secure. */
+ return false;
+ }
+ return !(env->daif & PSTATE_F);
+ case EXCP_VIRQ:
+ if (secure || !(hcr_el2 & HCR_IMO) || (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE)) {
+ /* VIRQs are only taken when hypervized and non-secure. */
+ return false;
+ }
+ return !(env->daif & PSTATE_I);
+ default:
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Use the target EL, current execution state and SCR/HCR settings to
+ * determine whether the corresponding CPSR bit is used to mask the
+ * interrupt.
+ */
+ if ((target_el > cur_el) && (target_el != 1)) {
+ /* Exceptions targeting a higher EL may not be maskable */
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_AARCH64)) {
+ /*
+ * 64-bit masking rules are simple: exceptions to EL3
+ * can't be masked, and exceptions to EL2 can only be
+ * masked from Secure state. The HCR and SCR settings
+ * don't affect the masking logic, only the interrupt routing.
+ */
+ if (target_el == 3 || !secure) {
+ unmasked = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The old 32-bit-only environment has a more complicated
+ * masking setup. HCR and SCR bits not only affect interrupt
+ * routing but also change the behaviour of masking.
+ */
+ bool hcr, scr;
+
+ switch (excp_idx) {
+ case EXCP_FIQ:
+ /*
+ * If FIQs are routed to EL3 or EL2 then there are cases where
+ * we override the CPSR.F in determining if the exception is
+ * masked or not. If neither of these are set then we fall back
+ * to the CPSR.F setting otherwise we further assess the state
+ * below.
+ */
+ hcr = hcr_el2 & HCR_FMO;
+ scr = (env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_FIQ);
+
+ /*
+ * When EL3 is 32-bit, the SCR.FW bit controls whether the
+ * CPSR.F bit masks FIQ interrupts when taken in non-secure
+ * state. If SCR.FW is set then FIQs can be masked by CPSR.F
+ * when non-secure but only when FIQs are only routed to EL3.
+ */
+ scr = scr && !((env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_FW) && !hcr);
+ break;
+ case EXCP_IRQ:
+ /*
+ * When EL3 execution state is 32-bit, if HCR.IMO is set then
+ * we may override the CPSR.I masking when in non-secure state.
+ * The SCR.IRQ setting has already been taken into consideration
+ * when setting the target EL, so it does not have a further
+ * affect here.
+ */
+ hcr = hcr_el2 & HCR_IMO;
+ scr = false;
+ break;
+ default:
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+ }
+
+ if ((scr || hcr) && !secure) {
+ unmasked = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The PSTATE bits only mask the interrupt if we have not overriden the
+ * ability above.
+ */
+ return unmasked || pstate_unmasked;
+}
+
bool arm_cpu_exec_interrupt(CPUState *cs, int interrupt_request)
{
CPUClass *cc = CPU_GET_CLASS(cs);
--
2.20.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-07 14:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-07 14:32 [PULL 00/48] target-arm queue Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:32 ` [PULL 01/48] target/arm/monitor: query-cpu-model-expansion crashed qemu when using machine type none Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:32 ` [PULL 02/48] target/arm: Define isar_feature_aa64_vh Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:32 ` [PULL 03/48] target/arm: Enable HCR_E2H for VHE Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:32 ` [PULL 04/48] target/arm: Add CONTEXTIDR_EL2 Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 05/48] target/arm: Add TTBR1_EL2 Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 06/48] target/arm: Update CNTVCT_EL0 for VHE Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 07/48] target/arm: Split out vae1_tlbmask Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 08/48] target/arm: Split out alle1_tlbmask Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 09/48] target/arm: Simplify tlb_force_broadcast alternatives Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 10/48] target/arm: Rename ARMMMUIdx*_S12NSE* to ARMMMUIdx*_E10_* Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 11/48] target/arm: Rename ARMMMUIdx_S2NS to ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 12/48] target/arm: Rename ARMMMUIdx_S1NSE* to ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E* Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 13/48] target/arm: Rename ARMMMUIdx_S1SE[01] to ARMMMUIdx_SE10_[01] Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 14/48] target/arm: Rename ARMMMUIdx*_S1E3 to ARMMMUIdx*_SE3 Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 15/48] target/arm: Rename ARMMMUIdx_S1E2 to ARMMMUIdx_E2 Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 16/48] target/arm: Recover 4 bits from TBFLAGs Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 17/48] target/arm: Expand TBFLAG_ANY.MMUIDX to 4 bits Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 18/48] target/arm: Rearrange ARMMMUIdxBit Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 19/48] target/arm: Tidy ARMMMUIdx m-profile definitions Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 20/48] target/arm: Reorganize ARMMMUIdx Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 21/48] target/arm: Add regime_has_2_ranges Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 22/48] target/arm: Update arm_mmu_idx for VHE Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 23/48] target/arm: Update arm_sctlr " Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 24/48] target/arm: Update aa64_zva_access for EL2 Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 25/48] target/arm: Update ctr_el0_access " Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 26/48] target/arm: Add the hypervisor virtual counter Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 27/48] target/arm: Update timer access for VHE Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 28/48] target/arm: Update define_one_arm_cp_reg_with_opaque " Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 29/48] target/arm: Add VHE system register redirection and aliasing Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 30/48] target/arm: Add VHE timer " Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 31/48] target/arm: Flush tlb for ASID changes in EL2&0 translation regime Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 32/48] target/arm: Flush tlbs for E2&0 " Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 33/48] target/arm: Update arm_phys_excp_target_el for TGE Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 34/48] target/arm: Update {fp,sve}_exception_el for VHE Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 35/48] target/arm: check TGE and E2H flags for EL0 pauth traps Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 36/48] target/arm: Update get_a64_user_mem_index for VHE Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 37/48] target/arm: Update arm_cpu_do_interrupt_aarch64 " Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 38/48] target/arm: Enable ARMv8.1-VHE in -cpu max Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` Peter Maydell [this message]
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 40/48] target/arm: Pass more cpu state to arm_excp_unmasked Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 41/48] target/arm: Use bool for unmasked in arm_excp_unmasked Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 42/48] target/arm: Raise only one interrupt in arm_cpu_exec_interrupt Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 43/48] bcm2835_dma: Fix the ylen loop in TD mode Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 44/48] bcm2835_dma: Re-initialize xlen " Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 45/48] docs/arm-cpu-features: Make kvm-no-adjvtime comment clearer Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 46/48] armv7m_systick: delay timer_new to avoid memleaks Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 47/48] stm32f2xx_timer: " Peter Maydell
2020-02-07 14:33 ` [PULL 48/48] stellaris: " Peter Maydell
2020-02-10 12:06 ` [PULL 00/48] target-arm queue Peter Maydell
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