From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Cc: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>,
qemu-block@nongnu.org, John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>,
Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 07/14] block/crypto: implement the encryption key management
Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 15:14:18 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200514141418.GJ1280939@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1413abb3-f226-5ecc-3ea9-3dd945a134ed@redhat.com>
On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 04:09:59PM +0200, Max Reitz wrote:
> On 10.05.20 15:40, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> > This implements the encryption key management using the generic code in
> > qcrypto layer and exposes it to the user via qemu-img
> >
> > This code adds another 'write_func' because the initialization
> > write_func works directly on the underlying file, and amend
> > works on instance of luks device.
> >
> > This commit also adds a 'hack/workaround' I and Kevin Wolf (thanks)
> > made to make the driver both support write sharing (to avoid breaking the users),
> > and be safe against concurrent metadata update (the keyslots)
> >
> > Eventually the write sharing for luks driver will be deprecated
> > and removed together with this hack.
> >
> > The hack is that we ask (as a format driver) for BLK_PERM_CONSISTENT_READ
> > and then when we want to update the keys, we unshare that permission.
> > So if someone else has the image open, even readonly, encryption
> > key update will fail gracefully.
> >
> > Also thanks to Daniel Berrange for the idea of
> > unsharing read, rather that write permission which allows
> > to avoid cases when the other user had opened the image read-only.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > block/crypto.c | 127 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > block/crypto.h | 34 +++++++++++++
> > 2 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/block/crypto.c b/block/crypto.c
> > index 2e16b62bdc..b14cb0ff06 100644
> > --- a/block/crypto.c
> > +++ b/block/crypto.c
>
> [...]
>
> > +static void
> > +block_crypto_child_perms(BlockDriverState *bs, BdrvChild *c,
> > + const BdrvChildRole *role,
> > + BlockReopenQueue *reopen_queue,
> > + uint64_t perm, uint64_t shared,
> > + uint64_t *nperm, uint64_t *nshared)
> > +{
> > +
> > + BlockCrypto *crypto = bs->opaque;
> > +
> > + bdrv_filter_default_perms(bs, c, role, reopen_queue,
> > + perm, shared, nperm, nshared);
> > + /*
> > + * Ask for consistent read permission so that if
> > + * someone else tries to open this image with this permission
> > + * neither will be able to edit encryption keys, since
> > + * we will unshare that permission while trying to
> > + * update the encryption keys
> > + */
> > + if (!(bs->open_flags & BDRV_O_NO_IO)) {
> > + *nperm |= BLK_PERM_CONSISTENT_READ;
> > + }
>
> I’m not sure this is important, because this really means we won’t do
> I/O. Its only relevant use in this case is for qemu-img info. Do we
> really care if someone edits the key slots while qemu-img info is
> processing?
FWIW, OpenStack runs qemu-img info in a periodic background job, so
it can be concurrent with anything else they are running. Having said
that due to previous QEMU bugs, they unconditonally pass the arg to
qemu-img to explicitly disable locking
Regards,
Daniel
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-14 14:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-10 13:40 [PATCH v6 00/14] LUKS: encryption slot management using amend interface Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 01/14] qcrypto/core: add generic infrastructure for crypto options amendment Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 02/14] qcrypto/luks: implement encryption key management Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-14 11:56 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-17 8:13 ` Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 03/14] block/amend: add 'force' option Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-14 12:18 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-17 8:15 ` Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 04/14] block/amend: separate amend and create options for qemu-img Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-14 12:28 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-14 16:10 ` Eric Blake
2020-05-15 6:22 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-15 17:24 ` Eric Blake
2020-05-17 8:47 ` Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-17 8:54 ` Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 05/14] block/amend: refactor qcow2 amend options Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-14 13:36 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-17 17:52 ` Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 06/14] block/crypto: rename two functions Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 07/14] block/crypto: implement the encryption key management Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-14 14:09 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-14 14:14 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2020-05-14 14:32 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-17 17:56 ` Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 08/14] block/qcow2: extend qemu-img amend interface with crypto options Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-14 14:30 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-17 18:03 ` Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 09/14] iotests: filter few more luks specific create options Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-14 14:49 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-17 18:50 ` Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 10/14] iotests: qemu-img tests for luks key management Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 11/14] block/core: add generic infrastructure for x-blockdev-amend qmp command Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-14 15:47 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-18 10:48 ` Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 12/14] block/crypto: implement blockdev-amend Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-14 16:05 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 13/14] block/qcow2: " Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-14 16:05 ` Max Reitz
2020-05-10 13:40 ` [PATCH v6 14/14] iotests: add tests for blockdev-amend Maxim Levitsky
2020-05-10 14:37 ` [PATCH v6 00/14] LUKS: encryption slot management using amend interface no-reply
2020-05-10 15:14 ` no-reply
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