From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3CADAC433DF for ; Mon, 1 Jun 2020 09:17:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F35AE206E2 for ; Mon, 1 Jun 2020 09:17:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="BcPY4l0D" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org F35AE206E2 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:55548 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jfgZV-0006Mk-4h for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Mon, 01 Jun 2020 05:17:29 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:58100) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jfgYe-0005Mo-8U for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 01 Jun 2020 05:16:36 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com ([207.211.31.120]:48535 helo=us-smtp-1.mimecast.com) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jfgYd-00043d-98 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 01 Jun 2020 05:16:35 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1591002993; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=0Wd9igXbzydG2FapnoJya+QCDVjj2Ujw2KrJzi5Gj9E=; b=BcPY4l0DmJCRVSuEI5NzO5NYi7rub8uuNCbAmB2Y0BC9i6bqZH4u5Nw0DwVXuyu2lzCoRr hsSWBGzDFSl4C8jQDooX84/+so8NYht5bS2OJzrri33KVpkx5PcuN4eWdIRC3JR56c54qP 9HsO25eZj6YP7SDx0U2j7ovGo8hqKBs= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-307-DxNkUf26OiCA4Azbb0arTw-1; Mon, 01 Jun 2020 05:16:30 -0400 X-MC-Unique: DxNkUf26OiCA4Azbb0arTw-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx06.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 33292800053; Mon, 1 Jun 2020 09:16:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from work-vm (ovpn-113-144.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.113.144]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2D68E5C1B2; Mon, 1 Jun 2020 09:16:20 +0000 (UTC) Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 10:16:18 +0100 From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" To: Sean Christopherson Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection Message-ID: <20200601091618.GC2743@work-vm> References: <20200521034304.340040-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20200529221926.GA3168@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200529221926.GA3168@linux.intel.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.13.4 (2020-02-15) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.16 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=207.211.31.120; envelope-from=dgilbert@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-1.mimecast.com X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: First seen = 2020/06/01 02:19:57 X-ACL-Warn: Detected OS = Linux 2.2.x-3.x [generic] [fuzzy] X-Spam_score_int: -20 X-Spam_score: -2.1 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.1 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_HK_NAME_DR=0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001 autolearn=_AUTOLEARN X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" , cohuck@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Eduardo Habkost , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini , Richard Henderson , David Gibson Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" * Sean Christopherson (sean.j.christopherson@intel.com) wrote: > On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 01:42:46PM +1000, David Gibson wrote: > > A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the > > hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order > > to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. > > > > AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has > > its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism > > to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection > > level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected > > execution environment. > > > > The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each > > platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem > > ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. > > > > AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option > > "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other > > than SEV. > > > > This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration > > for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's > > "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a > > "guest-memory-protection" property pointing to a platform specific > > object which configures and manages the specific details. > > > > For now this series covers just AMD SEV and POWER PEF. I'm hoping it > > can be extended to cover the Intel and s390 mechanisms as well, > > though. > > > > Note: I'm using the term "guest memory protection" throughout to refer > > to mechanisms like this. I don't particular like the term, it's both > > long and not really precise. If someone can think of a succinct way > > of saying "a means of protecting guest memory from a possibly > > compromised hypervisor", I'd be grateful for the suggestion. > > Many of the features are also going far beyond just protecting memory, so > even the "memory" part feels wrong. Maybe something like protected-guest > or secure-guest? > > A little imprecision isn't necessarily a bad thing, e.g. memory-encryption > is quite precise, but also wrong once it encompasses anything beyond plain > old encryption. The common thread I think is 'untrusted host' - but I don't know of a better way to describe that. Dave -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK