From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Yi Ren" <c4tren@gmail.com>,
"QEMU Developers" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
"Gerd Hoffmann" <kraxel@redhat.com>,
"Ren Ding" <rding@gatech.edu>,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>,
"Hanqing Zhao" <hanqing@gatech.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] ait-vga: check address before reading configuration bytes
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 05:40:29 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200604053924-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <nycvar.YSQ.7.77.849.2006041445530.30592@xnncv>
On Thu, Jun 04, 2020 at 02:48:59PM +0530, P J P wrote:
> Hello Phil,
>
> +-- On Thu, 4 Jun 2020, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote --+
> | >> @@ -1381,6 +1381,8 @@ uint32_t pci_default_read_config(PCIDevice *d,
> | >> +Â Â Â assert(address + len <= pci_config_size(d));
> |
> | Yes, maybe I was not clear while reviewing v1, we need to audit the
> | callers and fix them first, then we can safely add the assert here.
>
> That's an elaborate task. Could we please make that into another patch series?
So let's make this a separate patch as defence in depth in case
there are more bugs somewhere. Patch 1 is a CVE fix. Patch 2
is not.
> +-- On Thu, 4 Jun 2020, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote --+
> | On Thu, Jun 04, 2020 at 01:52:50AM +0530, P J P wrote:
> | > While reading PCI configuration bytes, a guest may send an
> | > address towards the end of the configuration space. It may lead
> | > to an OOB access issue. Add check to ensure 'address + size' is
> | > within PCI configuration space.
> |
> | Please include a CVE number for this security flaw if there is
> | one.
>
> Yes. For now I'll send a revised patch to fix this ati-vga OOB access issue.
>
> Thank you.
> --
> Prasad J Pandit / Red Hat Product Security Team
> 8685 545E B54C 486B C6EB 271E E285 8B5A F050 DE8D
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-04 9:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-03 20:22 [PATCH v2 0/2] Ensure PCI configuration access is within bounds P J P
2020-06-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] ait-vga: check address before reading configuration bytes P J P
2020-06-03 21:58 ` BALATON Zoltan
2020-06-04 8:43 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-06-04 9:18 ` P J P
2020-06-04 9:40 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2020-06-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] pci: ensure configuration access is within bounds P J P
2020-06-03 22:13 ` BALATON Zoltan
2020-06-04 5:14 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2020-06-04 9:44 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-04 5:31 ` P J P
2020-06-04 6:07 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-04 9:41 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-04 11:37 ` BALATON Zoltan
2020-06-04 11:40 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-04 11:49 ` BALATON Zoltan
2020-06-04 11:58 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-04 12:14 ` BALATON Zoltan
2020-06-04 14:11 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-04 9:10 ` Peter Maydell
2020-06-04 9:35 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-04 9:38 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
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