From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 17344C433DF for ; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 05:53:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D5BD420709 for ; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 05:53:53 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=gibson.dropbear.id.au header.i=@gibson.dropbear.id.au header.b="g6i56Vsc" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org D5BD420709 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=gibson.dropbear.id.au Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:43806 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1joKpd-0001aC-4H for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 01:53:53 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:33434) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1joKjf-0000kn-Lb; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 01:47:43 -0400 Received: from ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:41177) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1joKjd-0004VB-HF; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 01:47:43 -0400 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 49spv50fKWz9sTC; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 15:47:28 +1000 (AEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1593064049; bh=EEmTbZZVcmzkrdOgtIVLfWGut2RQOlCho8VlMoYE5zc=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=g6i56VscgZX7GjhhX4rwun/gt9BfGwz8rULD0Of1Yem9eSAGCD3JRxQRsSr5sVy/g X9Ep7Sk9lIPTiKxUZL+a6lanNLJh4cSOHUNYI7ik7dCI2AkjbPRa7XZvj+MwgsOSWU XyIoT5MaDytwjMhjY9W3lO6E4vtXtMHY8Glrh7T0= Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 15:47:23 +1000 From: David Gibson To: Cornelia Huck Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models Message-ID: <20200625054723.GG172395@umbus.fritz.box> References: <20200619020602.118306-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <2fa7c84a-6929-ef04-1d61-f76a4cac35f5@de.ibm.com> <20200624090648.6bdf82bd.cohuck@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="Fnm8lRGFTVS/3GuM" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200624090648.6bdf82bd.cohuck@redhat.com> Received-SPF: pass client-ip=203.11.71.1; envelope-from=dgibson@ozlabs.org; helo=ozlabs.org X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: First seen = 2020/06/24 22:09:21 X-ACL-Warn: Detected OS = Linux 2.2.x-3.x [generic] X-Spam_score_int: -9 X-Spam_score: -1.0 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.0 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=1, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001 autolearn=_AUTOLEARN X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com, david@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, dgilbert@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, Christian Borntraeger , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, Richard Henderson , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Eduardo Habkost Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" --Fnm8lRGFTVS/3GuM Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Wed, Jun 24, 2020 at 09:06:48AM +0200, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Mon, 22 Jun 2020 16:27:28 +0200 > Christian Borntraeger wrote: >=20 > > On 19.06.20 04:05, David Gibson wrote: > > > A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the > > > hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order > > > to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. > > >=20 > > > AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has > > > its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism > > > to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection > > > level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected > > > execution environment. > > >=20 > > > The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each > > > platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem > > > ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. > > >=20 > > > AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option > > > "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other > > > than SEV. > > >=20 > > > This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration > > > for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's > > > "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a > > > "host-trust-limitation" property pointing to a platform specific > > > object which configures and manages the specific details. > > >=20 > > > For now this series covers just AMD SEV and POWER PEF. I'm hoping it > > > can be extended to cover the Intel and s390 mechanisms as well, > > > though. =20 > >=20 > > Let me try to summarize what I understand what you try to achieve: > > one command line parameter for all platforms that=20 > >=20 > > common across all platforms: > > - disable KSM > > - by default enables iommu_platform > >=20 > >=20 > > per platform: > > - setup the necessary encryption scheme when appropriate > > - block migration > > -.... > >=20 > >=20 > > The tricky part is certainly the per platform thing. For example on > > s390 we just have a cpumodel flag that provides interfaces to the guest > > to switch into protected mode via the ultravisor. This works perfectly > > fine with the host model, so no need to configure anything. The platfo= rm > > code then disables KSM _on_switchover_ and not in general. Because the= =20 > > guest CAN switch into protected, but it does not have to. > >=20 > > So this feels really hard to do right. Would a virtual BoF on KVM forum > > be too late? We had a BoF on protected guests last year and that was > > valuable. >=20 > Maybe we can do some kind of call to discuss this earlier? (Maybe in > the KVM call slot on Tuesdays?) I think it would be really helpful if > everybody would have at least a general understanding about how > encryption/protection works on the different architectures. Yes, I think this would be a good idea. KVM Forum is probably later than we want, plus since it is virtual, I probably won't be shifting into the right timezone to attend much of it. I don't know when that Tuesday KVM call is. Generally the best available time for Australia/Europe meetings this time of year is 9am CET / 5pm AEST. As a once off I could go somewhat later into my evening, though. --=20 David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_ | _way_ _around_! http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson --Fnm8lRGFTVS/3GuM Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEdfRlhq5hpmzETofcbDjKyiDZs5IFAl70OmsACgkQbDjKyiDZ s5LT1A/+IwaLiZZ3b7YhAaur+c0t0DHFTO6Kc2RYpqJrHL1qEhm794BeLB7FyFzb mi1sQs3TzS3fXAzO3Smjd3hJLDXTdz6Ffi8efAI/ftRxzi2Llhd9qaO8u8y+d1Kg dziTxoe9doUU4Y2WNz+cNKxcNYC/+N3Zv7WurDuQ0lutKs1YE3NN7wcebiZf4RRv aL1XIyHpBRe827Om1gsNBICkFxzvkXk0vg8IO5KttISNEUMMJly5JC9szcCOTX6h x1DUKdWS/JK3YNc2M7PN5rwupy1ws9iW9LEIyWwAQXHU7PL3MVrHTUjOJNlhGxUl tPsPL+SteLhhgmwQVxB3D2WskmJsJ2i37e7TzlbCaZXiO3eiBvz+6pQQ1LVz2/++ bdlHNKlLl7iaHjnIaUtqgamCCy4AXnPJI83IuQGY9spdJHd4PMrqDBiPo3m2xSe3 U4C3KD+Bz5LsfqACaN8HGr91QrIAXIE3ajUf6zqHuTdP9BUeps9rArV64cJ/vhYE I86ixvvO0Bfyy9eu0AXtG+rupjLvFdF9mWhQ8kIK98+QXYCh8FuN8OEZ6A+eAT04 pRlRFqyx5AJy2CHW1ik0XEw68jY/A404+N5b4GABMjDxdQ0C52j5xDQiuycTUkGJ vAjWg8x2UrQP3v7qmunRTQnDY6X2pfXbPetCJftbv9ZDQ86UevA= =CtJc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --Fnm8lRGFTVS/3GuM--