From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E883C433DF for ; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 05:51:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 08F3120709 for ; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 05:51:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=gibson.dropbear.id.au header.i=@gibson.dropbear.id.au header.b="hFF+QDfX" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 08F3120709 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=gibson.dropbear.id.au Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:35180 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1joKnG-0006Sh-8m for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 01:51:26 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:33656) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1joKkI-0001oU-Je; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 01:48:22 -0400 Received: from ozlabs.org ([2401:3900:2:1::2]:52493) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1joKkG-0004hD-NR; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 01:48:22 -0400 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 49spw14jNRz9sSt; Thu, 25 Jun 2020 15:48:17 +1000 (AEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1593064097; bh=NJ28wOH7hosAT259+yC/BIdJrW+PJTn7qShwkkuzS4U=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=hFF+QDfXJgw5xoEaDG9aH69IFgyYnxCRTdA+4yJdqkfUcwyq+xg+0EURZgQYn9EV/ +nL9bSiET9vcwRJVZGtWBoug8XO4LlmzKiBQ/ogZNxe5kt+uNGiL/p8GN73JluUrNo 1nBhxPGNm7zXXW5p/bFPET1VdHID88IMmKvDaqkA= Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 15:48:09 +1000 From: David Gibson To: Cornelia Huck Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models Message-ID: <20200625054809.GH172395@umbus.fritz.box> References: <20200619020602.118306-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <2fa7c84a-6929-ef04-1d61-f76a4cac35f5@de.ibm.com> <20200624090648.6bdf82bd.cohuck@redhat.com> <20200625054723.GG172395@umbus.fritz.box> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="Hlh2aiwFLCZwGcpw" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200625054723.GG172395@umbus.fritz.box> Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2401:3900:2:1::2; envelope-from=dgibson@ozlabs.org; helo=ozlabs.org X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: No matching host in p0f cache. That's all we know. X-Spam_score_int: -9 X-Spam_score: -1.0 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.0 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=1, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001 autolearn=_AUTOLEARN X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com, david@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, dgilbert@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, Christian Borntraeger , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, Richard Henderson , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Eduardo Habkost Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" --Hlh2aiwFLCZwGcpw Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 03:47:23PM +1000, David Gibson wrote: > On Wed, Jun 24, 2020 at 09:06:48AM +0200, Cornelia Huck wrote: > > On Mon, 22 Jun 2020 16:27:28 +0200 > > Christian Borntraeger wrote: > >=20 > > > On 19.06.20 04:05, David Gibson wrote: > > > > A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby = the > > > > hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order > > > > to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. > > > >=20 > > > > AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel = has > > > > its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechani= sm > > > > to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection > > > > level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected > > > > execution environment. > > > >=20 > > > > The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each > > > > platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't s= eem > > > > ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. > > > >=20 > > > > AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option > > > > "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other > > > > than SEV. > > > >=20 > > > > This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration > > > > for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's > > > > "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a > > > > "host-trust-limitation" property pointing to a platform specific > > > > object which configures and manages the specific details. > > > >=20 > > > > For now this series covers just AMD SEV and POWER PEF. I'm hoping = it > > > > can be extended to cover the Intel and s390 mechanisms as well, > > > > though. =20 > > >=20 > > > Let me try to summarize what I understand what you try to achieve: > > > one command line parameter for all platforms that=20 > > >=20 > > > common across all platforms: > > > - disable KSM > > > - by default enables iommu_platform > > >=20 > > >=20 > > > per platform: > > > - setup the necessary encryption scheme when appropriate > > > - block migration > > > -.... > > >=20 > > >=20 > > > The tricky part is certainly the per platform thing. For example on > > > s390 we just have a cpumodel flag that provides interfaces to the gue= st > > > to switch into protected mode via the ultravisor. This works perfectly > > > fine with the host model, so no need to configure anything. The plat= form > > > code then disables KSM _on_switchover_ and not in general. Because th= e=20 > > > guest CAN switch into protected, but it does not have to. > > >=20 > > > So this feels really hard to do right. Would a virtual BoF on KVM for= um > > > be too late? We had a BoF on protected guests last year and that was > > > valuable. > >=20 > > Maybe we can do some kind of call to discuss this earlier? (Maybe in > > the KVM call slot on Tuesdays?) I think it would be really helpful if > > everybody would have at least a general understanding about how > > encryption/protection works on the different architectures. >=20 > Yes, I think this would be a good idea. KVM Forum is probably later > than we want, plus since it is virtual, I probably won't be shifting > into the right timezone to attend much of it. >=20 > I don't know when that Tuesday KVM call is. Generally the best > available time for Australia/Europe meetings this time of year is 9am > CET / 5pm AEST. As a once off I could go somewhat later into my > evening, though. Oh.. plus I'm on holiday next week and the one after (27 Jun - 12 Jul). --=20 David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_ | _way_ _around_! http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson --Hlh2aiwFLCZwGcpw Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEdfRlhq5hpmzETofcbDjKyiDZs5IFAl70OpkACgkQbDjKyiDZ s5IeyRAAwVEArjMO0O/eMYFSBMS46vT0Xspoz5OiR9m897fYy5ZzN2MNjgzSSCU4 IUDAgStKS/X2GkToNDl9nyn3VHZB7X6zuS9wfbCrdBg4ZY1snVcPZlT/QIFvTV2g keNXzW7Qb40nWFFxI+4tWglwPmXv8+npvbtPXxZhTaukbX+P+FDEdUAWz9mqjDN7 IW0uk2EqE6ZwjxVLcKhGAqVQktrduQTzqjmqFBoDraLxM8OQwaH96XPd+cnFvQKL h13g6sX1olxGHx2HYCpuCrCjORmSMBkn5HeteqmA16XxsLZgetDg7xvK1GZvj10R DXaWsjjif72PUhxpItzv/C4+uk2UC29ZVajKPZig09oHaUUROS2+BYCYzTtcBs0n 06p0uDpJKHfDgXEBK44o5yS6Fr5Pk3jBOPnZaMrkzwVIJhuGoh2yV/tOmjm5kGay ElHFWuNqnX+Fm/H1usCPs2xIHjN5lOuggPwNdt1a94EginlLy4K7aHU7n7zvUu2G hZ7vFalOUt50ELWiiEPpvr/lJoqivX6cOuEU1SQCAbfEjkVhD6d6++DBm1snw/WQ DmU6XoturVHY1xQzog34NHTfUym7nQ7g1v1JsGFGS66cAxXW/4TMcVGTu8I16Q/W sFcXSZQCfcZIWpE+g14e8ngEMxSUSL3MqwezCJe339EQemVmocY= =pFq4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --Hlh2aiwFLCZwGcpw--