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From: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
To: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
	Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
	Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	QEMU Developers <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
	Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>,
	Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>, Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>,
	Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 15:48:56 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200714134856.GC5120@linux.fritz.box> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200714133021.GF25187@redhat.com>

Am 14.07.2020 um 15:30 hat Daniel P. Berrangé geschrieben:
> On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 07:02:59AM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 11:22:28AM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote:
> > > On Tue, 14 Jul 2020 at 11:12, Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > > And for people who want to build QEMU with lots of functionality (like
> > > > Fedora does), I think a -security flag would be a useful addition.
> > > > We can then tell security researchers "only a high security issue
> > > > if it reproduces with -security=high, only a security issue
> > > > if it reproduces with -security=low".
> > > 
> > > I think a -security option would also be useful to users -- it
> > > makes it easier for them to check "is this configuration using
> > > something that I didn't realize was not intended to be secure".
> > > For me, something useful for our users is much more compelling
> > > than "this might make security researchers' lives a bit easier".
> > > 
> > > thanks
> > > -- PMM
> > 
> > True. And I guess downstreams can also force the option to high or set the
> > default to high rather easily if they want to.
> > 
> > So the option would be:
> > 
> > -security level
> > 	Set minimal required security level of QEMU.
> > 
> > 	high: block use of QEMU functionality which is intended to be secure against
> > 		malicious guests.
> > 	low: allow use of all QEMU functionality, best effort security
> > 		against malicious guests.
> > 
> > Default would be -security low.
> > 
> > Does this look reasonable?
> 
> The challenge I see is that wiring up a runtime flag into every relevant
> part of the QEMU codebase is an pretty large amount of work. Every device,
> every machine type, every backend type, every generic subsystem will all
> need checks for this flag. It is possible, but it isn't going to be quick
> or easy, especially with poor error reporting support in many areas.

Would it make more sense as a configure flag that decides whether or not
to compile in potentially problematic devices/backends?

Kevin



  reply	other threads:[~2020-07-14 13:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-14  8:36 [PATCH 0/1] MAINTAINERS: add security quotient field P J P
2020-07-14  8:36 ` [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or " P J P
2020-07-14  9:42   ` Peter Maydell
2020-07-14  9:52     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 10:12       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-07-14 10:22         ` Peter Maydell
2020-07-14 11:02           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-07-14 13:10             ` P J P
2020-07-16  6:55               ` Cornelia Huck
2020-07-16  8:36                 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16  9:21                   ` P J P
2020-07-16  9:39                     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16  9:45                     ` Christian Schoenebeck
2020-07-16 10:01                       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 12:22                         ` Christian Schoenebeck
2020-07-16 12:54                           ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 13:30             ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 13:48               ` Kevin Wolf [this message]
2020-07-14 13:56                 ` Thomas Huth
2020-07-14 15:04                   ` Christian Schoenebeck
2020-07-14 14:02                 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 10:18   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-07-14 11:51   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-07-16  8:56   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-16  9:44     ` P J P
2020-07-16 10:09       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 10:43         ` Markus Armbruster
2020-07-14  9:46 ` [PATCH 0/1] MAINTAINERS: add " Michael S. Tsirkin

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