From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.3 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB810C433E0 for ; Thu, 16 Jul 2020 12:55:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A4B2620739 for ; Thu, 16 Jul 2020 12:55:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="evq2dHmh" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org A4B2620739 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:42440 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jw3Py-0001FJ-VX for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Thu, 16 Jul 2020 08:55:18 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:43972) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jw3PK-0000p1-Ss for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 16 Jul 2020 08:54:38 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com ([205.139.110.120]:25064 helo=us-smtp-1.mimecast.com) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jw3PH-0005dS-TQ for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 16 Jul 2020 08:54:38 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1594904074; h=from:from:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=wyRiOpViw1Q5Akmp/w8Hi4Jxr7h5dB/9IiTn5x3FA8A=; b=evq2dHmh/V1ly+TdT3iyJ91Rp5ant3l6f4vGZxWcblVwm3h7hJfPBMdYJ1aAv18Rx+jYf6 Fb4iulocULGaWHfkkcEoilMq904UD5aNPJllE6OZZDbsmLbk1FVxzfunSUcFrgSs5hnKea 5UnjHRN1WU8DUOFFPZtagH4Ya6vOjiw= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-346-MRi14MpZN6W2QzN9IIdU6Q-1; Thu, 16 Jul 2020 08:54:18 -0400 X-MC-Unique: MRi14MpZN6W2QzN9IIdU6Q-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx04.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 64CBBC746B; Thu, 16 Jul 2020 12:54:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from redhat.com (unknown [10.36.110.42]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A7B1E78A52; Thu, 16 Jul 2020 12:54:07 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2020 13:54:04 +0100 From: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= To: Christian Schoenebeck Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field Message-ID: <20200716125404.GQ227735@redhat.com> References: <20200714083631.888605-1-ppandit@redhat.com> <3491260.5YPxQhmjAg@silver> <20200716100157.GK227735@redhat.com> <5717837.yeCYy4G0CH@silver> MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <5717837.yeCYy4G0CH@silver> User-Agent: Mutt/1.14.5 (2020-06-23) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.14 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Disposition: inline Received-SPF: pass client-ip=205.139.110.120; envelope-from=berrange@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-1.mimecast.com X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: First seen = 2020/07/15 19:36:06 X-ACL-Warn: Detected OS = Linux 2.2.x-3.x [generic] [fuzzy] X-Spam_score_int: -40 X-Spam_score: -4.1 X-Spam_bar: ---- X-Spam_report: (-4.1 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-1, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Reply-To: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= Cc: Kevin Wolf , Peter Maydell , Stefano Stabellini , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Cornelia Huck , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Michael Roth , Greg Kurz , Stefan Hajnoczi , Paolo Bonzini , P J P , Philippe =?utf-8?Q?Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 02:22:14PM +0200, Christian Schoenebeck wrote: > On Donnerstag, 16. Juli 2020 12:01:57 CEST Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > My concern here is that just distinguishing between either 'low' or 'high' > > > is a far too rough classification. > > > > > > In our preceding communication regarding 9pfs, I made clear that a) we do > > > care about security relevant 9pfs issues, and only b) the avarage use > > > cases (as far we know) for 9pfs are above a certain trust level. > > > > > > However b) does not imply 9pfs being 'unsafe', nor that we want users to > > > refrain using it in a security relevant environment. So 9pfs would > > > actually be somewhere in between. > > > > We shouldn't overthink this and invent many classification levels. > > > > This is essentially about distinguishing code that is written with the > > intent of protecting from a malicous guest, from code that assumes a > > non-malicious guest. That is a pretty clear demarcation on when it is > > reasonable to use any given feature in QEMU. > > > > Within the set of code that is assuming a malicious guest, there are > > still going to be varying levels of quality, and that is ok. We don't > > need to express that programatically, the docs are still there to > > describe the fine nuances of any given feature. We're just saying that > > in general, this set of code is acceptable to use in combination with > > a malicious guest, and if you find bugs we'll triage them as security > > flaws. > > Yes, that would be a base consideration for any security classification. And > it applies to 9pfs hence it would suggest 'high' for 9pfs, but ... > > > 9p is generally written from the POV of protecting against a malicious > > guest, so it would be considered part of the high security set, and > > flaws will be treated as CVEs. We don't need to be break it down into > > any more detail than that. > > ... this is where it already differs from reality, as 9pfs security issues > were both handled as CVEs as well as normal reports for years, which nobody > objected. Even if something is classified as "high", we still have the freedom to decide whether each specific issue is worthy of a CVE or not. > So I wonder how helpful it would be trying to either put 9pfs into either > 'high' or 'low', because another observed problematic with 9pfs is that the > degree of participation is so low, that if you try to impose certain formal > minimum requirements to contributors, you usually never hear from them again. > > And BTW Prasad actually suggested the opposite classification: I don't personally mind whether 9p is classified high or low. It is really upto the maintainers to decide which classification best fits. I'm just saying that I think the simple binary choice is sufficient for our needs. Regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|