qemu-devel.nongnu.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: virtio-fs@redhat.com, vromanso@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	rmohr@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH for-5.1 2/3] virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o chroot sandboxing option
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2020 17:58:11 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200722165811.GT2324845@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200722130206.224898-3-stefanha@redhat.com>

On Wed, Jul 22, 2020 at 02:02:05PM +0100, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> virtiofsd cannot run in an unprivileged container because CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> is required to create namespaces.
> 
> Introduce a weaker sandbox that is sufficient in container environments
> because the container runtime already sets up namespaces. Use chroot to
> restrict path traversal to the shared directory.
> 
> virtiofsd loses the following:
> 
> 1. Mount namespace. The process chroots to the shared directory but
>    leaves the mounts in place. Seccomp rejects mount(2)/umount(2)
>    syscalls.
> 
> 2. Pid namespace. This should be fine because virtiofsd is the only
>    process running in the container.
> 
> 3. Network namespace. This should be fine because seccomp already
>    rejects the connect(2) syscall, but an additional layer of security
>    is lost. Container runtime-specific network security policies can be
>    used drop network traffic (except for the vhost-user UNIX domain
>    socket).

IIUC this relies on the fact that the container will still have 
CAP_SYS_CHROOT IOW, we still don't have a solution for running
virtiofsd as an unprivileged user.

Bearing in mind possibly need for future improvements to handle
unprivileged users....

> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
> ---
>  tools/virtiofsd/helper.c         |  3 +++
>  tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c b/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c
> index 3105b6c23a..7421c9ca1a 100644
> --- a/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c
> +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c
> @@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ void fuse_cmdline_help(void)
>             "    -o cache=<mode>            cache mode. could be one of \"auto, "
>             "always, none\"\n"
>             "                               default: auto\n"
> +           "    -o chroot|no_chroot        use container-friendly chroot instead\n"
> +           "                               of stronger mount namespace sandbox\n"
> +           "                               default: false\n"

A simple boolean like this feels like it lacks future-proofing.

Should we have an option that takes an enumerated arg string:

   -o sandbox=[namespace|chroot|....]

so we can add more options later with the same syntax.


Regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|



  reply	other threads:[~2020-07-22 17:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-22 13:02 [PATCH for-5.1 0/3] virtiofsd: allow virtiofsd to run in a container Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 13:02 ` [PATCH for-5.1 1/3] virtiofsd: drop CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 16:51   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-22 13:02 ` [PATCH for-5.1 2/3] virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o chroot sandboxing option Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 16:58   ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2020-07-23 12:17     ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 17:58   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-23 12:28     ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-23 13:47       ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2020-07-23 15:36         ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 18:17   ` Vivek Goyal
2020-07-23 12:29     ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 19:03   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-23 12:32     ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-23 17:55       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-24 12:22         ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 13:02 ` [PATCH for-5.1 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 17:03   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-23 12:46     ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-23 12:50       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-23 13:56         ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2020-07-23 15:19           ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 18:19 ` [Virtio-fs] [PATCH for-5.1 0/3] virtiofsd: allow virtiofsd to run in a container Vivek Goyal
2020-07-23 12:46   ` Stefan Hajnoczi

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20200722165811.GT2324845@redhat.com \
    --to=berrange@redhat.com \
    --cc=dgilbert@redhat.com \
    --cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
    --cc=rmohr@redhat.com \
    --cc=stefanha@redhat.com \
    --cc=virtio-fs@redhat.com \
    --cc=vromanso@redhat.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).