From: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
To: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, "Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>,
brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, dgilbert@redhat.com,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Thomas Huth" <thuth@redhat.com>,
pbonzini@redhat.com, "Richard Henderson" <rth@twiddle.net>,
mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, ehabkost@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [for-5.2 v4 10/10] s390: Recognize host-trust-limitation option
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2020 17:22:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200907172253.0a51f5f7.pasic@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200724025744.69644-11-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
On Fri, 24 Jul 2020 12:57:44 +1000
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
> At least some s390 cpu models support "Protected Virtualization" (PV),
> a mechanism to protect guests from eavesdropping by a compromised
> hypervisor.
>
> This is similar in function to other mechanisms like AMD's SEV and
> POWER's PEF, which are controlled bythe "host-trust-limitation"
> machine option. s390 is a slightly special case, because we already
> supported PV, simply by using a CPU model with the required feature
> (S390_FEAT_UNPACK).
>
> To integrate this with the option used by other platforms, we
> implement the following compromise:
>
> - When the host-trust-limitation option is set, s390 will recognize
> it, verify that the CPU can support PV (failing if not) and set
> virtio default options necessary for encrypted or protected guests,
> as on other platforms. i.e. if host-trust-limitation is set, we
> will either create a guest capable of entering PV mode, or fail
> outright
Shouldn't we also fail outright if the virtio features are not PV
compatible (invalid configuration)?
I would like to see something like follows as a part of this series.
----------------------------8<--------------------------
From: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2020 15:00:17 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] virtio: handle host trust limitation
If host_trust_limitation_enabled() returns true, then emulated virtio
devices must offer VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM, because the device is not
capable of accessing all of the guest memory. Otherwise we are in
violation of the virtio specification.
Let's fail realize if we detect that VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM feature is
obligatory but missing.
Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
---
hw/virtio/virtio.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
index 5bd2a2f621..19b4b0a37a 100644
--- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include "hw/virtio/virtio-access.h"
#include "sysemu/dma.h"
#include "sysemu/runstate.h"
+#include "exec/host-trust-limitation.h"
/*
* The alignment to use between consumer and producer parts of vring.
@@ -3618,6 +3619,12 @@ static void virtio_device_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
/* Devices should either use vmsd or the load/save methods */
assert(!vdc->vmsd || !vdc->load);
+ if (host_trust_limitation_enabled(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine()))
+ && !virtio_host_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM)) {
+ error_setg(&err, "devices without VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM are not compatible with host trust imitation");
+ error_propagate(errp, err);
+ return;
+ }
if (vdc->realize != NULL) {
vdc->realize(dev, &err);
if (err != NULL) {
--
2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-07 15:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-24 2:57 [for-5.2 v4 00/10] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 01/10] host trust limitation: Introduce new host trust limitation interface David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 02/10] host trust limitation: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 03/10] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 04/10] host trust limitation: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 05/10] host trust limitation: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 06/10] host trust limitation: Add Error ** to HostTrustLimitation::kvm_init David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 07/10] spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 08/10] spapr: PEF: block migration David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:01 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 09/10] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:05 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-08-13 7:43 ` Greg Kurz
2020-08-13 8:19 ` Greg Kurz
2020-09-07 15:10 ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-11 2:04 ` David Gibson
2020-09-11 13:49 ` Halil Pasic
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 10/10] s390: Recognize host-trust-limitation option David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:50 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-08-03 7:40 ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-06 6:14 ` David Gibson
2020-08-06 7:18 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-03 7:49 ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-03 7:54 ` David Gibson
2020-08-03 8:07 ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-03 8:14 ` David Gibson
2020-08-03 8:33 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-09-07 15:22 ` Halil Pasic [this message]
2020-09-10 11:36 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-09-10 18:29 ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-11 0:07 ` David Gibson
2020-09-11 6:25 ` Greg Kurz
2020-09-11 12:45 ` Halil Pasic
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