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From: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
To: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, "Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, dgilbert@redhat.com,
	"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
	"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Huth" <thuth@redhat.com>,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, "Richard Henderson" <rth@twiddle.net>,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, ehabkost@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [for-5.2 v4 10/10] s390: Recognize host-trust-limitation option
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2020 17:22:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200907172253.0a51f5f7.pasic@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200724025744.69644-11-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

On Fri, 24 Jul 2020 12:57:44 +1000
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:

> At least some s390 cpu models support "Protected Virtualization" (PV),
> a mechanism to protect guests from eavesdropping by a compromised
> hypervisor.
> 
> This is similar in function to other mechanisms like AMD's SEV and
> POWER's PEF, which are controlled bythe "host-trust-limitation"
> machine option.  s390 is a slightly special case, because we already
> supported PV, simply by using a CPU model with the required feature
> (S390_FEAT_UNPACK).
> 
> To integrate this with the option used by other platforms, we
> implement the following compromise:
> 
>  - When the host-trust-limitation option is set, s390 will recognize
>    it, verify that the CPU can support PV (failing if not) and set
>    virtio default options necessary for encrypted or protected guests,
>    as on other platforms.  i.e. if host-trust-limitation is set, we
>    will either create a guest capable of entering PV mode, or fail
>    outright

Shouldn't we also fail outright if the virtio features are not PV
compatible (invalid configuration)?

I would like to see something like follows as a part of this series.
----------------------------8<--------------------------
From: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2020 15:00:17 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] virtio: handle host trust limitation

If host_trust_limitation_enabled() returns true, then emulated virtio
devices must offer VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM, because the device is not
capable of accessing all of the guest memory. Otherwise we are in
violation of the virtio specification.

Let's fail realize if we detect that VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM feature is
obligatory but missing.

Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
---
 hw/virtio/virtio.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
index 5bd2a2f621..19b4b0a37a 100644
--- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include "hw/virtio/virtio-access.h"
 #include "sysemu/dma.h"
 #include "sysemu/runstate.h"
+#include "exec/host-trust-limitation.h"
 
 /*
  * The alignment to use between consumer and producer parts of vring.
@@ -3618,6 +3619,12 @@ static void virtio_device_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
     /* Devices should either use vmsd or the load/save methods */
     assert(!vdc->vmsd || !vdc->load);
 
+    if (host_trust_limitation_enabled(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine()))
+        && !virtio_host_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM)) {
+        error_setg(&err, "devices without VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM are not compatible with host trust imitation");
+        error_propagate(errp, err);
+        return;
+    }
     if (vdc->realize != NULL) {
         vdc->realize(dev, &err);
         if (err != NULL) {
-- 
2.21.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-09-07 15:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-24  2:57 [for-5.2 v4 00/10] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 01/10] host trust limitation: Introduce new host trust limitation interface David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 02/10] host trust limitation: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 03/10] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 04/10] host trust limitation: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 05/10] host trust limitation: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 06/10] host trust limitation: Add Error ** to HostTrustLimitation::kvm_init David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 07/10] spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 08/10] spapr: PEF: block migration David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:01   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 09/10] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:05   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-08-13  7:43     ` Greg Kurz
2020-08-13  8:19       ` Greg Kurz
2020-09-07 15:10   ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-11  2:04     ` David Gibson
2020-09-11 13:49       ` Halil Pasic
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 10/10] s390: Recognize host-trust-limitation option David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:50   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-08-03  7:40     ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-06  6:14     ` David Gibson
2020-08-06  7:18       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-03  7:49   ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-03  7:54     ` David Gibson
2020-08-03  8:07       ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-03  8:14         ` David Gibson
2020-08-03  8:33           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-09-07 15:22   ` Halil Pasic [this message]
2020-09-10 11:36     ` Cornelia Huck
2020-09-10 18:29       ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-11  0:07         ` David Gibson
2020-09-11  6:25           ` Greg Kurz
2020-09-11 12:45           ` Halil Pasic

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