From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08B86C4361A for ; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 13:14:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 640E02251E for ; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 13:13:59 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 640E02251E Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:52280 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1klAuM-0006DE-Bg for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Fri, 04 Dec 2020 08:13:58 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:36514) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1klAtG-0005bk-Lv for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 04 Dec 2020 08:12:50 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([63.128.21.124]:50906) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1klAtF-0004WG-3k for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 04 Dec 2020 08:12:50 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1607087568; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=dTuffgmH1WmsRCJY1lEtuWIaGh3L582bzfqpO1hbOAM=; b=fhZNc+ALQS1uSHN7y3Gtx8MKVIbgWQj9rvqhzrJoD0fbvRGCk/SA/M4J/SjoBqNGM6pTv1 /6TaEqztj3RUh7WIQG1ToS+ya03EzAoLsDAcCTPBftUn3XiJGnSJ2QE2PkwCaE5f0BxGfi yKtowQ16pgVySTzI7KHph3oxeYoBxwg= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-152-ZYKOlPF7OnewaHIFhhdMpw-1; Fri, 04 Dec 2020 08:12:44 -0500 X-MC-Unique: ZYKOlPF7OnewaHIFhhdMpw-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx06.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9CC8710054FF; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 13:12:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from gondolin (ovpn-113-97.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.113.97]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6CB745C230; Fri, 4 Dec 2020 13:12:32 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 14:12:29 +0100 From: Cornelia Huck To: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Subject: Re: [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models Message-ID: <20201204141229.688b11e4.cohuck@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20201204130727.GD2883@work-vm> References: <20201204054415.579042-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20201204140205.66e205da.cohuck@redhat.com> <20201204130727.GD2883@work-vm> Organization: Red Hat GmbH MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.16 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=63.128.21.124; envelope-from=cohuck@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: -35 X-Spam_score: -3.6 X-Spam_bar: --- X-Spam_report: (-3.6 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-1.496, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Richard Henderson , Marcelo Tosatti , david@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Eduardo Habkost , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, Christian Borntraeger , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, berrange@redhat.com, thuth@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, rth@twiddle.net, David Gibson Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" On Fri, 4 Dec 2020 13:07:27 +0000 "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" wrote: > * Cornelia Huck (cohuck@redhat.com) wrote: > > On Fri, 4 Dec 2020 09:06:50 +0100 > > Christian Borntraeger wrote: > > > > > On 04.12.20 06:44, David Gibson wrote: > > > > A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the > > > > hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order > > > > to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. > > > > > > > > AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has > > > > its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism > > > > to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection > > > > level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected > > > > execution environment. > > > > > > > > The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each > > > > platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem > > > > ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. > > > > > > > > AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option > > > > "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other > > > > than SEV. > > > > > > > > This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration > > > > for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's > > > > "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a > > > > "securable-guest-memory" property pointing to a platform specific > > > > > > Can we do "securable-guest" ? > > > s390x also protects registers and integrity. memory is only one piece > > > of the puzzle and what we protect might differ from platform to > > > platform. > > > > > > > I agree. Even technologies that currently only do memory encryption may > > be enhanced with more protections later. > > There's already SEV-ES patches onlist for this on the SEV side. > > > > Perhaps 'confidential guest' is actually what we need, since the > marketing folks seem to have started labelling this whole idea > 'confidential computing'. It's more like a 'possibly confidential guest', though.