From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8EA29C4167B for ; Tue, 8 Dec 2020 04:30:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2B12523A57 for ; Tue, 8 Dec 2020 04:30:09 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 2B12523A57 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=gibson.dropbear.id.au Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:33718 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kmUdb-0006Bw-UQ for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 23:30:07 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:50254) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kmUbE-0004Be-Gn; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 23:27:40 -0500 Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:40113 helo=ozlabs.org) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kmUb6-0006MT-RW; Mon, 07 Dec 2020 23:27:40 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4CqnFt0gnCz9sW0; Tue, 8 Dec 2020 15:27:14 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1607401634; bh=mLyOVhZ4oR5+tNvzHEh2SyeDztIphEHMovVY51ggypE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=otGoUEr3F0jJHjzIxwnmjcR/tXCYQC2ipuLDclv8VzbiVgvpfU5F5eRLIYtg3mdaR RM3hjKME3yJn/yUcBMAL1ZeV26OnYJYCEf2TFfQBdvYBp1uEsslbMMYjsOSb7meJsV eceQkRMNUelGTQi0VrNCFDbimXn86KdQKWr1S+MM= Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 13:57:28 +1100 From: David Gibson To: Cornelia Huck Subject: Re: [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models Message-ID: <20201208025728.GD2555@yekko.fritz.box> References: <20201204054415.579042-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20201204140205.66e205da.cohuck@redhat.com> <20201204130727.GD2883@work-vm> <20201204141229.688b11e4.cohuck@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="ylS2wUBXLOxYXZFQ" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20201204141229.688b11e4.cohuck@redhat.com> Received-SPF: pass client-ip=203.11.71.1; envelope-from=dgibson@ozlabs.org; helo=ozlabs.org X-Spam_score_int: -17 X-Spam_score: -1.8 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.25, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Richard Henderson , Marcelo Tosatti , david@redhat.com, "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, pasic@linux.ibm.com, Christian Borntraeger , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, berrange@redhat.com, thuth@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, rth@twiddle.net, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Eduardo Habkost Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" --ylS2wUBXLOxYXZFQ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Fri, Dec 04, 2020 at 02:12:29PM +0100, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Fri, 4 Dec 2020 13:07:27 +0000 > "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" wrote: >=20 > > * Cornelia Huck (cohuck@redhat.com) wrote: > > > On Fri, 4 Dec 2020 09:06:50 +0100 > > > Christian Borntraeger wrote: > > > =20 > > > > On 04.12.20 06:44, David Gibson wrote: =20 > > > > > A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereb= y the > > > > > hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in or= der > > > > > to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. > > > > >=20 > > > > > AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Inte= l has > > > > > its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mecha= nism > > > > > to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protect= ion > > > > > level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected > > > > > execution environment. > > > > >=20 > > > > > The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each > > > > > platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't= seem > > > > > ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. > > > > >=20 > > > > > AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option > > > > > "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases oth= er > > > > > than SEV. > > > > >=20 > > > > > This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configurati= on > > > > > for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's > > > > > "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a > > > > > "securable-guest-memory" property pointing to a platform specific= =20 > > > >=20 > > > > Can we do "securable-guest" ? > > > > s390x also protects registers and integrity. memory is only one pie= ce > > > > of the puzzle and what we protect might differ from platform to=20 > > > > platform. > > > > =20 > > >=20 > > > I agree. Even technologies that currently only do memory encryption m= ay > > > be enhanced with more protections later. =20 > >=20 > > There's already SEV-ES patches onlist for this on the SEV side. > >=20 > > > >=20 > > Perhaps 'confidential guest' is actually what we need, since the > > marketing folks seem to have started labelling this whole idea > > 'confidential computing'. That's not a bad idea, much as I usually hate marketing terms. But it does seem to be becoming a general term for this style of thing, and it doesn't overlap too badly with other terms ("secure" and "protected" are also used for hypervisor-from-guest and guest-from-guest protection). > It's more like a 'possibly confidential guest', though. Hmm. What about "Confidential Guest Facility" or "Confidential Guest Mechanism"? The implication being that the facility is there, whether or not the guest actually uses it. --=20 David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. 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