From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA2E9C4361B for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 06:23:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0290F23741 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 06:23:13 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 0290F23741 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=gibson.dropbear.id.au Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:43216 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kpmgy-0000Xh-Jw for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 01:23:12 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:36682) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kpmfQ-0008L4-25; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 01:21:36 -0500 Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org ([2401:3900:2:1::2]:53289 helo=ozlabs.org) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kpmfM-0007wY-MM; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 01:21:35 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4CxMMT2yg5z9sW4; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 17:21:25 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1608186085; bh=YdCuD3Vy9G1qMy5stSqn/dM/yhe8CwLet1I0HgO67Rw=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=iBbMpNbC3XPPzWAhHsMoBhBreH3Kbth7scDIaAZMhmxLv1i2o4/nd9PPeSgKbAJcy OVKpptPfSrTTnXgRvY2fEEAgN3Ls4cy36Y0KvIJm9O4KyoljhW2Ytla8cazRS+DgDA xGVEhZejg7koVC2Ph1pj5gVDlabbCTDU/A0XHy9U= Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 17:21:16 +1100 From: David Gibson To: Cornelia Huck Subject: Re: [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models Message-ID: <20201217062116.GK310465@yekko.fritz.box> References: <20201204054415.579042-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20201204140205.66e205da.cohuck@redhat.com> <20201204130727.GD2883@work-vm> <20201204141229.688b11e4.cohuck@redhat.com> <20201208025728.GD2555@yekko.fritz.box> <20201208134308.2afa0e3e.cohuck@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="mGCtrYeZ202LI9ZG" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20201208134308.2afa0e3e.cohuck@redhat.com> Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2401:3900:2:1::2; envelope-from=dgibson@ozlabs.org; helo=ozlabs.org X-Spam_score_int: -17 X-Spam_score: -1.8 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.249, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Richard Henderson , Marcelo Tosatti , david@redhat.com, "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, pasic@linux.ibm.com, Christian Borntraeger , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, berrange@redhat.com, thuth@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, rth@twiddle.net, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Eduardo Habkost Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" --mGCtrYeZ202LI9ZG Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Tue, Dec 08, 2020 at 01:43:08PM +0100, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Tue, 8 Dec 2020 13:57:28 +1100 > David Gibson wrote: >=20 > > On Fri, Dec 04, 2020 at 02:12:29PM +0100, Cornelia Huck wrote: > > > On Fri, 4 Dec 2020 13:07:27 +0000 > > > "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" wrote: > > > =20 > > > > * Cornelia Huck (cohuck@redhat.com) wrote: =20 > > > > > On Fri, 4 Dec 2020 09:06:50 +0100 > > > > > Christian Borntraeger wrote: > > > > > =20 > > > > > > On 04.12.20 06:44, David Gibson wrote: =20 > > > > > > > A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms wh= ereby the > > > > > > > hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, i= n order > > > > > > > to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. > > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > > AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and = Intel has > > > > > > > its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming m= echanism > > > > > > > to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory pro= tection > > > > > > > level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a prote= cted > > > > > > > execution environment. > > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > > The current code (committed or draft) for these features has = each > > > > > > > platform's version configured entirely differently. That doe= sn't seem > > > > > > > ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. > > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > > AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option > > > > > > > "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases= other > > > > > > > than SEV. > > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > > This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configu= ration > > > > > > > for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's > > > > > > > "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a > > > > > > > "securable-guest-memory" property pointing to a platform spec= ific =20 > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > Can we do "securable-guest" ? > > > > > > s390x also protects registers and integrity. memory is only one= piece > > > > > > of the puzzle and what we protect might differ from platform to= =20 > > > > > > platform. > > > > > > =20 > > > > >=20 > > > > > I agree. Even technologies that currently only do memory encrypti= on may > > > > > be enhanced with more protections later. =20 > > > >=20 > > > > There's already SEV-ES patches onlist for this on the SEV side. > > > >=20 > > > > > > > >=20 > > > > Perhaps 'confidential guest' is actually what we need, since the > > > > marketing folks seem to have started labelling this whole idea > > > > 'confidential computing'. =20 > >=20 > > That's not a bad idea, much as I usually hate marketing terms. But it > > does seem to be becoming a general term for this style of thing, and > > it doesn't overlap too badly with other terms ("secure" and > > "protected" are also used for hypervisor-from-guest and > > guest-from-guest protection). > >=20 > > > It's more like a 'possibly confidential guest', though. =20 > >=20 > > Hmm. What about "Confidential Guest Facility" or "Confidential Guest > > Mechanism"? The implication being that the facility is there, whether > > or not the guest actually uses it. > >=20 >=20 > "Confidential Guest Enablement"? The others generally sound fine to me > as well, though; not sure if "Facility" might be a bit confusing, as > that term is already a bit overloaded. Well, "facility" is a bit overloaded, but IMO "enablement" is even more so. I think I'll go with "confidential guest support" in the next spin. --=20 David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. 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