From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9D47C4361B for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 11:50:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2778D238E5 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 11:50:54 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 2778D238E5 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:35234 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kpro5-0004j9-4X for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 06:50:53 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:49234) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kprh2-0005lr-R0 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 06:43:36 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([63.128.21.124]:26369) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1kprh1-0000Sb-48 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 06:43:36 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1608205414; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=QyIqB23JwnZYHGAWkNFaM9pV1Ag2jMMOyHckGdG4sJU=; b=QLBDDxDSbqpqVlJpc2YS6GXb9nQO5JGrQpOFVK2HsoCaZPdJWqK4qtLiXSDXSLERokwbrr dIViv5ndEEkF00rjlLQ3oNBLnE2Ar8MbCBmP9+dXVJeN+P55jCRAppqfFELixXRnTCcD0P WvbVhtMzOGS8H0DH+8mqlTPOg60QvJE= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-574-ep45ulrANZOTpRE_DowVqg-1; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 06:43:29 -0500 X-MC-Unique: ep45ulrANZOTpRE_DowVqg-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A1A2D800D55; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 11:43:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from gondolin (ovpn-113-176.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.113.176]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CDC9D1A262; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 11:43:16 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 12:43:13 +0100 From: Cornelia Huck To: David Gibson Subject: Re: [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models Message-ID: <20201217124313.0b321ecf.cohuck@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20201217062116.GK310465@yekko.fritz.box> References: <20201204054415.579042-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20201204140205.66e205da.cohuck@redhat.com> <20201204130727.GD2883@work-vm> <20201204141229.688b11e4.cohuck@redhat.com> <20201208025728.GD2555@yekko.fritz.box> <20201208134308.2afa0e3e.cohuck@redhat.com> <20201217062116.GK310465@yekko.fritz.box> Organization: Red Hat GmbH MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Sig_/R0kL8VplyVYXrejI1PMf7M_"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha256 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.23 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=63.128.21.124; envelope-from=cohuck@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: -20 X-Spam_score: -2.1 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.1 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Richard Henderson , Marcelo Tosatti , david@redhat.com, "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, pasic@linux.ibm.com, Christian Borntraeger , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, berrange@redhat.com, thuth@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, rth@twiddle.net, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Eduardo Habkost Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" --Sig_/R0kL8VplyVYXrejI1PMf7M_ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Thu, 17 Dec 2020 17:21:16 +1100 David Gibson wrote: > On Tue, Dec 08, 2020 at 01:43:08PM +0100, Cornelia Huck wrote: > > On Tue, 8 Dec 2020 13:57:28 +1100 > > David Gibson wrote: > > =20 > > > On Fri, Dec 04, 2020 at 02:12:29PM +0100, Cornelia Huck wrote: =20 > > > > On Fri, 4 Dec 2020 13:07:27 +0000 > > > > "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" wrote: > > > > =20 > > > > > * Cornelia Huck (cohuck@redhat.com) wrote: =20 > > > > > > On Fri, 4 Dec 2020 09:06:50 +0100 > > > > > > Christian Borntraeger wrote: > > > > > > =20 > > > > > > > On 04.12.20 06:44, David Gibson wrote: =20 > > > > > > > > A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms = whereby the > > > > > > > > hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory,= in order > > > > > > > > to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. > > > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > > > AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, an= d Intel has > > > > > > > > its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming= mechanism > > > > > > > > to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory p= rotection > > > > > > > > level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a pro= tected > > > > > > > > execution environment. > > > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > > > The current code (committed or draft) for these features ha= s each > > > > > > > > platform's version configured entirely differently. That d= oesn't seem > > > > > > > > ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. > > > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > > > AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option > > > > > > > > "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cas= es other > > > > > > > > than SEV. > > > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > > > This series is a proposal to at least partially unify confi= guration > > > > > > > > for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's > > > > > > > > "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a > > > > > > > > "securable-guest-memory" property pointing to a platform sp= ecific =20 > > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > > Can we do "securable-guest" ? > > > > > > > s390x also protects registers and integrity. memory is only o= ne piece > > > > > > > of the puzzle and what we protect might differ from platform = to=20 > > > > > > > platform. > > > > > > > =20 > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > I agree. Even technologies that currently only do memory encryp= tion may > > > > > > be enhanced with more protections later. =20 > > > > >=20 > > > > > There's already SEV-ES patches onlist for this on the SEV side. > > > > >=20 > > > > > > > > > >=20 > > > > > Perhaps 'confidential guest' is actually what we need, since the > > > > > marketing folks seem to have started labelling this whole idea > > > > > 'confidential computing'. =20 > > >=20 > > > That's not a bad idea, much as I usually hate marketing terms. But it > > > does seem to be becoming a general term for this style of thing, and > > > it doesn't overlap too badly with other terms ("secure" and > > > "protected" are also used for hypervisor-from-guest and > > > guest-from-guest protection). > > > =20 > > > > It's more like a 'possibly confidential guest', though. =20 > > >=20 > > > Hmm. What about "Confidential Guest Facility" or "Confidential Guest > > > Mechanism"? The implication being that the facility is there, whether > > > or not the guest actually uses it. > > > =20 > >=20 > > "Confidential Guest Enablement"? The others generally sound fine to me > > as well, though; not sure if "Facility" might be a bit confusing, as > > that term is already a bit overloaded. =20 >=20 > Well, "facility" is a bit overloaded, but IMO "enablement" is even > more so. I think I'll go with "confidential guest support" in the > next spin. >=20 Works for me. --Sig_/R0kL8VplyVYXrejI1PMf7M_ Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEw9DWbcNiT/aowBjO3s9rk8bwL68FAl/bRFEACgkQ3s9rk8bw L68CLRAAp36nl9zlR8I/XeSW6EAJQS+9P2Ose7DKrowr6/vkXSSOtHl9cv/6TDiU V5tOO3CbItyzBPxw5w7ezy88bgYOxgijmr4MHs4nC0YqtzYYv4vCeEIKmT99rgy4 q/nCkRGY0C+cnSuehjLgPIC9wqFuOjrgui4edY1+eNxe311QZR/XuAfSGs4RJ0VB UiT7+xdqiygzNTgiLttpw+msZrj9lKLmad5LnUiEvVvzbxFPtWWqbBisWS7M7D49 58yYobJr/o/Rh77mqNFDzgBiWmYvnmi2ukAMyLSUl+g0fGMKZzu1CVjPE0wg1jkX n8B7qkpZrTC27HqzUR+r37fuBpWgkqBmiUXzyayn4z3Z+HoY4Io2ipfYOK62PRLm +0j6Tgw3cIBHY+NscF4f83iNQRrxqqZia9PWdncfdwJC/JIkNnV9hIABTkm4lC2L GPoXS0X6/6Q5dXILqrSPJUuaWlF3P3/m3ehAHLqurs9hirutfTR5MPWREcy1oBxm kGqCaXUO/faCGGoJkYdKot5UpysuL87RBo7EgBo3HL8V/VfUlo+6CJeiPQWbDKw9 l9z3kZfbFzl2FrJmxfuJapVlRCfSzpjVCebMDl4CSjP+Dax170lAt9bX/0CgdL8u z8c8aFVhACPWFRw8CJaqldSznQsISXj5BnPHvGTSwYTZRnNH1AA= =XYiF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --Sig_/R0kL8VplyVYXrejI1PMf7M_--