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Tue, 12 Jan 2021 12:00:01 +0100 Authentication-Results: garm.ovh; auth=pass (GARM-98R002aa6424c8-1bae-4fd3-90b2-bb0287a7b3cc, D7A3512486C53AB1907B5452A8D2CB06296403FA) smtp.auth=groug@kaod.org X-OVh-ClientIp: 82.253.208.248 Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 11:59:59 +0100 From: Greg Kurz To: David Gibson Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property Message-ID: <20210112115959.2c042dbb@bahia.lan> In-Reply-To: <20210112044508.427338-6-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> References: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20210112044508.427338-6-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.17.8 (GTK+ 2.24.32; x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Originating-IP: [37.59.142.98] X-ClientProxiedBy: DAG7EX1.mxp5.local (172.16.2.61) To DAG8EX1.mxp5.local (172.16.2.71) X-Ovh-Tracer-GUID: ffca4688-4df4-4ccc-a6b2-4ca9940b29dd X-Ovh-Tracer-Id: 9310347805589936479 X-VR-SPAMSTATE: OK X-VR-SPAMSCORE: -100 X-VR-SPAMCAUSE: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgedujedrvdehgedgudekucetufdoteggodetrfdotffvucfrrhhofhhilhgvmecuqfggjfdpvefjgfevmfevgfenuceurghilhhouhhtmecuhedttdenucesvcftvggtihhpihgvnhhtshculddquddttddmnecujfgurhepfffhvffukfgjfhfogggtgfhisehtjeertdertddvnecuhfhrohhmpefirhgvghcumfhurhiiuceoghhrohhugheskhgrohgurdhorhhgqeenucggtffrrghtthgvrhhnpeefuddtieejjeevheekieeltefgleetkeetheettdeifeffvefhffelffdtfeeljeenucfkpheptddrtddrtddrtddpfeejrdehledrudegvddrleeknecuvehluhhsthgvrhfuihiivgeptdenucfrrghrrghmpehmohguvgepshhmthhpqdhouhhtpdhhvghlohepmhigphhlrghnhedrmhgrihhlrdhovhhhrdhnvghtpdhinhgvtheptddrtddrtddrtddpmhgrihhlfhhrohhmpehgrhhouhhgsehkrghougdrohhrghdprhgtphhtthhopehjuhhnrdhnrghkrghjihhmrgesihhnthgvlhdrtghomh Received-SPF: pass client-ip=178.32.125.2; envelope-from=groug@kaod.org; helo=smtpout1.mo529.mail-out.ovh.net X-Spam_score_int: -18 X-Spam_score: -1.9 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.9 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: pair@us.ibm.com, Marcelo Tosatti , brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, mst@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, Christian Borntraeger , andi.kleen@intel.com, thuth@redhat.com, Eduardo Habkost , richard.henderson@linaro.org, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, jun.nakajima@intel.com, "Daniel P. =?UTF-8?B?QmVycmFuZ8Op?=" , Cornelia Huck , qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" On Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:45:00 +1100 David Gibson wrote: > Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we > get to kvm_init(). Although protection of guest memory from the > hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's > not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator. > > In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is > almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled. > > So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets > this QOM interface link directly in the machine. For compatibility we > keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of > the new property. > Do we really want to keep "memory-encryption" in the long term ? If not, then maybe engage the deprecation process and add a warning in machine_set_memory_encryption() ? Apart from that, LGTM: Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz > Signed-off-by: David Gibson > --- > accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 5 +++-- > accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 5 +++-- > hw/core/machine.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > include/hw/boards.h | 2 +- > include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 +- > target/i386/sev.c | 32 ++------------------------------ > 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > index 260ed73ffe..28ab126f70 100644 > --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > @@ -2181,8 +2181,9 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) > * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory > * encryption context. > */ > - if (ms->memory_encryption) { > - ret = sev_guest_init(ms->memory_encryption); > + if (ms->cgs) { > + /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */ > + ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs); > if (ret < 0) { > goto err; > } > diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > index 5db9ab8f00..3d4787ae4a 100644 > --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > @@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ > #include "qemu-common.h" > #include "sysemu/sev.h" > > -int sev_guest_init(const char *id) > +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs) > { > - return -1; > + /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */ > + g_assert_not_reached(); > } > diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c > index 8909117d80..94194ab82d 100644 > --- a/hw/core/machine.c > +++ b/hw/core/machine.c > @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ > #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h" > #include "migration/global_state.h" > #include "migration/vmstate.h" > +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h" > > GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_2[] = {}; > const size_t hw_compat_5_2_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_2); > @@ -427,16 +428,37 @@ static char *machine_get_memory_encryption(Object *obj, Error **errp) > { > MachineState *ms = MACHINE(obj); > > - return g_strdup(ms->memory_encryption); > + if (ms->cgs) { > + return g_strdup(object_get_canonical_path_component(OBJECT(ms->cgs))); > + } > + > + return NULL; > } > > static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value, > Error **errp) > { > - MachineState *ms = MACHINE(obj); > + Object *cgs = > + object_resolve_path_component(object_get_objects_root(), value); > + > + if (!cgs) { > + error_setg(errp, "No such memory encryption object '%s'", value); > + return; > + } > > - g_free(ms->memory_encryption); > - ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value); > + object_property_set_link(obj, "confidential-guest-support", cgs, errp); > +} > + > +static void machine_check_confidential_guest_support(const Object *obj, > + const char *name, > + Object *new_target, > + Error **errp) > +{ > + /* > + * So far the only constraint is that the target has the > + * TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT interface, and that's checked > + * by the QOM core > + */ > } > > static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp) > @@ -836,6 +858,15 @@ static void machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) > object_class_property_set_description(oc, "suppress-vmdesc", > "Set on to disable self-describing migration"); > > + object_class_property_add_link(oc, "confidential-guest-support", > + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT, > + offsetof(MachineState, cgs), > + machine_check_confidential_guest_support, > + OBJ_PROP_LINK_STRONG); > + object_class_property_set_description(oc, "confidential-guest-support", > + "Set confidential guest scheme to support"); > + > + /* For compatibility */ > object_class_property_add_str(oc, "memory-encryption", > machine_get_memory_encryption, machine_set_memory_encryption); > object_class_property_set_description(oc, "memory-encryption", > @@ -1158,9 +1189,9 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine) > cc->deprecation_note); > } > > - if (machine->memory_encryption) { > + if (machine->cgs) { > /* > - * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real > + * With confidential guests, the host can't see the real > * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge > * areas. > */ > diff --git a/include/hw/boards.h b/include/hw/boards.h > index 17b1f3f0b9..1acd662fa5 100644 > --- a/include/hw/boards.h > +++ b/include/hw/boards.h > @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ struct MachineState { > bool iommu; > bool suppress_vmdesc; > bool enable_graphics; > - char *memory_encryption; > + ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs; > char *ram_memdev_id; > /* > * convenience alias to ram_memdev_id backend memory region > diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h > index 7335e59867..3b5b1aacf1 100644 > --- a/include/sysemu/sev.h > +++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h > @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ > > #include "sysemu/kvm.h" > > -int sev_guest_init(const char *id); > +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs); > int sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp); > int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret, > uint64_t gpa, Error **errp); > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c > index 2a4b2187d6..5399a136ad 100644 > --- a/target/i386/sev.c > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c > @@ -335,26 +335,6 @@ static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info = { > } > }; > > -static SevGuestState * > -lookup_sev_guest_info(const char *id) > -{ > - Object *obj; > - SevGuestState *info; > - > - obj = object_resolve_path_component(object_get_objects_root(), id); > - if (!obj) { > - return NULL; > - } > - > - info = (SevGuestState *) > - object_dynamic_cast(obj, TYPE_SEV_GUEST); > - if (!info) { > - return NULL; > - } > - > - return info; > -} > - > bool > sev_enabled(void) > { > @@ -682,10 +662,9 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) > } > } > > -int > -sev_guest_init(const char *id) > +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs) > { > - SevGuestState *sev; > + SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs); > char *devname; > int ret, fw_error; > uint32_t ebx; > @@ -698,13 +677,6 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id) > return -1; > } > > - sev = lookup_sev_guest_info(id); > - if (!sev) { > - error_report("%s: '%s' is not a valid '%s' object", > - __func__, id, TYPE_SEV_GUEST); > - goto err; > - } > - > sev_guest = sev; > sev->state = SEV_STATE_UNINIT; >