From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: mszeredi@redhat.com, slp@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
virtio-fs@redhat.com, Alex Xu <alex@alxu.ca>,
P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
vgoyal@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] virtiofsd: prevent opening of special files (CVE-2020-35517)
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 10:36:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210126103619.GD3640294@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210126103502.260758-1-stefanha@redhat.com>
On Tue, Jan 26, 2021 at 10:35:02AM +0000, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> A well-behaved FUSE client does not attempt to open special files with
> FUSE_OPEN because they are handled on the client side (e.g. device nodes
> are handled by client-side device drivers).
>
> The check to prevent virtiofsd from opening special files is missing in
> a few cases, most notably FUSE_OPEN. A malicious client can cause
> virtiofsd to open a device node, potentially allowing the guest to
> escape. This can be exploited by a modified guest device driver. It is
> not exploitable from guest userspace since the guest kernel will handle
> special files inside the guest instead of sending FUSE requests.
>
> This patch adds the missing checks to virtiofsd. This is a short-term
> solution because it does not prevent a compromised virtiofsd process
> from opening device nodes on the host.
>
> Reported-by: Alex Xu <alex@alxu.ca>
> Fixes: CVE-2020-35517
> Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Regards,
Daniel
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-26 10:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-26 10:35 [PATCH v2] virtiofsd: prevent opening of special files (CVE-2020-35517) Stefan Hajnoczi
2021-01-26 10:36 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2021-01-26 10:47 ` [Virtio-fs] " Liam Merwick
2021-01-26 17:16 ` Greg Kurz
2021-01-27 9:25 ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-27 10:20 ` Greg Kurz
2021-01-27 10:34 ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-27 13:49 ` Greg Kurz
2021-01-27 14:09 ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-27 15:09 ` Greg Kurz
2021-01-27 15:22 ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-27 15:35 ` Greg Kurz
2021-01-27 15:47 ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-27 15:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-28 12:14 ` Greg Kurz
2021-01-28 14:00 ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-28 14:26 ` Greg Kurz
2021-01-27 10:18 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
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