From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: mszeredi@redhat.com, Daniel Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>,
slp@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>,
virtio-fs@redhat.com, Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>,
Alex Xu <alex@alxu.ca>, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
vgoyal@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] virtiofsd: prevent opening of special files (CVE-2020-35517)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 18:14:17 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210204181417.GN3039@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210204150208.367837-1-stefanha@redhat.com>
* Stefan Hajnoczi (stefanha@redhat.com) wrote:
> v4:
> * Patch 1: Return positive errno if openat(2) fails in lo_do_open() [Greg]
> * Patch 3: Return -fd instead or -errno after lo_inode_open() in lo_do_open() [Greg]
> * Patch 3: Use De Morgan's Law to simplify the boolean expression in lo_create() [Vivek]
> * Patch 3: Add missing errno = -truncfd after lo_inode_open() call in lo_setattr
> v3:
> * Restructure lo_create() to handle externally-created files (we need
> to allocate an inode for them) [Greg]
> * Patch 1 & 2 refactor the code so that Patch 3 can implement the CVE fix
> v3:
> * Protect lo_create() [Greg]
> v2:
> * Add doc comment clarifying that symlinks are traversed client-side
> [Daniel]
>
> A well-behaved FUSE client does not attempt to open special files with
> FUSE_OPEN because they are handled on the client side (e.g. device nodes
> are handled by client-side device drivers).
>
> The check to prevent virtiofsd from opening special files is missing in
> a few cases, most notably FUSE_OPEN. A malicious client can cause
> virtiofsd to open a device node, potentially allowing the guest to
> escape. This can be exploited by a modified guest device driver. It is
> not exploitable from guest userspace since the guest kernel will handle
> special files inside the guest instead of sending FUSE requests.
>
> This patch series fixes this issue by introducing the lo_inode_open() function
> to check the file type before opening it. This is a short-term solution because
> it does not prevent a compromised virtiofsd process from opening device nodes
> on the host.
>
> This issue was diagnosed on public IRC and is therefore already known
> and not embargoed.
>
> Reported-by: Alex Xu <alex@alxu.ca>
> Fixes: CVE-2020-35517
Queued
> Stefan Hajnoczi (3):
> virtiofsd: extract lo_do_open() from lo_open()
> virtiofsd: optionally return inode pointer from lo_do_lookup()
> virtiofsd: prevent opening of special files (CVE-2020-35517)
>
> tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 224 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> 1 file changed, 148 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.29.2
>
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-04 18:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-04 15:02 [PATCH v5 0/3] virtiofsd: prevent opening of special files (CVE-2020-35517) Stefan Hajnoczi
2021-02-04 15:02 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] virtiofsd: extract lo_do_open() from lo_open() Stefan Hajnoczi
2021-02-04 17:08 ` Greg Kurz
2021-02-04 15:02 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] virtiofsd: optionally return inode pointer from lo_do_lookup() Stefan Hajnoczi
2021-02-04 15:02 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] virtiofsd: prevent opening of special files (CVE-2020-35517) Stefan Hajnoczi
2021-02-04 17:12 ` Greg Kurz
2021-02-04 16:15 ` [PATCH v5 0/3] " no-reply
2021-02-04 17:35 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-02-04 18:14 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
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