From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, peter.maydell@linaro.org,
dgilbert@redhat.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com
Cc: qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>,
cohuck@redhat.com, berrange@redhat.com, ehabkost@redhat.com,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com,
mtosatti@redhat.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org,
mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>,
borntraeger@de.ibm.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org,
frankja@linux.ibm.com, mst@redhat.com,
pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Subject: [PULL v9 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption()
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 17:07:26 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210208060735.39838-5-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210208060735.39838-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
When the "memory-encryption" property is set, we also disable KSM
merging for the guest, since it won't accomplish anything.
We want that, but doing it in the property set function itself is
thereoretically incorrect, in the unlikely event of some configuration
environment that set the property then cleared it again before
constructing the guest.
More importantly, it makes some other cleanups we want more difficult.
So, instead move this logic to machine_run_board_init() conditional on
the final value of the property.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
---
hw/core/machine.c | 17 +++++++++--------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
index 5d6163ab70..919067b5c9 100644
--- a/hw/core/machine.c
+++ b/hw/core/machine.c
@@ -437,14 +437,6 @@ static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value,
g_free(ms->memory_encryption);
ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value);
-
- /*
- * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real contents of RAM,
- * so there's no point in it trying to merge areas.
- */
- if (value) {
- machine_set_mem_merge(obj, false, errp);
- }
}
static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp)
@@ -1166,6 +1158,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
cc->deprecation_note);
}
+ if (machine->memory_encryption) {
+ /*
+ * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real
+ * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge
+ * areas.
+ */
+ machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
+ }
+
machine_class->init(machine);
phase_advance(PHASE_MACHINE_INITIALIZED);
}
--
2.29.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-08 11:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-08 6:07 [PULL v9 00/13] Cgs patches David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson [this message]
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2021-02-08 6:05 [PULL v9 00/13] Cgs patches David Gibson
2021-02-08 6:05 ` [PULL v9 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
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