From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: "Connor Kuehl" <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>,
"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Dov Murik" <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
"David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
"Daniel P . Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Markus Armbruster" <armbru@redhat.com>,
"Eric Blake" <eblake@redhat.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 05/12] i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 2021 17:26:20 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210826222627.3556-6-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210826222627.3556-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
The SNP_LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch
context within the firmware.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
target/i386/sev.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
target/i386/trace-events | 1 +
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index b8bd6ed9ea..51689d4fa4 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -875,6 +875,28 @@ sev_read_file_base64(const char *filename, guchar **data, gsize *len)
return 0;
}
+static int
+sev_snp_launch_start(SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest)
+{
+ int fw_error, rc;
+ SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(sev_snp_guest);
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start *start = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf;
+
+ trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_start(start->policy);
+
+ rc = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START,
+ start, &fw_error);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ error_report("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, rc, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ sev_set_guest_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int
sev_launch_start(SevGuestState *sev_guest)
{
@@ -1173,7 +1195,12 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
goto err;
}
- ret = sev_launch_start(SEV_GUEST(sev_common));
+ if (sev_snp_enabled()) {
+ ret = sev_snp_launch_start(SEV_SNP_GUEST(sev_common));
+ } else {
+ ret = sev_launch_start(SEV_GUEST(sev_common));
+ }
+
if (ret) {
error_setg(errp, "%s: failed to create encryption context", __func__);
goto err;
diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events
index 2cd8726eeb..18cc14b956 100644
--- a/target/i386/trace-events
+++ b/target/i386/trace-events
@@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s"
kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) ""
kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d"
kvm_sev_attestation_report(const char *mnonce, const char *data) "mnonce %s data %s"
+kvm_sev_snp_launch_start(uint64_t policy) "policy 0x%" PRIx64
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-26 22:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-26 22:26 [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/12] i386/sev: introduce "sev-common" type to encapsulate common SEV state Michael Roth
2021-09-01 14:18 ` Markus Armbruster
2021-09-03 15:11 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/12] linux-header: add the SNP specific command Michael Roth
2021-09-03 20:36 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 14:27 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/12] i386/sev: introduce 'sev-snp-guest' object Michael Roth
2021-09-01 14:29 ` Markus Armbruster
2021-09-03 15:15 ` Michael Roth
2021-09-03 21:12 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 14:20 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/12] i386/sev: initialize SNP context Michael Roth
2021-09-05 7:07 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-05 13:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-05 17:09 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-05 9:19 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-05 14:05 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-05 17:03 ` Dov Murik
2021-08-26 22:26 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/12] i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/12] i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch Michael Roth
2021-09-03 20:24 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 16:18 ` Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/12] target/i386: set SEV-SNP CPUID bit when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/12] target/i386: allow versioned CPUs to specify new cache_info Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/12] target/i386: add new EPYC CPU versions with updated cache_info Michael Roth
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/12] i386/sev: sev-snp: add support for CPUID validation Michael Roth
2021-09-05 10:02 ` Dov Murik
2021-09-07 16:50 ` Michael Roth
2021-09-07 17:44 ` Dov Murik
2021-08-26 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/12] i386/sev: update query-sev QAPI format to handle SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2021-09-01 14:14 ` Markus Armbruster
2021-09-03 15:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-09-03 15:30 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-03 15:43 ` Michael Roth via
2021-09-03 15:58 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-03 16:01 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-09-04 5:41 ` Markus Armbruster
2021-09-07 11:52 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-09-07 14:33 ` Michael Roth via
2021-09-03 15:27 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-11-16 9:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-11-16 11:54 ` Brijesh Singh
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