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Mon, 06 Sep 2021 06:12:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from avogadro.redhat.com ([2001:b07:6468:f312:c8dd:75d4:99ab:290a]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id k4sm7992331wrm.74.2021.09.06.06.11.59 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 06 Sep 2021 06:12:00 -0700 (PDT) From: Paolo Bonzini To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Subject: [PULL 36/36] doc: Add the SGX doc Date: Mon, 6 Sep 2021 15:10:59 +0200 Message-Id: <20210906131059.55234-37-pbonzini@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 In-Reply-To: <20210906131059.55234-1-pbonzini@redhat.com> References: <20210906131059.55234-1-pbonzini@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2a00:1450:4864:20::333; envelope-from=paolo.bonzini@gmail.com; helo=mail-wm1-x333.google.com X-Spam_score_int: -14 X-Spam_score: -1.5 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.5 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.249, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Yang Zhong , Sean Christopherson Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" From: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-34-yang.zhong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- docs/intel-sgx.txt | 167 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 167 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/intel-sgx.txt diff --git a/docs/intel-sgx.txt b/docs/intel-sgx.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f934d92f37 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/intel-sgx.txt @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +=============================== +Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) +=============================== + +Overview +======== + +Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of instructions and mechanisms +for memory accesses in order to provide security accesses for sensitive +applications and data. SGX allows an application to use it's pariticular +address space as an *enclave*, which is a protected area provides confidentiality +and integrity even in the presence of privileged malware. Accesses to the +enclave memory area from any software not resident in the enclave are prevented, +including those from privileged software. + +Virtual SGX +=========== + +SGX feature is exposed to guest via SGX CPUID. Looking at SGX CPUID, we can +report the same CPUID info to guest as on host for most of SGX CPUID. With +reporting the same CPUID guest is able to use full capacity of SGX, and KVM +doesn't need to emulate those info. + +The guest's EPC base and size are determined by Qemu, and KVM needs Qemu to +notify such info to it before it can initialize SGX for guest. + +Virtual EPC +----------- + +By default, Qemu does not assign EPC to a VM, i.e. fully enabling SGX in a VM +requires explicit allocation of EPC to the VM. Similar to other specialized +memory types, e.g. hugetlbfs, EPC is exposed as a memory backend. + +SGX EPC is enumerated through CPUID, i.e. EPC "devices" need to be realized +prior to realizing the vCPUs themselves, which occurs long before generic +devices are parsed and realized. This limitation means that EPC does not +require -maxmem as EPC is not treated as {cold,hot}plugged memory. + +Qemu does not artificially restrict the number of EPC sections exposed to a +guest, e.g. Qemu will happily allow you to create 64 1M EPC sections. Be aware +that some kernels may not recognize all EPC sections, e.g. the Linux SGX driver +is hardwired to support only 8 EPC sections. + +The following Qemu snippet creates two EPC sections, with 64M pre-allocated +to the VM and an additional 28M mapped but not allocated: + + -object memory-backend-epc,id=mem1,size=64M,prealloc=on \ + -object memory-backend-epc,id=mem2,size=28M \ + -M sgx-epc.0.memdev=mem1,sgx-epc.1.memdev=mem2 + +Note: + +The size and location of the virtual EPC are far less restricted compared +to physical EPC. Because physical EPC is protected via range registers, +the size of the physical EPC must be a power of two (though software sees +a subset of the full EPC, e.g. 92M or 128M) and the EPC must be naturally +aligned. KVM SGX's virtual EPC is purely a software construct and only +requires the size and location to be page aligned. Qemu enforces the EPC +size is a multiple of 4k and will ensure the base of the EPC is 4k aligned. +To simplify the implementation, EPC is always located above 4g in the guest +physical address space. + +Migration +--------- + +Qemu/KVM doesn't prevent live migrating SGX VMs, although from hardware's +perspective, SGX doesn't support live migration, since both EPC and the SGX +key hierarchy are bound to the physical platform. However live migration +can be supported in the sense if guest software stack can support recreating +enclaves when it suffers sudden lose of EPC; and if guest enclaves can detect +SGX keys being changed, and handle gracefully. For instance, when ERESUME fails +with #PF.SGX, guest software can gracefully detect it and recreate enclaves; +and when enclave fails to unseal sensitive information from outside, it can +detect such error and sensitive information can be provisioned to it again. + +CPUID +----- + +Due to its myriad dependencies, SGX is currently not listed as supported +in any of Qemu's built-in CPU configuration. To expose SGX (and SGX Launch +Control) to a guest, you must either use `-cpu host` to pass-through the +host CPU model, or explicitly enable SGX when using a built-in CPU model, +e.g. via `-cpu ,+sgx` or `-cpu ,+sgx,+sgxlc`. + +All SGX sub-features enumerated through CPUID, e.g. SGX2, MISCSELECT, +ATTRIBUTES, etc... can be restricted via CPUID flags. Be aware that enforcing +restriction of MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM requires intercepting ECREATE, +i.e. may marginally reduce SGX performance in the guest. All SGX sub-features +controlled via -cpu are prefixed with "sgx", e.g.: + +$ qemu-system-x86_64 -cpu help | xargs printf "%s\n" | grep sgx + sgx + sgx-debug + sgx-encls-c + sgx-enclv + sgx-exinfo + sgx-kss + sgx-mode64 + sgx-provisionkey + sgx-tokenkey + sgx1 + sgx2 + sgxlc + +The following Qemu snippet passes through the host CPU (and host physical +address width) but restricts access to the provision and EINIT token keys: + + -cpu host,host-phys-bits,-sgx-provisionkey,-sgx-tokenkey + +Note: + +SGX sub-features cannot be emulated, i.e. sub-features that are not present +in hardware cannot be forced on via '-cpu'. + +Virtualize SGX Launch Control +----------------------------- + +Qemu SGX support for Launch Control (LC) is passive, in the sense that it +does not actively change the LC configuration. Qemu SGX provides the user +the ability to set/clear the CPUID flag (and by extension the associated +IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR bit in fw_cfg) and saves/restores the LE Hash MSRs +when getting/putting guest state, but Qemu does not add new controls to +directly modify the LC configuration. Similar to hardware behavior, locking +the LC configuration to a non-Intel value is left to guest firmware. Unlike +host bios setting for SGX launch control(LC), there is no special bios setting +for SGX guest by our design. If host is in locked mode, we can still allow +creating VM with SGX. + +Feature Control +--------------- + +Qemu SGX updates the `etc/msr_feature_control` fw_cfg entry to set the SGX +(bit 18) and SGX LC (bit 17) flags based on their respective CPUID support, +i.e. existing guest firmware will automatically set SGX and SGX LC accordingly, +assuming said firmware supports fw_cfg.msr_feature_control. + +Launch a guest +============== + +To launch a SGX guest +${QEMU} \ + -cpu host,+sgx-provisionkey \ + -object memory-backend-epc,id=mem1,size=64M,prealloc=on \ + -object memory-backend-epc,id=mem2,size=28M \ + -M sgx-epc.0.memdev=mem1,sgx-epc.1.memdev=mem2 + +Utilizing SGX in the guest requires a kernel/OS with SGX support. + +The support can be determined in guest by: +$ grep sgx /proc/cpuinfo + +Check the SGX epc info in the Guest: +$ dmesg | grep sgx +[ 1.242142] sgx: EPC section 0x180000000-0x181bfffff +[ 1.242319] sgx: EPC section 0x181c00000-0x1837fffff + +References +========== + +SGX Homepage: +https://software.intel.com/sgx + +SGX SDK: +https://github.com/intel/linux-sgx.git + +SGX SPEC: +Intel SDM Volume 3 -- 2.31.1