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From: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	luto@kernel.org, david@redhat.com,
	"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>,
	ak@linux.intel.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	jun.nakajima@intel.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 02/12] mm/memfd: Introduce MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 21:21:11 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220118132121.31388-3-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220118132121.31388-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>

Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the
created memfd is inaccessible from userspace. It does this by force
setting F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE seal when the file is created. It also set
F_SEAL_SEAL to prevent future sealing, which means, it can not coexist
with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING.

The pages backed by such memfd will be used as guest private memory in
confidential computing environments such as Intel TDX/AMD SEV. Since
page migration/swapping is not yet supported for such usages so these
pages are currently marked as UNMOVABLE and UNEVICTABLE which makes
them behave like long-term pinned pages.

Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/uapi/linux/memfd.h |  1 +
 mm/memfd.c                 | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
index 7a8a26751c23..48750474b904 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #define MFD_CLOEXEC		0x0001U
 #define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING	0x0002U
 #define MFD_HUGETLB		0x0004U
+#define MFD_INACCESSIBLE	0x0008U
 
 /*
  * Huge page size encoding when MFD_HUGETLB is specified, and a huge page
diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
index 9f80f162791a..26998d96dc11 100644
--- a/mm/memfd.c
+++ b/mm/memfd.c
@@ -245,16 +245,19 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 #define MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(MFD_NAME_PREFIX) - 1)
 #define MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN (NAME_MAX - MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN)
 
-#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB)
+#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | \
+		       MFD_INACCESSIBLE)
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
 		const char __user *, uname,
 		unsigned int, flags)
 {
+	struct address_space *mapping;
 	unsigned int *file_seals;
 	struct file *file;
 	int fd, error;
 	char *name;
+	gfp_t gfp;
 	long len;
 
 	if (!(flags & MFD_HUGETLB)) {
@@ -267,6 +270,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	/* Disallow sealing when MFD_INACCESSIBLE is set. */
+	if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE && flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* length includes terminating zero */
 	len = strnlen_user(uname, MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN + 1);
 	if (len <= 0)
@@ -315,6 +322,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
 		*file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL;
 	}
 
+	if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE) {
+		mapping = file_inode(file)->i_mapping;
+		gfp = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping);
+		gfp &= ~__GFP_MOVABLE;
+		mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping, gfp);
+		mapping_set_unevictable(mapping);
+
+		file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file);
+		*file_seals &= F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE;
+	}
+
 	fd_install(fd, file);
 	kfree(name);
 	return fd;
-- 
2.17.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-01-18 15:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-18 13:21 [PATCH v4 00/12] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory Chao Peng
2022-01-18 13:21 ` [PATCH v4 01/12] mm/shmem: Introduce F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE Chao Peng
2022-02-07 12:24   ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-02-17 12:56     ` Chao Peng
2022-02-11 23:33   ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 13:06     ` Chao Peng
2022-02-17 19:09       ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-23 11:49         ` Chao Peng
2022-02-23 12:05           ` Steven Price
2022-03-04 19:24             ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-07 13:26               ` Chao Peng
2022-03-08 12:17                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-01-18 13:21 ` Chao Peng [this message]
2022-01-21 15:50   ` [PATCH v4 02/12] mm/memfd: Introduce MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag Steven Price
2022-01-24 13:29     ` Chao Peng
2022-02-07 18:51   ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-02-08  8:49     ` David Hildenbrand
2022-02-08 18:22       ` Mike Rapoport
2022-01-18 13:21 ` [PATCH v4 03/12] mm: Introduce memfile_notifier Chao Peng
2022-03-07 15:42   ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-03-08  1:45     ` Chao Peng
2022-01-18 13:21 ` [PATCH v4 04/12] mm/shmem: Support memfile_notifier Chao Peng
2022-02-08 18:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-17 13:10     ` Chao Peng
2022-02-11 23:40   ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 13:23     ` Chao Peng
2022-01-18 13:21 ` [PATCH v4 05/12] KVM: Extend the memslot to support fd-based private memory Chao Peng
2022-01-18 13:21 ` [PATCH v4 06/12] KVM: Use kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext Chao Peng
2022-01-18 13:21 ` [PATCH v4 07/12] KVM: Add KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_ERROR exit Chao Peng
2022-01-18 13:21 ` [PATCH v4 08/12] KVM: Use memfile_pfn_ops to obtain pfn for private pages Chao Peng
2022-01-18 13:21 ` [PATCH v4 09/12] KVM: Handle page fault for private memory Chao Peng
2022-01-18 13:21 ` [PATCH v4 10/12] KVM: Register private memslot to memory backing store Chao Peng
2022-01-18 13:21 ` [PATCH v4 11/12] KVM: Zap existing KVM mappings when pages changed in the private fd Chao Peng
2022-01-18 13:21 ` [PATCH v4 12/12] KVM: Expose KVM_MEM_PRIVATE Chao Peng
2022-01-25 20:20   ` Maciej S. Szmigiero
2022-02-17 13:45     ` Chao Peng
2022-02-22  1:16       ` Maciej S. Szmigiero
2022-02-23 12:00         ` Chao Peng
2022-02-23 18:32           ` Maciej S. Szmigiero
2022-02-24  8:07             ` Chao Peng
2022-01-28 16:47 ` [PATCH v4 00/12] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory Steven Price
2022-02-02  2:28   ` Nakajima, Jun
2022-02-02  9:23     ` Steven Price
2022-02-02 20:47       ` Nakajima, Jun
2022-02-08 18:33 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-17 13:47   ` Chao Peng

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