From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: "Kevin Wolf" <kwolf@redhat.com>,
"Eduardo Otubo" <otubo@redhat.com>,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
qemu-block@nongnu.org, "Kashyap Chamarthy" <kchamart@redhat.com>,
"Richard W.M. Jones" <rjones@redhat.com>,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <f4bug@amsat.org>,
"Hanna Reitz" <hreitz@redhat.com>
Subject: [PULL 08/10] seccomp: block setns, unshare and execveat syscalls
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 11:57:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220217115723.1782616-9-berrange@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220217115723.1782616-1-berrange@redhat.com>
setns/unshare are used to change namespaces which is not something QEMU
needs to be able todo.
execveat is a new variant of execve so should be blocked just like
execve already is.
Acked-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
softmmu/qemu-seccomp.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/softmmu/qemu-seccomp.c b/softmmu/qemu-seccomp.c
index a7bb5c350f..deaf8a4ef5 100644
--- a/softmmu/qemu-seccomp.c
+++ b/softmmu/qemu-seccomp.c
@@ -248,6 +248,11 @@ static const struct QemuSeccompSyscall denylist[] = {
{ SCMP_SYS(clone3), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_SPAWN,
0, NULL, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOSYS) },
#endif
+#ifdef __SNR_execveat
+ { SCMP_SYS(execveat), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_SPAWN },
+#endif
+ { SCMP_SYS(setns), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_SPAWN },
+ { SCMP_SYS(unshare), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_SPAWN },
/* resource control */
{ SCMP_SYS(setpriority), QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_RESOURCECTL,
0, NULL, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM) },
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-17 12:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-17 11:57 [PULL 00/10] Misc next patches Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-17 11:57 ` [PULL 01/10] block: better document SSH host key fingerprint checking Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-17 11:57 ` [PULL 02/10] block: support sha256 fingerprint with pre-blockdev options Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-17 11:57 ` [PULL 03/10] block: print the server key type and fingerprint on failure Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-17 11:57 ` [PULL 04/10] seccomp: allow action to be customized per syscall Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-17 11:57 ` [PULL 05/10] seccomp: add unit test for seccomp filtering Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-17 11:57 ` [PULL 06/10] seccomp: fix blocking of process spawning Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-17 11:57 ` [PULL 07/10] seccomp: block use of clone3 syscall Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-17 11:57 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2022-02-17 11:57 ` [PULL 09/10] MAINTAINERS: take over seccomp from Eduardo Otubo Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-17 11:57 ` [PULL 10/10] docs: expand firmware descriptor to allow flash without NVRAM Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-18 20:05 ` [PULL 00/10] Misc next patches Peter Maydell
2022-02-21 19:17 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2022-02-24 12:48 ` Peter Maydell
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