From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: "Dov Murik" <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Gerd Hoffmann" <kraxel@redhat.com>,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
"Eduardo Habkost" <eduardo@habkost.net>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Marcel Apfelbaum" <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
"Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum" <tobin@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH] x86: Don't add RNG seed to Linux cmdline for SEV guests
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2023 08:41:16 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230207084116.285787-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
Recent feature to supply RNG seed to the guest kernel modifies the
kernel command-line by adding extra data at its end; this breaks
measured boot with SEV and OVMF, and possibly signed boot.
Specifically SEV doesn't miss this feature because it uses UEFI/OVMF
which has its own way of getting random seed (not to mention that
getting the random seed from the untrusted host breaks the confidential
computing trust model).
Disable the RNG seed feature in SEV guests.
Fixes: eac7a7791bb6 ("x86: don't let decompressed kernel image clobber setup_data")
Reported-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
---
There might be a need for a wider change to the ways setup_data entries
are handled in x86_load_linux(); here I just try to restore the
situation for SEV guests prior to the addition of the SETUP_RNG_SEED
entry.
Recent discussions on other (safer?) ways to pass this setup_data entry:
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/da39abab9785aea2a2e7652ed6403b6268aeb31f.camel@linux.ibm.com/
Note that in qemu 7.2.0 this is broken as well -- there the
SETUP_RNG_SEED entry is appended to the Linux kernel data (and therefore
modifies and breaks the measurement of the kernel in SEV measured boot).
A similar fix will be needed there (but I fear this patch cannot be
applied as-is).
---
hw/i386/x86.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/i386/x86.c b/hw/i386/x86.c
index eaff4227bd..e65a83f8df 100644
--- a/hw/i386/x86.c
+++ b/hw/i386/x86.c
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
load_image_size(dtb_filename, setup_data->data, dtb_size);
}
- if (!legacy_no_rng_seed && protocol >= 0x209) {
+ if (!legacy_no_rng_seed && protocol >= 0x209 && !sev_enabled()) {
setup_data_offset = cmdline_size;
cmdline_size += sizeof(SetupData) + RNG_SEED_LENGTH;
kernel_cmdline = g_realloc(kernel_cmdline, cmdline_size);
base-commit: 6661b8c7fe3f8b5687d2d90f7b4f3f23d70e3e8b
--
2.25.1
next reply other threads:[~2023-02-07 8:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-07 8:41 Dov Murik [this message]
2023-02-07 17:28 ` [PATCH] x86: Don't add RNG seed to Linux cmdline for SEV guests Jason A. Donenfeld
2023-02-07 21:45 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-07 22:17 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2023-02-07 22:31 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-07 22:33 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2023-02-07 22:49 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2023-02-08 9:11 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-08 11:23 ` Dov Murik
2023-02-08 13:20 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-08 13:30 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2023-02-08 13:58 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-07 23:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-07 23:24 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2023-02-08 11:35 ` Dov Murik
2023-02-08 15:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-08 15:39 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-08 15:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2023-02-08 15:49 ` Dov Murik
2023-02-08 15:51 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2023-02-08 15:52 ` Dov Murik
2023-02-08 15:54 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2023-02-08 11:57 ` Dov Murik
2023-02-08 9:35 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-02-08 9:50 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-08 9:30 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-02-08 11:27 ` Dov Murik
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20230207084116.285787-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com \
--to=dovmurik@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=Jason@zx2c4.com \
--cc=berrange@redhat.com \
--cc=eduardo@habkost.net \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=kraxel@redhat.com \
--cc=marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com \
--cc=mst@redhat.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
--cc=richard.henderson@linaro.org \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=tobin@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).