From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com, mtosatti@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, weijiang.yang@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] target/i386: Add CET MSRs access interfaces
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2023 00:12:25 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230421041227.90915-3-weijiang.yang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230421041227.90915-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Add access interfaces for supported CET MSRs.
These CET MSRs include:
MSR_IA32_U_CET - store user mode CET control bits.
MSR_IA32_S_CET - store supervisor mode CET control bits.
MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP - strore user mode shadow stack pointer.
MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP - store current shadow stack pointer.
Other MSRs, i.e., MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2}_SSP and MSR_IA32_INTR_SSP_TBL
are for non-supported supervisor mode shadow stack, are ignored now.
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
---
target/i386/cpu.h | 10 ++++++++++
target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.h b/target/i386/cpu.h
index 6526a03206..b78ce8e5c4 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.h
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.h
@@ -545,6 +545,11 @@ typedef enum X86Seg {
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS 0x00000490
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC 0x00000491
+#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x000006a0
+#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x000006a2
+#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x000006a7
+#define MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP 0x4b564d09
+
#define XSTATE_FP_BIT 0
#define XSTATE_SSE_BIT 1
#define XSTATE_YMM_BIT 2
@@ -1756,6 +1761,11 @@ typedef struct CPUArchState {
uintptr_t retaddr;
+ uint64_t u_cet;
+ uint64_t s_cet;
+ uint64_t pl3_ssp;
+ uint64_t guest_ssp;
+
/* Fields up to this point are cleared by a CPU reset */
struct {} end_reset_fields;
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
index de531842f6..13fae898ce 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
@@ -3646,6 +3646,22 @@ static int kvm_put_msrs(X86CPU *cpu, int level)
}
}
+ if (((env->features[FEAT_7_0_ECX] & CPUID_7_0_ECX_CET_SHSTK) ||
+ (env->features[FEAT_7_0_EDX] & CPUID_7_0_EDX_CET_IBT)) &&
+ (env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO] & XSTATE_CET_U_MASK)) {
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET, env->u_cet);
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, env->pl3_ssp);
+ }
+
+ if ((env->features[FEAT_7_0_ECX] & CPUID_7_0_ECX_CET_SHSTK) &&
+ (env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO] & XSTATE_CET_U_MASK)) {
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP, env->guest_ssp);
+ }
+
+ if (env->features[FEAT_7_0_EDX] & CPUID_7_0_EDX_CET_IBT) {
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET, env->s_cet);
+ }
+
return kvm_buf_set_msrs(cpu);
}
@@ -4024,6 +4040,22 @@ static int kvm_get_msrs(X86CPU *cpu)
kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3, 0);
}
+ if (((env->features[FEAT_7_0_ECX] & CPUID_7_0_ECX_CET_SHSTK) ||
+ (env->features[FEAT_7_0_EDX] & CPUID_7_0_EDX_CET_IBT)) &&
+ (env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO] & XSTATE_CET_U_MASK)) {
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0);
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+ }
+
+ if ((env->features[FEAT_7_0_ECX] & CPUID_7_0_ECX_CET_SHSTK) &&
+ (env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO] & XSTATE_CET_U_MASK)) {
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (env->features[FEAT_7_0_EDX] & CPUID_7_0_EDX_CET_IBT) {
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0);
+ }
+
if (env->features[FEAT_XSAVE] & CPUID_D_1_EAX_XFD) {
kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_XFD, 0);
kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, 0);
@@ -4346,6 +4378,18 @@ static int kvm_get_msrs(X86CPU *cpu)
env->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash[index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0] =
msrs[i].data;
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
+ env->u_cet = msrs[i].data;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
+ env->s_cet = msrs[i].data;
+ break;
+ case MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
+ env->pl3_ssp = msrs[i].data;
+ break;
+ case MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP:
+ env->guest_ssp = msrs[i].data;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_XFD:
env->msr_xfd = msrs[i].data;
break;
--
2.27.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-21 7:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-21 4:12 [PATCH 0/4] Enable VMM userspace support for CET virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 4:12 ` [PATCH 1/4] target/i386: Enable XSAVES support for user mode CET states Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 4:12 ` Yang Weijiang [this message]
2023-04-21 4:12 ` [PATCH 3/4] target/i386: Enable CET states migration Yang Weijiang
2023-04-21 4:12 ` [PATCH 4/4] target/i386: Advertise CET flags in feature words Yang Weijiang
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