From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Wei Liu" <wei.liu@kernel.org>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Sean Christopherson" <seanjc@google.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
"Wanpeng Li" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
"Alexander Graf" <graf@amazon.com>,
"Forrest Yuan Yu" <yuanyu@google.com>,
"James Morris" <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
"John Andersen" <john.s.andersen@intel.com>,
"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Marian Rotariu" <marian.c.rotariu@gmail.com>,
"Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>,
"Nicușor Cîțu" <nicu.citu@icloud.com>,
"Rick Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
"Thara Gopinath" <tgopinath@microsoft.com>,
"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
"Zahra Tarkhani" <ztarkhani@microsoft.com>,
"Ștefan Șicleru" <ssicleru@bitdefender.com>,
dev@lists.cloudhypervisor.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, x86@kernel.org,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 5/9] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to lock control registers
Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 16:16:09 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202305301614.BF8D80D3D5@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <901ff104-215c-8e81-fbae-5ecd8fa94449@digikod.net>
On Mon, May 29, 2023 at 06:48:03PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> On 08/05/2023 23:11, Wei Liu wrote:
> > On Fri, May 05, 2023 at 05:20:42PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > > This enables guests to lock their CR0 and CR4 registers with a subset of
> > > X86_CR0_WP, X86_CR4_SMEP, X86_CR4_SMAP, X86_CR4_UMIP, X86_CR4_FSGSBASE
> > > and X86_CR4_CET flags.
> > >
> > > The new KVM_HC_LOCK_CR_UPDATE hypercall takes two arguments. The first
> > > is to identify the control register, and the second is a bit mask to
> > > pin (i.e. mark as read-only).
> > >
> > > These register flags should already be pinned by Linux guests, but once
> > > compromised, this self-protection mechanism could be disabled, which is
> > > not the case with this dedicated hypercall.
> > >
> > > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> > > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> > > Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
> > > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > > Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
> > > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> > > Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505152046.6575-6-mic@digikod.net
> > [...]
> > > hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE);
> > > if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu))
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > index ffab64d08de3..a529455359ac 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > @@ -7927,11 +7927,77 @@ static unsigned long emulator_get_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr)
> > > return value;
> > > }
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_HEKI
> > > +
> > > +extern unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask;
> > > +
> >
> > Can this be moved to a header file?
>
> Yep, but I'm not sure which one. Any preference Kees?
Uh, er, I was never expecting that mask to be non-static. ;) To that
end, how about putting it in arch/x86/kvm/x86.h ?
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-30 23:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-05 15:20 [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 1/9] KVM: x86: Add kvm_x86_ops.fault_gva() Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 2/9] KVM: x86/mmu: Add support for prewrite page tracking Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 16:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-05 16:49 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 17:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-24 20:53 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 3/9] virt: Implement Heki common code Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-08 17:29 ` Wei Liu
2023-05-17 12:47 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-05-29 16:03 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 4/9] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to set EPT permissions Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 16:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-05 17:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 17:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 5/9] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to lock control registers Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-08 21:11 ` Wei Liu
2023-05-29 16:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-30 23:16 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 6/9] KVM: x86: Add Heki hypervisor support Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-08 21:18 ` Wei Liu
2023-05-26 16:49 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 7/9] KVM: VMX: Add MBEC support Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 8/9] KVM: x86/mmu: Enable guests to lock themselves thanks to MBEC Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 15:20 ` [PATCH v1 9/9] virt: Add Heki KUnit tests Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-24 21:04 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity Trilok Soni
2023-05-25 13:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-25 18:34 ` Trilok Soni
2023-05-30 9:54 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-24 22:20 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-25 0:37 ` Trilok Soni
2023-05-25 13:59 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-25 15:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-25 16:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-25 19:16 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-05-26 15:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-26 15:22 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-30 16:23 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
[not found] ` <ZHes4a73Zg+6JuFB@google.com>
2023-06-02 15:07 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-26 2:36 ` James Morris
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