From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
To: "Alex Bennée" <alex.bennee@linaro.org>,
"Laurent Vivier" <laurent@vivier.eu>,
"Peter Maydell" <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
"David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@linaro.org>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-arm@nongnu.org,
qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, "Ilya Leoshkevich" <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/8] linux-user: Expose do_guest_openat() and do_guest_readlink()
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 15:27:36 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230606132743.1386003-2-iii@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230606132743.1386003-1-iii@linux.ibm.com>
These functions will be required by the GDB stub in order to provide
the guest view of /proc to GDB.
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
---
linux-user/qemu.h | 3 +++
linux-user/syscall.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/linux-user/qemu.h b/linux-user/qemu.h
index 92f9f5af41c..a5830ec2396 100644
--- a/linux-user/qemu.h
+++ b/linux-user/qemu.h
@@ -165,6 +165,9 @@ typedef struct TaskState {
} TaskState;
abi_long do_brk(abi_ulong new_brk);
+int do_guest_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *pathname,
+ int flags, mode_t mode);
+ssize_t do_guest_readlink(const char *pathname, char *buf, size_t bufsiz);
/* user access */
diff --git a/linux-user/syscall.c b/linux-user/syscall.c
index 83685f0aa59..2d3070cfd62 100644
--- a/linux-user/syscall.c
+++ b/linux-user/syscall.c
@@ -8448,7 +8448,8 @@ static int open_hardware(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int fd)
}
#endif
-static int do_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode)
+int do_guest_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *pathname,
+ int flags, mode_t mode)
{
struct fake_open {
const char *filename;
@@ -8520,6 +8521,36 @@ static int do_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *pathname, int
return safe_openat(dirfd, path(pathname), flags, mode);
}
+ssize_t do_guest_readlink(const char *pathname, char *buf, size_t bufsiz)
+{
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ if (!pathname || !buf) {
+ errno = EFAULT;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!bufsiz) {
+ /* Short circuit this for the magic exe check. */
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (is_proc_myself((const char *)pathname, "exe")) {
+ /*
+ * Don't worry about sign mismatch as earlier mapping
+ * logic would have thrown a bad address error.
+ */
+ ret = MIN(strlen(exec_path), bufsiz);
+ /* We cannot NUL terminate the string. */
+ memcpy(buf, exec_path, ret);
+ } else {
+ ret = readlink(path(pathname), buf, bufsiz);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int do_execveat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd,
abi_long pathname, abi_long guest_argp,
abi_long guest_envp, int flags)
@@ -8994,7 +9025,7 @@ static abi_long do_syscall1(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1,
case TARGET_NR_open:
if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg1)))
return -TARGET_EFAULT;
- ret = get_errno(do_openat(cpu_env, AT_FDCWD, p,
+ ret = get_errno(do_guest_openat(cpu_env, AT_FDCWD, p,
target_to_host_bitmask(arg2, fcntl_flags_tbl),
arg3));
fd_trans_unregister(ret);
@@ -9004,7 +9035,7 @@ static abi_long do_syscall1(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1,
case TARGET_NR_openat:
if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg2)))
return -TARGET_EFAULT;
- ret = get_errno(do_openat(cpu_env, arg1, p,
+ ret = get_errno(do_guest_openat(cpu_env, arg1, p,
target_to_host_bitmask(arg3, fcntl_flags_tbl),
arg4));
fd_trans_unregister(ret);
@@ -10229,22 +10260,7 @@ static abi_long do_syscall1(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1,
void *p2;
p = lock_user_string(arg1);
p2 = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, arg2, arg3, 0);
- if (!p || !p2) {
- ret = -TARGET_EFAULT;
- } else if (!arg3) {
- /* Short circuit this for the magic exe check. */
- ret = -TARGET_EINVAL;
- } else if (is_proc_myself((const char *)p, "exe")) {
- /*
- * Don't worry about sign mismatch as earlier mapping
- * logic would have thrown a bad address error.
- */
- ret = MIN(strlen(exec_path), arg3);
- /* We cannot NUL terminate the string. */
- memcpy(p2, exec_path, ret);
- } else {
- ret = get_errno(readlink(path(p), p2, arg3));
- }
+ ret = get_errno(do_guest_readlink(p, p2, arg3));
unlock_user(p2, arg2, ret);
unlock_user(p, arg1, 0);
}
--
2.40.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-06 13:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-06 13:27 [PATCH v3 0/8] gdbstub: Add support for info proc mappings Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-06-06 13:27 ` Ilya Leoshkevich [this message]
2023-06-06 16:33 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] linux-user: Expose do_guest_openat() and do_guest_readlink() Richard Henderson
2023-06-06 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] linux-user: Add "safe" parameter to do_guest_openat() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-06-06 18:24 ` Richard Henderson
2023-06-06 19:29 ` Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-06-06 20:35 ` Richard Henderson
2023-06-06 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] linux-user: Emulate /proc/self/smaps Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-06-06 18:00 ` Richard Henderson
2023-06-06 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] gdbstub: Expose gdb_get_process() and gdb_get_first_cpu_in_process() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-06-06 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] gdbstub: Report the actual qemu-user pid Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-06-06 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] gdbstub: Add support for info proc mappings Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-06-21 10:19 ` Alex Bennée
2023-06-06 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] docs: Document security implications of debugging Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-06-06 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] tests/tcg: Add a test for info proc mappings Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-06-21 10:21 ` Alex Bennée
2023-06-21 13:48 ` Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-06-21 14:43 ` Alex Bennée
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