[PATCH v4 07/24] nbd/client: Add safety check on chunk payload length

[Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>]

Our existing use of structured replies either reads into a qiov capped
at 32M (NBD_CMD_READ) or caps allocation to 1000 bytes (see
NBD_MAX_MALLOC_PAYLOAD in block/nbd.c).  But the existing length
checks are rather late; if we encounter a buggy (or malicious) server
that sends a super-large payload length, we should drop the connection
right then rather than assuming the layer on top will be careful.
This becomes more important when we permit 64-bit lengths which are
even more likely to have the potential for attempted denial of service
abuse.

Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@yandex-team.ru>
---

v4: sink this later in series [Vladimir]
---
 nbd/client.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/nbd/client.c b/nbd/client.c
index ea3590ca3d0..1b5569556fe 100644
--- a/nbd/client.c
+++ b/nbd/client.c
@@ -1413,6 +1413,18 @@ static int nbd_receive_structured_reply_chunk(QIOChannel *ioc,
     chunk->cookie = be64_to_cpu(chunk->cookie);
     chunk->length = be32_to_cpu(chunk->length);

+    /*
+     * Because we use BLOCK_STATUS with REQ_ONE, and cap READ requests
+     * at 32M, no valid server should send us payload larger than
+     * this.  Even if we stopped using REQ_ONE, sane servers will cap
+     * the number of extents they return for block status.
+     */
+    if (chunk->length > NBD_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE + sizeof(NBDStructuredReadData)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "server chunk %" PRIu32 " (%s) payload is too long",
+                   chunk->type, nbd_rep_lookup(chunk->type));
+        return -EINVAL;
+    }
+
     return 0;
 }

-- 
2.40.1