From: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
To: qemu-arm@nongnu.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: [PATCH 06/14] target/arm/ptw: Pass an ARMSecuritySpace to arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate()
Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2023 16:46:40 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230714154648.327466-7-peter.maydell@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230714154648.327466-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org>
arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate() takes a bool secure, which it uses to
determine whether EL2 is enabled in the current security state.
With the advent of FEAT_RME this is no longer sufficient, because
EL2 can be enabled for Secure state but not for Root, and both
of those will pass 'secure == true' in the callsites in ptw.c.
As it happens in all of our callsites in ptw.c we either avoid making
the call or else avoid using the returned value if we're doing a
translation for Root, so this is not a behaviour change even if the
experimental FEAT_RME is enabled. But it is less confusing in the
ptw.c code if we avoid the use of a bool secure that duplicates some
of the information in the ArmSecuritySpace argument.
Make arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate() take an ARMSecuritySpace argument
instead.
Note that since arm_hcr_el2_eff() uses the return value from
arm_security_space_below_el3() for the 'space' argument, its
behaviour does not change even when at EL3 (Root security state) and
it continues to tell you what EL2 would be if you were in it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
---
target/arm/cpu.h | 2 +-
target/arm/helper.c | 7 ++++---
target/arm/ptw.c | 13 +++++--------
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h
index 4d6c0f95d59..3743a9e2f8a 100644
--- a/target/arm/cpu.h
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.h
@@ -2555,7 +2555,7 @@ static inline bool arm_is_el2_enabled(CPUARMState *env)
* "for all purposes other than a direct read or write access of HCR_EL2."
* Not included here is HCR_RW.
*/
-uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secure);
+uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(CPUARMState *env, ARMSecuritySpace space);
uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env);
uint64_t arm_hcrx_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env);
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
index d08c058e424..1e45fdb47c9 100644
--- a/target/arm/helper.c
+++ b/target/arm/helper.c
@@ -5731,11 +5731,12 @@ static void hcr_writelow(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
* Bits that are not included here:
* RW (read from SCR_EL3.RW as needed)
*/
-uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secure)
+uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(CPUARMState *env, ARMSecuritySpace space)
{
uint64_t ret = env->cp15.hcr_el2;
- if (!arm_is_el2_enabled_secstate(env, secure)) {
+ if (space == ARMSS_Root ||
+ !arm_is_el2_enabled_secstate(env, arm_space_is_secure(space))) {
/*
* "This register has no effect if EL2 is not enabled in the
* current Security state". This is ARMv8.4-SecEL2 speak for
@@ -5799,7 +5800,7 @@ uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env)
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
return 0;
}
- return arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, arm_is_secure_below_el3(env));
+ return arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, arm_security_space_below_el3(env));
}
/*
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
index 63dd8e3cbe1..9e45160e1ba 100644
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
@@ -209,9 +209,9 @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
ARMSecuritySpace space)
{
uint64_t hcr_el2;
- bool is_secure = arm_space_is_secure(space);
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
+ bool is_secure = arm_space_is_secure(space);
switch (env->v7m.mpu_ctrl[is_secure] &
(R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_ENABLE_MASK | R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_HFNMIENA_MASK)) {
case R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_ENABLE_MASK:
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
}
}
- hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
+ hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, space);
switch (mmu_idx) {
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
@@ -530,7 +530,6 @@ static bool fault_s1ns(ARMSecuritySpace space, ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx)
static bool S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
hwaddr addr, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
{
- bool is_secure = ptw->in_secure;
ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = ptw->in_mmu_idx;
ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = ptw->in_ptw_idx;
uint8_t pte_attrs;
@@ -587,7 +586,7 @@ static bool S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
}
if (regime_is_stage2(s2_mmu_idx)) {
- uint64_t hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
+ uint64_t hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, ptw->in_space);
if ((hcr & HCR_PTW) && S2_attrs_are_device(hcr, pte_attrs)) {
/*
@@ -3066,7 +3065,6 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_disabled(CPUARMState *env,
ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
{
ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = ptw->in_mmu_idx;
- bool is_secure = arm_space_is_secure(ptw->in_space);
uint8_t memattr = 0x00; /* Device nGnRnE */
uint8_t shareability = 0; /* non-shareable */
int r_el;
@@ -3112,7 +3110,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_disabled(CPUARMState *env,
/* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */
if (r_el == 1) {
- uint64_t hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
+ uint64_t hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, ptw->in_space);
if (hcr & HCR_DC) {
if (hcr & HCR_DCT) {
memattr = 0xf0; /* Tagged, Normal, WB, RWA */
@@ -3149,7 +3147,6 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_twostage(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
{
hwaddr ipa;
int s1_prot, s1_lgpgsz;
- bool is_secure = ptw->in_secure;
ARMSecuritySpace in_space = ptw->in_space;
bool ret, ipa_secure;
ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs1;
@@ -3212,7 +3209,7 @@ static bool get_phys_addr_twostage(CPUARMState *env, S1Translate *ptw,
}
/* Combine the S1 and S2 cache attributes. */
- hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
+ hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, in_space);
if (hcr & HCR_DC) {
/*
* HCR.DC forces the first stage attributes to
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-14 15:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-14 15:46 [PATCH 00/14] target/arm/ptw: Cleanups and a few bugfixes Peter Maydell
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 01/14] target/arm/ptw: Don't set fi->s1ptw for UnsuppAtomicUpdate fault Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 9:22 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 02/14] target/arm/ptw: Don't report GPC faults on stage 1 ptw as stage2 faults Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 9:34 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 03/14] target/arm/ptw: Set s1ns bit in fault info more consistently Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 9:54 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 04/14] target/arm/ptw: Pass ptw into get_phys_addr_pmsa*() and get_phys_addr_disabled() Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 10:25 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 05/14] target/arm/ptw: Pass ARMSecurityState to regime_translation_disabled() Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 10:25 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` Peter Maydell [this message]
2023-07-23 15:24 ` [PATCH 06/14] target/arm/ptw: Pass an ARMSecuritySpace to arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate() Richard Henderson
2023-07-24 13:42 ` Peter Maydell
2023-07-24 14:38 ` Peter Maydell
2023-07-25 18:36 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 07/14] target/arm/ptw: Only fold in NSTable bit effects in Secure state Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 15:29 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 08/14] target/arm/ptw: Remove last uses of ptw->in_secure Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 15:35 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 09/14] target/arm/ptw: Remove S1Translate::in_secure Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 15:48 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 10/14] target/arm/ptw: Drop S1Translate::out_secure Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 15:49 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 11/14] target/arm/ptw: Set attributes correctly for MMU disabled data accesses Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 15:50 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 12/14] target/arm/ptw: Check for block descriptors at invalid levels Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 15:58 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 13/14] target/arm/ptw: Report stage 2 fault level for stage 2 faults on stage 1 ptw Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 16:00 ` Richard Henderson
2023-07-14 15:46 ` [PATCH 14/14] target/arm: Adjust PAR_EL1.SH for Device and Normal-NC memory types Peter Maydell
2023-07-23 16:02 ` Richard Henderson
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