From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: xiaoyao.li@intel.com, michael.roth@amd.com, david@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 16/26] target/i386: SEV: use KVM_SEV_INIT2 if possible
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 19:11:06 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240322181116.1228416-17-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240322181116.1228416-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Implement support for the KVM_X86_SEV_VM and KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM virtual
machine types, and the KVM_SEV_INIT2 function of KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP.
These replace the KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT functions, and have
several advantages:
- sharing the initialization sequence with SEV-SNP and TDX
- allowing arguments including the set of desired VMSA features
- protection against invalid use of KVM_GET/SET_* ioctls for guests
with encrypted state
If the KVM_X86_SEV_VM and KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM types are not supported,
fall back to KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT (which use the
default x86 VM type).
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 2 ++
target/i386/sev.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
index b599a7fae36..2577e345502 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
@@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ static int kvm_get_one_msr(X86CPU *cpu, int index, uint64_t *value);
static const char *vm_type_name[] = {
[KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM] = "default",
+ [KVM_X86_SEV_VM] = "SEV",
+ [KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM] = "SEV-ES",
};
bool kvm_is_vm_type_supported(int type)
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index ebe36d4c10c..9dab4060b84 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include "qemu/error-report.h"
#include "crypto/hash.h"
#include "sysemu/kvm.h"
+#include "kvm/kvm_i386.h"
#include "sev.h"
#include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
#include "sysemu/runstate.h"
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST)
struct SevGuestState {
X86ConfidentialGuest parent_obj;
+ int kvm_type;
+
/* configuration parameters */
char *sev_device;
uint32_t policy;
@@ -850,6 +853,26 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, bool running, RunState state)
}
}
+static int sev_kvm_type(X86ConfidentialGuest *cg)
+{
+ SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cg);
+ int kvm_type;
+
+ if (sev->kvm_type != -1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ kvm_type = (sev->policy & SEV_POLICY_ES) ? KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM : KVM_X86_SEV_VM;
+ if (kvm_is_vm_type_supported(kvm_type)) {
+ sev->kvm_type = kvm_type;
+ } else {
+ sev->kvm_type = KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM;
+ }
+
+out:
+ return sev->kvm_type;
+}
+
static int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
{
SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs);
@@ -929,13 +952,19 @@ static int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
__func__);
goto err;
}
- cmd = KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
- } else {
- cmd = KVM_SEV_INIT;
}
trace_kvm_sev_init();
- ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, cmd, NULL, &fw_error);
+ if (sev_kvm_type(X86_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST(sev)) == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM) {
+ cmd = sev_es_enabled() ? KVM_SEV_ES_INIT : KVM_SEV_INIT;
+
+ ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, cmd, NULL, &fw_error);
+ } else {
+ struct kvm_sev_init args = { 0 };
+
+ ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &args, &fw_error);
+ }
+
if (ret) {
error_setg(errp, "%s: failed to initialize ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
__func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
@@ -1327,8 +1356,10 @@ static void
sev_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
{
ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_CLASS(oc);
+ X86ConfidentialGuestClass *x86_klass = X86_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_CLASS(oc);
klass->kvm_init = sev_kvm_init;
+ x86_klass->kvm_type = sev_kvm_type;
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "sev-device",
sev_guest_get_sev_device,
@@ -1357,6 +1388,8 @@ sev_guest_instance_init(Object *obj)
{
SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(obj);
+ sev->kvm_type = -1;
+
sev->sev_device = g_strdup(DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE);
sev->policy = DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY;
object_property_add_uint32_ptr(obj, "policy", &sev->policy,
--
2.44.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-22 18:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-22 18:10 [PATCH for-9.1 00/26] x86, kvm: common confidential computing subset Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:10 ` [PATCH 01/26] pci-host/q35: Move PAM initialization above SMRAM initialization Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:10 ` [PATCH 02/26] q35: Introduce smm_ranges property for q35-pci-host Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:10 ` [PATCH 03/26] confidential guest support: Add kvm_init() and kvm_reset() in class Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-25 8:32 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2024-03-25 10:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:10 ` [PATCH 04/26] i386/sev: Switch to use confidential_guest_kvm_init() Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:10 ` [PATCH 05/26] ppc/pef: switch to use confidential_guest_kvm_init/reset() Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:10 ` [PATCH 06/26] s390: Switch to use confidential_guest_kvm_init() Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:10 ` [PATCH 07/26] scripts/update-linux-headers: Add setup_data.h to import list Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:10 ` [PATCH 08/26] scripts/update-linux-headers: Add bits.h to file imports Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:10 ` [PATCH 09/26] [HACK] linux-headers: Update headers for 6.8 + kvm-coco-queue + SNP Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 10/26] [TO SQUASH] hw/i386: Remove redeclaration of struct setup_data Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 11/26] runstate: skip initial CPU reset if reset is not actually possible Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-25 8:58 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-03-25 9:32 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 12/26] KVM: track whether guest state is encrypted Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-25 9:25 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2024-03-26 15:48 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-27 9:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 13/26] KVM: remove kvm_arch_cpu_check_are_resettable Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-25 9:26 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 14/26] target/i386: introduce x86-confidential-guest Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 15/26] target/i386: Implement mc->kvm_type() to get VM type Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-25 9:29 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2024-03-25 10:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:11 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 17/26] trace/kvm: Split address space and slot id in trace_kvm_set_user_memory() Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 18/26] kvm: Introduce support for memory_attributes Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-25 9:31 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 19/26] RAMBlock: Add support of KVM private guest memfd Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:53 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 20/26] kvm: Enable KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 for memslot Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 21/26] kvm/memory: Make memory type private by default if it has guest memfd backend Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-26 8:56 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 22/26] HostMem: Add mechanism to opt in kvm guest memfd via MachineState Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 23/26] RAMBlock: make guest_memfd require uncoordinated discard Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 24/26] physmem: Introduce ram_block_discard_guest_memfd_range() Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 25/26] kvm: handle KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-26 8:53 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-22 18:11 ` [PATCH 26/26] i386/kvm: Move architectural CPUID leaf generation to separate helper Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-01 15:03 ` Xiaoyao Li
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