From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, "Eduardo Habkost" <eduardo@habkost.net>,
"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
"Marcel Apfelbaum" <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@linaro.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Yanan Wang" <wangyanan55@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] x86/loader: expose unpatched kernel
Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2024 09:26:09 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240602092541-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240411094830.1337658-5-kraxel@redhat.com>
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 11:48:28AM +0200, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
> Add a new "etc/boot/kernel" fw_cfg file, containing the kernel without
> the setup header patches. Intended use is booting in UEFI with secure
> boot enabled, where the setup header patching breaks secure boot
> verification.
>
> Needs OVMF changes too to be actually useful.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
So given we have this, do we still need patch 2?
> ---
> hw/i386/x86.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/hw/i386/x86.c b/hw/i386/x86.c
> index 6f75948b3021..6724e408e576 100644
> --- a/hw/i386/x86.c
> +++ b/hw/i386/x86.c
> @@ -1125,6 +1125,9 @@ void x86_load_linux(X86MachineState *x86ms,
> sev_load_ctx.setup_data = (char *)setup;
> sev_load_ctx.setup_size = setup_size;
>
> + /* kernel without setup header patches */
> + fw_cfg_add_file(fw_cfg, "etc/boot/kernel", kernel, kernel_size);
> +
> if (sev_enabled()) {
> sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(&sev_load_ctx, &error_fatal);
> }
> --
> 2.44.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-02 13:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-11 9:48 [PATCH 0/5] x86/loader: secure boot support for direct kernel load Gerd Hoffmann
2024-04-11 9:48 ` [PATCH 1/5] vl: fix qemu_validate_options() indention Gerd Hoffmann
2024-11-18 12:35 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2024-04-11 9:48 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/loader: only patch linux kernels Gerd Hoffmann
2024-12-17 11:09 ` Michael Tokarev
2024-12-17 14:12 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2024-04-11 9:48 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86/loader: read complete kernel Gerd Hoffmann
2024-04-11 9:48 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/loader: expose unpatched kernel Gerd Hoffmann
2024-06-02 13:26 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2024-06-03 9:00 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2024-04-11 9:48 ` [PATCH 5/5] x86/loader: add -shim option Gerd Hoffmann
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