From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: richard.henderson@linaro.org
Subject: [PATCH 06/11] target/i386: disable/enable breakpoints on vmentry/vmexit
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2024 09:18:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240604071833.962574-7-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240604071833.962574-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
If the required DR7 (either from the VMCB or from the host save
area) disables a breakpoint that was enabled prior to vmentry
or vmexit, it is left enabled and will trigger EXCP_DEBUG.
This causes a spurious #DB on the next crossing of the breakpoint.
To disable it, vmentry/vmexit must use cpu_x86_update_dr7
to load DR7.
Because cpu_x86_update_dr7 takes a 32-bit argument, check
reserved bits prior to calling cpu_x86_update_dr7, and do the
same for DR6 as well for consistency.
This scenario is tested by the "host_rflags" test in kvm-unit-tests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/tcg/sysemu/svm_helper.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/tcg/sysemu/svm_helper.c b/target/i386/tcg/sysemu/svm_helper.c
index 5d6de2294fa..922d8964f8e 100644
--- a/target/i386/tcg/sysemu/svm_helper.c
+++ b/target/i386/tcg/sysemu/svm_helper.c
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ void helper_vmrun(CPUX86State *env, int aflag, int next_eip_addend)
uint64_t new_cr0;
uint64_t new_cr3;
uint64_t new_cr4;
+ uint64_t new_dr6;
+ uint64_t new_dr7;
if (aflag == 2) {
addr = env->regs[R_EAX];
@@ -361,20 +363,22 @@ void helper_vmrun(CPUX86State *env, int aflag, int next_eip_addend)
env->vm_vmcb + offsetof(struct vmcb, save.rsp));
env->regs[R_EAX] = x86_ldq_phys(cs,
env->vm_vmcb + offsetof(struct vmcb, save.rax));
- env->dr[7] = x86_ldq_phys(cs,
- env->vm_vmcb + offsetof(struct vmcb, save.dr7));
- env->dr[6] = x86_ldq_phys(cs,
- env->vm_vmcb + offsetof(struct vmcb, save.dr6));
+
+ new_dr7 = x86_ldq_phys(cs, env->vm_vmcb + offsetof(struct vmcb, save.dr7));
+ new_dr6 = x86_ldq_phys(cs, env->vm_vmcb + offsetof(struct vmcb, save.dr6));
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
- if (env->dr[6] & DR_RESERVED_MASK) {
+ if (new_dr7 & DR_RESERVED_MASK) {
cpu_vmexit(env, SVM_EXIT_ERR, 0, GETPC());
}
- if (env->dr[7] & DR_RESERVED_MASK) {
+ if (new_dr6 & DR_RESERVED_MASK) {
cpu_vmexit(env, SVM_EXIT_ERR, 0, GETPC());
}
#endif
+ cpu_x86_update_dr7(env, new_dr7);
+ env->dr[6] = new_dr6;
+
if (is_efer_invalid_state(env)) {
cpu_vmexit(env, SVM_EXIT_ERR, 0, GETPC());
}
@@ -864,8 +868,11 @@ void do_vmexit(CPUX86State *env)
env->dr[6] = x86_ldq_phys(cs,
env->vm_hsave + offsetof(struct vmcb, save.dr6));
- env->dr[7] = x86_ldq_phys(cs,
- env->vm_hsave + offsetof(struct vmcb, save.dr7));
+
+ /* Disables all breakpoints in the host DR7 register. */
+ cpu_x86_update_dr7(env,
+ x86_ldq_phys(cs,
+ env->vm_hsave + offsetof(struct vmcb, save.dr7)) & ~0xff);
/* other setups */
x86_stl_phys(cs,
@@ -891,8 +898,6 @@ void do_vmexit(CPUX86State *env)
from the page table indicated the host's CR3. If the PDPEs contain
illegal state, the processor causes a shutdown. */
- /* Disables all breakpoints in the host DR7 register. */
-
/* Checks the reloaded host state for consistency. */
/* If the host's rIP reloaded by #VMEXIT is outside the limit of the
--
2.45.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-04 7:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-04 7:18 [PATCH 00/11] target/i386: fixes for INHIBIT_IRQ, TF and RF Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 7:18 ` [PATCH 01/11] target/i386: fix pushed value of EFLAGS.RF Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 10:51 ` Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 7:18 ` [PATCH 02/11] target/i386: fix implementation of ICEBP Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 13:50 ` Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 7:18 ` [PATCH 03/11] target/i386: cleanup HLT helpers Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 10:54 ` Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 7:18 ` [PATCH 04/11] target/i386: cleanup PAUSE helpers Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 10:59 ` Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 14:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 7:18 ` [PATCH 05/11] target/i386: implement DR7.GD Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 13:22 ` Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 7:18 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2024-06-04 13:24 ` [PATCH 06/11] target/i386: disable/enable breakpoints on vmentry/vmexit Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 7:18 ` [PATCH 07/11] target/i386: fix INHIBIT_IRQ/TF/RF handling for VMRUN Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 13:28 ` Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 7:18 ` [PATCH 08/11] target/i386: fix INHIBIT_IRQ/TF/RF handling for PAUSE Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 13:44 ` Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 13:49 ` Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 14:10 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 14:14 ` Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 7:18 ` [PATCH 09/11] target/i386: fix TF/RF handling for HLT Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 13:46 ` Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 7:18 ` [PATCH 10/11] target/i386: document incorrect semantics of watchpoint following MOV/POP SS Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 13:57 ` Richard Henderson
2024-06-04 7:18 ` [PATCH 11/11] target/i386: document use of DISAS_NORETURN Paolo Bonzini
2024-06-04 13:58 ` Richard Henderson
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