* [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support
@ 2024-08-10 16:44 Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-10 16:44 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] machine/nitro-enclave: New machine type for AWS Nitro Enclaves Dorjoy Chowdhury
` (5 more replies)
0 siblings, 6 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Dorjoy Chowdhury @ 2024-08-10 16:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo,
mst, marcel.apfelbaum, berrange, philmd
This is v3 submission for AWS Nitro Enclave emulation in QEMU. From the QEMU side
the implementation for nitro enclaves is complete. A lot of changes from v2 so all
the patches need to be reviewed. v2 is at:
https://mail.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2024-06/msg00012.html
Changes in v3:
- Support for virtio-nsm device
- The EIF related logic has been removed from microvm.c i.e., the logic is
contained in enclave related code
- For vsock emulation in nitro-enclave, now vhost-user-vsock is being used
instead of vhost-vsock (more details in the cover-letter below)
- updated documentation accordingly
Changes in v2:
- moved eif.c and eif.h files from hw/i386 to hw/core
Hi,
Hope everyone is doing well. This is a patch series adding AWS Nitro Enclave[1]
emulation support in QEMU. Alexander Graf is mentoring me on this work. I have
a gitlab branch where you can view the patches in the gitlab web UI for each commit:
https://gitlab.com/dorjoy03/qemu/-/tree/nitro-enclave-emulation
AWS nitro enclaves is an Amazon EC2[2] feature that allows creating isolated
execution environments, called enclaves, from Amazon EC2 instances, which are
used for processing highly sensitive data. Enclaves have no persistent storage
and no external networking. The enclave VMs are based on Firecracker microvm
and have a vhost-vsock device for communication with the parent EC2 instance
that spawned it and a Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device for cryptographic
attestation. The parent instance VM always has CID 3 while the enclave VM gets
a dynamic CID. The enclave VMs can communicate with the parent instance over
various ports to CID 3, for example, the init process inside an enclave sends a
heartbeat to port 9000 upon boot, expecting a heartbeat reply, letting the
parent instance know that the enclave VM has successfully booted.
From inside an EC2 instance, nitro-cli[3] is used to spawn an enclave VM using
an EIF (Enclave Image Format)[4] file. EIF files can be built using nitro-cli
as well. The EIF specification can be found in the README of the github
aws-nitro-enclaves-image-format repository[4]. An EIF file contains the kernel,
cmdline and ramdisk(s) in different sections which are used to boot the enclave
VM.
Adding nitro enclave emulation support in QEMU will make the life of AWS Nitro
Enclave users easier as they will be able to test their EIF images locally
without having to run real nitro enclaves which can be difficult for debugging
due to its roots in security. This will also make quick prototyping easier.
In QEMU, the new nitro-enclave machine type is implemented based on the microvm
machine type similar to how AWS Nitro Enclaves are based on Firecracker microvm.
The vsock emulation support is added using vhost-user-vsock device. This is
needed as nitro VMs always talk to parent VM (CID 3) but there is no support for
sibling VM communication in vhost-vsock. So to run nitro-enclave, a process that
does vsock emulation in user-space like vhost-device-vsock[5] from rust-vmm must
be run. I am working on adding proxying using vsock (right now it uses unix
domain socket) to the host machine in vhost-device-vsock which I will be posting
a PR to the rust-vmm repo. This will allow users to run the necessary parent VM
applications in the host machine instead of a separate VM with CID 3. Once that
work is done, I will update the documentation in docs/system/i386/nitro-enclave.rst
accordingly.
A new device virtio-nsm support has been added to QEMU. This device is built-into
the nitro-enclave VM. The virtio-nsm spec can be found here[6].
For local testing you need to generate a hello.eif image by first building
nitro-cli locally[7]. Then you can use nitro-cli to build a hello.eif image[8].
More details about testing can be found in the docs/system/i386/nitro-enclave.rst
file.
Thanks.
Regards,
Dorjoy
[1] https://docs.aws.amazon.com/enclaves/latest/user/nitro-enclave.html
[2] https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/
[3] https://docs.aws.amazon.com/enclaves/latest/user/getting-started.html
[4] https://github.com/aws/aws-nitro-enclaves-image-format?tab=readme-ov-file#enclave-image-file-eif-specification
[5] https://github.com/rust-vmm/vhost-device/tree/main/vhost-device-vsock
[6] https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/virtio-comment/202310/msg00387.html
[7] https://github.com/aws/aws-nitro-enclaves-cli/blob/main/docs/ubuntu_20.04_how_to_install_nitro_cli_from_github_sources.md
[8] https://github.com/aws/aws-nitro-enclaves-cli/blob/main/examples/x86_64/hello/README.md
Dorjoy Chowdhury (5):
machine/nitro-enclave: New machine type for AWS Nitro Enclaves
machine/nitro-enclave: Add vhost-user-vsock device
device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device
machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in Nitro Secure Module device
docs/nitro-enclave: Documentation for nitro-enclave machine type
MAINTAINERS | 17 +
backends/hostmem-memfd.c | 2 -
configs/devices/i386-softmmu/default.mak | 1 +
docs/system/i386/nitro-enclave.rst | 80 +
hw/core/eif.c | 707 ++++++++
hw/core/eif.h | 22 +
hw/core/machine.c | 71 +-
hw/core/meson.build | 3 +
hw/i386/Kconfig | 6 +
hw/i386/meson.build | 1 +
hw/i386/microvm.c | 6 +-
hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 299 ++++
hw/virtio/Kconfig | 5 +
hw/virtio/meson.build | 4 +
hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c | 73 +
hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c | 1929 ++++++++++++++++++++++
include/hw/boards.h | 2 +
include/hw/i386/microvm.h | 2 +
include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 56 +
include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h | 59 +
include/sysemu/hostmem.h | 2 +
21 files changed, 3311 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 docs/system/i386/nitro-enclave.rst
create mode 100644 hw/core/eif.c
create mode 100644 hw/core/eif.h
create mode 100644 hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
create mode 100644 hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c
create mode 100644 hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c
create mode 100644 include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
create mode 100644 include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h
--
2.39.2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 1/5] machine/nitro-enclave: New machine type for AWS Nitro Enclaves
2024-08-10 16:44 [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-10 16:44 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 13:56 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-10 16:44 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add vhost-user-vsock device Dorjoy Chowdhury
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 21+ messages in thread
From: Dorjoy Chowdhury @ 2024-08-10 16:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo,
mst, marcel.apfelbaum, berrange, philmd
AWS nitro enclaves[1] is an Amazon EC2[2] feature that allows creating
isolated execution environments, called enclaves, from Amazon EC2
instances which are used for processing highly sensitive data.
Enclaves have no persistent storage and no external networking. The
enclave VMs are based on Firecracker microvm with a vhost-vsock
device for communication with the parent EC2 instance that spawned
it and a Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device for cryptographic attestation.
The parent instance VM always has CID 3 while the enclave VM gets a
dynamic CID.
An EIF (Enclave Image Format)[3] file is used to boot an AWS nitro
enclave virtual machine. The EIF file contains the necessary kernel,
cmdline, ramdisk(s) sections to boot.
This commit adds support for limited AWS nitro enclave emulation using
a new machine type option '-M nitro-enclave'. This new machine type is
based on the 'microvm' machine type, similar to how real nitro enclave
VMs are based on Firecracker microvm. For nitro-enclave to boot from
an EIF file, the kernel and ramdisk(s) are extracted into a temporary
kernel and a temporary initrd file which are then hooked into the
regular x86 boot mechanism along with the extracted cmdline. The EIF
file path should be provided using the '-kernel' QEMU option.
The vsock and NSM devices will be implemented so that they are available
automatically in nitro-enclave machine type in the following commits.
[1] https://docs.aws.amazon.com/enclaves/latest/user/nitro-enclave.html
[2] https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/
[3] https://github.com/aws/aws-nitro-enclaves-image-format
Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
---
MAINTAINERS | 9 +
configs/devices/i386-softmmu/default.mak | 1 +
hw/core/eif.c | 514 +++++++++++++++++++++++
hw/core/eif.h | 19 +
hw/core/meson.build | 1 +
hw/i386/Kconfig | 4 +
hw/i386/meson.build | 1 +
hw/i386/microvm.c | 6 +-
hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 93 ++++
include/hw/i386/microvm.h | 2 +
include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 29 ++
11 files changed, 678 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 hw/core/eif.c
create mode 100644 hw/core/eif.h
create mode 100644 hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
create mode 100644 include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 10af212632..f8d63031f0 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -1877,6 +1877,15 @@ F: hw/i386/microvm.c
F: include/hw/i386/microvm.h
F: pc-bios/bios-microvm.bin
+nitro-enclave
+M: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
+M: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
+S: Maintained
+F: hw/core/eif.c
+F: hw/core/eif.h
+F: hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
+F: include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
+
Machine core
M: Eduardo Habkost <eduardo@habkost.net>
M: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
diff --git a/configs/devices/i386-softmmu/default.mak b/configs/devices/i386-softmmu/default.mak
index 448e3e3b1b..4faf2f0315 100644
--- a/configs/devices/i386-softmmu/default.mak
+++ b/configs/devices/i386-softmmu/default.mak
@@ -29,3 +29,4 @@
# CONFIG_I440FX=n
# CONFIG_Q35=n
# CONFIG_MICROVM=n
+# CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVE=n
diff --git a/hw/core/eif.c b/hw/core/eif.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5558879a96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hw/core/eif.c
@@ -0,0 +1,514 @@
+/*
+ * EIF (Enclave Image Format) related helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2024 Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
+ * (at your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the
+ * top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+#include "qemu/bswap.h"
+#include "qapi/error.h"
+#include <zlib.h> /* for crc32 */
+
+#include "hw/core/eif.h"
+
+#define MAX_SECTIONS 32
+
+/* members are ordered according to field order in .eif file */
+typedef struct EifHeader {
+ uint8_t magic[4]; /* must be .eif in ascii i.e., [46, 101, 105, 102] */
+ uint16_t version;
+ uint16_t flags;
+ uint64_t default_memory;
+ uint64_t default_cpus;
+ uint16_t reserved;
+ uint16_t section_cnt;
+ uint64_t section_offsets[MAX_SECTIONS];
+ uint64_t section_sizes[MAX_SECTIONS];
+ uint32_t unused;
+ uint32_t eif_crc32;
+} QEMU_PACKED EifHeader;
+
+/* members are ordered according to field order in .eif file */
+typedef struct EifSectionHeader {
+ /*
+ * 0 = invalid, 1 = kernel, 2 = cmdline, 3 = ramdisk, 4 = signature,
+ * 5 = metadata
+ */
+ uint16_t section_type;
+ uint16_t flags;
+ uint64_t section_size;
+} QEMU_PACKED EifSectionHeader;
+
+enum EifSectionTypes {
+ EIF_SECTION_INVALID = 0,
+ EIF_SECTION_KERNEL = 1,
+ EIF_SECTION_CMDLINE = 2,
+ EIF_SECTION_RAMDISK = 3,
+ EIF_SECTION_SIGNATURE = 4,
+ EIF_SECTION_METADATA = 5,
+ EIF_SECTION_MAX = 6,
+};
+
+static const char *section_type_to_string(uint16_t type)
+{
+ const char *str;
+ switch (type) {
+ case EIF_SECTION_INVALID:
+ str = "invalid";
+ break;
+ case EIF_SECTION_KERNEL:
+ str = "kernel";
+ break;
+ case EIF_SECTION_CMDLINE:
+ str = "cmdline";
+ break;
+ case EIF_SECTION_RAMDISK:
+ str = "ramdisk";
+ break;
+ case EIF_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
+ str = "signature";
+ break;
+ case EIF_SECTION_METADATA:
+ str = "metadata";
+ break;
+ default:
+ str = "unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return str;
+}
+
+static bool read_eif_header(FILE *f, EifHeader *header, uint32_t *crc,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ size_t got;
+ size_t header_size = sizeof(*header);
+
+ got = fread(header, 1, header_size, f);
+ if (got != header_size) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to read EIF header");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(header->magic, ".eif", 4) != 0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid EIF image. Magic mismatch.");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Exclude header->eif_crc32 field from CRC calculation */
+ *crc = crc32(*crc, (uint8_t *)header, header_size - 4);
+
+ header->version = be16_to_cpu(header->version);
+ header->flags = be16_to_cpu(header->flags);
+ header->default_memory = be64_to_cpu(header->default_memory);
+ header->default_cpus = be64_to_cpu(header->default_cpus);
+ header->reserved = be16_to_cpu(header->reserved);
+ header->section_cnt = be16_to_cpu(header->section_cnt);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < MAX_SECTIONS; ++i) {
+ header->section_offsets[i] = be64_to_cpu(header->section_offsets[i]);
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < MAX_SECTIONS; ++i) {
+ header->section_sizes[i] = be64_to_cpu(header->section_sizes[i]);
+ }
+
+ header->unused = be32_to_cpu(header->unused);
+ header->eif_crc32 = be32_to_cpu(header->eif_crc32);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool read_eif_section_header(FILE *f, EifSectionHeader *section_header,
+ uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
+{
+ size_t got;
+ size_t section_header_size = sizeof(*section_header);
+
+ got = fread(section_header, 1, section_header_size, f);
+ if (got != section_header_size) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to read EIF section header");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *crc = crc32(*crc, (uint8_t *)section_header, section_header_size);
+
+ section_header->section_type = be16_to_cpu(section_header->section_type);
+ section_header->flags = be16_to_cpu(section_header->flags);
+ section_header->section_size = be64_to_cpu(section_header->section_size);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Upon success, the caller is responsible for unlinking and freeing *tmp_path.
+ */
+static bool get_tmp_file(const char *template, char **tmp_path, Error **errp)
+{
+ int tmp_fd;
+
+ *tmp_path = NULL;
+ tmp_fd = g_file_open_tmp(template, tmp_path, NULL);
+ if (tmp_fd < 0 || *tmp_path == NULL) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to create temporary file for template %s",
+ template);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ close(tmp_fd);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void safe_fclose(FILE *f)
+{
+ if (f) {
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+}
+
+static void safe_unlink(char *f)
+{
+ if (f) {
+ unlink(f);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Upon success, the caller is reponsible for unlinking and freeing *kernel_path
+ */
+static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
+ uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
+{
+ size_t got;
+ FILE *tmp_file = NULL;
+ uint8_t *kernel = NULL;
+
+ *kernel_path = NULL;
+ if (!get_tmp_file("eif-kernel-XXXXXX", kernel_path, errp)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ tmp_file = fopen(*kernel_path, "wb");
+ if (tmp_file == NULL) {
+ error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Failed to open temporary file %s",
+ *kernel_path);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ kernel = g_malloc(size);
+ got = fread(kernel, 1, size, f);
+ if ((uint64_t) got != size) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to read EIF kernel section data");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ got = fwrite(kernel, 1, size, tmp_file);
+ if ((uint64_t) got != size) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to write EIF kernel section data to temporary"
+ " file");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ *crc = crc32(*crc, kernel, size);
+ g_free(kernel);
+ fclose(tmp_file);
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ safe_fclose(tmp_file);
+
+ safe_unlink(*kernel_path);
+ g_free(*kernel_path);
+ *kernel_path = NULL;
+
+ g_free(kernel);
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool read_eif_cmdline(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char *cmdline,
+ uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
+{
+ size_t got = fread(cmdline, 1, size, f);
+ if ((uint64_t) got != size) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to read EIF cmdline section data");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *crc = crc32(*crc, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
+ uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
+{
+ size_t got;
+ uint8_t *ramdisk = g_malloc(size);
+
+ got = fread(ramdisk, 1, size, eif);
+ if ((uint64_t) got != size) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to read EIF ramdisk section data");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ got = fwrite(ramdisk, 1, size, initrd);
+ if ((uint64_t) got != size) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to write EIF ramdisk data to temporary file");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ *crc = crc32(*crc, ramdisk, size);
+ g_free(ramdisk);
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ g_free(ramdisk);
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Expects file to have offset 0 before this function is called */
+static long get_file_size(FILE *f, Error **errp)
+{
+ long size;
+
+ if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END) != 0) {
+ error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Failed to seek to the end of file");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ size = ftell(f);
+ if (size == -1) {
+ error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Failed to get offset");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0) {
+ error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Failed to seek back to the start");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Upon success, the caller is reponsible for unlinking and freeing
+ * *kernel_path, *initrd_path and freeing *cmdline.
+ */
+bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
+ char **kernel_path, char **initrd_path, char **cmdline,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ FILE *machine_initrd_f = NULL;
+ FILE *initrd_path_f = NULL;
+ long machine_initrd_size;
+ uint32_t crc = 0;
+ EifHeader eif_header;
+ bool seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_MAX] = {false};
+
+ *kernel_path = *initrd_path = *cmdline = NULL;
+
+ f = fopen(eif_path, "rb");
+ if (f == NULL) {
+ error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Failed to open %s", eif_path);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (!read_eif_header(f, &eif_header, &crc, errp)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (eif_header.version < 4) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Expected EIF version 4 or greater");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (eif_header.flags != 0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Expected EIF flags to be 0");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (eif_header.section_cnt > MAX_SECTIONS) {
+ error_setg(errp, "EIF header section count must not be greater than "
+ "%d but found %d", MAX_SECTIONS, eif_header.section_cnt);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < eif_header.section_cnt; ++i) {
+ EifSectionHeader section_header;
+ uint16_t section_type;
+
+ if (fseek(f, eif_header.section_offsets[i], SEEK_SET) != 0) {
+ error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Failed to offset to %lu in EIF file",
+ eif_header.section_offsets[i]);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (!read_eif_section_header(f, §ion_header, &crc, errp)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (section_header.flags != 0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Expected EIF section header flags to be 0");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (eif_header.section_sizes[i] != section_header.section_size) {
+ error_setg(errp, "EIF section size mismatch between header and "
+ "section header: header %lu, section header %lu",
+ eif_header.section_sizes[i],
+ section_header.section_size);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ section_type = section_header.section_type;
+
+ switch (section_type) {
+ case EIF_SECTION_KERNEL:
+ if (seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_KERNEL]) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid EIF image. More than 1 kernel "
+ "section");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!read_eif_kernel(f, section_header.section_size, kernel_path,
+ &crc, errp)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ case EIF_SECTION_CMDLINE:
+ {
+ uint64_t size;
+ if (seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_CMDLINE]) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid EIF image. More than 1 cmdline "
+ "section");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ size = section_header.section_size;
+ *cmdline = g_malloc(size + 1);
+ if (!read_eif_cmdline(f, size, *cmdline, &crc, errp)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ (*cmdline)[size] = '\0';
+
+ break;
+ }
+ case EIF_SECTION_RAMDISK:
+ {
+ if (!seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_RAMDISK]) {
+ /*
+ * If this is the first time we are seeing a ramdisk section,
+ * we need to create the initrd temporary file.
+ */
+ if (!get_tmp_file("eif-initrd-XXXXXX", initrd_path, errp)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ initrd_path_f = fopen(*initrd_path, "wb");
+ if (initrd_path_f == NULL) {
+ error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Failed to open file %s",
+ *initrd_path);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!read_eif_ramdisk(f, initrd_path_f, section_header.section_size,
+ &crc, errp)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ /* other sections including invalid or unknown sections */
+ {
+ uint8_t *buf;
+ size_t got;
+ uint64_t size = section_header.section_size;
+ buf = g_malloc(size);
+ got = fread(buf, 1, size, f);
+ if ((uint64_t) got != size) {
+ g_free(buf);
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to read EIF %s section data",
+ section_type_to_string(section_type));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ crc = crc32(crc, buf, size);
+ g_free(buf);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (section_type < EIF_SECTION_MAX) {
+ seen_sections[section_type] = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_KERNEL]) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid EIF image. No kernel section.");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_CMDLINE]) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid EIF image. No cmdline section.");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_RAMDISK]) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid EIF image. No ramdisk section.");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (eif_header.eif_crc32 != crc) {
+ error_setg(errp, "CRC mismatch. Expected %u but header has %u.",
+ crc, eif_header.eif_crc32);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Let's append the initrd file from "-initrd" option if any. Although
+ * we pass the crc pointer to read_eif_ramdisk, it is not useful anymore.
+ * We have already done the crc mismatch check above this code.
+ */
+ if (machine_initrd) {
+ machine_initrd_f = fopen(machine_initrd, "rb");
+ if (machine_initrd_f == NULL) {
+ error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Failed to open initrd file %s",
+ machine_initrd);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ machine_initrd_size = get_file_size(machine_initrd_f, errp);
+ if (machine_initrd_size == -1) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (!read_eif_ramdisk(machine_initrd_f, initrd_path_f,
+ machine_initrd_size, &crc, errp)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ fclose(f);
+ fclose(initrd_path_f);
+ safe_fclose(machine_initrd_f);
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ safe_fclose(f);
+ safe_fclose(initrd_path_f);
+ safe_fclose(machine_initrd_f);
+
+ safe_unlink(*kernel_path);
+ g_free(*kernel_path);
+ *kernel_path = NULL;
+
+ safe_unlink(*initrd_path);
+ g_free(*initrd_path);
+ *initrd_path = NULL;
+
+ g_free(*cmdline);
+ *cmdline = NULL;
+
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/hw/core/eif.h b/hw/core/eif.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7063974d93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hw/core/eif.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * EIF (Enclave Image Format) related helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2024 Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
+ * (at your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the
+ * top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HW_CORE_EIF_H
+#define HW_CORE_EIF_H
+
+bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
+ char **kernel_path, char **initrd_path,
+ char **kernel_cmdline, Error **errp);
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/hw/core/meson.build b/hw/core/meson.build
index a3d9bab9f4..f32d1ad943 100644
--- a/hw/core/meson.build
+++ b/hw/core/meson.build
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_REGISTER', if_true: files('register.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_SPLIT_IRQ', if_true: files('split-irq.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_XILINX_AXI', if_true: files('stream.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_PLATFORM_BUS', if_true: files('sysbus-fdt.c'))
+system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVE', if_true: [files('eif.c'), zlib])
system_ss.add(files(
'cpu-sysemu.c',
diff --git a/hw/i386/Kconfig b/hw/i386/Kconfig
index f4a33b6c08..eba8eaa960 100644
--- a/hw/i386/Kconfig
+++ b/hw/i386/Kconfig
@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ config MICROVM
select USB_XHCI_SYSBUS
select I8254
+config NITRO_ENCLAVE
+ default y
+ depends on MICROVM
+
config X86_IOMMU
bool
depends on PC
diff --git a/hw/i386/meson.build b/hw/i386/meson.build
index 03aad10df7..10bdfde27c 100644
--- a/hw/i386/meson.build
+++ b/hw/i386/meson.build
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ i386_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU', if_true: files('amd_iommu.c'),
if_false: files('amd_iommu-stub.c'))
i386_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_I440FX', if_true: files('pc_piix.c'))
i386_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_MICROVM', if_true: files('x86-common.c', 'microvm.c', 'acpi-microvm.c', 'microvm-dt.c'))
+i386_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVE', if_true: files('nitro_enclave.c'))
i386_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_Q35', if_true: files('pc_q35.c'))
i386_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VMMOUSE', if_true: files('vmmouse.c'))
i386_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VMPORT', if_true: files('vmport.c'))
diff --git a/hw/i386/microvm.c b/hw/i386/microvm.c
index 40edcee7af..869c177642 100644
--- a/hw/i386/microvm.c
+++ b/hw/i386/microvm.c
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ static void microvm_devices_init(MicrovmMachineState *mms)
static void microvm_memory_init(MicrovmMachineState *mms)
{
+ MicrovmMachineClass *mmc = MICROVM_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(mms);
MachineState *machine = MACHINE(mms);
X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(mms);
MemoryRegion *ram_below_4g, *ram_above_4g;
@@ -328,7 +329,7 @@ static void microvm_memory_init(MicrovmMachineState *mms)
rom_set_fw(fw_cfg);
if (machine->kernel_filename != NULL) {
- x86_load_linux(x86ms, fw_cfg, 0, true);
+ mmc->x86_load_linux(x86ms, fw_cfg, 0, true);
}
if (mms->option_roms) {
@@ -637,9 +638,12 @@ GlobalProperty microvm_properties[] = {
static void microvm_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
{
X86MachineClass *x86mc = X86_MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
+ MicrovmMachineClass *mmc = MICROVM_MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
HotplugHandlerClass *hc = HOTPLUG_HANDLER_CLASS(oc);
+ mmc->x86_load_linux = x86_load_linux;
+
mc->init = microvm_machine_state_init;
mc->family = "microvm_i386";
diff --git a/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..98690c6373
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * AWS nitro-enclave machine
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2024 Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
+ * (at your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the
+ * top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+#include "qemu/error-report.h"
+#include "qapi/error.h"
+
+#include "hw/core/eif.h"
+#include "hw/i386/x86.h"
+#include "hw/i386/microvm.h"
+#include "hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h"
+
+static void nitro_enclave_machine_initfn(Object *obj)
+{
+ MicrovmMachineState *mms = MICROVM_MACHINE(obj);
+ X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(obj);
+
+ /* AWS nitro enclaves have PCIE and ACPI disabled */
+ mms->pcie = ON_OFF_AUTO_OFF;
+ x86ms->acpi = ON_OFF_AUTO_OFF;
+}
+
+static void x86_load_eif(X86MachineState *x86ms, FWCfgState *fw_cfg,
+ int acpi_data_size, bool pvh_enabled)
+{
+ Error *err;
+ char *eif_kernel, *eif_initrd, *eif_cmdline;
+ MachineState *machine = MACHINE(x86ms);
+
+ if (!read_eif_file(machine->kernel_filename, machine->initrd_filename,
+ &eif_kernel, &eif_initrd, &eif_cmdline, &err)) {
+ error_report_err(err);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ g_free(machine->kernel_filename);
+ machine->kernel_filename = eif_kernel;
+ g_free(machine->initrd_filename);
+ machine->initrd_filename = eif_initrd;
+
+ /*
+ * If kernel cmdline argument was provided, let's concatenate it to the
+ * extracted EIF kernel cmdline.
+ */
+ if (machine->kernel_cmdline != NULL) {
+ char *cmd = g_strdup_printf("%s %s", eif_cmdline,
+ machine->kernel_cmdline);
+ g_free(eif_cmdline);
+ g_free(machine->kernel_cmdline);
+ machine->kernel_cmdline = cmd;
+ } else {
+ machine->kernel_cmdline = eif_cmdline;
+ }
+
+ x86_load_linux(x86ms, fw_cfg, 0, true);
+
+ unlink(machine->kernel_filename);
+ unlink(machine->initrd_filename);
+ return;
+}
+
+static void nitro_enclave_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
+{
+ MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
+ MicrovmMachineClass *mmc = MICROVM_MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
+
+ mmc->x86_load_linux = x86_load_eif;
+
+ mc->family = "nitro_enclave_i386";
+ mc->desc = "AWS Nitro Enclave";
+}
+
+static const TypeInfo nitro_enclave_machine_info = {
+ .name = TYPE_NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE,
+ .parent = TYPE_MICROVM_MACHINE,
+ .instance_size = sizeof(NitroEnclaveMachineState),
+ .instance_init = nitro_enclave_machine_initfn,
+ .class_size = sizeof(NitroEnclaveMachineClass),
+ .class_init = nitro_enclave_class_init,
+};
+
+static void nitro_enclave_machine_init(void)
+{
+ type_register_static(&nitro_enclave_machine_info);
+}
+type_init(nitro_enclave_machine_init);
diff --git a/include/hw/i386/microvm.h b/include/hw/i386/microvm.h
index fad97a891d..b9ac34a3ef 100644
--- a/include/hw/i386/microvm.h
+++ b/include/hw/i386/microvm.h
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ struct MicrovmMachineClass {
X86MachineClass parent;
HotplugHandler *(*orig_hotplug_handler)(MachineState *machine,
DeviceState *dev);
+ void (*x86_load_linux)(X86MachineState *x86ms, FWCfgState *fw_cfg,
+ int acpi_data_size, bool pvh_enabled);
};
struct MicrovmMachineState {
diff --git a/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h b/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a1dada9371
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/*
+ * AWS nitro-enclave machine
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2024 Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
+ * (at your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the
+ * top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HW_I386_NITRO_ENCLAVE_H
+#define HW_I386_NITRO_ENCLAVE_H
+
+#include "hw/i386/microvm.h"
+#include "qom/object.h"
+
+struct NitroEnclaveMachineClass {
+ MicrovmMachineClass parent;
+};
+
+struct NitroEnclaveMachineState {
+ MicrovmMachineState parent;
+};
+
+#define TYPE_NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE MACHINE_TYPE_NAME("nitro-enclave")
+OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(NitroEnclaveMachineState, NitroEnclaveMachineClass,
+ NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE)
+
+#endif
--
2.39.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 2/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add vhost-user-vsock device
2024-08-10 16:44 [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-10 16:44 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] machine/nitro-enclave: New machine type for AWS Nitro Enclaves Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-10 16:44 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 14:24 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device Dorjoy Chowdhury
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 21+ messages in thread
From: Dorjoy Chowdhury @ 2024-08-10 16:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo,
mst, marcel.apfelbaum, berrange, philmd
AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in vhost-vsock device support which
enables applications in enclave VMs to communicate with the parent
EC2 VM over vsock. The enclave VMs have dynamic CID while the parent
always has CID 3. In QEMU, the vsock emulation for nitro enclave is
added using vhost-user-vsock as opposed to vhost-vsock. vhost-vsock
doesn't support sibling VM communication which is needed for nitro
enclaves.
In QEMU's nitro-enclave emulation, for the vsock communication to CID
3 to work, another process that does the vsock emulation in userspace
must be run, for example, vhost-device-vsock[1] from rust-vmm, with
necessary vsock communication support in another guest VM with CID 3.
A new mandatory nitro-enclave machine option 'vsock' has been added.
The value for this option should be the chardev id from the '-chardev'
option for the vhost-user-vsock device to work.
Using vhost-user-vsock also enables the possibility to implement some
proxying support in the vhost-user-vsock daemon that will forward all
the packets to the host machine instead of CID 3 so that users of
nitro-enclave can run the necessary applications in their host machine
instead of running another whole VM with CID 3.
[1] https://github.com/rust-vmm/vhost-device/tree/main/vhost-device-vsock
Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
---
backends/hostmem-memfd.c | 2 -
hw/core/machine.c | 71 +++++++++---------
hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/hw/boards.h | 2 +
include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 8 +++
include/sysemu/hostmem.h | 2 +
7 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/backends/hostmem-memfd.c b/backends/hostmem-memfd.c
index 6a3c89a12b..9f890a813e 100644
--- a/backends/hostmem-memfd.c
+++ b/backends/hostmem-memfd.c
@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@
#include "qapi/error.h"
#include "qom/object.h"
-#define TYPE_MEMORY_BACKEND_MEMFD "memory-backend-memfd"
-
OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(HostMemoryBackendMemfd, MEMORY_BACKEND_MEMFD)
diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
index 27dcda0248..b4662b2795 100644
--- a/hw/core/machine.c
+++ b/hw/core/machine.c
@@ -998,6 +998,39 @@ void machine_add_audiodev_property(MachineClass *mc)
"Audiodev to use for default machine devices");
}
+static bool create_default_memdev(MachineState *ms, const char *path,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ Object *obj;
+ MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_GET_CLASS(ms);
+ bool r = false;
+
+ obj = object_new(path ? TYPE_MEMORY_BACKEND_FILE : TYPE_MEMORY_BACKEND_RAM);
+ if (path) {
+ if (!object_property_set_str(obj, "mem-path", path, errp)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!object_property_set_int(obj, "size", ms->ram_size, errp)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ object_property_add_child(object_get_objects_root(), mc->default_ram_id,
+ obj);
+ /* Ensure backend's memory region name is equal to mc->default_ram_id */
+ if (!object_property_set_bool(obj, "x-use-canonical-path-for-ramblock-id",
+ false, errp)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!user_creatable_complete(USER_CREATABLE(obj), errp)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = object_property_set_link(OBJECT(ms), "memory-backend", obj, errp);
+
+out:
+ object_unref(obj);
+ return r;
+}
+
static void machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
{
MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
@@ -1017,6 +1050,8 @@ static void machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
*/
mc->numa_mem_align_shift = 23;
+ mc->create_default_memdev = create_default_memdev;
+
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "kernel",
machine_get_kernel, machine_set_kernel);
object_class_property_set_description(oc, "kernel",
@@ -1410,38 +1445,6 @@ MemoryRegion *machine_consume_memdev(MachineState *machine,
return ret;
}
-static bool create_default_memdev(MachineState *ms, const char *path, Error **errp)
-{
- Object *obj;
- MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_GET_CLASS(ms);
- bool r = false;
-
- obj = object_new(path ? TYPE_MEMORY_BACKEND_FILE : TYPE_MEMORY_BACKEND_RAM);
- if (path) {
- if (!object_property_set_str(obj, "mem-path", path, errp)) {
- goto out;
- }
- }
- if (!object_property_set_int(obj, "size", ms->ram_size, errp)) {
- goto out;
- }
- object_property_add_child(object_get_objects_root(), mc->default_ram_id,
- obj);
- /* Ensure backend's memory region name is equal to mc->default_ram_id */
- if (!object_property_set_bool(obj, "x-use-canonical-path-for-ramblock-id",
- false, errp)) {
- goto out;
- }
- if (!user_creatable_complete(USER_CREATABLE(obj), errp)) {
- goto out;
- }
- r = object_property_set_link(OBJECT(ms), "memory-backend", obj, errp);
-
-out:
- object_unref(obj);
- return r;
-}
-
const char *machine_class_default_cpu_type(MachineClass *mc)
{
if (mc->valid_cpu_types && !mc->valid_cpu_types[1]) {
@@ -1545,7 +1548,9 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine, const char *mem_path, Error *
machine_class->default_ram_id);
return;
}
- if (!create_default_memdev(current_machine, mem_path, errp)) {
+
+ if (!machine_class->create_default_memdev(current_machine, mem_path,
+ errp)) {
return;
}
}
diff --git a/hw/i386/Kconfig b/hw/i386/Kconfig
index eba8eaa960..821532c4c8 100644
--- a/hw/i386/Kconfig
+++ b/hw/i386/Kconfig
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ config MICROVM
config NITRO_ENCLAVE
default y
depends on MICROVM
+ select VHOST_USER_VSOCK
config X86_IOMMU
bool
diff --git a/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
index 98690c6373..280ab4cc9b 100644
--- a/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
+++ b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
@@ -11,11 +11,81 @@
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
#include "qemu/error-report.h"
#include "qapi/error.h"
+#include "qom/object_interfaces.h"
+#include "chardev/char.h"
+#include "hw/sysbus.h"
#include "hw/core/eif.h"
#include "hw/i386/x86.h"
#include "hw/i386/microvm.h"
#include "hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h"
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio-mmio.h"
+#include "hw/virtio/vhost-user-vsock.h"
+#include "sysemu/hostmem.h"
+
+static BusState *find_free_virtio_mmio_bus(void)
+{
+ BusChild *kid;
+ BusState *bus = sysbus_get_default();
+
+ QTAILQ_FOREACH(kid, &bus->children, sibling) {
+ DeviceState *dev = kid->child;
+ if (object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(dev), TYPE_VIRTIO_MMIO)) {
+ VirtIOMMIOProxy *mmio = VIRTIO_MMIO(OBJECT(dev));
+ VirtioBusState *mmio_virtio_bus = &mmio->bus;
+ BusState *mmio_bus = &mmio_virtio_bus->parent_obj;
+ if (QTAILQ_EMPTY(&mmio_bus->children)) {
+ return mmio_bus;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void vhost_user_vsock_init(NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems)
+{
+ DeviceState *dev = qdev_new(TYPE_VHOST_USER_VSOCK);
+ VHostUserVSock *vsock = VHOST_USER_VSOCK(dev);
+ BusState *bus;
+
+ if (!nems->vsock) {
+ error_report("A valid chardev id for vhost-user-vsock device must be "
+ "provided using the 'vsock' machine option");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ bus = find_free_virtio_mmio_bus();
+ if (!bus) {
+ error_report("Failed to find bus for vhost-user-vsock device");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ Chardev *chardev = qemu_chr_find(nems->vsock);
+ if (!chardev) {
+ error_report("Failed to find chardev with id %s", nems->vsock);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ vsock->conf.chardev.chr = chardev;
+
+ qdev_realize_and_unref(dev, bus, &error_fatal);
+}
+
+static void nitro_enclave_devices_init(NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems)
+{
+ vhost_user_vsock_init(nems);
+}
+
+static void nitro_enclave_machine_state_init(MachineState *machine)
+{
+ NitroEnclaveMachineClass *ne_class =
+ NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(machine);
+ NitroEnclaveMachineState *ne_state = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(machine);
+
+ ne_class->parent_init(machine);
+ nitro_enclave_devices_init(ne_state);
+}
static void nitro_enclave_machine_initfn(Object *obj)
{
@@ -66,15 +136,68 @@ static void x86_load_eif(X86MachineState *x86ms, FWCfgState *fw_cfg,
return;
}
+static bool create_memfd_backend(MachineState *ms, const char *path,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ Object *obj;
+ MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_GET_CLASS(ms);
+ bool r = false;
+
+ obj = object_new(TYPE_MEMORY_BACKEND_MEMFD);
+ if (!object_property_set_int(obj, "size", ms->ram_size, errp)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ object_property_add_child(object_get_objects_root(), mc->default_ram_id,
+ obj);
+
+ if (!user_creatable_complete(USER_CREATABLE(obj), errp)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = object_property_set_link(OBJECT(ms), "memory-backend", obj, errp);
+
+out:
+ object_unref(obj);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static char *nitro_enclave_get_vsock_chardev_id(Object *obj, Error **errp)
+{
+ NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(obj);
+
+ return g_strdup(nems->vsock);
+}
+
+static void nitro_enclave_set_vsock_chardev_id(Object *obj, const char *value,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(obj);
+
+ g_free(nems->vsock);
+ nems->vsock = g_strdup(value);
+}
+
static void nitro_enclave_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
{
MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
MicrovmMachineClass *mmc = MICROVM_MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
+ NitroEnclaveMachineClass *nemc = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
mmc->x86_load_linux = x86_load_eif;
mc->family = "nitro_enclave_i386";
mc->desc = "AWS Nitro Enclave";
+
+ nemc->parent_init = mc->init;
+ mc->init = nitro_enclave_machine_state_init;
+
+ mc->create_default_memdev = create_memfd_backend;
+
+ object_class_property_add_str(oc, NITRO_ENCLAVE_VSOCK_CHARDEV_ID,
+ nitro_enclave_get_vsock_chardev_id,
+ nitro_enclave_set_vsock_chardev_id);
+ object_class_property_set_description(oc, NITRO_ENCLAVE_VSOCK_CHARDEV_ID,
+ "Set chardev id for vhost-user-vsock "
+ "device");
}
static const TypeInfo nitro_enclave_machine_info = {
diff --git a/include/hw/boards.h b/include/hw/boards.h
index 48ff6d8b93..c268e7f005 100644
--- a/include/hw/boards.h
+++ b/include/hw/boards.h
@@ -308,6 +308,8 @@ struct MachineClass {
int64_t (*get_default_cpu_node_id)(const MachineState *ms, int idx);
ram_addr_t (*fixup_ram_size)(ram_addr_t size);
uint64_t smbios_memory_device_size;
+ bool (*create_default_memdev)(MachineState *ms, const char *path,
+ Error **errp);
};
/**
diff --git a/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h b/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
index a1dada9371..3e302de851 100644
--- a/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
+++ b/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
@@ -14,12 +14,20 @@
#include "hw/i386/microvm.h"
#include "qom/object.h"
+/* Machine type options */
+#define NITRO_ENCLAVE_VSOCK_CHARDEV_ID "vsock"
+
struct NitroEnclaveMachineClass {
MicrovmMachineClass parent;
+
+ void (*parent_init)(MachineState *state);
};
struct NitroEnclaveMachineState {
MicrovmMachineState parent;
+
+ /* Machine type options */
+ char *vsock;
};
#define TYPE_NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE MACHINE_TYPE_NAME("nitro-enclave")
diff --git a/include/sysemu/hostmem.h b/include/sysemu/hostmem.h
index de47ae59e4..67f45abe39 100644
--- a/include/sysemu/hostmem.h
+++ b/include/sysemu/hostmem.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(HostMemoryBackend, HostMemoryBackendClass,
*/
#define TYPE_MEMORY_BACKEND_FILE "memory-backend-file"
+#define TYPE_MEMORY_BACKEND_MEMFD "memory-backend-memfd"
+
/**
* HostMemoryBackendClass:
--
2.39.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 3/5] device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-10 16:44 [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-10 16:44 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] machine/nitro-enclave: New machine type for AWS Nitro Enclaves Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-10 16:44 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add vhost-user-vsock device Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-10 16:45 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 14:15 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-13 12:54 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in " Dorjoy Chowdhury
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 2 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Dorjoy Chowdhury @ 2024-08-10 16:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo,
mst, marcel.apfelbaum, berrange, philmd
Nitro Secure Module (NSM)[1] device is used in AWS Nitro Enclaves for
stripped down TPM functionality like cryptographic attestation. The
requests to and responses from NSM device are CBOR[2] encoded.
This commit adds support for NSM device in QEMU. Although related to
AWS Nitro Enclaves, the virito-nsm device is independent and can be
used in other machine types as well. The libcbor[3] library has been
used for the CBOR encoding and decoding functionalities.
[1] https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/virtio-comment/202310/msg00387.html
[2] http://cbor.io/
[3] https://libcbor.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
---
MAINTAINERS | 8 +
hw/virtio/Kconfig | 5 +
hw/virtio/meson.build | 4 +
hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c | 73 ++
hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c | 1929 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h | 59 +
6 files changed, 2078 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c
create mode 100644 hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c
create mode 100644 include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index f8d63031f0..05b66a7f93 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -2349,6 +2349,14 @@ F: include/sysemu/rng*.h
F: backends/rng*.c
F: tests/qtest/virtio-rng-test.c
+virtio-nsm
+M: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
+M: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
+S: Maintained
+F: hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c
+F: hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c
+F: include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h
+
vhost-user-stubs
M: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
S: Maintained
diff --git a/hw/virtio/Kconfig b/hw/virtio/Kconfig
index aa63ff7fd4..29fee32035 100644
--- a/hw/virtio/Kconfig
+++ b/hw/virtio/Kconfig
@@ -6,6 +6,11 @@ config VIRTIO_RNG
default y
depends on VIRTIO
+config VIRTIO_NSM
+ bool
+ default y
+ depends on VIRTIO
+
config VIRTIO_IOMMU
bool
default y
diff --git a/hw/virtio/meson.build b/hw/virtio/meson.build
index 621fc65454..831819eefb 100644
--- a/hw/virtio/meson.build
+++ b/hw/virtio/meson.build
@@ -48,12 +48,15 @@ else
system_virtio_ss.add(files('vhost-stub.c'))
endif
+libcbor = dependency('libcbor', version: '>=0.8.0')
+
specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_BALLOON', if_true: files('virtio-balloon.c'))
specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VHOST_USER_FS', if_true: files('vhost-user-fs.c'))
specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_PMEM', if_true: files('virtio-pmem.c'))
specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VHOST_VSOCK', if_true: files('vhost-vsock.c'))
specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VHOST_USER_VSOCK', if_true: files('vhost-user-vsock.c'))
specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_RNG', if_true: files('virtio-rng.c'))
+specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_NSM', if_true: [files('virtio-nsm.c'), libcbor])
specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_MEM', if_true: files('virtio-mem.c'))
specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VHOST_USER_SCMI', if_true: files('vhost-user-scmi.c'))
specific_virtio_ss.add(when: ['CONFIG_VIRTIO_PCI', 'CONFIG_VHOST_USER_SCMI'], if_true: files('vhost-user-scmi-pci.c'))
@@ -70,6 +73,7 @@ virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_CRYPTO', if_true: files('virtio-crypto-pc
virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_INPUT_HOST', if_true: files('virtio-input-host-pci.c'))
virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_INPUT', if_true: files('virtio-input-pci.c'))
virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_RNG', if_true: files('virtio-rng-pci.c'))
+virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_NSM', if_true: [files('virtio-nsm-pci.c'), libcbor])
virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_BALLOON', if_true: files('virtio-balloon-pci.c'))
virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_9P', if_true: files('virtio-9p-pci.c'))
virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_SCSI', if_true: files('virtio-scsi-pci.c'))
diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dca797315a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * AWS Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2024 Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
+ * (at your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the
+ * top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h"
+#include "hw/qdev-properties.h"
+#include "qapi/error.h"
+#include "qemu/module.h"
+#include "qom/object.h"
+
+typedef struct VirtIONsmPCI VirtIONsmPCI;
+
+#define TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM_PCI "virtio-nsm-pci-base"
+DECLARE_INSTANCE_CHECKER(VirtIONsmPCI, VIRTIO_NSM_PCI,
+ TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM_PCI)
+
+struct VirtIONsmPCI {
+ VirtIOPCIProxy parent_obj;
+ VirtIONSM vdev;
+};
+
+static void virtio_nsm_pci_realize(VirtIOPCIProxy *vpci_dev, Error **errp)
+{
+ VirtIONsmPCI *vnsm = VIRTIO_NSM_PCI(vpci_dev);
+ DeviceState *vdev = DEVICE(&vnsm->vdev);
+
+ virtio_pci_force_virtio_1(vpci_dev);
+
+ if (!qdev_realize(vdev, BUS(&vpci_dev->bus), errp)) {
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+static void virtio_nsm_pci_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
+{
+ DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
+ VirtioPCIClass *k = VIRTIO_PCI_CLASS(klass);
+
+ k->realize = virtio_nsm_pci_realize;
+ set_bit(DEVICE_CATEGORY_MISC, dc->categories);
+}
+
+static void virtio_nsm_initfn(Object *obj)
+{
+ VirtIONsmPCI *dev = VIRTIO_NSM_PCI(obj);
+
+ virtio_instance_init_common(obj, &dev->vdev, sizeof(dev->vdev),
+ TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM);
+}
+
+static const VirtioPCIDeviceTypeInfo virtio_nsm_pci_info = {
+ .base_name = TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM_PCI,
+ .generic_name = "virtio-nsm-pci",
+ .instance_size = sizeof(VirtIONsmPCI),
+ .instance_init = virtio_nsm_initfn,
+ .class_init = virtio_nsm_pci_class_init,
+};
+
+static void virtio_nsm_pci_register(void)
+{
+ virtio_pci_types_register(&virtio_nsm_pci_info);
+}
+
+type_init(virtio_nsm_pci_register)
diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1610bcedc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1929 @@
+/*
+ * AWS Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2024 Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
+ * (at your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the
+ * top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+#include "qemu/guest-random.h"
+#include "qapi/error.h"
+#include <cbor.h>
+
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h"
+#include "standard-headers/linux/virtio_ids.h"
+
+#define NSM_PCR_DATA_REQ_MAX_SIZE 512
+
+enum NSMResponseTypes {
+ NSM_SUCCESS = 0,
+ NSM_INVALID_ARGUMENT = 1,
+ NSM_INVALID_INDEX = 2,
+ NSM_READONLY_INDEX = 3,
+ NSM_INVALID_OPERATION = 4,
+ NSM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL = 5,
+ NSM_INPUT_TOO_LARGE = 6,
+ NSM_INTERNAL_ERROR = 7,
+};
+
+static bool qemu_cbor_map_add(cbor_item_t *map, cbor_item_t *key,
+ cbor_item_t *value)
+{
+ bool success = false;
+ struct cbor_pair pair = (struct cbor_pair) {
+ .key = cbor_move(key),
+ .value = cbor_move(value)
+ };
+
+ success = cbor_map_add(map, pair);
+ if (!success) {
+ cbor_incref(pair.key);
+ cbor_incref(pair.value);
+ }
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+static bool qemu_cbor_array_push(cbor_item_t *array, cbor_item_t *value)
+{
+ bool success = false;
+
+ success = cbor_array_push(array, cbor_move(value));
+ if (!success) {
+ cbor_incref(value);
+ }
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+static bool qemu_cbor_add_bool_to_map(cbor_item_t *map, const char *key,
+ bool value)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
+
+ key_cbor = cbor_build_string(key);
+ if (!key_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ value_cbor = cbor_build_bool(value);
+ if (!value_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (key_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
+ }
+ if (value_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool qemu_cbor_add_uint8_to_map(cbor_item_t *map, const char *key,
+ uint8_t value)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
+
+ key_cbor = cbor_build_string(key);
+ if (!key_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ value_cbor = cbor_build_uint8(value);
+ if (!value_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (key_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
+ }
+ if (value_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool qemu_cbor_add_map_to_map(cbor_item_t *map, const char *key,
+ size_t nested_map_size,
+ cbor_item_t **nested_map)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
+
+ key_cbor = cbor_build_string(key);
+ if (!key_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ value_cbor = cbor_new_definite_map(nested_map_size);
+ if (!value_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ *nested_map = value_cbor;
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (key_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
+ }
+ if (value_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(cbor_item_t *map, const char *key,
+ uint8_t *arr, size_t len)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
+
+ key_cbor = cbor_build_string(key);
+ if (!key_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ value_cbor = cbor_build_bytestring(arr, len);
+ if (!value_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (key_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
+ }
+ if (value_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool qemu_cbor_add_string_to_map(cbor_item_t *map, const char *key,
+ const char *value)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
+
+ key_cbor = cbor_build_string(key);
+ if (!key_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ value_cbor = cbor_build_string(value);
+ if (!value_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (key_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
+ }
+ if (value_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool qemu_cbor_add_uint8_array_to_map(cbor_item_t *map, const char *key,
+ uint8_t *arr, size_t len)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
+
+ key_cbor = cbor_build_string(key);
+ if (!key_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ value_cbor = cbor_new_definite_array(len);
+ if (!value_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+ cbor_item_t *tmp = cbor_build_uint8(arr[i]);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_array_push(value_cbor, tmp)) {
+ cbor_decref(&tmp);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (key_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
+ }
+ if (value_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static const char *error_string(enum NSMResponseTypes type)
+{
+ const char *str;
+ switch (type) {
+ case NSM_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
+ str = "InvalidArgument";
+ break;
+ case NSM_INVALID_INDEX:
+ str = "InvalidIndex";
+ break;
+ case NSM_READONLY_INDEX:
+ str = "ReadOnlyIndex";
+ break;
+ case NSM_INVALID_OPERATION:
+ str = "InvalidOperation";
+ break;
+ case NSM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
+ str = "BufferTooSmall";
+ break;
+ case NSM_INPUT_TOO_LARGE:
+ str = "InputTooLarge";
+ break;
+ default:
+ str = "InternalError";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return str;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Error response structure:
+ *
+ * {
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = String("Error"),
+ * value = String(error_name)
+ * }
+ * }
+ *
+ * where error_name can be one of the following:
+ * InvalidArgument
+ * InvalidIndex
+ * InvalidResponse
+ * ReadOnlyIndex
+ * InvalidOperation
+ * BufferTooSmall
+ * InputTooLarge
+ * InternalError
+ */
+
+static bool error_response(struct iovec *response, enum NSMResponseTypes error,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *root;
+ size_t len;
+ bool r = false;
+
+ root = cbor_new_definite_map(1);
+ if (!root) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_string_to_map(root, "Error", error_string(error))) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ len = cbor_serialize(root, response->iov_base, response->iov_len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Response buffer is small for %s response",
+ error_string(error));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->iov_len = len;
+ r = true;
+
+ out:
+ if (root) {
+ cbor_decref(&root);
+ }
+ return r;
+
+ err:
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize %s response", error_string(error));
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * GetRandom response structure:
+ *
+ * {
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = String("GetRandom"),
+ * value = Map(1) {
+ * key = String("random"),
+ * value = Byte_String()
+ * }
+ * }
+ * }
+ */
+static bool handle_GetRandom(VirtIONSM *vnsm, struct iovec *request,
+ struct iovec *response, Error **errp)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *root, *nested_map;
+ size_t len;
+ uint8_t rnd[64];
+ bool r = false;
+
+ root = cbor_new_definite_map(1);
+ if (!root) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_map_to_map(root, "GetRandom", 1, &nested_map)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ qemu_guest_getrandom_nofail(rnd, 64);
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(nested_map, "random", rnd, 64)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ len = cbor_serialize(root, response->iov_base, response->iov_len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ response->iov_len = len;
+ r = true;
+
+ out:
+ if (root) {
+ cbor_decref(&root);
+ }
+ return r;
+
+ err:
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize GetRandom response");
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DescribeNSM response structure:
+ *
+ * {
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = String("DescribeNSM"),
+ * value = Map(7) {
+ * key = String("digest"),
+ * value = String("SHA384"),
+ * key = String("max_pcrs"),
+ * value = Uint8(32),
+ * key = String("module_id"),
+ * value = String("i-1234-enc5678"),
+ * key = String("locked_pcrs"),
+ * value = Array<Uint8>(),
+ * key = String("version_major"),
+ * value = Uint8(1),
+ * key = String("version_minor"),
+ * value = Uint8(0),
+ * key = String("version_patch"),
+ * value = Uint8(0)
+ * }
+ * }
+ * }
+ */
+static bool handle_DescribeNSM(VirtIONSM *vnsm, struct iovec *request,
+ struct iovec *response, Error **errp)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *root, *nested_map;
+ uint16_t locked_pcrs_cnt = 0;
+ uint8_t locked_pcrs_ind[NSM_MAX_PCRS];
+ size_t len;
+ bool r = false;
+
+ root = cbor_new_definite_map(1);
+ if (!root) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_map_to_map(root, "DescribeNSM", 7, &nested_map)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_string_to_map(nested_map, "digest", vnsm->digest)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_uint8_to_map(nested_map, "max_pcrs", vnsm->max_pcrs)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_string_to_map(nested_map, "module_id",
+ vnsm->module_id)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (uint8_t i = 0; i < NSM_MAX_PCRS; ++i) {
+ if (vnsm->pcrs[i].locked) {
+ locked_pcrs_ind[locked_pcrs_cnt++] = i;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_uint8_array_to_map(nested_map, "locked_pcrs",
+ locked_pcrs_ind, locked_pcrs_cnt)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_uint8_to_map(nested_map, "version_major",
+ vnsm->version_major)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_uint8_to_map(nested_map, "version_minor",
+ vnsm->version_minor)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_uint8_to_map(nested_map, "version_patch",
+ vnsm->version_patch)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ len = cbor_serialize(root, response->iov_base, response->iov_len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ response->iov_len = len;
+ r = true;
+
+ out:
+ if (root) {
+ cbor_decref(&root);
+ }
+ return r;
+
+ err:
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize DescribeNSM response");
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DescribePCR request structure:
+ *
+ * {
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = String("DescribePCR"),
+ * value = Map(1) {
+ * key = String("index"),
+ * value = Uint8(pcr)
+ * }
+ * }
+ * }
+ */
+typedef struct NSMDescribePCRReq {
+ uint8_t index;
+} NSMDescribePCRReq;
+
+static enum NSMResponseTypes get_nsm_describe_pcr_req(
+ uint8_t *req, size_t len,
+ NSMDescribePCRReq *nsm_req)
+{
+ size_t size;
+ uint8_t *str;
+ struct cbor_pair *pair;
+ cbor_item_t *item = NULL;
+ struct cbor_load_result result;
+ enum NSMResponseTypes r = NSM_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ item = cbor_load(req, len, &result);
+ if (!item || result.error.code != CBOR_ERR_NONE) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ pair = cbor_map_handle(item);
+ if (!cbor_isa_map(pair->value) || cbor_map_size(pair->value) != 1) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ pair = cbor_map_handle(pair->value);
+ if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ str = cbor_string_handle(pair->key);
+ size = cbor_string_length(pair->key);
+ if (!str || size != 5 || memcmp(str, "index", 5) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!cbor_isa_uint(pair->value) ||
+ cbor_int_get_width(pair->value) != CBOR_INT_8) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ nsm_req->index = cbor_get_uint8(pair->value);
+ r = NSM_SUCCESS;
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (item) {
+ cbor_decref(&item);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DescribePCR response structure:
+ *
+ * {
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = String("DescribePCR"),
+ * value = Map(2) {
+ * key = String("data"),
+ * value = Byte_String(),
+ * key = String("lock"),
+ * value = Bool()
+ * }
+ * }
+ * }
+ */
+static bool handle_DescribePCR(VirtIONSM *vnsm, struct iovec *request,
+ struct iovec *response, Error **errp)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *root = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *nested_map;
+ size_t len;
+ NSMDescribePCRReq nsm_req;
+ enum NSMResponseTypes type;
+ struct PCRInfo *pcr;
+ bool r = false;
+
+ type = get_nsm_describe_pcr_req(request->iov_base, request->iov_len,
+ &nsm_req);
+ if (type != NSM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (error_response(response, type, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (nsm_req.index >= vnsm->max_pcrs) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_INVALID_INDEX, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+ pcr = &(vnsm->pcrs[nsm_req.index]);
+
+ root = cbor_new_definite_map(1);
+ if (!root) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_map_to_map(root, "DescribePCR", 2, &nested_map)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(nested_map, "data", pcr->data,
+ SHA384_BYTE_LEN)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_bool_to_map(nested_map, "lock", pcr->locked)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ len = cbor_serialize(root, response->iov_base, response->iov_len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ response->iov_len = len;
+ r = true;
+
+ out:
+ if (root) {
+ cbor_decref(&root);
+ }
+ return r;
+
+ err:
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize DescribePCR response");
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ExtendPCR request structure:
+ *
+ * {
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = String("ExtendPCR"),
+ * value = Map(2) {
+ * key = String("index"),
+ * value = Uint8(pcr),
+ * key = String("data"),
+ * value = Byte_String(data),
+ * }
+ * }
+ * }
+ */
+typedef struct NSMExtendPCRReq {
+ uint8_t index;
+ uint16_t data_len;
+ uint8_t data[NSM_PCR_DATA_REQ_MAX_SIZE];
+} NSMExtendPCRReq;
+
+static bool get_nsm_extend_pcr_req(uint8_t *req, size_t len,
+ NSMExtendPCRReq *nsm_req)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *item = NULL;
+ size_t size ;
+ uint8_t *str;
+ struct cbor_pair *pair;
+ struct cbor_load_result result;
+ enum NSMResponseTypes r = NSM_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ item = cbor_load(req, len, &result);
+ if (!item || result.error.code != CBOR_ERR_NONE) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ pair = cbor_map_handle(item);
+ if (!cbor_isa_map(pair->value) || cbor_map_size(pair->value) != 2) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ pair = cbor_map_handle(pair->value);
+ if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ str = cbor_string_handle(pair->key);
+ size = cbor_string_length(pair->key);
+ if (!str || size != 5 || memcmp(str, "index", 5) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!cbor_isa_uint(pair->value) ||
+ cbor_int_get_width(pair->value) != CBOR_INT_8) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ nsm_req->index = cbor_get_uint8(pair->value);
+
+ /* let's move forward to the next key value pair */
+ pair++;
+ if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ str = cbor_string_handle(pair->key);
+ size = cbor_string_length(pair->key);
+ if (!str || size != 4 || memcmp(str, "data", 4) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!cbor_isa_bytestring(pair->value)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ str = cbor_bytestring_handle(pair->value);
+ size = cbor_bytestring_length(pair->value);
+ if (!str || size == 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (size > NSM_PCR_DATA_REQ_MAX_SIZE) {
+ r = NSM_INPUT_TOO_LARGE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ nsm_req->data_len = size;
+ memcpy(nsm_req->data, str, size);
+ r = NSM_SUCCESS;
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (item) {
+ cbor_decref(&item);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ExtendPCR response structure:
+ *
+ * {
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = String("ExtendPCR"),
+ * value = Map(1) {
+ * key = String("data"),
+ * value = Byte_String()
+ * }
+ * }
+ * }
+ */
+static bool handle_ExtendPCR(VirtIONSM *vnsm, struct iovec *request,
+ struct iovec *response, Error **errp)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *root = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *nested_map;
+ size_t len;
+ NSMExtendPCRReq nsm_req;
+ enum NSMResponseTypes type;
+ struct PCRInfo *pcr;
+ bool r = false;
+
+ type = get_nsm_extend_pcr_req(request->iov_base, request->iov_len,
+ &nsm_req);
+ if (type != NSM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (error_response(response, type, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (nsm_req.index >= vnsm->max_pcrs) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_INVALID_INDEX, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ pcr = &(vnsm->pcrs[nsm_req.index]);
+
+ if (pcr->locked) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_READONLY_INDEX, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!vnsm->extend_pcr(vnsm, nsm_req.index, nsm_req.data,
+ nsm_req.data_len)) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_INTERNAL_ERROR, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ root = cbor_new_definite_map(1);
+ if (!root) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_map_to_map(root, "ExtendPCR", 1, &nested_map)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(nested_map, "data", pcr->data,
+ SHA384_BYTE_LEN)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ len = cbor_serialize(root, response->iov_base, response->iov_len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ response->iov_len = len;
+ r = true;
+
+ out:
+ if (root) {
+ cbor_decref(&root);
+ }
+ return r;
+
+ err:
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize DescribePCR response");
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LockPCR request structure:
+ *
+ * {
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = String("LockPCR"),
+ * value = Map(1) {
+ * key = String("index"),
+ * value = Uint8(pcr)
+ * }
+ * }
+ * }
+ */
+typedef struct NSMLockPCRReq {
+ uint8_t index;
+} NSMLockPCRReq;
+
+static enum NSMResponseTypes get_nsm_lock_pcr_req(uint8_t *req, size_t len,
+ NSMLockPCRReq *nsm_req)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *item = NULL;
+ size_t size;
+ uint8_t *str;
+ struct cbor_pair *pair;
+ struct cbor_load_result result;
+ enum NSMResponseTypes r = NSM_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ item = cbor_load(req, len, &result);
+ if (!item || result.error.code != CBOR_ERR_NONE) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ pair = cbor_map_handle(item);
+ if (!cbor_isa_map(pair->value) || cbor_map_size(pair->value) != 1) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ pair = cbor_map_handle(pair->value);
+ if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ str = cbor_string_handle(pair->key);
+ size = cbor_string_length(pair->key);
+ if (!str || size != 5 || memcmp(str, "index", 5) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!cbor_isa_uint(pair->value) ||
+ cbor_int_get_width(pair->value) != CBOR_INT_8) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ nsm_req->index = cbor_get_uint8(pair->value);
+ r = NSM_SUCCESS;
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (item) {
+ cbor_decref(&item);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LockPCR success response structure:
+ * {
+ * String("LockPCR")
+ * }
+ */
+static bool handle_LockPCR(VirtIONSM *vnsm, struct iovec *request,
+ struct iovec *response, Error **errp)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *root = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ NSMLockPCRReq nsm_req;
+ enum NSMResponseTypes type;
+ struct PCRInfo *pcr;
+ bool r = false;
+
+ type = get_nsm_lock_pcr_req(request->iov_base, request->iov_len, &nsm_req);
+ if (type != NSM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (error_response(response, type, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (nsm_req.index >= vnsm->max_pcrs) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_INVALID_INDEX, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ pcr = &(vnsm->pcrs[nsm_req.index]);
+
+ if (pcr->locked) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_READONLY_INDEX, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ pcr->locked = true;
+
+ root = cbor_build_string("LockPCR");
+ if (!root) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ len = cbor_serialize(root, response->iov_base, response->iov_len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ response->iov_len = len;
+ r = true;
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ err:
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize LockPCR response");
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (root) {
+ cbor_decref(&root);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LockPCRs request structure:
+ *
+ * {
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = String("LockPCRs"),
+ * value = Map(1) {
+ * key = String("range"),
+ * value = Uint8(pcr)
+ * }
+ * }
+ * }
+ */
+typedef struct NSMLockPCRsReq {
+ uint16_t range;
+} NSMLockPCRsReq;
+
+static enum NSMResponseTypes get_nsm_lock_pcrs_req(uint8_t *req, size_t len,
+ NSMLockPCRsReq *nsm_req)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *item = NULL;
+ size_t size;
+ uint8_t *str;
+ struct cbor_pair *pair;
+ struct cbor_load_result result;
+ enum NSMResponseTypes r = NSM_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ item = cbor_load(req, len, &result);
+ if (!item || result.error.code != CBOR_ERR_NONE) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ pair = cbor_map_handle(item);
+ if (!cbor_isa_map(pair->value) || cbor_map_size(pair->value) != 1) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ pair = cbor_map_handle(pair->value);
+ if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ str = cbor_string_handle(pair->key);
+ size = cbor_string_length(pair->key);
+ if (!str || size != 5 || memcmp(str, "range", 5) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!cbor_isa_uint(pair->value) ||
+ cbor_int_get_width(pair->value) != CBOR_INT_8) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ nsm_req->range = cbor_get_uint8(pair->value);
+ r = NSM_SUCCESS;
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (item) {
+ cbor_decref(&item);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LockPCRs success response structure:
+ * {
+ * String("LockPCRs")
+ * }
+ */
+static bool handle_LockPCRs(VirtIONSM *vnsm, struct iovec *request,
+ struct iovec *response, Error **errp)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *root = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ NSMLockPCRsReq nsm_req;
+ enum NSMResponseTypes type;
+ bool r = false;
+
+ type = get_nsm_lock_pcrs_req(request->iov_base, request->iov_len, &nsm_req);
+ if (type != NSM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (error_response(response, type, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (nsm_req.range >= vnsm->max_pcrs) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_INVALID_INDEX, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i <= nsm_req.range; ++i) {
+ vnsm->pcrs[i].locked = true;
+ }
+
+ root = cbor_build_string("LockPCRs");
+ if (!root) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ len = cbor_serialize(root, response->iov_base, response->iov_len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ response->iov_len = len;
+ r = true;
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ err:
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize response");
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (root) {
+ cbor_decref(&root);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attestation request structure:
+ *
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = String("Attestation"),
+ * value = Map(3) {
+ * key = String("user_data"),
+ * value = Byte_String() || null,
+ * key = String("nonce"),
+ * value = Byte_String() || null,
+ * key = String("public_key"),
+ * value = Byte_String() || null,
+ * }
+ * }
+ * }
+ */
+typedef struct NSMAttestationReq {
+ uint16_t user_data_len;
+ uint8_t user_data[NSM_USER_DATA_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ uint16_t nonce_len;
+ uint8_t nonce[NSM_NONCE_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ uint16_t public_key_len;
+ uint8_t public_key[NSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE];
+} NSMAttestationReq;
+
+static enum NSMResponseTypes get_nsm_attestation_req(uint8_t *req, size_t len,
+ NSMAttestationReq *nsm_req)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *item = NULL;
+ size_t size;
+ uint8_t *str;
+ struct cbor_pair *pair;
+ struct cbor_load_result result;
+ enum NSMResponseTypes r = NSM_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ item = cbor_load(req, len, &result);
+ if (!item || result.error.code != CBOR_ERR_NONE) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ pair = cbor_map_handle(item);
+ if (!cbor_isa_map(pair->value) || cbor_map_size(pair->value) != 3) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ pair = cbor_map_handle(pair->value);
+ if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ str = cbor_string_handle(pair->key);
+ size = cbor_string_length(pair->key);
+ if (!str || size != 9 || memcmp(str, "user_data", 9) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (cbor_isa_bytestring(pair->value)) {
+ str = cbor_bytestring_handle(pair->value);
+ size = cbor_bytestring_length(pair->value);
+ if (!str || size == 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (size > NSM_USER_DATA_MAX_SIZE) {
+ r = NSM_INPUT_TOO_LARGE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ memcpy(nsm_req->user_data, str, size);
+ nsm_req->user_data_len = size;
+ } else if (cbor_is_null(pair->value)) {
+ nsm_req->user_data_len = 0;
+ } else {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* let's move forward */
+ pair++;
+ if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ str = cbor_string_handle(pair->key);
+ size = cbor_string_length(pair->key);
+ if (!str || size != 5 || memcmp(str, "nonce", 5) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (cbor_isa_bytestring(pair->value)) {
+ str = cbor_bytestring_handle(pair->value);
+ size = cbor_bytestring_length(pair->value);
+ if (!str || size == 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (size > NSM_NONCE_MAX_SIZE) {
+ r = NSM_INPUT_TOO_LARGE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ memcpy(nsm_req->nonce, str, size);
+ nsm_req->nonce_len = size;
+ } else if (cbor_is_null(pair->value)) {
+ nsm_req->nonce_len = 0;
+ } else {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* let's move forward */
+ pair++;
+ if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ str = cbor_string_handle(pair->key);
+ size = cbor_string_length(pair->key);
+ if (!str || size != 10 || memcmp(str, "public_key", 10) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (cbor_isa_bytestring(pair->value)) {
+ str = cbor_bytestring_handle(pair->value);
+ size = cbor_bytestring_length(pair->value);
+ if (!str || size == 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (size > NSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) {
+ r = NSM_INPUT_TOO_LARGE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ memcpy(nsm_req->public_key, str, size);
+ nsm_req->public_key_len = size;
+ } else if (cbor_is_null(pair->value)) {
+ nsm_req->public_key_len = 0;
+ } else {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ r = NSM_SUCCESS;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (item) {
+ cbor_decref(&item);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+static bool qemu_cbor_add_uint64_to_map(cbor_item_t *map, const char *key,
+ uint64_t value)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
+
+ key_cbor = cbor_build_string(key);
+ if (!key_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ value_cbor = cbor_build_uint64(value);
+ if (!value_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (key_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
+ }
+ if (value_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool add_protected_header_to_cose(cbor_item_t *cose)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *map = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *key = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *value = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *bs = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ bool r = false;
+ size_t buf_len = 4096;
+ uint8_t *buf = g_malloc(buf_len);
+
+ map = cbor_new_definite_map(1);
+ if (!map) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ key = cbor_build_uint8(1);
+ if (!key) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ value = cbor_new_int8();
+ if (!value) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ cbor_mark_negint(value);
+ /* we don't actually sign the data, so we use -1 as the 'alg' value */
+ cbor_set_uint8(value, 0);
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key, value)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ len = cbor_serialize(map, buf, buf_len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ goto cleanup_map;
+ }
+
+ bs = cbor_build_bytestring(buf, len);
+ if (!bs) {
+ goto cleanup_map;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_array_push(cose, bs)) {
+ cbor_decref(&bs);
+ goto cleanup_map;
+ }
+ r = true;
+ goto cleanup_map;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (key) {
+ cbor_decref(&key);
+ }
+ if (value) {
+ cbor_decref(&value);
+ }
+
+ cleanup_map:
+ if (map) {
+ cbor_decref(&map);
+ }
+ g_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static bool add_unprotected_header_to_cose(cbor_item_t *cose)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *map = cbor_new_definite_map(0);
+ if (!map) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_array_push(cose, map)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (map) {
+ cbor_decref(&map);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool qemu_cbor_add_uint8_key_bytestring_to_map(cbor_item_t *map,
+ uint8_t key, uint8_t *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
+
+ key_cbor = cbor_build_uint8(key);
+ if (!key_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ value_cbor = cbor_build_bytestring(buf, len);
+ if (!value_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (key_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
+ }
+ if (value_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool add_ca_bundle_to_payload(cbor_item_t *map)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *bs = NULL;
+ uint8_t zero[64] = {0};
+
+ key_cbor = cbor_build_string("cabundle");
+ if (!key_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ value_cbor = cbor_new_definite_array(1);
+ if (!value_cbor) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ bs = cbor_build_bytestring(zero, 64);
+ if (!bs) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_array_push(value_cbor, bs)) {
+ cbor_decref(&bs);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (key_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
+ }
+ if (value_cbor) {
+ cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool add_payload_to_cose(cbor_item_t *cose, VirtIONSM *vnsm)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *root = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *nested_map;
+ cbor_item_t *bs = NULL;
+ size_t locked_cnt;
+ uint8_t ind[NSM_MAX_PCRS];
+ size_t payload_map_size = 6;
+ size_t len;
+ struct PCRInfo *pcr;
+ uint8_t zero[64] = {0};
+ bool r = false;
+ size_t buf_len = 16384;
+ uint8_t *buf = g_malloc(buf_len);
+
+ if (vnsm->public_key_len > 0) {
+ payload_map_size++;
+ }
+ if (vnsm->user_data_len > 0) {
+ payload_map_size++;
+ }
+ if (vnsm->nonce_len > 0) {
+ payload_map_size++;
+ }
+ root = cbor_new_definite_map(payload_map_size);
+ if (!root) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_string_to_map(root, "module_id", vnsm->module_id)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_string_to_map(root, "digest", vnsm->digest)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_uint64_to_map(root, "timestamp", time(NULL))) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ locked_cnt = 0;
+ for (uint8_t i = 0; i < NSM_MAX_PCRS; ++i) {
+ if (vnsm->pcrs[i].locked) {
+ ind[locked_cnt++] = i;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_map_to_map(root, "pcrs", locked_cnt, &nested_map)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ for (uint8_t i = 0; i < locked_cnt; ++i) {
+ pcr = &(vnsm->pcrs[ind[i]]);
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_uint8_key_bytestring_to_map(nested_map, ind[i],
+ pcr->data,
+ SHA384_BYTE_LEN)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(root, "certificate", zero, 64)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!add_ca_bundle_to_payload(root)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (vnsm->public_key_len > 0 &&
+ !qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(root, "public_key", vnsm->public_key,
+ vnsm->public_key_len)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (vnsm->user_data_len > 0 &&
+ !qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(root, "user_data", vnsm->user_data,
+ vnsm->user_data_len)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (vnsm->nonce_len > 0 &&
+ !qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(root, "nonce", vnsm->nonce,
+ vnsm->nonce_len)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ len = cbor_serialize(root, buf, buf_len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ bs = cbor_build_bytestring(buf, len);
+ if (!bs) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_array_push(cose, bs)) {
+ cbor_decref(&bs);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ r = true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (root) {
+ cbor_decref(&root);
+ }
+ g_free(buf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static bool add_signature_to_cose(cbor_item_t *cose)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *bs = NULL;
+ uint8_t zero[64] = {0};
+
+ /* we don't actually sign the data, so we just put 64 zero bytes */
+ bs = cbor_build_bytestring(zero, 64);
+ if (!bs) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (!qemu_cbor_array_push(cose, bs)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (bs) {
+ cbor_decref(&bs);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attestation response structure:
+ *
+ * {
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = String("Attestation"),
+ * value = Map(1) {
+ * key = String("document"),
+ * value = Byte_String()
+ * }
+ * }
+ * }
+ *
+ * The document is a serialized COSE sign1 blob of the structure:
+ * {
+ * Array(4) {
+ * [0] { ByteString() }, // serialized protected header
+ * [1] { Map(0) }, // 0 length map
+ * [2] { ByteString() }, // serialized payload
+ * [3] { ByteString() }, // signature
+ * }
+ * }
+ *
+ * where [0] protected header is a serialized CBOR blob of the structure:
+ * {
+ * Map(1) {
+ * key = Uint8(1) // alg
+ * value = NegativeInt8() // Signing algorithm
+ * }
+ * }
+ *
+ * [2] payload is serialized CBOR blob of the structure:
+ * {
+ * Map(9/8/7) {
+ * [0] { key = String("module_id"), value = String(module_id) },
+ * [1] { key = String("digest"), value = String("SHA384") },
+ * [2] {
+ * key = String("timestamp"),
+ * value = Uint64(unix epoch of when document was created)
+ * },
+ * [3] {
+ * key = String("pcrs"),
+ * value = Map(locked_pcr_cnt) {
+ * key = Uint8(pcr_index),
+ * value = ByteString(pcr_data)
+ * },
+ * },
+ * [4] {
+ * key = String("certificate"),
+ * value = ByteString(Signing certificate)
+ * },
+ * [5] { key = String("cabundle"), value = Array(N) { ByteString()... } },
+ * [6] { key = String("public_key"), value = ByteString() }, // optional
+ * [7] { key = String("user_data"), value = ByteString() }, // optional
+ * [8] { key = String("nonce"), value = ByteString() }, // optional
+ * }
+ * }
+ */
+static bool handle_Attestation(VirtIONSM *vnsm, struct iovec *request,
+ struct iovec *response, Error **errp)
+{
+ cbor_item_t *root = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *cose = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *nested_map;
+ size_t len;
+ NSMAttestationReq nsm_req;
+ enum NSMResponseTypes type;
+ bool r = false;
+ size_t buf_len = 16384;
+ uint8_t *buf = g_malloc(buf_len);
+
+ type = get_nsm_attestation_req(request->iov_base, request->iov_len,
+ &nsm_req);
+ if (type != NSM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (error_response(response, type, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ cose = cbor_new_definite_array(4);
+ if (!cose) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!add_protected_header_to_cose(cose)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!add_unprotected_header_to_cose(cose)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (nsm_req.public_key_len > 0) {
+ memcpy(vnsm->public_key, nsm_req.public_key, nsm_req.public_key_len);
+ vnsm->public_key_len = nsm_req.public_key_len;
+ }
+ if (nsm_req.user_data_len > 0) {
+ memcpy(vnsm->user_data, nsm_req.user_data, nsm_req.user_data_len);
+ vnsm->user_data_len = nsm_req.user_data_len;
+ }
+ if (nsm_req.nonce_len > 0) {
+ memcpy(vnsm->nonce, nsm_req.nonce, nsm_req.nonce_len);
+ vnsm->nonce_len = nsm_req.nonce_len;
+ }
+
+ if (!add_payload_to_cose(cose, vnsm)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!add_signature_to_cose(cose)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ len = cbor_serialize(cose, buf, buf_len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ root = cbor_new_definite_map(1);
+ if (!root) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_map_to_map(root, "Attestation", 1, &nested_map)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(nested_map, "document", buf, len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ len = cbor_serialize(root, response->iov_base, response->iov_len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ if (error_response(response, NSM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, errp)) {
+ r = true;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ response->iov_len = len;
+ r = true;
+
+ out:
+ if (root) {
+ cbor_decref(&root);
+ }
+ if (cose) {
+ cbor_decref(&cose);
+ }
+ g_free(buf);
+ return r;
+
+ err:
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize Attestation response");
+ goto out;
+}
+
+enum CBOR_ROOT_TYPE {
+ CBOR_ROOT_TYPE_STRING = 0,
+ CBOR_ROOT_TYPE_MAP = 1,
+};
+
+struct nsm_cmd {
+ char name[16];
+ /*
+ * There are 2 types of request
+ * 1) String(); "GetRandom", "DescribeNSM"
+ * 2) Map(1) { key: String(), value: ... }
+ */
+ enum CBOR_ROOT_TYPE root_type;
+ bool (*response_fn)(VirtIONSM *vnsm, struct iovec *request,
+ struct iovec *response, Error **errp);
+};
+
+const struct nsm_cmd nsm_cmds[] = {
+ { "GetRandom", CBOR_ROOT_TYPE_STRING, handle_GetRandom },
+ { "DescribeNSM", CBOR_ROOT_TYPE_STRING, handle_DescribeNSM },
+ { "DescribePCR", CBOR_ROOT_TYPE_MAP, handle_DescribePCR },
+ { "ExtendPCR", CBOR_ROOT_TYPE_MAP, handle_ExtendPCR },
+ { "LockPCR", CBOR_ROOT_TYPE_MAP, handle_LockPCR },
+ { "LockPCRs", CBOR_ROOT_TYPE_MAP, handle_LockPCRs },
+ { "Attestation", CBOR_ROOT_TYPE_MAP, handle_Attestation },
+};
+
+static const struct nsm_cmd *get_nsm_request_cmd(uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t size;
+ uint8_t *req;
+ enum CBOR_ROOT_TYPE root_type;
+ struct cbor_load_result result;
+ cbor_item_t *item = cbor_load(buf, len, &result);
+ if (!item || result.error.code != CBOR_ERR_NONE) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (cbor_isa_string(item)) {
+ size = cbor_string_length(item);
+ req = cbor_string_handle(item);
+ root_type = CBOR_ROOT_TYPE_STRING;
+ } else if (cbor_isa_map(item) && cbor_map_size(item) == 1) {
+ struct cbor_pair *handle = cbor_map_handle(item);
+ if (cbor_isa_string(handle->key)) {
+ size = cbor_string_length(handle->key);
+ req = cbor_string_handle(handle->key);
+ root_type = CBOR_ROOT_TYPE_MAP;
+ } else {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } else {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (size == 0 || req == NULL) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(nsm_cmds); ++i) {
+ if (nsm_cmds[i].root_type == root_type &&
+ strlen(nsm_cmds[i].name) == size &&
+ memcmp(nsm_cmds[i].name, req, size) == 0) {
+ cbor_decref(&item);
+ return &nsm_cmds[i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (item) {
+ cbor_decref(&item);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static bool get_nsm_request_response(VirtIONSM *vnsm, struct iovec *req,
+ struct iovec *resp, Error **errp)
+{
+ const struct nsm_cmd *cmd;
+
+ cmd = get_nsm_request_cmd(req->iov_base, req->iov_len);
+
+ if (cmd == NULL) {
+ if (error_response(resp, NSM_INVALID_OPERATION, errp)) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize InvalidOperation response");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return cmd->response_fn(vnsm, req, resp, errp);
+}
+
+static void handle_input(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
+{
+ VirtQueueElement *out_elem = NULL;
+ VirtQueueElement *in_elem = NULL;
+ VirtIONSM *vnsm = VIRTIO_NSM(vdev);
+ Error *err = NULL;
+
+ out_elem = virtqueue_pop(vq, sizeof(VirtQueueElement));
+ if (!out_elem) {
+ /* nothing in virtqueue */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (out_elem->out_num != 1) {
+ virtio_error(vdev, "Expected one request buffer first in virtqueue");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ in_elem = virtqueue_pop(vq, sizeof(VirtQueueElement));
+ if (!in_elem) {
+ virtio_error(vdev, "Expected response buffer after request buffer "
+ "in virtqueue");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (in_elem->in_num != 1) {
+ virtio_error(vdev, "Expected one response buffer after request buffer "
+ "in virtqueue");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (!get_nsm_request_response(vnsm, out_elem->out_sg, in_elem->in_sg,
+ &err)) {
+ error_report_err(err);
+ virtio_error(vdev, "Failed to get NSM request response");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ virtqueue_push(vq, out_elem, 0);
+ virtqueue_push(vq, in_elem, in_elem->in_sg->iov_len);
+ g_free(out_elem);
+ g_free(in_elem);
+ virtio_notify(vdev, vq);
+ return;
+
+ cleanup:
+ if (out_elem) {
+ virtqueue_detach_element(vq, out_elem, 0);
+ }
+ if (in_elem) {
+ virtqueue_detach_element(vq, in_elem, 0);
+ }
+ g_free(out_elem);
+ g_free(in_elem);
+ return;
+}
+
+static uint64_t get_features(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint64_t f, Error **errp)
+{
+ return f;
+}
+
+static bool extend_pcr(VirtIONSM *vnsm, int ind, uint8_t *data, uint16_t len)
+{
+ GChecksum *hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
+ struct PCRInfo *pcr = &(vnsm->pcrs[ind]);
+ size_t digest_len = SHA384_BYTE_LEN;
+ if (!hasher) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ g_checksum_update(hasher, pcr->data, SHA384_BYTE_LEN);
+ g_checksum_update(hasher, data, len);
+
+ g_checksum_get_digest(hasher, pcr->data, &digest_len);
+
+ g_checksum_free(hasher);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void lock_pcr(VirtIONSM *vnsm, int ind)
+{
+ vnsm->pcrs[ind].locked = true;
+}
+
+static void virtio_nsm_device_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
+{
+ VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(dev);
+ VirtIONSM *vnsm = VIRTIO_NSM(dev);
+
+ vnsm->max_pcrs = NSM_MAX_PCRS;
+ vnsm->digest = (char *) "SHA384";
+ if (vnsm->module_id == NULL) {
+ vnsm->module_id = (char *) "i-234-enc5678";
+ }
+ vnsm->version_major = 1;
+ vnsm->version_minor = 0;
+ vnsm->version_patch = 0;
+ vnsm->extend_pcr = extend_pcr;
+ vnsm->lock_pcr = lock_pcr;
+
+ virtio_init(vdev, VIRTIO_ID_NITRO_SEC_MOD, 0);
+
+ vnsm->vq = virtio_add_queue(vdev, 2, handle_input);
+}
+
+static void virtio_nsm_device_unrealize(DeviceState *dev)
+{
+ VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(dev);
+
+ virtio_del_queue(vdev, 0);
+ virtio_cleanup(vdev);
+}
+
+static const VMStateDescription vmstate_virtio_nsm = {
+ .name = "virtio-nsm",
+ .minimum_version_id = 1,
+ .version_id = 1,
+ .fields = (const VMStateField[]) {
+ VMSTATE_VIRTIO_DEVICE,
+ VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
+ },
+};
+
+static Property virtio_nsm_properties[] = {
+ DEFINE_PROP_STRING("module-id", VirtIONSM, module_id),
+ DEFINE_PROP_END_OF_LIST(),
+};
+
+static void virtio_nsm_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
+{
+ DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
+ VirtioDeviceClass *vdc = VIRTIO_DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
+
+ device_class_set_props(dc, virtio_nsm_properties);
+ dc->vmsd = &vmstate_virtio_nsm;
+ set_bit(DEVICE_CATEGORY_MISC, dc->categories);
+ vdc->realize = virtio_nsm_device_realize;
+ vdc->unrealize = virtio_nsm_device_unrealize;
+ vdc->get_features = get_features;
+}
+
+static const TypeInfo virtio_nsm_info = {
+ .name = TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM,
+ .parent = TYPE_VIRTIO_DEVICE,
+ .instance_size = sizeof(VirtIONSM),
+ .class_init = virtio_nsm_class_init,
+};
+
+static void virtio_register_types(void)
+{
+ type_register_static(&virtio_nsm_info);
+}
+
+type_init(virtio_register_types)
diff --git a/include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h b/include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7901c19fe4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * AWS Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2024 Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
+ * (at your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the
+ * top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#ifndef QEMU_VIRTIO_NSM_H
+#define QEMU_VIRTIO_NSM_H
+
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
+#include "qom/object.h"
+
+#define NSM_MAX_PCRS 32
+#define NSM_USER_DATA_MAX_SIZE 512
+#define NSM_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 512
+#define NSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE 1024
+#define SHA384_BYTE_LEN 48
+
+#define TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM "virtio-nsm-device"
+OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(VirtIONSM, VIRTIO_NSM)
+#define VIRTIO_NSM_GET_PARENT_CLASS(obj) \
+ OBJECT_GET_PARENT_CLASS(obj, TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM)
+
+struct PCRInfo {
+ bool locked;
+ uint8_t data[SHA384_BYTE_LEN];
+};
+
+struct VirtIONSM {
+ VirtIODevice parent_obj;
+
+ /* Only one vq - guest puts request and response buffers on it */
+ VirtQueue *vq;
+
+ /* NSM State */
+ uint16_t max_pcrs;
+ struct PCRInfo pcrs[NSM_MAX_PCRS];
+ char *digest;
+ char *module_id;
+ uint8_t version_major;
+ uint8_t version_minor;
+ uint8_t version_patch;
+
+ uint16_t public_key_len;
+ uint8_t public_key[NSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE];
+ uint16_t user_data_len;
+ uint8_t user_data[NSM_USER_DATA_MAX_SIZE];
+ uint16_t nonce_len;
+ uint8_t nonce[NSM_NONCE_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ bool (*extend_pcr)(VirtIONSM *vnsm, int ind, uint8_t *data, uint16_t len);
+ void (*lock_pcr)(VirtIONSM *vnsm, int ind);
+};
+
+#endif
--
2.39.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-10 16:44 [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-10 16:45 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 13:51 ` Alexander Graf
` (3 more replies)
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] docs/nitro-enclave: Documentation for nitro-enclave machine type Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-18 11:51 ` [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
5 siblings, 4 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Dorjoy Chowdhury @ 2024-08-10 16:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo,
mst, marcel.apfelbaum, berrange, philmd
AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device which
is used for stripped down TPM functionality like attestation. This commit
adds the built-in NSM device in the nitro-enclave machine type.
In Nitro Enclaves, all the PCRs start in a known zero state and the first
16 PCRs are locked from boot and reserved. The PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 and PCR8
contain the SHA384 hashes related to the EIF file used to boot the
VM for validation.
A new optional nitro-enclave machine option 'id' has been added which will
be the enclave identifier reflected in the module-id of the NSM device.
Otherwise, the device will have a default id set.
Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
---
hw/core/eif.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
hw/core/eif.h | 5 +-
hw/core/meson.build | 4 +-
hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 85 ++++++++++++-
include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 19 +++
6 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/core/eif.c b/hw/core/eif.c
index 5558879a96..d2c65668ef 100644
--- a/hw/core/eif.c
+++ b/hw/core/eif.c
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
#include "qemu/bswap.h"
#include "qapi/error.h"
#include <zlib.h> /* for crc32 */
+#include <cbor.h>
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include <gnutls/x509.h>
#include "hw/core/eif.h"
@@ -180,6 +183,8 @@ static void safe_unlink(char *f)
* Upon success, the caller is reponsible for unlinking and freeing *kernel_path
*/
static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
+ GChecksum *image_hasher,
+ GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher,
uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
{
size_t got;
@@ -213,6 +218,8 @@ static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
}
*crc = crc32(*crc, kernel, size);
+ g_checksum_update(image_hasher, kernel, size);
+ g_checksum_update(bootstrap_hasher, kernel, size);
g_free(kernel);
fclose(tmp_file);
@@ -230,6 +237,8 @@ static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
}
static bool read_eif_cmdline(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char *cmdline,
+ GChecksum *image_hasher,
+ GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher,
uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
{
size_t got = fread(cmdline, 1, size, f);
@@ -239,10 +248,14 @@ static bool read_eif_cmdline(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char *cmdline,
}
*crc = crc32(*crc, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
+ g_checksum_update(image_hasher, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
+ g_checksum_update(bootstrap_hasher, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
return true;
}
static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
+ GChecksum *image_hasher,
+ GChecksum *bootstrap_or_app_hasher,
uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
{
size_t got;
@@ -261,6 +274,8 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
}
*crc = crc32(*crc, ramdisk, size);
+ g_checksum_update(image_hasher, ramdisk, size);
+ g_checksum_update(bootstrap_or_app_hasher, ramdisk, size);
g_free(ramdisk);
return true;
@@ -269,6 +284,125 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
return false;
}
+static bool get_fingerprint_sha384_from_cert(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
+ uint8_t *sha384, Error **errp)
+{
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
+ size_t hash_size = 48;
+ gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
+
+ gnutls_global_init();
+ gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
+
+ if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) != 0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint(crt, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384, sha384,
+ &hash_size) != 0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to compute SHA384 fingerprint");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
+ gnutls_global_deinit();
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool get_signature_fingerprint_sha384(FILE *eif, uint64_t size,
+ uint8_t *sha384,
+ uint32_t *crc,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ size_t got;
+ uint8_t *sig = NULL;
+ uint8_t *cert = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *item = NULL;
+ cbor_item_t *pcr0 = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ struct cbor_pair *pair;
+ struct cbor_load_result result;
+
+ sig = g_malloc(size);
+ got = fread(sig, 1, size, eif);
+ if ((uint64_t) got != size) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to read EIF signature section data");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ *crc = crc32(*crc, sig, size);
+
+ item = cbor_load(sig, size, &result);
+ if (!item || result.error.code != CBOR_ERR_NONE) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to load signature section data as CBOR");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!cbor_isa_array(item) || cbor_array_size(item) < 1) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ pcr0 = cbor_array_get(item, 0);
+ if (!pcr0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to get PCR0 signature");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!cbor_isa_map(pcr0) || cbor_map_size(pcr0) != 2) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ pair = cbor_map_handle(pcr0);
+ if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key) || cbor_string_length(pair->key) != 19 ||
+ memcmp(cbor_string_handle(pair->key), "signing_certificate", 19) != 0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid signautre CBOR");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!cbor_isa_array(pair->value)) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ len = cbor_array_size(pair->value);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ cert = g_malloc(len);
+ for (int i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+ cbor_item_t *tmp = cbor_array_get(pair->value, i);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (!cbor_isa_uint(tmp) || cbor_int_get_width(tmp) != CBOR_INT_8) {
+ cbor_decref(&tmp);
+ error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ cert[i] = cbor_get_uint8(tmp);
+ cbor_decref(&tmp);
+ }
+
+ if (!get_fingerprint_sha384_from_cert(cert, len, sha384, errp)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+
+ cleanup:
+ g_free(sig);
+ g_free(cert);
+ if (pcr0) {
+ cbor_decref(&pcr0);
+ }
+ if (item) {
+ cbor_decref(&item);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
/* Expects file to have offset 0 before this function is called */
static long get_file_size(FILE *f, Error **errp)
{
@@ -299,7 +433,9 @@ static long get_file_size(FILE *f, Error **errp)
*/
bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
char **kernel_path, char **initrd_path, char **cmdline,
- Error **errp)
+ uint8_t *image_sha384, uint8_t *bootstrap_sha384,
+ uint8_t *app_sha384, uint8_t *fingerprint_sha384,
+ bool *signature_found, Error **errp)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
FILE *machine_initrd_f = NULL;
@@ -308,9 +444,33 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
uint32_t crc = 0;
EifHeader eif_header;
bool seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_MAX] = {false};
-
+ /* kernel + ramdisks + cmdline sha384 hash */
+ GChecksum *image_hasher = NULL;
+ /* kernel + boot ramdisk + cmdline sha384 hash */
+ GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher = NULL;
+ /* application ramdisk(s) hash */
+ GChecksum *app_hasher = NULL;
+ size_t digest_len;
+
+ *signature_found = false;
*kernel_path = *initrd_path = *cmdline = NULL;
+ image_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
+ if (image_hasher == NULL) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for image");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ bootstrap_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
+ if (bootstrap_hasher == NULL) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for bootstrap");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ app_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
+ if (app_hasher == NULL) {
+ error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for app");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
f = fopen(eif_path, "rb");
if (f == NULL) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Failed to open %s", eif_path);
@@ -374,7 +534,7 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
goto cleanup;
}
if (!read_eif_kernel(f, section_header.section_size, kernel_path,
- &crc, errp)) {
+ image_hasher, bootstrap_hasher, &crc, errp)) {
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -389,7 +549,8 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
}
size = section_header.section_size;
*cmdline = g_malloc(size + 1);
- if (!read_eif_cmdline(f, size, *cmdline, &crc, errp)) {
+ if (!read_eif_cmdline(f, size, *cmdline, image_hasher,
+ bootstrap_hasher, &crc, errp)) {
goto cleanup;
}
(*cmdline)[size] = '\0';
@@ -398,7 +559,13 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
}
case EIF_SECTION_RAMDISK:
{
+ /*
+ * If it's the first ramdisk, we need to hash it into bootstrap,
+ * otherwise we need to hash it into app.
+ */
+ GChecksum *hasher = app_hasher;
if (!seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_RAMDISK]) {
+ hasher = bootstrap_hasher;
/*
* If this is the first time we are seeing a ramdisk section,
* we need to create the initrd temporary file.
@@ -415,12 +582,21 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
}
if (!read_eif_ramdisk(f, initrd_path_f, section_header.section_size,
- &crc, errp)) {
+ image_hasher, hasher, &crc, errp)) {
goto cleanup;
}
break;
}
+ case EIF_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
+ *signature_found = true;
+ if (!get_signature_fingerprint_sha384(f,
+ section_header.section_size,
+ fingerprint_sha384, &crc,
+ errp)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ break;
default:
/* other sections including invalid or unknown sections */
{
@@ -484,17 +660,34 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
}
if (!read_eif_ramdisk(machine_initrd_f, initrd_path_f,
- machine_initrd_size, &crc, errp)) {
+ machine_initrd_size, image_hasher, app_hasher,
+ &crc, errp)) {
goto cleanup;
}
}
+ digest_len = 48;
+ g_checksum_get_digest(image_hasher, image_sha384, &digest_len);
+ g_checksum_free(image_hasher);
+
+ digest_len = 48;
+ g_checksum_get_digest(bootstrap_hasher, bootstrap_sha384, &digest_len);
+ g_checksum_free(bootstrap_hasher);
+
+ digest_len = 48;
+ g_checksum_get_digest(app_hasher, app_sha384, &digest_len);
+ g_checksum_free(app_hasher);
+
fclose(f);
fclose(initrd_path_f);
safe_fclose(machine_initrd_f);
return true;
cleanup:
+ g_checksum_free(image_hasher);
+ g_checksum_free(bootstrap_hasher);
+ g_checksum_free(app_hasher);
+
safe_fclose(f);
safe_fclose(initrd_path_f);
safe_fclose(machine_initrd_f);
diff --git a/hw/core/eif.h b/hw/core/eif.h
index 7063974d93..fed3cb5514 100644
--- a/hw/core/eif.h
+++ b/hw/core/eif.h
@@ -13,7 +13,10 @@
bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
char **kernel_path, char **initrd_path,
- char **kernel_cmdline, Error **errp);
+ char **kernel_cmdline, uint8_t *image_sha384,
+ uint8_t *bootstrap_sha384, uint8_t *app_sha384,
+ uint8_t *fingerprint_sha384, bool *signature_found,
+ Error **errp);
#endif
diff --git a/hw/core/meson.build b/hw/core/meson.build
index f32d1ad943..7e7a14ee00 100644
--- a/hw/core/meson.build
+++ b/hw/core/meson.build
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ hwcore_ss.add(files(
'qdev-clock.c',
))
+libcbor = dependency('libcbor', version: '>=0.8.0')
+
common_ss.add(files('cpu-common.c'))
common_ss.add(files('machine-smp.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_FITLOADER', if_true: files('loader-fit.c'))
@@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_REGISTER', if_true: files('register.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_SPLIT_IRQ', if_true: files('split-irq.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_XILINX_AXI', if_true: files('stream.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_PLATFORM_BUS', if_true: files('sysbus-fdt.c'))
-system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVE', if_true: [files('eif.c'), zlib])
+system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVE', if_true: [files('eif.c'), zlib, libcbor, gnutls])
system_ss.add(files(
'cpu-sysemu.c',
diff --git a/hw/i386/Kconfig b/hw/i386/Kconfig
index 821532c4c8..63271bf915 100644
--- a/hw/i386/Kconfig
+++ b/hw/i386/Kconfig
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ config NITRO_ENCLAVE
default y
depends on MICROVM
select VHOST_USER_VSOCK
+ select VIRTIO_NSM
config X86_IOMMU
bool
diff --git a/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
index 280ab4cc9b..b34e8399ee 100644
--- a/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
+++ b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include "hw/i386/microvm.h"
#include "hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h"
#include "hw/virtio/virtio-mmio.h"
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h"
#include "hw/virtio/vhost-user-vsock.h"
#include "sysemu/hostmem.h"
@@ -72,9 +73,27 @@ static void vhost_user_vsock_init(NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems)
qdev_realize_and_unref(dev, bus, &error_fatal);
}
+static void virtio_nsm_init(NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems)
+{
+ DeviceState *dev = qdev_new(TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM);
+ VirtIONSM *vnsm = VIRTIO_NSM(dev);
+ BusState *bus = find_free_virtio_mmio_bus();
+
+ if (!bus) {
+ error_report("Failed to find bus for virtio-nsm device.");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ qdev_prop_set_string(dev, "module-id", nems->id);
+
+ qdev_realize_and_unref(dev, bus, &error_fatal);
+ nems->vnsm = vnsm;
+}
+
static void nitro_enclave_devices_init(NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems)
{
vhost_user_vsock_init(nems);
+ virtio_nsm_init(nems);
}
static void nitro_enclave_machine_state_init(MachineState *machine)
@@ -87,10 +106,46 @@ static void nitro_enclave_machine_state_init(MachineState *machine)
nitro_enclave_devices_init(ne_state);
}
+static void nitro_enclave_machine_reset(MachineState *machine,
+ ShutdownCause reason)
+{
+ NitroEnclaveMachineClass *ne_class =
+ NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(machine);
+ NitroEnclaveMachineState *ne_state = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(machine);
+
+ ne_class->parent_reset(machine, reason);
+
+ memset(ne_state->vnsm->pcrs, 0, sizeof(ne_state->vnsm->pcrs));
+
+ /* PCR0 */
+ ne_state->vnsm->extend_pcr(ne_state->vnsm, 0, ne_state->image_sha384,
+ SHA384_BYTE_LEN);
+ /* PCR1 */
+ ne_state->vnsm->extend_pcr(ne_state->vnsm, 1, ne_state->bootstrap_sha384,
+ SHA384_BYTE_LEN);
+ /* PCR2 */
+ ne_state->vnsm->extend_pcr(ne_state->vnsm, 2, ne_state->app_sha384,
+ SHA384_BYTE_LEN);
+ /* PCR8 */
+ if (ne_state->signature_found) {
+ ne_state->vnsm->extend_pcr(ne_state->vnsm, 8,
+ ne_state->fingerprint_sha384,
+ SHA384_BYTE_LEN);
+ }
+
+ /* First 16 PCRs are locked from boot and reserved for nitro enclave */
+ for (int i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ ne_state->vnsm->lock_pcr(ne_state->vnsm, i);
+ }
+}
+
static void nitro_enclave_machine_initfn(Object *obj)
{
MicrovmMachineState *mms = MICROVM_MACHINE(obj);
X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(obj);
+ NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(obj);
+
+ nems->id = g_strdup("i-234-enc5678");
/* AWS nitro enclaves have PCIE and ACPI disabled */
mms->pcie = ON_OFF_AUTO_OFF;
@@ -103,9 +158,13 @@ static void x86_load_eif(X86MachineState *x86ms, FWCfgState *fw_cfg,
Error *err;
char *eif_kernel, *eif_initrd, *eif_cmdline;
MachineState *machine = MACHINE(x86ms);
+ NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(x86ms);
if (!read_eif_file(machine->kernel_filename, machine->initrd_filename,
- &eif_kernel, &eif_initrd, &eif_cmdline, &err)) {
+ &eif_kernel, &eif_initrd, &eif_cmdline,
+ nems->image_sha384, nems->bootstrap_sha384,
+ nems->app_sha384, nems->fingerprint_sha384,
+ &(nems->signature_found), &err)) {
error_report_err(err);
exit(1);
}
@@ -176,6 +235,22 @@ static void nitro_enclave_set_vsock_chardev_id(Object *obj, const char *value,
nems->vsock = g_strdup(value);
}
+static char *nitro_enclave_get_id(Object *obj, Error **errp)
+{
+ NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(obj);
+
+ return g_strdup(nems->id);
+}
+
+static void nitro_enclave_set_id(Object *obj, const char *value,
+ Error **errp)
+{
+ NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(obj);
+
+ g_free(nems->id);
+ nems->id = g_strdup(value);
+}
+
static void nitro_enclave_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
{
MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
@@ -190,6 +265,9 @@ static void nitro_enclave_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
nemc->parent_init = mc->init;
mc->init = nitro_enclave_machine_state_init;
+ nemc->parent_reset = mc->reset;
+ mc->reset = nitro_enclave_machine_reset;
+
mc->create_default_memdev = create_memfd_backend;
object_class_property_add_str(oc, NITRO_ENCLAVE_VSOCK_CHARDEV_ID,
@@ -198,6 +276,11 @@ static void nitro_enclave_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
object_class_property_set_description(oc, NITRO_ENCLAVE_VSOCK_CHARDEV_ID,
"Set chardev id for vhost-user-vsock "
"device");
+
+ object_class_property_add_str(oc, NITRO_ENCLAVE_ID, nitro_enclave_get_id,
+ nitro_enclave_set_id);
+ object_class_property_set_description(oc, NITRO_ENCLAVE_ID,
+ "Set enclave identifier");
}
static const TypeInfo nitro_enclave_machine_info = {
diff --git a/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h b/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
index 3e302de851..1a95191d76 100644
--- a/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
+++ b/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
@@ -13,14 +13,19 @@
#include "hw/i386/microvm.h"
#include "qom/object.h"
+#include "hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h"
+
+#define SHA384_BYTE_LEN 48
/* Machine type options */
#define NITRO_ENCLAVE_VSOCK_CHARDEV_ID "vsock"
+#define NITRO_ENCLAVE_ID "id"
struct NitroEnclaveMachineClass {
MicrovmMachineClass parent;
void (*parent_init)(MachineState *state);
+ void (*parent_reset)(MachineState *machine, ShutdownCause reason);
};
struct NitroEnclaveMachineState {
@@ -28,6 +33,20 @@ struct NitroEnclaveMachineState {
/* Machine type options */
char *vsock;
+ char *id;
+
+ /* Machine state */
+ VirtIONSM *vnsm;
+
+ /* kernel + ramdisks + cmdline sha384 hash */
+ uint8_t image_sha384[SHA384_BYTE_LEN];
+ /* kernel + boot ramdisk + cmdline sha384 hash */
+ uint8_t bootstrap_sha384[SHA384_BYTE_LEN];
+ /* application ramdisk(s) hash */
+ uint8_t app_sha384[SHA384_BYTE_LEN];
+ /* certificate fingerprint hash */
+ uint8_t fingerprint_sha384[SHA384_BYTE_LEN];
+ bool signature_found;
};
#define TYPE_NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE MACHINE_TYPE_NAME("nitro-enclave")
--
2.39.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 5/5] docs/nitro-enclave: Documentation for nitro-enclave machine type
2024-08-10 16:44 [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in " Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-10 16:45 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-18 11:51 ` [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
5 siblings, 0 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Dorjoy Chowdhury @ 2024-08-10 16:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo,
mst, marcel.apfelbaum, berrange, philmd
---
docs/system/i386/nitro-enclave.rst | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 80 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 docs/system/i386/nitro-enclave.rst
diff --git a/docs/system/i386/nitro-enclave.rst b/docs/system/i386/nitro-enclave.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..25bff898a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/system/i386/nitro-enclave.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+'nitro-enclave' virtual machine (``nitro-enclave``)
+===================================================
+
+``nitro-enclave`` is a machine type which emulates an ``AWS nitro enclave``
+virtual machine. `AWS nitro enclaves`_ is an `Amazon EC2`_ feature that allows
+creating isolated execution environments, called enclaves, from Amazon EC2
+instances which are used for processing highly sensitive data. Enclaves have
+no persistent storage and no external networking. The enclave VMs are based
+on Firecracker microvm with a vhost-vsock device for communication with the
+parent EC2 instance that spawned it and a Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device
+for cryptographic attestation. The parent instance VM always has CID 3 while
+the enclave VM gets a dynamic CID. Enclaves use an EIF (`Enclave Image Format`_)
+file which contains the necessary kernel, cmdline and ramdisk(s) to boot.
+
+In QEMU, ``nitro-enclave`` is a machine type based on ``microvm`` similar to how
+``AWS nitro enclaves`` are based on ``Firecracker`` microvm. This is useful for
+local testing of EIF files using QEMU instead of running real AWS Nitro Enclaves
+which can be difficult for debugging due to its roots in security. The vsock
+device emulation is done using vhost-user-vsock which means another process that
+can do the userspace emulation, like `vhost-device-vsock`_ from rust-vmm crate,
+must be run alongside nitro-enclave for the vsock communication to work.
+
+.. _AWS nitro enlaves: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/enclaves/latest/user/nitro-enclave.html
+.. _Amazon EC2: https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/
+.. _Enclave Image Format: https://github.com/aws/aws-nitro-enclaves-image-format
+.. _vhost-device-vsock: https://github.com/rust-vmm/vhost-device/tree/main/vhost-device-vsock
+
+Using the nitro-enclave machine type
+------------------------------
+
+Machine-specific options
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+It supports the following machine-specific options:
+
+- nitro-enclave.vsock=string (required) (Id of the chardev from '-chardev' option that vhost-user-vsock device will use)
+- nitro-enclave.id=string (optional) (Set enclave identifier)
+
+
+Running a nitro-enclave VM
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+First, run vhost-device-vsock (or a similar tool that supports vhost-user-vsock)
+
+ $ vhost-device-vsock \
+ --vm guest-cid=4,uds-path=/tmp/vm4.vsock,socket=/tmp/vhost4.socket \
+ --vm guest-cid=3,uds-path=/tmp/vm3.vsock,socket=/tmp/vhost3.socket
+
+Then, run the parent VM that has the necessary vsock communication support.
+
+ $ qemu-system-x86_64 -machine q35,memory-backend=mem0 -enable-kvm -m 8G \
+ -nic user,model=virtio -drive file=test_vm.qcow2,media=disk,if=virtio \
+ --display sdl -object memory-backend-memfd,id=mem0,size=8G \
+ -chardev socket,id=char0,reconnect=0,path=/tmp/vhost3.socket \
+ -device vhost-user-vsock-pci,chardev=char0
+
+Inside this VM the necessary applications should be run so that the nitro-enclave
+VM applications' vsock communication works. For example, the nitro-enclave VM's
+init process connects to CID 3 and sends a single byte hello heartbeat (0xB7) to
+let the parent VM know that it booted expecting a heartbeat (0xB7) response.
+
+Now run the nitro-enclave VM using the following command where ``hello.eif`` is
+an EIF file you would use to spawn a real AWS nitro enclave virtual machine:
+
+ $ qemu-system-x86_64 -M nitro-enclave,vsock=c,id=hello-world \
+ -kernel hello-world.eif -nographic -m 4G --enable-kvm -cpu host \
+ -chardev socket,id=c,path=/tmp/vhost4.socket
+
+In this example, the nitro-enclave VM has CID 4.
+
+
+Limitations
+-----------
+
+AWS nitro enclave emulation support in QEMU requires users to run vhost-device-vsock
+or similar tool for vhost-user-vsock support and another VM with CID 3 with necessary
+vsock communication support. Requirement of running another VM and necessary applications
+inside it can be lifted if some proxying support is added to vhost-device-vsock to
+forward all packets to the host machine, in which case, users can run the necessary
+applications in the host machine instead of the parent VM with CID 3.
--
2.39.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in " Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-12 13:51 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-12 14:00 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-12 13:55 ` Alexander Graf
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 1 reply; 21+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2024-08-12 13:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dorjoy Chowdhury, qemu-devel
Cc: agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo, mst,
marcel.apfelbaum, berrange, philmd
On 10.08.24 18:45, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device which
> is used for stripped down TPM functionality like attestation. This commit
> adds the built-in NSM device in the nitro-enclave machine type.
>
> In Nitro Enclaves, all the PCRs start in a known zero state and the first
> 16 PCRs are locked from boot and reserved. The PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 and PCR8
> contain the SHA384 hashes related to the EIF file used to boot the
> VM for validation.
>
> A new optional nitro-enclave machine option 'id' has been added which will
> be the enclave identifier reflected in the module-id of the NSM device.
> Otherwise, the device will have a default id set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> ---
> hw/core/eif.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> hw/core/eif.h | 5 +-
> hw/core/meson.build | 4 +-
> hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
> hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 85 ++++++++++++-
> include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 19 +++
> 6 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
[...]
> diff --git a/hw/core/meson.build b/hw/core/meson.build
> index f32d1ad943..7e7a14ee00 100644
> --- a/hw/core/meson.build
> +++ b/hw/core/meson.build
> @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ hwcore_ss.add(files(
> 'qdev-clock.c',
> ))
>
> +libcbor = dependency('libcbor', version: '>=0.8.0')
> +
> common_ss.add(files('cpu-common.c'))
> common_ss.add(files('machine-smp.c'))
> system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_FITLOADER', if_true: files('loader-fit.c'))
> @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_REGISTER', if_true: files('register.c'))
> system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_SPLIT_IRQ', if_true: files('split-irq.c'))
> system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_XILINX_AXI', if_true: files('stream.c'))
> system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_PLATFORM_BUS', if_true: files('sysbus-fdt.c'))
> -system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVE', if_true: [files('eif.c'), zlib])
> +system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVE', if_true: [files('eif.c'), zlib, libcbor, gnutls])
I think this is missing a dependency check somewhere:
../hw/core/eif.c:16:10: fatal error: gnutls/gnutls.h: No such file or
directory
16 | #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
It's also the first time anything accesses gnutls directly instead of
through the QEMU crypto framework. Is there a particular reason you can
not use qcrypto?
Alex
Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in " Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 13:51 ` Alexander Graf
@ 2024-08-12 13:55 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-12 14:07 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-13 12:57 ` Alexander Graf
3 siblings, 0 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2024-08-12 13:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dorjoy Chowdhury, qemu-devel
Cc: agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo, mst,
marcel.apfelbaum, berrange, philmd
On 10.08.24 18:45, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device which
> is used for stripped down TPM functionality like attestation. This commit
> adds the built-in NSM device in the nitro-enclave machine type.
>
> In Nitro Enclaves, all the PCRs start in a known zero state and the first
> 16 PCRs are locked from boot and reserved. The PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 and PCR8
> contain the SHA384 hashes related to the EIF file used to boot the
> VM for validation.
>
> A new optional nitro-enclave machine option 'id' has been added which will
> be the enclave identifier reflected in the module-id of the NSM device.
> Otherwise, the device will have a default id set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> ---
> hw/core/eif.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> hw/core/eif.h | 5 +-
> hw/core/meson.build | 4 +-
> hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
> hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 85 ++++++++++++-
> include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 19 +++
> 6 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/hw/core/eif.c b/hw/core/eif.c
> index 5558879a96..d2c65668ef 100644
> --- a/hw/core/eif.c
> +++ b/hw/core/eif.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
> #include "qemu/bswap.h"
> #include "qapi/error.h"
> #include <zlib.h> /* for crc32 */
> +#include <cbor.h>
> +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
> +#include <gnutls/x509.h>
>
> #include "hw/core/eif.h"
>
> @@ -180,6 +183,8 @@ static void safe_unlink(char *f)
> * Upon success, the caller is reponsible for unlinking and freeing *kernel_path
> */
> static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
> + GChecksum *image_hasher,
> + GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher,
> uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
> {
> size_t got;
> @@ -213,6 +218,8 @@ static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
> }
>
> *crc = crc32(*crc, kernel, size);
> + g_checksum_update(image_hasher, kernel, size);
> + g_checksum_update(bootstrap_hasher, kernel, size);
> g_free(kernel);
> fclose(tmp_file);
>
> @@ -230,6 +237,8 @@ static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
> }
>
> static bool read_eif_cmdline(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char *cmdline,
> + GChecksum *image_hasher,
> + GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher,
> uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
> {
> size_t got = fread(cmdline, 1, size, f);
> @@ -239,10 +248,14 @@ static bool read_eif_cmdline(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char *cmdline,
> }
>
> *crc = crc32(*crc, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
> + g_checksum_update(image_hasher, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
> + g_checksum_update(bootstrap_hasher, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
> return true;
> }
>
> static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
> + GChecksum *image_hasher,
> + GChecksum *bootstrap_or_app_hasher,
> uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
> {
> size_t got;
> @@ -261,6 +274,8 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
> }
>
> *crc = crc32(*crc, ramdisk, size);
> + g_checksum_update(image_hasher, ramdisk, size);
> + g_checksum_update(bootstrap_or_app_hasher, ramdisk, size);
> g_free(ramdisk);
> return true;
>
> @@ -269,6 +284,125 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
> return false;
> }
>
> +static bool get_fingerprint_sha384_from_cert(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
> + uint8_t *sha384, Error **errp)
> +{
> + gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
> + size_t hash_size = 48;
> + gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
> +
> + gnutls_global_init();
> + gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
> +
> + if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) != 0) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint(crt, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384, sha384,
> + &hash_size) != 0) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to compute SHA384 fingerprint");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +
> + cleanup:
> + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
> + gnutls_global_deinit();
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool get_signature_fingerprint_sha384(FILE *eif, uint64_t size,
> + uint8_t *sha384,
> + uint32_t *crc,
> + Error **errp)
> +{
> + size_t got;
> + uint8_t *sig = NULL;
> + uint8_t *cert = NULL;
> + cbor_item_t *item = NULL;
> + cbor_item_t *pcr0 = NULL;
> + size_t len;
> + struct cbor_pair *pair;
> + struct cbor_load_result result;
> +
> + sig = g_malloc(size);
> + got = fread(sig, 1, size, eif);
> + if ((uint64_t) got != size) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to read EIF signature section data");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + *crc = crc32(*crc, sig, size);
> +
> + item = cbor_load(sig, size, &result);
> + if (!item || result.error.code != CBOR_ERR_NONE) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to load signature section data as CBOR");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!cbor_isa_array(item) || cbor_array_size(item) < 1) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + pcr0 = cbor_array_get(item, 0);
> + if (!pcr0) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to get PCR0 signature");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!cbor_isa_map(pcr0) || cbor_map_size(pcr0) != 2) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + pair = cbor_map_handle(pcr0);
> + if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key) || cbor_string_length(pair->key) != 19 ||
> + memcmp(cbor_string_handle(pair->key), "signing_certificate", 19) != 0) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Invalid signautre CBOR");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!cbor_isa_array(pair->value)) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + len = cbor_array_size(pair->value);
> + if (len == 0) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + cert = g_malloc(len);
> + for (int i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
> + cbor_item_t *tmp = cbor_array_get(pair->value, i);
> + if (!tmp) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!cbor_isa_uint(tmp) || cbor_int_get_width(tmp) != CBOR_INT_8) {
> + cbor_decref(&tmp);
> + error_setg(errp, "Invalid signature CBOR");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + cert[i] = cbor_get_uint8(tmp);
> + cbor_decref(&tmp);
> + }
> +
> + if (!get_fingerprint_sha384_from_cert(cert, len, sha384, errp)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +
> + cleanup:
> + g_free(sig);
> + g_free(cert);
> + if (pcr0) {
> + cbor_decref(&pcr0);
> + }
> + if (item) {
> + cbor_decref(&item);
> + }
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> /* Expects file to have offset 0 before this function is called */
> static long get_file_size(FILE *f, Error **errp)
> {
> @@ -299,7 +433,9 @@ static long get_file_size(FILE *f, Error **errp)
> */
> bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> char **kernel_path, char **initrd_path, char **cmdline,
> - Error **errp)
> + uint8_t *image_sha384, uint8_t *bootstrap_sha384,
> + uint8_t *app_sha384, uint8_t *fingerprint_sha384,
> + bool *signature_found, Error **errp)
> {
> FILE *f = NULL;
> FILE *machine_initrd_f = NULL;
> @@ -308,9 +444,33 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> uint32_t crc = 0;
> EifHeader eif_header;
> bool seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_MAX] = {false};
> -
> + /* kernel + ramdisks + cmdline sha384 hash */
> + GChecksum *image_hasher = NULL;
> + /* kernel + boot ramdisk + cmdline sha384 hash */
> + GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher = NULL;
> + /* application ramdisk(s) hash */
> + GChecksum *app_hasher = NULL;
> + size_t digest_len;
> +
> + *signature_found = false;
> *kernel_path = *initrd_path = *cmdline = NULL;
>
> + image_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> + if (image_hasher == NULL) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for image");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + bootstrap_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> + if (bootstrap_hasher == NULL) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for bootstrap");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + app_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> + if (app_hasher == NULL) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for app");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> f = fopen(eif_path, "rb");
> if (f == NULL) {
> error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Failed to open %s", eif_path);
> @@ -374,7 +534,7 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> goto cleanup;
> }
> if (!read_eif_kernel(f, section_header.section_size, kernel_path,
> - &crc, errp)) {
> + image_hasher, bootstrap_hasher, &crc, errp)) {
> goto cleanup;
> }
>
> @@ -389,7 +549,8 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> }
> size = section_header.section_size;
> *cmdline = g_malloc(size + 1);
> - if (!read_eif_cmdline(f, size, *cmdline, &crc, errp)) {
> + if (!read_eif_cmdline(f, size, *cmdline, image_hasher,
> + bootstrap_hasher, &crc, errp)) {
> goto cleanup;
> }
> (*cmdline)[size] = '\0';
> @@ -398,7 +559,13 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> }
> case EIF_SECTION_RAMDISK:
> {
> + /*
> + * If it's the first ramdisk, we need to hash it into bootstrap,
> + * otherwise we need to hash it into app.
> + */
> + GChecksum *hasher = app_hasher;
> if (!seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_RAMDISK]) {
> + hasher = bootstrap_hasher;
> /*
> * If this is the first time we are seeing a ramdisk section,
> * we need to create the initrd temporary file.
> @@ -415,12 +582,21 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> }
>
> if (!read_eif_ramdisk(f, initrd_path_f, section_header.section_size,
> - &crc, errp)) {
> + image_hasher, hasher, &crc, errp)) {
> goto cleanup;
> }
>
> break;
> }
> + case EIF_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
> + *signature_found = true;
> + if (!get_signature_fingerprint_sha384(f,
> + section_header.section_size,
> + fingerprint_sha384, &crc,
> + errp)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + break;
> default:
> /* other sections including invalid or unknown sections */
> {
> @@ -484,17 +660,34 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> }
>
> if (!read_eif_ramdisk(machine_initrd_f, initrd_path_f,
> - machine_initrd_size, &crc, errp)) {
> + machine_initrd_size, image_hasher, app_hasher,
> + &crc, errp)) {
> goto cleanup;
> }
> }
>
> + digest_len = 48;
> + g_checksum_get_digest(image_hasher, image_sha384, &digest_len);
> + g_checksum_free(image_hasher);
> +
> + digest_len = 48;
> + g_checksum_get_digest(bootstrap_hasher, bootstrap_sha384, &digest_len);
> + g_checksum_free(bootstrap_hasher);
> +
> + digest_len = 48;
> + g_checksum_get_digest(app_hasher, app_sha384, &digest_len);
> + g_checksum_free(app_hasher);
> +
> fclose(f);
> fclose(initrd_path_f);
> safe_fclose(machine_initrd_f);
> return true;
>
> cleanup:
> + g_checksum_free(image_hasher);
> + g_checksum_free(bootstrap_hasher);
> + g_checksum_free(app_hasher);
> +
> safe_fclose(f);
> safe_fclose(initrd_path_f);
> safe_fclose(machine_initrd_f);
> diff --git a/hw/core/eif.h b/hw/core/eif.h
> index 7063974d93..fed3cb5514 100644
> --- a/hw/core/eif.h
> +++ b/hw/core/eif.h
> @@ -13,7 +13,10 @@
>
> bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> char **kernel_path, char **initrd_path,
> - char **kernel_cmdline, Error **errp);
> + char **kernel_cmdline, uint8_t *image_sha384,
> + uint8_t *bootstrap_sha384, uint8_t *app_sha384,
> + uint8_t *fingerprint_sha384, bool *signature_found,
> + Error **errp);
>
> #endif
>
> diff --git a/hw/core/meson.build b/hw/core/meson.build
> index f32d1ad943..7e7a14ee00 100644
> --- a/hw/core/meson.build
> +++ b/hw/core/meson.build
> @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ hwcore_ss.add(files(
> 'qdev-clock.c',
> ))
>
> +libcbor = dependency('libcbor', version: '>=0.8.0')
Amazon Linux 2023 only ships with 0.7.0. Fortunately, all of your code
seems to work fine with 0.7.0 as well. All I needed to make it compile
was to change the version check :)
Alex
Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 1/5] machine/nitro-enclave: New machine type for AWS Nitro Enclaves
2024-08-10 16:44 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] machine/nitro-enclave: New machine type for AWS Nitro Enclaves Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-12 13:56 ` Alexander Graf
0 siblings, 0 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2024-08-12 13:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dorjoy Chowdhury, qemu-devel
Cc: agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo, mst,
marcel.apfelbaum, berrange, philmd
On 10.08.24 18:44, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> AWS nitro enclaves[1] is an Amazon EC2[2] feature that allows creating
> isolated execution environments, called enclaves, from Amazon EC2
> instances which are used for processing highly sensitive data.
> Enclaves have no persistent storage and no external networking. The
> enclave VMs are based on Firecracker microvm with a vhost-vsock
> device for communication with the parent EC2 instance that spawned
> it and a Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device for cryptographic attestation.
> The parent instance VM always has CID 3 while the enclave VM gets a
> dynamic CID.
>
> An EIF (Enclave Image Format)[3] file is used to boot an AWS nitro
> enclave virtual machine. The EIF file contains the necessary kernel,
> cmdline, ramdisk(s) sections to boot.
>
> This commit adds support for limited AWS nitro enclave emulation using
> a new machine type option '-M nitro-enclave'. This new machine type is
> based on the 'microvm' machine type, similar to how real nitro enclave
> VMs are based on Firecracker microvm. For nitro-enclave to boot from
> an EIF file, the kernel and ramdisk(s) are extracted into a temporary
> kernel and a temporary initrd file which are then hooked into the
> regular x86 boot mechanism along with the extracted cmdline. The EIF
> file path should be provided using the '-kernel' QEMU option.
>
> The vsock and NSM devices will be implemented so that they are available
> automatically in nitro-enclave machine type in the following commits.
>
> [1] https://docs.aws.amazon.com/enclaves/latest/user/nitro-enclave.html
> [2] https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/
> [3] https://github.com/aws/aws-nitro-enclaves-image-format
>
> Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
If I run this code with an invalid kernel parameter, something in the
error path is off. Can you please try to exercise your error paths to
validate they work correctly?
$ ./build/qemu-system-x86_64 -M nitro-enclave -nographic -kernel foobar
qemu-system-x86_64: ../util/error.c:68: error_setv: Assertion `*errp ==
NULL' failed.
Alex
Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-12 13:51 ` Alexander Graf
@ 2024-08-12 14:00 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
0 siblings, 0 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Daniel P. Berrangé @ 2024-08-12 14:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander Graf
Cc: Dorjoy Chowdhury, qemu-devel, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp,
richard.henderson, eduardo, mst, marcel.apfelbaum, philmd
On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 03:51:22PM +0200, Alexander Graf wrote:
>
> On 10.08.24 18:45, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> > AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device which
> > is used for stripped down TPM functionality like attestation. This commit
> > adds the built-in NSM device in the nitro-enclave machine type.
> >
> > In Nitro Enclaves, all the PCRs start in a known zero state and the first
> > 16 PCRs are locked from boot and reserved. The PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 and PCR8
> > contain the SHA384 hashes related to the EIF file used to boot the
> > VM for validation.
> >
> > A new optional nitro-enclave machine option 'id' has been added which will
> > be the enclave identifier reflected in the module-id of the NSM device.
> > Otherwise, the device will have a default id set.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > hw/core/eif.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > hw/core/eif.h | 5 +-
> > hw/core/meson.build | 4 +-
> > hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
> > hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 85 ++++++++++++-
> > include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 19 +++
> > 6 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >
>
> [...]
>
>
> > diff --git a/hw/core/meson.build b/hw/core/meson.build
> > index f32d1ad943..7e7a14ee00 100644
> > --- a/hw/core/meson.build
> > +++ b/hw/core/meson.build
> > @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ hwcore_ss.add(files(
> > 'qdev-clock.c',
> > ))
> >
> > +libcbor = dependency('libcbor', version: '>=0.8.0')
> > +
> > common_ss.add(files('cpu-common.c'))
> > common_ss.add(files('machine-smp.c'))
> > system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_FITLOADER', if_true: files('loader-fit.c'))
> > @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_REGISTER', if_true: files('register.c'))
> > system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_SPLIT_IRQ', if_true: files('split-irq.c'))
> > system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_XILINX_AXI', if_true: files('stream.c'))
> > system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_PLATFORM_BUS', if_true: files('sysbus-fdt.c'))
> > -system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVE', if_true: [files('eif.c'), zlib])
> > +system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVE', if_true: [files('eif.c'), zlib, libcbor, gnutls])
>
>
> I think this is missing a dependency check somewhere:
>
> ../hw/core/eif.c:16:10: fatal error: gnutls/gnutls.h: No such file or
> directory
> 16 | #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
> | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> It's also the first time anything accesses gnutls directly instead of
> through the QEMU crypto framework. Is there a particular reason you can not
> use qcrypto?
None of the existing qcrypto APIs provide the functionality needed in
this patch. The right answer though is to introduce a new API in
qcrypto to avoid directly coupling this Nitro code to GNUTLS.
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in " Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 13:51 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-12 13:55 ` Alexander Graf
@ 2024-08-12 14:07 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-16 12:50 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-13 12:57 ` Alexander Graf
3 siblings, 1 reply; 21+ messages in thread
From: Daniel P. Berrangé @ 2024-08-12 14:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dorjoy Chowdhury
Cc: qemu-devel, graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp,
richard.henderson, eduardo, mst, marcel.apfelbaum, philmd
On Sat, Aug 10, 2024 at 10:45:01PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device which
> is used for stripped down TPM functionality like attestation. This commit
> adds the built-in NSM device in the nitro-enclave machine type.
>
> In Nitro Enclaves, all the PCRs start in a known zero state and the first
> 16 PCRs are locked from boot and reserved. The PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 and PCR8
> contain the SHA384 hashes related to the EIF file used to boot the
> VM for validation.
>
> A new optional nitro-enclave machine option 'id' has been added which will
> be the enclave identifier reflected in the module-id of the NSM device.
> Otherwise, the device will have a default id set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> ---
> hw/core/eif.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> hw/core/eif.h | 5 +-
> hw/core/meson.build | 4 +-
> hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
> hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 85 ++++++++++++-
> include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 19 +++
> 6 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/hw/core/eif.c b/hw/core/eif.c
> index 5558879a96..d2c65668ef 100644
> --- a/hw/core/eif.c
> +++ b/hw/core/eif.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
> #include "qemu/bswap.h"
> #include "qapi/error.h"
> #include <zlib.h> /* for crc32 */
> +#include <cbor.h>
> +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
> +#include <gnutls/x509.h>
>
> #include "hw/core/eif.h"
>
> @@ -269,6 +284,125 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
> return false;
> }
>
> +static bool get_fingerprint_sha384_from_cert(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
> + uint8_t *sha384, Error **errp)
> +{
> + gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
> + size_t hash_size = 48;
> + gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
> +
> + gnutls_global_init();
> + gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
> +
> + if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) != 0) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint(crt, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384, sha384,
> + &hash_size) != 0) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to compute SHA384 fingerprint");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +
> + cleanup:
> + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
> + gnutls_global_deinit();
> + return false;
> +}
I'd suggest this go into qcrypto/x509-utils.c & include/qcrypto/x509-utils.h,
as:
int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert,
size_t size,
QCryptoHashAlgorith hash,
Error **errp);
there's no need to be calling gnutls_global_init() / deinit() either.
> @@ -299,7 +433,9 @@ static long get_file_size(FILE *f, Error **errp)
> */
> bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> char **kernel_path, char **initrd_path, char **cmdline,
> - Error **errp)
> + uint8_t *image_sha384, uint8_t *bootstrap_sha384,
> + uint8_t *app_sha384, uint8_t *fingerprint_sha384,
> + bool *signature_found, Error **errp)
> {
> FILE *f = NULL;
> FILE *machine_initrd_f = NULL;
> @@ -308,9 +444,33 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> uint32_t crc = 0;
> EifHeader eif_header;
> bool seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_MAX] = {false};
> -
> + /* kernel + ramdisks + cmdline sha384 hash */
> + GChecksum *image_hasher = NULL;
> + /* kernel + boot ramdisk + cmdline sha384 hash */
> + GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher = NULL;
> + /* application ramdisk(s) hash */
> + GChecksum *app_hasher = NULL;
> + size_t digest_len;
> +
> + *signature_found = false;
> *kernel_path = *initrd_path = *cmdline = NULL;
>
> + image_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> + if (image_hasher == NULL) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for image");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + bootstrap_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> + if (bootstrap_hasher == NULL) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for bootstrap");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + app_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> + if (app_hasher == NULL) {
> + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for app");
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
Don't use GChecksum APIs please, use the qcrypto hash APIs instead,
as we need all code to be using the designated QEMU crypto backend.
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-12 14:15 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-13 12:54 ` Alexander Graf
1 sibling, 0 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Daniel P. Berrangé @ 2024-08-12 14:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dorjoy Chowdhury
Cc: qemu-devel, graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp,
richard.henderson, eduardo, mst, marcel.apfelbaum, philmd
On Sat, Aug 10, 2024 at 10:45:00PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> Nitro Secure Module (NSM)[1] device is used in AWS Nitro Enclaves for
> stripped down TPM functionality like cryptographic attestation. The
> requests to and responses from NSM device are CBOR[2] encoded.
>
> This commit adds support for NSM device in QEMU. Although related to
> AWS Nitro Enclaves, the virito-nsm device is independent and can be
> used in other machine types as well. The libcbor[3] library has been
> used for the CBOR encoding and decoding functionalities.
>
> [1] https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/virtio-comment/202310/msg00387.html
> [2] http://cbor.io/
> [3] https://libcbor.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
>
> Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> ---
> MAINTAINERS | 8 +
> hw/virtio/Kconfig | 5 +
> hw/virtio/meson.build | 4 +
> hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c | 73 ++
> hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c | 1929 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h | 59 +
> 6 files changed, 2078 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c
> create mode 100644 hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c
> create mode 100644 include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h
>
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index f8d63031f0..05b66a7f93 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -2349,6 +2349,14 @@ F: include/sysemu/rng*.h
> F: backends/rng*.c
> F: tests/qtest/virtio-rng-test.c
>
> +virtio-nsm
> +M: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
> +M: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> +S: Maintained
> +F: hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c
> +F: hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c
> +F: include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h
> +
> vhost-user-stubs
> M: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
> S: Maintained
> diff --git a/hw/virtio/Kconfig b/hw/virtio/Kconfig
> index aa63ff7fd4..29fee32035 100644
> --- a/hw/virtio/Kconfig
> +++ b/hw/virtio/Kconfig
> @@ -6,6 +6,11 @@ config VIRTIO_RNG
> default y
> depends on VIRTIO
>
> +config VIRTIO_NSM
> + bool
> + default y
> + depends on VIRTIO
> +
> config VIRTIO_IOMMU
> bool
> default y
> diff --git a/hw/virtio/meson.build b/hw/virtio/meson.build
> index 621fc65454..831819eefb 100644
> --- a/hw/virtio/meson.build
> +++ b/hw/virtio/meson.build
> @@ -48,12 +48,15 @@ else
> system_virtio_ss.add(files('vhost-stub.c'))
> endif
>
> +libcbor = dependency('libcbor', version: '>=0.8.0')
> +
> specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_BALLOON', if_true: files('virtio-balloon.c'))
> specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VHOST_USER_FS', if_true: files('vhost-user-fs.c'))
> specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_PMEM', if_true: files('virtio-pmem.c'))
> specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VHOST_VSOCK', if_true: files('vhost-vsock.c'))
> specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VHOST_USER_VSOCK', if_true: files('vhost-user-vsock.c'))
> specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_RNG', if_true: files('virtio-rng.c'))
> +specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_NSM', if_true: [files('virtio-nsm.c'), libcbor])
> specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_MEM', if_true: files('virtio-mem.c'))
> specific_virtio_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VHOST_USER_SCMI', if_true: files('vhost-user-scmi.c'))
> specific_virtio_ss.add(when: ['CONFIG_VIRTIO_PCI', 'CONFIG_VHOST_USER_SCMI'], if_true: files('vhost-user-scmi-pci.c'))
> @@ -70,6 +73,7 @@ virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_CRYPTO', if_true: files('virtio-crypto-pc
> virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_INPUT_HOST', if_true: files('virtio-input-host-pci.c'))
> virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_INPUT', if_true: files('virtio-input-pci.c'))
> virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_RNG', if_true: files('virtio-rng-pci.c'))
> +virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_NSM', if_true: [files('virtio-nsm-pci.c'), libcbor])
> virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_BALLOON', if_true: files('virtio-balloon-pci.c'))
> virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_9P', if_true: files('virtio-9p-pci.c'))
> virtio_pci_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VIRTIO_SCSI', if_true: files('virtio-scsi-pci.c'))
> diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..dca797315a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
> +/*
> + * AWS Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2024 Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> + *
> + * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
> + * (at your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the
> + * top-level directory.
> + */
> +
> +#include "qemu/osdep.h"
> +
> +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-pci.h"
> +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h"
> +#include "hw/qdev-properties.h"
> +#include "qapi/error.h"
> +#include "qemu/module.h"
> +#include "qom/object.h"
> +
> +typedef struct VirtIONsmPCI VirtIONsmPCI;
> +
> +#define TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM_PCI "virtio-nsm-pci-base"
> +DECLARE_INSTANCE_CHECKER(VirtIONsmPCI, VIRTIO_NSM_PCI,
> + TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM_PCI)
> +
> +struct VirtIONsmPCI {
> + VirtIOPCIProxy parent_obj;
> + VirtIONSM vdev;
> +};
> +
> +static void virtio_nsm_pci_realize(VirtIOPCIProxy *vpci_dev, Error **errp)
> +{
> + VirtIONsmPCI *vnsm = VIRTIO_NSM_PCI(vpci_dev);
> + DeviceState *vdev = DEVICE(&vnsm->vdev);
> +
> + virtio_pci_force_virtio_1(vpci_dev);
> +
> + if (!qdev_realize(vdev, BUS(&vpci_dev->bus), errp)) {
> + return;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void virtio_nsm_pci_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
> +{
> + DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
> + VirtioPCIClass *k = VIRTIO_PCI_CLASS(klass);
> +
> + k->realize = virtio_nsm_pci_realize;
> + set_bit(DEVICE_CATEGORY_MISC, dc->categories);
> +}
> +
> +static void virtio_nsm_initfn(Object *obj)
> +{
> + VirtIONsmPCI *dev = VIRTIO_NSM_PCI(obj);
> +
> + virtio_instance_init_common(obj, &dev->vdev, sizeof(dev->vdev),
> + TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM);
> +}
> +
> +static const VirtioPCIDeviceTypeInfo virtio_nsm_pci_info = {
> + .base_name = TYPE_VIRTIO_NSM_PCI,
> + .generic_name = "virtio-nsm-pci",
> + .instance_size = sizeof(VirtIONsmPCI),
> + .instance_init = virtio_nsm_initfn,
> + .class_init = virtio_nsm_pci_class_init,
> +};
> +
> +static void virtio_nsm_pci_register(void)
> +{
> + virtio_pci_types_register(&virtio_nsm_pci_info);
> +}
> +
> +type_init(virtio_nsm_pci_register)
> diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..1610bcedc6
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1929 @@
> +/*
> + * AWS Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2024 Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> + *
> + * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or
> + * (at your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the
> + * top-level directory.
> + */
> +
> +#include "qemu/osdep.h"
> +#include "qemu/guest-random.h"
> +#include "qapi/error.h"
> +#include <cbor.h>
> +
> +#include "hw/virtio/virtio.h"
> +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h"
> +#include "standard-headers/linux/virtio_ids.h"
> +
> +#define NSM_PCR_DATA_REQ_MAX_SIZE 512
> +
> +enum NSMResponseTypes {
> + NSM_SUCCESS = 0,
> + NSM_INVALID_ARGUMENT = 1,
> + NSM_INVALID_INDEX = 2,
> + NSM_READONLY_INDEX = 3,
> + NSM_INVALID_OPERATION = 4,
> + NSM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL = 5,
> + NSM_INPUT_TOO_LARGE = 6,
> + NSM_INTERNAL_ERROR = 7,
> +};
> +
> +static bool qemu_cbor_map_add(cbor_item_t *map, cbor_item_t *key,
> + cbor_item_t *value)
> +{
> + bool success = false;
> + struct cbor_pair pair = (struct cbor_pair) {
> + .key = cbor_move(key),
> + .value = cbor_move(value)
> + };
> +
> + success = cbor_map_add(map, pair);
> + if (!success) {
> + cbor_incref(pair.key);
> + cbor_incref(pair.value);
> + }
> +
> + return success;
> +}
I'd suggest all these 'qemu_cbor_' helper methods could be split off into a
separate file, since this virtio-nsm.c is pretty large with all these helpers
inlines.
> +static bool extend_pcr(VirtIONSM *vnsm, int ind, uint8_t *data, uint16_t len)
> +{
> + GChecksum *hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> + struct PCRInfo *pcr = &(vnsm->pcrs[ind]);
> + size_t digest_len = SHA384_BYTE_LEN;
> + if (!hasher) {
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + g_checksum_update(hasher, pcr->data, SHA384_BYTE_LEN);
> + g_checksum_update(hasher, data, len);
> +
> + g_checksum_get_digest(hasher, pcr->data, &digest_len);
> +
> + g_checksum_free(hasher);
> + return true;
> +}
Use the qcrypto hash APIs instead of GChecksum please.
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add vhost-user-vsock device
2024-08-10 16:44 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add vhost-user-vsock device Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-12 14:24 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-13 18:02 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
0 siblings, 1 reply; 21+ messages in thread
From: Daniel P. Berrangé @ 2024-08-12 14:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dorjoy Chowdhury
Cc: qemu-devel, graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp,
richard.henderson, eduardo, mst, marcel.apfelbaum, philmd
On Sat, Aug 10, 2024 at 10:44:59PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in vhost-vsock device support which
> enables applications in enclave VMs to communicate with the parent
> EC2 VM over vsock. The enclave VMs have dynamic CID while the parent
> always has CID 3. In QEMU, the vsock emulation for nitro enclave is
> added using vhost-user-vsock as opposed to vhost-vsock. vhost-vsock
> doesn't support sibling VM communication which is needed for nitro
> enclaves.
>
> In QEMU's nitro-enclave emulation, for the vsock communication to CID
> 3 to work, another process that does the vsock emulation in userspace
> must be run, for example, vhost-device-vsock[1] from rust-vmm, with
> necessary vsock communication support in another guest VM with CID 3.
> A new mandatory nitro-enclave machine option 'vsock' has been added.
> The value for this option should be the chardev id from the '-chardev'
> option for the vhost-user-vsock device to work.
>
> Using vhost-user-vsock also enables the possibility to implement some
> proxying support in the vhost-user-vsock daemon that will forward all
> the packets to the host machine instead of CID 3 so that users of
> nitro-enclave can run the necessary applications in their host machine
> instead of running another whole VM with CID 3.
>
> [1] https://github.com/rust-vmm/vhost-device/tree/main/vhost-device-vsock
>
> Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> ---
> backends/hostmem-memfd.c | 2 -
> hw/core/machine.c | 71 +++++++++---------
> hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
> hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/hw/boards.h | 2 +
> include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 8 +++
> include/sysemu/hostmem.h | 2 +
> 7 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
> index 98690c6373..280ab4cc9b 100644
> --- a/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
> +++ b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
> @@ -11,11 +11,81 @@
> #include "qemu/osdep.h"
> #include "qemu/error-report.h"
> #include "qapi/error.h"
> +#include "qom/object_interfaces.h"
>
> +#include "chardev/char.h"
> +#include "hw/sysbus.h"
> #include "hw/core/eif.h"
> #include "hw/i386/x86.h"
> #include "hw/i386/microvm.h"
> #include "hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h"
> +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-mmio.h"
> +#include "hw/virtio/vhost-user-vsock.h"
> +#include "sysemu/hostmem.h"
> +
> +static BusState *find_free_virtio_mmio_bus(void)
> +{
> + BusChild *kid;
> + BusState *bus = sysbus_get_default();
> +
> + QTAILQ_FOREACH(kid, &bus->children, sibling) {
> + DeviceState *dev = kid->child;
> + if (object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(dev), TYPE_VIRTIO_MMIO)) {
> + VirtIOMMIOProxy *mmio = VIRTIO_MMIO(OBJECT(dev));
> + VirtioBusState *mmio_virtio_bus = &mmio->bus;
> + BusState *mmio_bus = &mmio_virtio_bus->parent_obj;
> + if (QTAILQ_EMPTY(&mmio_bus->children)) {
> + return mmio_bus;
> + }
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static void vhost_user_vsock_init(NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems)
> +{
> + DeviceState *dev = qdev_new(TYPE_VHOST_USER_VSOCK);
> + VHostUserVSock *vsock = VHOST_USER_VSOCK(dev);
> + BusState *bus;
> +
> + if (!nems->vsock) {
> + error_report("A valid chardev id for vhost-user-vsock device must be "
> + "provided using the 'vsock' machine option");
> + exit(1);
> + }
> +
> + bus = find_free_virtio_mmio_bus();
> + if (!bus) {
> + error_report("Failed to find bus for vhost-user-vsock device");
> + exit(1);
> + }
> +
> + Chardev *chardev = qemu_chr_find(nems->vsock);
> + if (!chardev) {
> + error_report("Failed to find chardev with id %s", nems->vsock);
> + exit(1);
> + }
> +
> + vsock->conf.chardev.chr = chardev;
> +
> + qdev_realize_and_unref(dev, bus, &error_fatal);
> +}
Why does this machine need to create the vhost-user-vsock device itself ?
Doing it this way prevents the mgmt app from changing any of the other
vsock device settings beyond 'chardev'. The entity creating QEMU can use
-device to create the vsock device.
> +
> +static void nitro_enclave_devices_init(NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems)
> +{
> + vhost_user_vsock_init(nems);
> +}
> +
> +static void nitro_enclave_machine_state_init(MachineState *machine)
> +{
> + NitroEnclaveMachineClass *ne_class =
> + NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(machine);
> + NitroEnclaveMachineState *ne_state = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(machine);
> +
> + ne_class->parent_init(machine);
> + nitro_enclave_devices_init(ne_state);
> +}
>
> static void nitro_enclave_machine_initfn(Object *obj)
> {
> @@ -66,15 +136,68 @@ static void x86_load_eif(X86MachineState *x86ms, FWCfgState *fw_cfg,
> return;
> }
>
> +static bool create_memfd_backend(MachineState *ms, const char *path,
> + Error **errp)
> +{
> + Object *obj;
> + MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_GET_CLASS(ms);
> + bool r = false;
> +
> + obj = object_new(TYPE_MEMORY_BACKEND_MEMFD);
> + if (!object_property_set_int(obj, "size", ms->ram_size, errp)) {
> + goto out;
> + }
> + object_property_add_child(object_get_objects_root(), mc->default_ram_id,
> + obj);
> +
> + if (!user_creatable_complete(USER_CREATABLE(obj), errp)) {
> + goto out;
> + }
> + r = object_property_set_link(OBJECT(ms), "memory-backend", obj, errp);
> +
> +out:
> + object_unref(obj);
> + return r;
> +}
> +
> +static char *nitro_enclave_get_vsock_chardev_id(Object *obj, Error **errp)
> +{
> + NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(obj);
> +
> + return g_strdup(nems->vsock);
> +}
> +
> +static void nitro_enclave_set_vsock_chardev_id(Object *obj, const char *value,
> + Error **errp)
> +{
> + NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(obj);
> +
> + g_free(nems->vsock);
> + nems->vsock = g_strdup(value);
> +}
> +
> static void nitro_enclave_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
> {
> MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
> MicrovmMachineClass *mmc = MICROVM_MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
> + NitroEnclaveMachineClass *nemc = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
>
> mmc->x86_load_linux = x86_load_eif;
>
> mc->family = "nitro_enclave_i386";
> mc->desc = "AWS Nitro Enclave";
> +
> + nemc->parent_init = mc->init;
> + mc->init = nitro_enclave_machine_state_init;
> +
> + mc->create_default_memdev = create_memfd_backend;
> +
> + object_class_property_add_str(oc, NITRO_ENCLAVE_VSOCK_CHARDEV_ID,
> + nitro_enclave_get_vsock_chardev_id,
> + nitro_enclave_set_vsock_chardev_id);
> + object_class_property_set_description(oc, NITRO_ENCLAVE_VSOCK_CHARDEV_ID,
> + "Set chardev id for vhost-user-vsock "
> + "device");
> }
>
> static const TypeInfo nitro_enclave_machine_info = {
> diff --git a/include/hw/boards.h b/include/hw/boards.h
> index 48ff6d8b93..c268e7f005 100644
> --- a/include/hw/boards.h
> +++ b/include/hw/boards.h
> @@ -308,6 +308,8 @@ struct MachineClass {
> int64_t (*get_default_cpu_node_id)(const MachineState *ms, int idx);
> ram_addr_t (*fixup_ram_size)(ram_addr_t size);
> uint64_t smbios_memory_device_size;
> + bool (*create_default_memdev)(MachineState *ms, const char *path,
> + Error **errp);
> };
>
> /**
> diff --git a/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h b/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
> index a1dada9371..3e302de851 100644
> --- a/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
> +++ b/include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h
> @@ -14,12 +14,20 @@
> #include "hw/i386/microvm.h"
> #include "qom/object.h"
>
> +/* Machine type options */
> +#define NITRO_ENCLAVE_VSOCK_CHARDEV_ID "vsock"
> +
> struct NitroEnclaveMachineClass {
> MicrovmMachineClass parent;
> +
> + void (*parent_init)(MachineState *state);
> };
>
> struct NitroEnclaveMachineState {
> MicrovmMachineState parent;
> +
> + /* Machine type options */
> + char *vsock;
> };
>
> #define TYPE_NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE MACHINE_TYPE_NAME("nitro-enclave")
> diff --git a/include/sysemu/hostmem.h b/include/sysemu/hostmem.h
> index de47ae59e4..67f45abe39 100644
> --- a/include/sysemu/hostmem.h
> +++ b/include/sysemu/hostmem.h
> @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(HostMemoryBackend, HostMemoryBackendClass,
> */
> #define TYPE_MEMORY_BACKEND_FILE "memory-backend-file"
>
> +#define TYPE_MEMORY_BACKEND_MEMFD "memory-backend-memfd"
> +
>
> /**
> * HostMemoryBackendClass:
> --
> 2.39.2
>
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 14:15 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
@ 2024-08-13 12:54 ` Alexander Graf
1 sibling, 0 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2024-08-13 12:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dorjoy Chowdhury, qemu-devel
Cc: agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo, mst,
marcel.apfelbaum, berrange, philmd
On 10.08.24 18:45, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> Nitro Secure Module (NSM)[1] device is used in AWS Nitro Enclaves for
> stripped down TPM functionality like cryptographic attestation. The
> requests to and responses from NSM device are CBOR[2] encoded.
>
> This commit adds support for NSM device in QEMU. Although related to
> AWS Nitro Enclaves, the virito-nsm device is independent and can be
> used in other machine types as well. The libcbor[3] library has been
> used for the CBOR encoding and decoding functionalities.
>
> [1] https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/virtio-comment/202310/msg00387.html
> [2] http://cbor.io/
> [3] https://libcbor.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
>
> Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> ---
> MAINTAINERS | 8 +
> hw/virtio/Kconfig | 5 +
> hw/virtio/meson.build | 4 +
> hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c | 73 ++
> hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c | 1929 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h | 59 +
> 6 files changed, 2078 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 hw/virtio/virtio-nsm-pci.c
> create mode 100644 hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.c
> create mode 100644 include/hw/virtio/virtio-nsm.h
>
[...]
> +
> +/*
> + * Attestation request structure:
> + *
> + * Map(1) {
> + * key = String("Attestation"),
> + * value = Map(3) {
> + * key = String("user_data"),
> + * value = Byte_String() || null,
> + * key = String("nonce"),
> + * value = Byte_String() || null,
> + * key = String("public_key"),
> + * value = Byte_String() || null,
> + * }
> + * }
> + * }
> + */
> +typedef struct NSMAttestationReq {
> + uint16_t user_data_len;
> + uint8_t user_data[NSM_USER_DATA_MAX_SIZE];
> +
> + uint16_t nonce_len;
> + uint8_t nonce[NSM_NONCE_MAX_SIZE];
> +
> + uint16_t public_key_len;
> + uint8_t public_key[NSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE];
> +} NSMAttestationReq;
> +
> +static enum NSMResponseTypes get_nsm_attestation_req(uint8_t *req, size_t len,
> + NSMAttestationReq *nsm_req)
> +{
> + cbor_item_t *item = NULL;
> + size_t size;
> + uint8_t *str;
> + struct cbor_pair *pair;
> + struct cbor_load_result result;
> + enum NSMResponseTypes r = NSM_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
> +
> + item = cbor_load(req, len, &result);
> + if (!item || result.error.code != CBOR_ERR_NONE) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + pair = cbor_map_handle(item);
> + if (!cbor_isa_map(pair->value) || cbor_map_size(pair->value) != 3) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + pair = cbor_map_handle(pair->value);
> + if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + str = cbor_string_handle(pair->key);
> + size = cbor_string_length(pair->key);
> + if (!str || size != 9 || memcmp(str, "user_data", 9) != 0) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + if (cbor_isa_bytestring(pair->value)) {
> + str = cbor_bytestring_handle(pair->value);
> + size = cbor_bytestring_length(pair->value);
> + if (!str || size == 0) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (size > NSM_USER_DATA_MAX_SIZE) {
> + r = NSM_INPUT_TOO_LARGE;
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + memcpy(nsm_req->user_data, str, size);
> + nsm_req->user_data_len = size;
> + } else if (cbor_is_null(pair->value)) {
> + nsm_req->user_data_len = 0;
> + } else {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + /* let's move forward */
> + pair++;
> + if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + str = cbor_string_handle(pair->key);
> + size = cbor_string_length(pair->key);
> + if (!str || size != 5 || memcmp(str, "nonce", 5) != 0) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + if (cbor_isa_bytestring(pair->value)) {
> + str = cbor_bytestring_handle(pair->value);
> + size = cbor_bytestring_length(pair->value);
> + if (!str || size == 0) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (size > NSM_NONCE_MAX_SIZE) {
> + r = NSM_INPUT_TOO_LARGE;
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + memcpy(nsm_req->nonce, str, size);
> + nsm_req->nonce_len = size;
> + } else if (cbor_is_null(pair->value)) {
> + nsm_req->nonce_len = 0;
> + } else {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + /* let's move forward */
> + pair++;
> + if (!cbor_isa_string(pair->key)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + str = cbor_string_handle(pair->key);
> + size = cbor_string_length(pair->key);
> + if (!str || size != 10 || memcmp(str, "public_key", 10) != 0) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + if (cbor_isa_bytestring(pair->value)) {
> + str = cbor_bytestring_handle(pair->value);
> + size = cbor_bytestring_length(pair->value);
> + if (!str || size == 0) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (size > NSM_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) {
> + r = NSM_INPUT_TOO_LARGE;
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + memcpy(nsm_req->public_key, str, size);
> + nsm_req->public_key_len = size;
> + } else if (cbor_is_null(pair->value)) {
> + nsm_req->public_key_len = 0;
> + } else {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + r = NSM_SUCCESS;
> +
> + cleanup:
> + if (item) {
> + cbor_decref(&item);
> + }
> + return r;
> +}
> +
> +static bool qemu_cbor_add_uint64_to_map(cbor_item_t *map, const char *key,
> + uint64_t value)
> +{
> + cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
> + cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
> +
> + key_cbor = cbor_build_string(key);
> + if (!key_cbor) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + value_cbor = cbor_build_uint64(value);
> + if (!value_cbor) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +
> + cleanup:
> + if (key_cbor) {
> + cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
> + }
> + if (value_cbor) {
> + cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
> + }
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool add_protected_header_to_cose(cbor_item_t *cose)
> +{
> + cbor_item_t *map = NULL;
> + cbor_item_t *key = NULL;
> + cbor_item_t *value = NULL;
> + cbor_item_t *bs = NULL;
> + size_t len;
> + bool r = false;
> + size_t buf_len = 4096;
> + uint8_t *buf = g_malloc(buf_len);
> +
> + map = cbor_new_definite_map(1);
> + if (!map) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + key = cbor_build_uint8(1);
> + if (!key) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + value = cbor_new_int8();
> + if (!value) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + cbor_mark_negint(value);
> + /* we don't actually sign the data, so we use -1 as the 'alg' value */
> + cbor_set_uint8(value, 0);
> +
> + if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key, value)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + len = cbor_serialize(map, buf, buf_len);
> + if (len == 0) {
> + goto cleanup_map;
> + }
> +
> + bs = cbor_build_bytestring(buf, len);
> + if (!bs) {
> + goto cleanup_map;
> + }
> + if (!qemu_cbor_array_push(cose, bs)) {
> + cbor_decref(&bs);
> + goto cleanup_map;
> + }
> + r = true;
> + goto cleanup_map;
> +
> + cleanup:
> + if (key) {
> + cbor_decref(&key);
> + }
> + if (value) {
> + cbor_decref(&value);
> + }
> +
> + cleanup_map:
> + if (map) {
> + cbor_decref(&map);
> + }
> + g_free(buf);
> + return r;
> +}
> +
> +static bool add_unprotected_header_to_cose(cbor_item_t *cose)
> +{
> + cbor_item_t *map = cbor_new_definite_map(0);
> + if (!map) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!qemu_cbor_array_push(cose, map)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +
> + cleanup:
> + if (map) {
> + cbor_decref(&map);
> + }
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool qemu_cbor_add_uint8_key_bytestring_to_map(cbor_item_t *map,
> + uint8_t key, uint8_t *buf,
> + size_t len)
> +{
> + cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
> + cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
> +
> + key_cbor = cbor_build_uint8(key);
> + if (!key_cbor) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + value_cbor = cbor_build_bytestring(buf, len);
> + if (!value_cbor) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +
> + cleanup:
> + if (key_cbor) {
> + cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
> + }
> + if (value_cbor) {
> + cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
> + }
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool add_ca_bundle_to_payload(cbor_item_t *map)
> +{
> + cbor_item_t *key_cbor = NULL;
> + cbor_item_t *value_cbor = NULL;
> + cbor_item_t *bs = NULL;
> + uint8_t zero[64] = {0};
> +
> + key_cbor = cbor_build_string("cabundle");
> + if (!key_cbor) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + value_cbor = cbor_new_definite_array(1);
> + if (!value_cbor) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + bs = cbor_build_bytestring(zero, 64);
> + if (!bs) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!qemu_cbor_array_push(value_cbor, bs)) {
> + cbor_decref(&bs);
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!qemu_cbor_map_add(map, key_cbor, value_cbor)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +
> + cleanup:
> + if (key_cbor) {
> + cbor_decref(&key_cbor);
> + }
> + if (value_cbor) {
> + cbor_decref(&value_cbor);
> + }
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool add_payload_to_cose(cbor_item_t *cose, VirtIONSM *vnsm)
> +{
> + cbor_item_t *root = NULL;
> + cbor_item_t *nested_map;
> + cbor_item_t *bs = NULL;
> + size_t locked_cnt;
> + uint8_t ind[NSM_MAX_PCRS];
> + size_t payload_map_size = 6;
> + size_t len;
> + struct PCRInfo *pcr;
> + uint8_t zero[64] = {0};
> + bool r = false;
> + size_t buf_len = 16384;
> + uint8_t *buf = g_malloc(buf_len);
> +
> + if (vnsm->public_key_len > 0) {
> + payload_map_size++;
> + }
> + if (vnsm->user_data_len > 0) {
> + payload_map_size++;
> + }
> + if (vnsm->nonce_len > 0) {
> + payload_map_size++;
> + }
> + root = cbor_new_definite_map(payload_map_size);
> + if (!root) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!qemu_cbor_add_string_to_map(root, "module_id", vnsm->module_id)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!qemu_cbor_add_string_to_map(root, "digest", vnsm->digest)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!qemu_cbor_add_uint64_to_map(root, "timestamp", time(NULL))) {
Timestamp is in milliseconds, so you need to multiply by 1000.
Alex
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> + locked_cnt = 0;
> + for (uint8_t i = 0; i < NSM_MAX_PCRS; ++i) {
> + if (vnsm->pcrs[i].locked) {
> + ind[locked_cnt++] = i;
> + }
> + }
> + if (!qemu_cbor_add_map_to_map(root, "pcrs", locked_cnt, &nested_map)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + for (uint8_t i = 0; i < locked_cnt; ++i) {
> + pcr = &(vnsm->pcrs[ind[i]]);
> + if (!qemu_cbor_add_uint8_key_bytestring_to_map(nested_map, ind[i],
> + pcr->data,
> + SHA384_BYTE_LEN)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + }
> + if (!qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(root, "certificate", zero, 64)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (!add_ca_bundle_to_payload(root)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (vnsm->public_key_len > 0 &&
> + !qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(root, "public_key", vnsm->public_key,
> + vnsm->public_key_len)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (vnsm->user_data_len > 0 &&
> + !qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(root, "user_data", vnsm->user_data,
> + vnsm->user_data_len)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> + if (vnsm->nonce_len > 0 &&
> + !qemu_cbor_add_bytestring_to_map(root, "nonce", vnsm->nonce,
> + vnsm->nonce_len)) {
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
A real Nitro Enclave attestation doc contains user_data and nonce even
when they are empty. I think we should do the same.
Alex
Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in " Dorjoy Chowdhury
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2024-08-12 14:07 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
@ 2024-08-13 12:57 ` Alexander Graf
3 siblings, 0 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2024-08-13 12:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dorjoy Chowdhury, qemu-devel
Cc: agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo, mst,
marcel.apfelbaum, berrange, philmd
On 10.08.24 18:45, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device which
> is used for stripped down TPM functionality like attestation. This commit
> adds the built-in NSM device in the nitro-enclave machine type.
>
> In Nitro Enclaves, all the PCRs start in a known zero state and the first
> 16 PCRs are locked from boot and reserved. The PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 and PCR8
> contain the SHA384 hashes related to the EIF file used to boot the
> VM for validation.
>
> A new optional nitro-enclave machine option 'id' has been added which will
> be the enclave identifier reflected in the module-id of the NSM device.
> Otherwise, the device will have a default id set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> ---
> hw/core/eif.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> hw/core/eif.h | 5 +-
> hw/core/meson.build | 4 +-
> hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
> hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 85 ++++++++++++-
> include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 19 +++
> 6 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
[...]
> @@ -87,10 +106,46 @@ static void nitro_enclave_machine_state_init(MachineState *machine)
> nitro_enclave_devices_init(ne_state);
> }
>
> +static void nitro_enclave_machine_reset(MachineState *machine,
> + ShutdownCause reason)
> +{
> + NitroEnclaveMachineClass *ne_class =
> + NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(machine);
> + NitroEnclaveMachineState *ne_state = NITRO_ENCLAVE_MACHINE(machine);
> +
> + ne_class->parent_reset(machine, reason);
> +
> + memset(ne_state->vnsm->pcrs, 0, sizeof(ne_state->vnsm->pcrs));
> +
> + /* PCR0 */
> + ne_state->vnsm->extend_pcr(ne_state->vnsm, 0, ne_state->image_sha384,
> + SHA384_BYTE_LEN);
> + /* PCR1 */
> + ne_state->vnsm->extend_pcr(ne_state->vnsm, 1, ne_state->bootstrap_sha384,
> + SHA384_BYTE_LEN);
> + /* PCR2 */
> + ne_state->vnsm->extend_pcr(ne_state->vnsm, 2, ne_state->app_sha384,
> + SHA384_BYTE_LEN);
What about PCR3 and PCR4? Both are just sha384 values of input
strings[1]. Can you make these input strings NSM device as well as
machine properties as well?
[1] https://docs.aws.amazon.com/enclaves/latest/user/set-up-attestation.html
Alex
Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add vhost-user-vsock device
2024-08-12 14:24 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
@ 2024-08-13 18:02 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-14 8:17 ` Alexander Graf
0 siblings, 1 reply; 21+ messages in thread
From: Dorjoy Chowdhury @ 2024-08-13 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel P. Berrangé
Cc: qemu-devel, graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp,
richard.henderson, eduardo, mst, marcel.apfelbaum, philmd
On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 8:24 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Aug 10, 2024 at 10:44:59PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> > AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in vhost-vsock device support which
> > enables applications in enclave VMs to communicate with the parent
> > EC2 VM over vsock. The enclave VMs have dynamic CID while the parent
> > always has CID 3. In QEMU, the vsock emulation for nitro enclave is
> > added using vhost-user-vsock as opposed to vhost-vsock. vhost-vsock
> > doesn't support sibling VM communication which is needed for nitro
> > enclaves.
> >
> > In QEMU's nitro-enclave emulation, for the vsock communication to CID
> > 3 to work, another process that does the vsock emulation in userspace
> > must be run, for example, vhost-device-vsock[1] from rust-vmm, with
> > necessary vsock communication support in another guest VM with CID 3.
> > A new mandatory nitro-enclave machine option 'vsock' has been added.
> > The value for this option should be the chardev id from the '-chardev'
> > option for the vhost-user-vsock device to work.
> >
> > Using vhost-user-vsock also enables the possibility to implement some
> > proxying support in the vhost-user-vsock daemon that will forward all
> > the packets to the host machine instead of CID 3 so that users of
> > nitro-enclave can run the necessary applications in their host machine
> > instead of running another whole VM with CID 3.
> >
> > [1] https://github.com/rust-vmm/vhost-device/tree/main/vhost-device-vsock
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > backends/hostmem-memfd.c | 2 -
> > hw/core/machine.c | 71 +++++++++---------
> > hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
> > hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > include/hw/boards.h | 2 +
> > include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 8 +++
> > include/sysemu/hostmem.h | 2 +
> > 7 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
> >
>
> > diff --git a/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
> > index 98690c6373..280ab4cc9b 100644
> > --- a/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
> > +++ b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
> > @@ -11,11 +11,81 @@
> > #include "qemu/osdep.h"
> > #include "qemu/error-report.h"
> > #include "qapi/error.h"
> > +#include "qom/object_interfaces.h"
> >
> > +#include "chardev/char.h"
> > +#include "hw/sysbus.h"
> > #include "hw/core/eif.h"
> > #include "hw/i386/x86.h"
> > #include "hw/i386/microvm.h"
> > #include "hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h"
> > +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-mmio.h"
> > +#include "hw/virtio/vhost-user-vsock.h"
> > +#include "sysemu/hostmem.h"
> > +
> > +static BusState *find_free_virtio_mmio_bus(void)
> > +{
> > + BusChild *kid;
> > + BusState *bus = sysbus_get_default();
> > +
> > + QTAILQ_FOREACH(kid, &bus->children, sibling) {
> > + DeviceState *dev = kid->child;
> > + if (object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(dev), TYPE_VIRTIO_MMIO)) {
> > + VirtIOMMIOProxy *mmio = VIRTIO_MMIO(OBJECT(dev));
> > + VirtioBusState *mmio_virtio_bus = &mmio->bus;
> > + BusState *mmio_bus = &mmio_virtio_bus->parent_obj;
> > + if (QTAILQ_EMPTY(&mmio_bus->children)) {
> > + return mmio_bus;
> > + }
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + return NULL;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void vhost_user_vsock_init(NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems)
> > +{
> > + DeviceState *dev = qdev_new(TYPE_VHOST_USER_VSOCK);
> > + VHostUserVSock *vsock = VHOST_USER_VSOCK(dev);
> > + BusState *bus;
> > +
> > + if (!nems->vsock) {
> > + error_report("A valid chardev id for vhost-user-vsock device must be "
> > + "provided using the 'vsock' machine option");
> > + exit(1);
> > + }
> > +
> > + bus = find_free_virtio_mmio_bus();
> > + if (!bus) {
> > + error_report("Failed to find bus for vhost-user-vsock device");
> > + exit(1);
> > + }
> > +
> > + Chardev *chardev = qemu_chr_find(nems->vsock);
> > + if (!chardev) {
> > + error_report("Failed to find chardev with id %s", nems->vsock);
> > + exit(1);
> > + }
> > +
> > + vsock->conf.chardev.chr = chardev;
> > +
> > + qdev_realize_and_unref(dev, bus, &error_fatal);
> > +}
>
> Why does this machine need to create the vhost-user-vsock device itself ?
> Doing it this way prevents the mgmt app from changing any of the other
> vsock device settings beyond 'chardev'. The entity creating QEMU can use
> -device to create the vsock device.
>
Hi Daniel. Good point. The reason to make the vhost-user-vsock device
built-in is because nitro VMs will always need it anyway (like the
virtio-nsm device which is built-in too). When an EIF image is built
using nitro-cli the "init" process in the EIF image tries to connect
to (AF_VSOCK, CID 3, port 9000) to send a heartbeat and expects a
heartbeat reply. So my understanding is that if we don't create it
inside the machine code itself, users would always need to provide the
explicit options for the device anyway. But as you point out this also
makes the device settings non-configurable.
Hey Alex, do you have any suggestions on this?
Regards,
Dorjoy
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add vhost-user-vsock device
2024-08-13 18:02 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-14 8:17 ` Alexander Graf
0 siblings, 0 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Graf @ 2024-08-14 8:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dorjoy Chowdhury, Daniel P. Berrangé
Cc: qemu-devel, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson,
eduardo, mst, marcel.apfelbaum, philmd
On 13.08.24 20:02, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 8:24 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
>> On Sat, Aug 10, 2024 at 10:44:59PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
>>> AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in vhost-vsock device support which
>>> enables applications in enclave VMs to communicate with the parent
>>> EC2 VM over vsock. The enclave VMs have dynamic CID while the parent
>>> always has CID 3. In QEMU, the vsock emulation for nitro enclave is
>>> added using vhost-user-vsock as opposed to vhost-vsock. vhost-vsock
>>> doesn't support sibling VM communication which is needed for nitro
>>> enclaves.
>>>
>>> In QEMU's nitro-enclave emulation, for the vsock communication to CID
>>> 3 to work, another process that does the vsock emulation in userspace
>>> must be run, for example, vhost-device-vsock[1] from rust-vmm, with
>>> necessary vsock communication support in another guest VM with CID 3.
>>> A new mandatory nitro-enclave machine option 'vsock' has been added.
>>> The value for this option should be the chardev id from the '-chardev'
>>> option for the vhost-user-vsock device to work.
>>>
>>> Using vhost-user-vsock also enables the possibility to implement some
>>> proxying support in the vhost-user-vsock daemon that will forward all
>>> the packets to the host machine instead of CID 3 so that users of
>>> nitro-enclave can run the necessary applications in their host machine
>>> instead of running another whole VM with CID 3.
>>>
>>> [1] https://github.com/rust-vmm/vhost-device/tree/main/vhost-device-vsock
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
>>> ---
>>> backends/hostmem-memfd.c | 2 -
>>> hw/core/machine.c | 71 +++++++++---------
>>> hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
>>> hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> include/hw/boards.h | 2 +
>>> include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 8 +++
>>> include/sysemu/hostmem.h | 2 +
>>> 7 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
>>> index 98690c6373..280ab4cc9b 100644
>>> --- a/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
>>> +++ b/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c
>>> @@ -11,11 +11,81 @@
>>> #include "qemu/osdep.h"
>>> #include "qemu/error-report.h"
>>> #include "qapi/error.h"
>>> +#include "qom/object_interfaces.h"
>>>
>>> +#include "chardev/char.h"
>>> +#include "hw/sysbus.h"
>>> #include "hw/core/eif.h"
>>> #include "hw/i386/x86.h"
>>> #include "hw/i386/microvm.h"
>>> #include "hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h"
>>> +#include "hw/virtio/virtio-mmio.h"
>>> +#include "hw/virtio/vhost-user-vsock.h"
>>> +#include "sysemu/hostmem.h"
>>> +
>>> +static BusState *find_free_virtio_mmio_bus(void)
>>> +{
>>> + BusChild *kid;
>>> + BusState *bus = sysbus_get_default();
>>> +
>>> + QTAILQ_FOREACH(kid, &bus->children, sibling) {
>>> + DeviceState *dev = kid->child;
>>> + if (object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(dev), TYPE_VIRTIO_MMIO)) {
>>> + VirtIOMMIOProxy *mmio = VIRTIO_MMIO(OBJECT(dev));
>>> + VirtioBusState *mmio_virtio_bus = &mmio->bus;
>>> + BusState *mmio_bus = &mmio_virtio_bus->parent_obj;
>>> + if (QTAILQ_EMPTY(&mmio_bus->children)) {
>>> + return mmio_bus;
>>> + }
>>> + }
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + return NULL;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static void vhost_user_vsock_init(NitroEnclaveMachineState *nems)
>>> +{
>>> + DeviceState *dev = qdev_new(TYPE_VHOST_USER_VSOCK);
>>> + VHostUserVSock *vsock = VHOST_USER_VSOCK(dev);
>>> + BusState *bus;
>>> +
>>> + if (!nems->vsock) {
>>> + error_report("A valid chardev id for vhost-user-vsock device must be "
>>> + "provided using the 'vsock' machine option");
>>> + exit(1);
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + bus = find_free_virtio_mmio_bus();
>>> + if (!bus) {
>>> + error_report("Failed to find bus for vhost-user-vsock device");
>>> + exit(1);
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + Chardev *chardev = qemu_chr_find(nems->vsock);
>>> + if (!chardev) {
>>> + error_report("Failed to find chardev with id %s", nems->vsock);
>>> + exit(1);
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + vsock->conf.chardev.chr = chardev;
>>> +
>>> + qdev_realize_and_unref(dev, bus, &error_fatal);
>>> +}
>> Why does this machine need to create the vhost-user-vsock device itself ?
>> Doing it this way prevents the mgmt app from changing any of the other
>> vsock device settings beyond 'chardev'. The entity creating QEMU can use
>> -device to create the vsock device.
>>
> Hi Daniel. Good point. The reason to make the vhost-user-vsock device
> built-in is because nitro VMs will always need it anyway (like the
> virtio-nsm device which is built-in too). When an EIF image is built
> using nitro-cli the "init" process in the EIF image tries to connect
> to (AF_VSOCK, CID 3, port 9000) to send a heartbeat and expects a
> heartbeat reply. So my understanding is that if we don't create it
> inside the machine code itself, users would always need to provide the
> explicit options for the device anyway. But as you point out this also
> makes the device settings non-configurable.
>
> Hey Alex, do you have any suggestions on this?
IMHO devices that are required for the machine to function should be
part of the machine. Since vsock is a core part of the Nitro Enclave, it
should be part of the machine definition. It's as much a board
dependency as fw_cfg.
Alex
Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-12 14:07 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
@ 2024-08-16 12:50 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-16 12:57 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
0 siblings, 1 reply; 21+ messages in thread
From: Dorjoy Chowdhury @ 2024-08-16 12:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel P. Berrangé
Cc: qemu-devel, graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp,
richard.henderson, eduardo, mst, marcel.apfelbaum, philmd
Hi Daniel,
On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 8:07 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Aug 10, 2024 at 10:45:01PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> > AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device which
> > is used for stripped down TPM functionality like attestation. This commit
> > adds the built-in NSM device in the nitro-enclave machine type.
> >
> > In Nitro Enclaves, all the PCRs start in a known zero state and the first
> > 16 PCRs are locked from boot and reserved. The PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 and PCR8
> > contain the SHA384 hashes related to the EIF file used to boot the
> > VM for validation.
> >
> > A new optional nitro-enclave machine option 'id' has been added which will
> > be the enclave identifier reflected in the module-id of the NSM device.
> > Otherwise, the device will have a default id set.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > hw/core/eif.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > hw/core/eif.h | 5 +-
> > hw/core/meson.build | 4 +-
> > hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
> > hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 85 ++++++++++++-
> > include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 19 +++
> > 6 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/hw/core/eif.c b/hw/core/eif.c
> > index 5558879a96..d2c65668ef 100644
> > --- a/hw/core/eif.c
> > +++ b/hw/core/eif.c
> > @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
> > #include "qemu/bswap.h"
> > #include "qapi/error.h"
> > #include <zlib.h> /* for crc32 */
> > +#include <cbor.h>
> > +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
> > +#include <gnutls/x509.h>
> >
> > #include "hw/core/eif.h"
> >
>
> > @@ -269,6 +284,125 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
> > return false;
> > }
> >
> > +static bool get_fingerprint_sha384_from_cert(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
> > + uint8_t *sha384, Error **errp)
> > +{
> > + gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
> > + size_t hash_size = 48;
> > + gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
> > +
> > + gnutls_global_init();
> > + gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
> > +
> > + if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) != 0) {
> > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate");
> > + goto cleanup;
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint(crt, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384, sha384,
> > + &hash_size) != 0) {
> > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to compute SHA384 fingerprint");
> > + goto cleanup;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return true;
> > +
> > + cleanup:
> > + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
> > + gnutls_global_deinit();
> > + return false;
> > +}
>
> I'd suggest this go into qcrypto/x509-utils.c & include/qcrypto/x509-utils.h,
> as:
>
> int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert,
> size_t size,
> QCryptoHashAlgorith hash,
> Error **errp);
>
> there's no need to be calling gnutls_global_init() / deinit() either.
>
>
> > @@ -299,7 +433,9 @@ static long get_file_size(FILE *f, Error **errp)
> > */
> > bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> > char **kernel_path, char **initrd_path, char **cmdline,
> > - Error **errp)
> > + uint8_t *image_sha384, uint8_t *bootstrap_sha384,
> > + uint8_t *app_sha384, uint8_t *fingerprint_sha384,
> > + bool *signature_found, Error **errp)
> > {
> > FILE *f = NULL;
> > FILE *machine_initrd_f = NULL;
> > @@ -308,9 +444,33 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> > uint32_t crc = 0;
> > EifHeader eif_header;
> > bool seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_MAX] = {false};
> > -
> > + /* kernel + ramdisks + cmdline sha384 hash */
> > + GChecksum *image_hasher = NULL;
> > + /* kernel + boot ramdisk + cmdline sha384 hash */
> > + GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher = NULL;
> > + /* application ramdisk(s) hash */
> > + GChecksum *app_hasher = NULL;
> > + size_t digest_len;
> > +
> > + *signature_found = false;
> > *kernel_path = *initrd_path = *cmdline = NULL;
> >
> > + image_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > + if (image_hasher == NULL) {
> > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for image");
> > + goto cleanup;
> > + }
> > + bootstrap_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > + if (bootstrap_hasher == NULL) {
> > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for bootstrap");
> > + goto cleanup;
> > + }
> > + app_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > + if (app_hasher == NULL) {
> > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for app");
> > + goto cleanup;
> > + }
>
> Don't use GChecksum APIs please, use the qcrypto hash APIs instead,
> as we need all code to be using the designated QEMU crypto backend.
>
Thanks for the reviews. I was looking into replacing the GChecksum
uses with qcrypto apis and was able to do it in the extendPCR function
but I need some help with how I can do this in the eif.c file. For
example, the "image_hash" needs to be a SHA384 hash of the kernel,
cmdline, ramdisks sections' data as they appear in the order that is
in the EIF file. Using GChecksum it was easy as I was able to just
pass the hashers to the "read_eif_kernel", "read_eif_ramdisk" etc
functions and call "update" on them. But the qcrypto apis are
stateless i.e., I would need to pass all the buffers in a single api
call so it wouldn't work right now out of the box. Do you have any
suggestions how I should modify/create qcrypto apis so that I can
easily do this (considering that I would need to implement for
different qcrypto backends)? Thanks!
Regards,
Dorjoy
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-16 12:50 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-16 12:57 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-16 13:34 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
0 siblings, 1 reply; 21+ messages in thread
From: Daniel P. Berrangé @ 2024-08-16 12:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dorjoy Chowdhury
Cc: qemu-devel, graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp,
richard.henderson, eduardo, mst, marcel.apfelbaum, philmd
On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 06:50:34PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> Hi Daniel,
>
> On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 8:07 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Sat, Aug 10, 2024 at 10:45:01PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> > > AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device which
> > > is used for stripped down TPM functionality like attestation. This commit
> > > adds the built-in NSM device in the nitro-enclave machine type.
> > >
> > > In Nitro Enclaves, all the PCRs start in a known zero state and the first
> > > 16 PCRs are locked from boot and reserved. The PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 and PCR8
> > > contain the SHA384 hashes related to the EIF file used to boot the
> > > VM for validation.
> > >
> > > A new optional nitro-enclave machine option 'id' has been added which will
> > > be the enclave identifier reflected in the module-id of the NSM device.
> > > Otherwise, the device will have a default id set.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> > > ---
> > > hw/core/eif.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > > hw/core/eif.h | 5 +-
> > > hw/core/meson.build | 4 +-
> > > hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
> > > hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 85 ++++++++++++-
> > > include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 19 +++
> > > 6 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/hw/core/eif.c b/hw/core/eif.c
> > > index 5558879a96..d2c65668ef 100644
> > > --- a/hw/core/eif.c
> > > +++ b/hw/core/eif.c
> > > @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
> > > #include "qemu/bswap.h"
> > > #include "qapi/error.h"
> > > #include <zlib.h> /* for crc32 */
> > > +#include <cbor.h>
> > > +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
> > > +#include <gnutls/x509.h>
> > >
> > > #include "hw/core/eif.h"
> > >
> >
> > > @@ -269,6 +284,125 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
> > > return false;
> > > }
> > >
> > > +static bool get_fingerprint_sha384_from_cert(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
> > > + uint8_t *sha384, Error **errp)
> > > +{
> > > + gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
> > > + size_t hash_size = 48;
> > > + gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
> > > +
> > > + gnutls_global_init();
> > > + gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
> > > +
> > > + if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) != 0) {
> > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate");
> > > + goto cleanup;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint(crt, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384, sha384,
> > > + &hash_size) != 0) {
> > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to compute SHA384 fingerprint");
> > > + goto cleanup;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + return true;
> > > +
> > > + cleanup:
> > > + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
> > > + gnutls_global_deinit();
> > > + return false;
> > > +}
> >
> > I'd suggest this go into qcrypto/x509-utils.c & include/qcrypto/x509-utils.h,
> > as:
> >
> > int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert,
> > size_t size,
> > QCryptoHashAlgorith hash,
> > Error **errp);
> >
> > there's no need to be calling gnutls_global_init() / deinit() either.
> >
> >
> > > @@ -299,7 +433,9 @@ static long get_file_size(FILE *f, Error **errp)
> > > */
> > > bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> > > char **kernel_path, char **initrd_path, char **cmdline,
> > > - Error **errp)
> > > + uint8_t *image_sha384, uint8_t *bootstrap_sha384,
> > > + uint8_t *app_sha384, uint8_t *fingerprint_sha384,
> > > + bool *signature_found, Error **errp)
> > > {
> > > FILE *f = NULL;
> > > FILE *machine_initrd_f = NULL;
> > > @@ -308,9 +444,33 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> > > uint32_t crc = 0;
> > > EifHeader eif_header;
> > > bool seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_MAX] = {false};
> > > -
> > > + /* kernel + ramdisks + cmdline sha384 hash */
> > > + GChecksum *image_hasher = NULL;
> > > + /* kernel + boot ramdisk + cmdline sha384 hash */
> > > + GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher = NULL;
> > > + /* application ramdisk(s) hash */
> > > + GChecksum *app_hasher = NULL;
> > > + size_t digest_len;
> > > +
> > > + *signature_found = false;
> > > *kernel_path = *initrd_path = *cmdline = NULL;
> > >
> > > + image_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > > + if (image_hasher == NULL) {
> > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for image");
> > > + goto cleanup;
> > > + }
> > > + bootstrap_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > > + if (bootstrap_hasher == NULL) {
> > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for bootstrap");
> > > + goto cleanup;
> > > + }
> > > + app_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > > + if (app_hasher == NULL) {
> > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for app");
> > > + goto cleanup;
> > > + }
> >
> > Don't use GChecksum APIs please, use the qcrypto hash APIs instead,
> > as we need all code to be using the designated QEMU crypto backend.
> >
>
> Thanks for the reviews. I was looking into replacing the GChecksum
> uses with qcrypto apis and was able to do it in the extendPCR function
> but I need some help with how I can do this in the eif.c file. For
> example, the "image_hash" needs to be a SHA384 hash of the kernel,
> cmdline, ramdisks sections' data as they appear in the order that is
> in the EIF file. Using GChecksum it was easy as I was able to just
> pass the hashers to the "read_eif_kernel", "read_eif_ramdisk" etc
> functions and call "update" on them. But the qcrypto apis are
> stateless i.e., I would need to pass all the buffers in a single api
> call so it wouldn't work right now out of the box. Do you have any
> suggestions how I should modify/create qcrypto apis so that I can
> easily do this (considering that I would need to implement for
> different qcrypto backends)? Thanks!
Looking at the read_eif_* methods:
@ -213,6 +218,8 @@ static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
}
*crc = crc32(*crc, kernel, size);
+ g_checksum_update(image_hasher, kernel, size);
+ g_checksum_update(bootstrap_hasher, kernel, size);
g_free(kernel);
fclose(tmp_file);
@@ -230,6 +237,8 @@ static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
}
static bool read_eif_cmdline(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char *cmdline,
+ GChecksum *image_hasher,
+ GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher,
uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
{
size_t got = fread(cmdline, 1, size, f);
@@ -239,10 +248,14 @@ static bool read_eif_cmdline(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char *cmdline,
}
*crc = crc32(*crc, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
+ g_checksum_update(image_hasher, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
+ g_checksum_update(bootstrap_hasher, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
return true;
}
static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
+ GChecksum *image_hasher,
+ GChecksum *bootstrap_or_app_hasher,
uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
{
size_t got;
@@ -261,6 +274,8 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
}
*crc = crc32(*crc, ramdisk, size);
+ g_checksum_update(image_hasher, ramdisk, size);
+ g_checksum_update(bootstrap_or_app_hasher, ramdisk, size);
g_free(ramdisk);
return true;
For the kernel + ramdisk, these methods are freeing the buffer.
For the cmdline, the pointer is held by the caller.
I'd suggest that read_eif_kernel+ramddisk are changed to return
the data pointer instead of free'ing it.
The caller can then stash the kernl+cmdline+ramdisk into an iovec
and calc the hash in a single stateless operation.
If you really don't want to do that, then you'll have to wait for
this series to be finalized & merged next dev cycle:
https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2024-08/msg01173.html
It is getting close to ready, so might not be too long, but I can't
guarantee a timeframe.
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in Nitro Secure Module device
2024-08-16 12:57 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
@ 2024-08-16 13:34 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
0 siblings, 0 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Dorjoy Chowdhury @ 2024-08-16 13:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel P. Berrangé
Cc: qemu-devel, graf, agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp,
richard.henderson, eduardo, mst, marcel.apfelbaum, philmd
On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 6:58 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2024 at 06:50:34PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> > Hi Daniel,
> >
> > On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 8:07 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Sat, Aug 10, 2024 at 10:45:01PM +0600, Dorjoy Chowdhury wrote:
> > > > AWS Nitro Enclaves have built-in Nitro Secure Module (NSM) device which
> > > > is used for stripped down TPM functionality like attestation. This commit
> > > > adds the built-in NSM device in the nitro-enclave machine type.
> > > >
> > > > In Nitro Enclaves, all the PCRs start in a known zero state and the first
> > > > 16 PCRs are locked from boot and reserved. The PCR0, PCR1, PCR2 and PCR8
> > > > contain the SHA384 hashes related to the EIF file used to boot the
> > > > VM for validation.
> > > >
> > > > A new optional nitro-enclave machine option 'id' has been added which will
> > > > be the enclave identifier reflected in the module-id of the NSM device.
> > > > Otherwise, the device will have a default id set.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > hw/core/eif.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > > > hw/core/eif.h | 5 +-
> > > > hw/core/meson.build | 4 +-
> > > > hw/i386/Kconfig | 1 +
> > > > hw/i386/nitro_enclave.c | 85 ++++++++++++-
> > > > include/hw/i386/nitro_enclave.h | 19 +++
> > > > 6 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/hw/core/eif.c b/hw/core/eif.c
> > > > index 5558879a96..d2c65668ef 100644
> > > > --- a/hw/core/eif.c
> > > > +++ b/hw/core/eif.c
> > > > @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
> > > > #include "qemu/bswap.h"
> > > > #include "qapi/error.h"
> > > > #include <zlib.h> /* for crc32 */
> > > > +#include <cbor.h>
> > > > +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
> > > > +#include <gnutls/x509.h>
> > > >
> > > > #include "hw/core/eif.h"
> > > >
> > >
> > > > @@ -269,6 +284,125 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
> > > > return false;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > +static bool get_fingerprint_sha384_from_cert(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
> > > > + uint8_t *sha384, Error **errp)
> > > > +{
> > > > + gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
> > > > + size_t hash_size = 48;
> > > > + gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
> > > > +
> > > > + gnutls_global_init();
> > > > + gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
> > > > +
> > > > + if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) != 0) {
> > > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate");
> > > > + goto cleanup;
> > > > + }
> > > > +
> > > > + if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_fingerprint(crt, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384, sha384,
> > > > + &hash_size) != 0) {
> > > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to compute SHA384 fingerprint");
> > > > + goto cleanup;
> > > > + }
> > > > +
> > > > + return true;
> > > > +
> > > > + cleanup:
> > > > + gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
> > > > + gnutls_global_deinit();
> > > > + return false;
> > > > +}
> > >
> > > I'd suggest this go into qcrypto/x509-utils.c & include/qcrypto/x509-utils.h,
> > > as:
> > >
> > > int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert,
> > > size_t size,
> > > QCryptoHashAlgorith hash,
> > > Error **errp);
> > >
> > > there's no need to be calling gnutls_global_init() / deinit() either.
> > >
> > >
> > > > @@ -299,7 +433,9 @@ static long get_file_size(FILE *f, Error **errp)
> > > > */
> > > > bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> > > > char **kernel_path, char **initrd_path, char **cmdline,
> > > > - Error **errp)
> > > > + uint8_t *image_sha384, uint8_t *bootstrap_sha384,
> > > > + uint8_t *app_sha384, uint8_t *fingerprint_sha384,
> > > > + bool *signature_found, Error **errp)
> > > > {
> > > > FILE *f = NULL;
> > > > FILE *machine_initrd_f = NULL;
> > > > @@ -308,9 +444,33 @@ bool read_eif_file(const char *eif_path, const char *machine_initrd,
> > > > uint32_t crc = 0;
> > > > EifHeader eif_header;
> > > > bool seen_sections[EIF_SECTION_MAX] = {false};
> > > > -
> > > > + /* kernel + ramdisks + cmdline sha384 hash */
> > > > + GChecksum *image_hasher = NULL;
> > > > + /* kernel + boot ramdisk + cmdline sha384 hash */
> > > > + GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher = NULL;
> > > > + /* application ramdisk(s) hash */
> > > > + GChecksum *app_hasher = NULL;
> > > > + size_t digest_len;
> > > > +
> > > > + *signature_found = false;
> > > > *kernel_path = *initrd_path = *cmdline = NULL;
> > > >
> > > > + image_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > > > + if (image_hasher == NULL) {
> > > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for image");
> > > > + goto cleanup;
> > > > + }
> > > > + bootstrap_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > > > + if (bootstrap_hasher == NULL) {
> > > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for bootstrap");
> > > > + goto cleanup;
> > > > + }
> > > > + app_hasher = g_checksum_new(G_CHECKSUM_SHA384);
> > > > + if (app_hasher == NULL) {
> > > > + error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize sha384 hash for app");
> > > > + goto cleanup;
> > > > + }
> > >
> > > Don't use GChecksum APIs please, use the qcrypto hash APIs instead,
> > > as we need all code to be using the designated QEMU crypto backend.
> > >
> >
> > Thanks for the reviews. I was looking into replacing the GChecksum
> > uses with qcrypto apis and was able to do it in the extendPCR function
> > but I need some help with how I can do this in the eif.c file. For
> > example, the "image_hash" needs to be a SHA384 hash of the kernel,
> > cmdline, ramdisks sections' data as they appear in the order that is
> > in the EIF file. Using GChecksum it was easy as I was able to just
> > pass the hashers to the "read_eif_kernel", "read_eif_ramdisk" etc
> > functions and call "update" on them. But the qcrypto apis are
> > stateless i.e., I would need to pass all the buffers in a single api
> > call so it wouldn't work right now out of the box. Do you have any
> > suggestions how I should modify/create qcrypto apis so that I can
> > easily do this (considering that I would need to implement for
> > different qcrypto backends)? Thanks!
>
> Looking at the read_eif_* methods:
>
> @ -213,6 +218,8 @@ static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
> }
>
> *crc = crc32(*crc, kernel, size);
> + g_checksum_update(image_hasher, kernel, size);
> + g_checksum_update(bootstrap_hasher, kernel, size);
> g_free(kernel);
> fclose(tmp_file);
>
> @@ -230,6 +237,8 @@ static bool read_eif_kernel(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char **kernel_path,
> }
>
> static bool read_eif_cmdline(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char *cmdline,
> + GChecksum *image_hasher,
> + GChecksum *bootstrap_hasher,
> uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
> {
> size_t got = fread(cmdline, 1, size, f);
> @@ -239,10 +248,14 @@ static bool read_eif_cmdline(FILE *f, uint64_t size, char *cmdline,
> }
>
> *crc = crc32(*crc, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
> + g_checksum_update(image_hasher, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
> + g_checksum_update(bootstrap_hasher, (uint8_t *)cmdline, size);
> return true;
> }
>
> static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
> + GChecksum *image_hasher,
> + GChecksum *bootstrap_or_app_hasher,
> uint32_t *crc, Error **errp)
> {
> size_t got;
> @@ -261,6 +274,8 @@ static bool read_eif_ramdisk(FILE *eif, FILE *initrd, uint64_t size,
> }
>
> *crc = crc32(*crc, ramdisk, size);
> + g_checksum_update(image_hasher, ramdisk, size);
> + g_checksum_update(bootstrap_or_app_hasher, ramdisk, size);
> g_free(ramdisk);
> return true;
>
>
> For the kernel + ramdisk, these methods are freeing the buffer.
> For the cmdline, the pointer is held by the caller.
>
> I'd suggest that read_eif_kernel+ramddisk are changed to return
> the data pointer instead of free'ing it.
>
> The caller can then stash the kernl+cmdline+ramdisk into an iovec
> and calc the hash in a single stateless operation.
>
>
>
> If you really don't want to do that, then you'll have to wait for
> this series to be finalized & merged next dev cycle:
>
> https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2024-08/msg01173.html
>
> It is getting close to ready, so might not be too long, but I can't
> guarantee a timeframe.
>
Thanks Daniel! It looks like returning the buffers is the way to move
forward for now.
Regards,
Dorjoy
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support
2024-08-10 16:44 [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] docs/nitro-enclave: Documentation for nitro-enclave machine type Dorjoy Chowdhury
@ 2024-08-18 11:51 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
5 siblings, 0 replies; 21+ messages in thread
From: Dorjoy Chowdhury @ 2024-08-18 11:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: graf, berrange
Cc: agraf, stefanha, pbonzini, slp, richard.henderson, eduardo,
qemu-devel, mst, marcel.apfelbaum, philmd
Thanks for the reviews. I have now posted a v4 at:
https://mail.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2024-08/msg02675.html
Regards,
Dorjoy
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 21+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2024-08-18 11:52 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2024-08-10 16:44 [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-10 16:44 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] machine/nitro-enclave: New machine type for AWS Nitro Enclaves Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 13:56 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-10 16:44 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add vhost-user-vsock device Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 14:24 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-13 18:02 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-14 8:17 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 14:15 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-13 12:54 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] machine/nitro-enclave: Add built-in " Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-12 13:51 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-12 14:00 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-12 13:55 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-12 14:07 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-16 12:50 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-16 12:57 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2024-08-16 13:34 ` Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-13 12:57 ` Alexander Graf
2024-08-10 16:45 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] docs/nitro-enclave: Documentation for nitro-enclave machine type Dorjoy Chowdhury
2024-08-18 11:51 ` [PATCH v3 0/5] AWS Nitro Enclave emulation support Dorjoy Chowdhury
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