From: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Cc: vkuznets@redhat.com, kraxel@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v1 18/28] i386/sev: add support for confidential guest reset
Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2025 20:33:46 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251212150359.548787-19-anisinha@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251212150359.548787-1-anisinha@redhat.com>
When the KVM VM file descriptor changes as a part of the confidential guest
reset mechanism, it necessary to create a new confidential guest context and
re-encrypt the VM memeory. This happens for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP virtual machines
as a part of SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH operations.
A new resettable interface for SEV module has been added. A new reset callback
for the reset 'exit' state has been implemented to perform the above operations
when the VM file descriptor has changed during VM reset.
Signed-off-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/sev.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 83b9bfb2ae..246a58c752 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -30,8 +30,10 @@
#include "system/kvm.h"
#include "kvm/kvm_i386.h"
#include "sev.h"
+#include "system/cpus.h"
#include "system/system.h"
#include "system/runstate.h"
+#include "system/reset.h"
#include "trace.h"
#include "migration/blocker.h"
#include "qom/object.h"
@@ -84,6 +86,10 @@ typedef struct QEMU_PACKED PaddedSevHashTable {
uint8_t padding[ROUND_UP(sizeof(SevHashTable), 16) - sizeof(SevHashTable)];
} PaddedSevHashTable;
+static void sev_handle_reset(Object *obj, ResetType type);
+
+SevKernelLoaderContext sev_load_ctx = {};
+
QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(PaddedSevHashTable) % 16 != 0);
#define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID "00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e"
@@ -127,6 +133,7 @@ struct SevCommonState {
uint8_t build_id;
int sev_fd;
SevState state;
+ ResettableState reset_state;
QTAILQ_HEAD(, SevLaunchVmsa) launch_vmsa;
};
@@ -2012,6 +2019,37 @@ static int sev_snp_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * handle sev vm reset
+ */
+static void sev_handle_reset(Object *obj, ResetType type)
+{
+ SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
+ SevCommonStateClass *klass = SEV_COMMON_GET_CLASS(sev_common);
+
+ if (!sev_common) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!runstate_is_running()) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(&sev_load_ctx, &error_fatal);
+ if (!sev_check_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) {
+ /* this calls sev_snp_launch_finish() etc */
+ klass->launch_finish(sev_common);
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+static ResettableState *sev_reset_state(Object *obj)
+{
+ SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(obj);
+ return &sev_common->reset_state;
+}
+
int
sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
{
@@ -2490,6 +2528,8 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
return false;
}
+ /* save the context here so that it can be re-used when vm is reset */
+ memcpy(&sev_load_ctx, ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
return klass->build_kernel_loader_hashes(sev_common, area, ctx, errp);
}
@@ -2750,8 +2790,16 @@ static void
sev_common_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
{
ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_CLASS(oc);
+ ResettableClass *rc = RESETTABLE_CLASS(oc);
klass->kvm_init = sev_common_kvm_init;
+ /*
+ * the exit phase makes sure sev handles reset after all legacy resets
+ * have taken place (in the hold phase) and IGVM has also properly
+ * set up the boot state.
+ */
+ rc->phases.exit = sev_handle_reset;
+ rc->get_state = sev_reset_state;
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "sev-device",
sev_common_get_sev_device,
@@ -2786,6 +2834,8 @@ sev_common_instance_init(Object *obj)
cgs->get_mem_map_entry = cgs_get_mem_map_entry;
cgs->set_guest_policy = cgs_set_guest_policy;
+ qemu_register_resettable(OBJECT(sev_common));
+
QTAILQ_INIT(&sev_common->launch_vmsa);
}
@@ -2800,6 +2850,7 @@ static const TypeInfo sev_common_info = {
.abstract = true,
.interfaces = (const InterfaceInfo[]) {
{ TYPE_USER_CREATABLE },
+ { TYPE_RESETTABLE_INTERFACE },
{ }
}
};
--
2.42.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-12-12 15:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-12 15:03 [PATCH v1 00/28] Introduce support for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 01/28] i386/kvm: avoid installing duplicate msr entries in msr_handlers Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 02/28] hw/accel: add a per-accelerator callback to change VM accelerator handle Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 03/28] system/physmem: add helper to reattach existing memory after KVM VM fd change Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 04/28] accel/kvm: add changes required to support KVM VM file descriptor change Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 05/28] accel/kvm: mark guest state as unprotected after vm " Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 06/28] accel/kvm: add a notifier to indicate KVM VM file descriptor has changed Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 07/28] kvm/i386: implement architecture support for kvm file descriptor change Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 08/28] hw/i386: refactor x86_bios_rom_init for reuse in confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 09/28] kvm/i386: reload firmware for " Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 10/28] accel/kvm: Add notifier to inform that the KVM VM file fd is about to be changed Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 11/28] accel/kvm: rebind current VCPUs to the new KVM VM file descriptor upon reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 12/28] i386/tdx: refactor TDX firmware memory initialization code into a new function Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 13/28] i386/tdx: finalize TDX guest state upon reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 14/28] i386/tdx: add a pre-vmfd change notifier to reset tdx state Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 15/28] i386/sev: add migration blockers only once Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 16/28] i386/sev: add notifiers " Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 17/28] i386/sev: free existing launch update data and kernel hashes data on init Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` Ani Sinha [this message]
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 19/28] hw/vfio: generate new file fd for pseudo device and rebind existing descriptors Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 20/28] kvm/i8254: add support for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 21/28] hw/hyperv/vmbus: " Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 22/28] accel/kvm: add a per-confidential class callback to unlock guest state Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 23/28] kvm/xen-emu: re-initialize capabilities during confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 24/28] kvm/xen_evtchn: add support for " Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 25/28] ppc/openpic: create a new openpic device and reattach mem region on coco reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 26/28] kvm/vcpu: add notifiers to inform vcpu file descriptor change Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 27/28] kvm/i386/apic: set local apic after vcpu file descriptors changed Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 28/28] kvm/clock: add support for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
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