From: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Cc: vkuznets@redhat.com, kraxel@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v1 22/28] accel/kvm: add a per-confidential class callback to unlock guest state
Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2025 20:33:50 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251212150359.548787-23-anisinha@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251212150359.548787-1-anisinha@redhat.com>
As a part of the confidential guest reset process, the existing encrypted guest
state must be made mutable since it would be discarded after reset. A new
encrypted and locked guest state must be established after the reset. To this
end, a new callback per confidential guest support class (eg, tdx or sev-snp)
is added that will indicate whether its possible to rebuild guest state:
bool (*can_rebuild_guest_state)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs)
This api returns true if rebuilding guest state is possible,
false otherwise. A KVM based confidential guest reset is only possible when
the existing state is locked but its possible to rebuild guest state.
Otherwise, the guest is not resettable.
Signed-off-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
include/system/confidential-guest-support.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++
system/runstate.c | 11 +++++++--
target/i386/kvm/tdx.c | 6 +++++
target/i386/sev.c | 9 +++++++
4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
index 0cc8b26e64..3c37227263 100644
--- a/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
+++ b/include/system/confidential-guest-support.h
@@ -152,6 +152,11 @@ typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
*/
int (*get_mem_map_entry)(int index, ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry *entry,
Error **errp);
+
+ /*
+ * is it possible to rebuild the guest state?
+ */
+ bool (*can_rebuild_guest_state)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs);
} ConfidentialGuestSupportClass;
static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
@@ -167,6 +172,28 @@ static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
return 0;
}
+static inline bool
+confidential_guest_can_rebuild_state(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs)
+{
+ ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass;
+
+ if (!cgs) {
+ /* non-confidential guests */
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(cgs);
+ if (klass->can_rebuild_guest_state) {
+ return klass->can_rebuild_guest_state(cgs);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * by default, we should not be able to unprotect the
+ * confidential guest state
+ */
+ return false;
+}
+
static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_reset(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs,
Error **errp)
{
diff --git a/system/runstate.c b/system/runstate.c
index f5e57fd1f7..fb878c2992 100644
--- a/system/runstate.c
+++ b/system/runstate.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include "system/reset.h"
#include "system/runstate.h"
#include "system/runstate-action.h"
+#include "system/confidential-guest-support.h"
#include "system/system.h"
#include "system/tpm.h"
#include "trace.h"
@@ -564,7 +565,12 @@ void qemu_system_reset(ShutdownCause reason)
if (cpus_are_resettable()) {
cpu_synchronize_all_post_reset();
} else {
- assert(runstate_check(RUN_STATE_PRELAUNCH));
+ /*
+ * for confidential guests, cpus are not resettable but their
+ * state can be rebuilt under some conditions.
+ */
+ assert(runstate_check(RUN_STATE_PRELAUNCH) ||
+ (current_machine->cgs && runstate_is_running()));
}
vm_set_suspended(false);
@@ -713,7 +719,8 @@ void qemu_system_reset_request(ShutdownCause reason)
if (reboot_action == REBOOT_ACTION_SHUTDOWN &&
reason != SHUTDOWN_CAUSE_SUBSYSTEM_RESET) {
shutdown_requested = reason;
- } else if (!cpus_are_resettable()) {
+ } else if (!cpus_are_resettable() &&
+ !confidential_guest_can_rebuild_state(current_machine->cgs)) {
error_report("cpus are not resettable, terminating");
shutdown_requested = reason;
} else {
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/tdx.c b/target/i386/kvm/tdx.c
index b6fac162bd..20f9d63eff 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm/tdx.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm/tdx.c
@@ -1594,6 +1594,11 @@ static ResettableState *tdx_reset_state(Object *obj)
return &tdx->reset_state;
}
+static bool tdx_can_rebuild_guest_state(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+
static void tdx_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
{
ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_CLASS(oc);
@@ -1601,6 +1606,7 @@ static void tdx_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
ResettableClass *rc = RESETTABLE_CLASS(oc);
klass->kvm_init = tdx_kvm_init;
+ klass->can_rebuild_guest_state = tdx_can_rebuild_guest_state;
x86_klass->kvm_type = tdx_kvm_type;
x86_klass->cpu_instance_init = tdx_cpu_instance_init;
x86_klass->adjust_cpuid_features = tdx_adjust_cpuid_features;
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 246a58c752..4eea58d160 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -2659,6 +2659,14 @@ static int cgs_set_guest_state(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len,
return -1;
}
+static bool sev_can_rebuild_guest_state(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs)
+{
+ if (!sev_snp_enabled() && !sev_es_enabled()) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
static int cgs_get_mem_map_entry(int index,
ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry *entry,
Error **errp)
@@ -2833,6 +2841,7 @@ sev_common_instance_init(Object *obj)
cgs->set_guest_state = cgs_set_guest_state;
cgs->get_mem_map_entry = cgs_get_mem_map_entry;
cgs->set_guest_policy = cgs_set_guest_policy;
+ cgs->can_rebuild_guest_state = sev_can_rebuild_guest_state;
qemu_register_resettable(OBJECT(sev_common));
--
2.42.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-12-12 15:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-12 15:03 [PATCH v1 00/28] Introduce support for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 01/28] i386/kvm: avoid installing duplicate msr entries in msr_handlers Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 02/28] hw/accel: add a per-accelerator callback to change VM accelerator handle Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 03/28] system/physmem: add helper to reattach existing memory after KVM VM fd change Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 04/28] accel/kvm: add changes required to support KVM VM file descriptor change Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 05/28] accel/kvm: mark guest state as unprotected after vm " Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 06/28] accel/kvm: add a notifier to indicate KVM VM file descriptor has changed Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 07/28] kvm/i386: implement architecture support for kvm file descriptor change Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 08/28] hw/i386: refactor x86_bios_rom_init for reuse in confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 09/28] kvm/i386: reload firmware for " Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 10/28] accel/kvm: Add notifier to inform that the KVM VM file fd is about to be changed Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 11/28] accel/kvm: rebind current VCPUs to the new KVM VM file descriptor upon reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 12/28] i386/tdx: refactor TDX firmware memory initialization code into a new function Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 13/28] i386/tdx: finalize TDX guest state upon reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 14/28] i386/tdx: add a pre-vmfd change notifier to reset tdx state Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 15/28] i386/sev: add migration blockers only once Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 16/28] i386/sev: add notifiers " Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 17/28] i386/sev: free existing launch update data and kernel hashes data on init Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 18/28] i386/sev: add support for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 19/28] hw/vfio: generate new file fd for pseudo device and rebind existing descriptors Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 20/28] kvm/i8254: add support for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 21/28] hw/hyperv/vmbus: " Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` Ani Sinha [this message]
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 23/28] kvm/xen-emu: re-initialize capabilities during " Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 24/28] kvm/xen_evtchn: add support for " Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 25/28] ppc/openpic: create a new openpic device and reattach mem region on coco reset Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 26/28] kvm/vcpu: add notifiers to inform vcpu file descriptor change Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 27/28] kvm/i386/apic: set local apic after vcpu file descriptors changed Ani Sinha
2025-12-12 15:03 ` [PATCH v1 28/28] kvm/clock: add support for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
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