[PATCH v5 1/1] linux-user: add openat2 support in linux-user

[PATCH v5 1/1] linux-user: add openat2 support in linux-user

[Michael Vogt]

This commit adds support for the `openat2()` syscall in the
`linux-user` userspace emulator.

It is implemented by extracting a new helper `maybe_do_fake_open()`
out of the exiting `do_guest_openat()` and share that with the
new `do_guest_openat2()`. Unfortunately we cannot just make
do_guest_openat2() a superset of do_guest_openat() because the
openat2() syscall is stricter with the argument checking and
will return an error for invalid flags or mode combinations (which
open()/openat() will ignore).

The implementation is similar to SYSCALL_DEFINE(openat2), i.e.
a new `copy_struct_from_user()` is used that works the same
as the kernels version to support backwards-compatibility
for struct syscall argument.

Instead of including openat2.h we create a copy of `open_how`
as `open_how_ver0` to ensure that if the structure grows we
can log a LOG_UNIMP warning.

Note that in this commit using openat2() for a "faked" file in
/proc will ignore the "resolve" flags. This is not great but it
seems similar to the exiting behavior when openat() is called
with a dirfd to "/proc". Here too the fake file lookup may
not catch the special file because "realpath()" is used to
determine if the path is in /proc. Alternatively to ignoring
we could simply fail with `-TARGET_ENOSYS` (or similar) if
`resolve` flags are passed and we found something that looks
like a file in /proc that needs faking.

Signed-off-by: Michael Vogt <mvogt@redhat.com>
Buglink: https://github.com/osbuild/bootc-image-builder/issues/619
---
 linux-user/syscall.c      | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 linux-user/syscall_defs.h |   7 +++
 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/linux-user/syscall.c b/linux-user/syscall.c
index b693aeff5b..99f3afece7 100644
--- a/linux-user/syscall.c
+++ b/linux-user/syscall.c
@@ -602,6 +602,34 @@ static int check_zeroed_user(abi_long addr, size_t ksize, size_t usize)
     return 1;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Copies a target struct to a host struct, in a way that guarantees
+ * backwards-compatibility for struct syscall arguments.
+ *
+ * Similar to kernels uaccess.h:copy_struct_from_user()
+ */
+static int
+copy_struct_from_user(void *dst, size_t ksize, abi_ptr src, size_t usize)
+{
+    size_t size = MIN(ksize, usize);
+    size_t rest = MAX(ksize, usize) - size;
+
+    /* Deal with trailing bytes. */
+    if (usize < ksize) {
+        memset(dst + size, 0, rest);
+    } else if (usize > ksize) {
+        int ret = check_zeroed_user(src, ksize, usize);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            return ret ?: -TARGET_E2BIG;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Copy the interoperable parts of the struct. */
+    if (copy_from_user(dst, src, size)) {
+        return -TARGET_EFAULT;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
 #define safe_syscall0(type, name) \
 static type safe_##name(void) \
 { \
@@ -653,6 +681,15 @@ safe_syscall3(ssize_t, read, int, fd, void *, buff, size_t, count)
 safe_syscall3(ssize_t, write, int, fd, const void *, buff, size_t, count)
 safe_syscall4(int, openat, int, dirfd, const char *, pathname, \
               int, flags, mode_t, mode)
+
+struct open_how_ver0 {
+    __u64 flags;
+    __u64 mode;
+    __u64 resolve;
+};
+safe_syscall4(int, openat2, int, dirfd, const char *, pathname, \
+              const struct open_how_ver0 *, how, size_t, size)
+
 #if defined(TARGET_NR_wait4) || defined(TARGET_NR_waitpid)
 safe_syscall4(pid_t, wait4, pid_t, pid, int *, status, int, options, \
               struct rusage *, rusage)
@@ -8334,8 +8371,9 @@ static int open_net_route(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int fd)
 }
 #endif
 
-int do_guest_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *fname,
-                    int flags, mode_t mode, bool safe)
+static int maybe_do_fake_open(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd,
+                              const char *fname, int flags, mode_t mode,
+                              bool safe)
 {
     g_autofree char *proc_name = NULL;
     const char *pathname;
@@ -8418,6 +8456,17 @@ int do_guest_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *fname,
         return fd;
     }
 
+    return -2;
+}
+
+int do_guest_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *pathname,
+                    int flags, mode_t mode, bool safe)
+{
+    int fd = maybe_do_fake_open(cpu_env, dirfd, pathname, flags, mode, safe);
+    if (fd > -2) {
+        return get_errno(fd);
+    }
+
     if (safe) {
         return safe_openat(dirfd, path(pathname), flags, mode);
     } else {
@@ -8425,6 +8474,55 @@ int do_guest_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *fname,
     }
 }
 
+
+static int do_openat2(CPUArchState *cpu_env, abi_long dirfd,
+                      abi_ptr guest_pathname, abi_ptr guest_open_how,
+                      abi_long guest_size)
+{
+    struct open_how_ver0 how = {0};
+    int ret;
+
+    if (guest_size < sizeof(struct target_open_how_ver0)) {
+        return -TARGET_EINVAL;
+    }
+    ret = copy_struct_from_user(&how, sizeof(how), guest_open_how, guest_size);
+    if (ret) {
+        if (ret == -TARGET_E2BIG) {
+            qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP,
+                          "Unimplemented openat2 open_how size: %lu\n",
+                          guest_size);
+        }
+        return ret;
+    }
+    char *pathname = lock_user_string(guest_pathname);
+    if (!pathname) {
+        return -TARGET_EFAULT;
+    }
+
+    how.flags = target_to_host_bitmask(how.flags, fcntl_flags_tbl);
+    how.mode = tswap64(how.mode);
+    how.resolve = tswap64(how.resolve);
+
+    /*
+     * Ideally we would pass "how->resolve" flags into this helper too but
+     * the lookup for files that need faking is based on "realpath()" so
+     * neither a dirfd for "proc" nor restrictions via "resolve" flags can
+     * be honored right now.
+     */
+    int fd = maybe_do_fake_open(cpu_env, dirfd, pathname, how.flags, how.mode,
+                                true);
+    if (fd > -2) {
+        return get_errno(fd);
+    } else {
+        ret = get_errno(safe_openat2(dirfd, pathname, &how,
+                                     sizeof(struct open_how_ver0)));
+    }
+
+    fd_trans_unregister(ret);
+    unlock_user(pathname, guest_pathname, 0);
+    return ret;
+}
+
 ssize_t do_guest_readlink(const char *pathname, char *buf, size_t bufsiz)
 {
     ssize_t ret;
@@ -9197,6 +9295,11 @@ static abi_long do_syscall1(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1,
         fd_trans_unregister(ret);
         unlock_user(p, arg2, 0);
         return ret;
+#if defined(TARGET_NR_openat2)
+    case TARGET_NR_openat2:
+        ret = do_openat2(cpu_env, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4);
+        return ret;
+#endif
 #if defined(TARGET_NR_name_to_handle_at) && defined(CONFIG_OPEN_BY_HANDLE)
     case TARGET_NR_name_to_handle_at:
         ret = do_name_to_handle_at(arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
diff --git a/linux-user/syscall_defs.h b/linux-user/syscall_defs.h
index 8ed53904ed..b83fa34663 100644
--- a/linux-user/syscall_defs.h
+++ b/linux-user/syscall_defs.h
@@ -2753,4 +2753,11 @@ struct target_sched_param {
     abi_int sched_priority;
 };
 
+/* from kernel's include/uapi/linux/openat2.h */
+struct target_open_how_ver0 {
+    abi_ullong flags;
+    abi_ullong mode;
+    abi_ullong resolve;
+};
+
 #endif
-- 
2.45.2

Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] linux-user: add openat2 support in linux-user

[Laurent Vivier]

Hi,

your PATCH 1/1 doesn't appear to be a reply of PATCH 0/1 (mail header tag 
"In-Reply-To:"/"Reference") so it is not correctly collected by patchew.org. Do you have the 
'thread' parameter for git-send-email?

See my comments below:

Le 19/09/2024 à 21:46, Michael Vogt a écrit :
> This commit adds support for the `openat2()` syscall in the
> `linux-user` userspace emulator.
> 
> It is implemented by extracting a new helper `maybe_do_fake_open()`
> out of the exiting `do_guest_openat()` and share that with the
> new `do_guest_openat2()`. Unfortunately we cannot just make
> do_guest_openat2() a superset of do_guest_openat() because the
> openat2() syscall is stricter with the argument checking and
> will return an error for invalid flags or mode combinations (which
> open()/openat() will ignore).
> 
> The implementation is similar to SYSCALL_DEFINE(openat2), i.e.
> a new `copy_struct_from_user()` is used that works the same
> as the kernels version to support backwards-compatibility
> for struct syscall argument.
> 
> Instead of including openat2.h we create a copy of `open_how`
> as `open_how_ver0` to ensure that if the structure grows we
> can log a LOG_UNIMP warning.
> 
> Note that in this commit using openat2() for a "faked" file in
> /proc will ignore the "resolve" flags. This is not great but it
> seems similar to the exiting behavior when openat() is called
> with a dirfd to "/proc". Here too the fake file lookup may
> not catch the special file because "realpath()" is used to
> determine if the path is in /proc. Alternatively to ignoring
> we could simply fail with `-TARGET_ENOSYS` (or similar) if
> `resolve` flags are passed and we found something that looks
> like a file in /proc that needs faking.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michael Vogt <mvogt@redhat.com>
> Buglink: https://github.com/osbuild/bootc-image-builder/issues/619
> ---
>   linux-user/syscall.c      | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>   linux-user/syscall_defs.h |   7 +++
>   2 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/linux-user/syscall.c b/linux-user/syscall.c
> index b693aeff5b..99f3afece7 100644
> --- a/linux-user/syscall.c
> +++ b/linux-user/syscall.c
> @@ -602,6 +602,34 @@ static int check_zeroed_user(abi_long addr, size_t ksize, size_t usize)
>       return 1;
>   }
>   
> +/*
> + * Copies a target struct to a host struct, in a way that guarantees
> + * backwards-compatibility for struct syscall arguments.
> + *
> + * Similar to kernels uaccess.h:copy_struct_from_user()
> + */
> +static int
> +copy_struct_from_user(void *dst, size_t ksize, abi_ptr src, size_t usize)
> +{
> +    size_t size = MIN(ksize, usize);
> +    size_t rest = MAX(ksize, usize) - size;
> +
> +    /* Deal with trailing bytes. */
> +    if (usize < ksize) {
> +        memset(dst + size, 0, rest);
> +    } else if (usize > ksize) {
> +        int ret = check_zeroed_user(src, ksize, usize);
> +        if (ret <= 0) {
> +            return ret ?: -TARGET_E2BIG;
> +        }
> +    }
> +    /* Copy the interoperable parts of the struct. */
> +    if (copy_from_user(dst, src, size)) {
> +        return -TARGET_EFAULT;
> +    }
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +
>   #define safe_syscall0(type, name) \
>   static type safe_##name(void) \
>   { \
> @@ -653,6 +681,15 @@ safe_syscall3(ssize_t, read, int, fd, void *, buff, size_t, count)
>   safe_syscall3(ssize_t, write, int, fd, const void *, buff, size_t, count)
>   safe_syscall4(int, openat, int, dirfd, const char *, pathname, \
>                 int, flags, mode_t, mode)
> +
> +struct open_how_ver0 {
> +    __u64 flags;
> +    __u64 mode;
> +    __u64 resolve;
> +};
> +safe_syscall4(int, openat2, int, dirfd, const char *, pathname, \
> +              const struct open_how_ver0 *, how, size_t, size)
> +
>   #if defined(TARGET_NR_wait4) || defined(TARGET_NR_waitpid)
>   safe_syscall4(pid_t, wait4, pid_t, pid, int *, status, int, options, \
>                 struct rusage *, rusage)
> @@ -8334,8 +8371,9 @@ static int open_net_route(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int fd)
>   }
>   #endif
>   
> -int do_guest_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *fname,
> -                    int flags, mode_t mode, bool safe)
> +static int maybe_do_fake_open(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd,
> +                              const char *fname, int flags, mode_t mode,
> +                              bool safe)
>   {
>       g_autofree char *proc_name = NULL;
>       const char *pathname;
> @@ -8418,6 +8456,17 @@ int do_guest_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *fname,
>           return fd;
>       }
>   
> +    return -2;
> +}
> +
> +int do_guest_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *pathname,
> +                    int flags, mode_t mode, bool safe)
> +{
> +    int fd = maybe_do_fake_open(cpu_env, dirfd, pathname, flags, mode, safe);
> +    if (fd > -2) {
> +        return get_errno(fd);

Don't put the get_errno() here, because safe_openat() and openat() below don't have one, and 
moreover the callers are doing get_errno(do_guest_openat()).

> +    }
> +
>       if (safe) {
>           return safe_openat(dirfd, path(pathname), flags, mode);
>       } else {
> @@ -8425,6 +8474,55 @@ int do_guest_openat(CPUArchState *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *fname,
>       }
>   }
>   
> +
> +static int do_openat2(CPUArchState *cpu_env, abi_long dirfd,
> +                      abi_ptr guest_pathname, abi_ptr guest_open_how,
> +                      abi_long guest_size)
> +{
> +    struct open_how_ver0 how = {0};
> +    int ret;
> +
> +    if (guest_size < sizeof(struct target_open_how_ver0)) {
> +        return -TARGET_EINVAL;
> +    }
> +    ret = copy_struct_from_user(&how, sizeof(how), guest_open_how, guest_size);
> +    if (ret) {
> +        if (ret == -TARGET_E2BIG) {
> +            qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP,
> +                          "Unimplemented openat2 open_how size: %lu\n",
> +                          guest_size);
> +        }
> +        return ret;
> +    }
> +    char *pathname = lock_user_string(guest_pathname);

Don't put the declaration in the middle of the code.
See https://qemu-project.gitlab.io/qemu/devel/style.html#declarations

> +    if (!pathname) {
> +        return -TARGET_EFAULT;
> +    }
> +
> +    how.flags = target_to_host_bitmask(how.flags, fcntl_flags_tbl);
> +    how.mode = tswap64(how.mode);
> +    how.resolve = tswap64(how.resolve);
> +
> +    /*
> +     * Ideally we would pass "how->resolve" flags into this helper too but
> +     * the lookup for files that need faking is based on "realpath()" so
> +     * neither a dirfd for "proc" nor restrictions via "resolve" flags can
> +     * be honored right now.
> +     */
> +    int fd = maybe_do_fake_open(cpu_env, dirfd, pathname, how.flags, how.mode,
> +                                true);
> +    if (fd > -2) {
> +        return get_errno(fd);

it's better to set "ret = get_errno(fd);" and not return to execute the fd_trans_unregister() and 
unlock_user() below.

> +    } else { > +        ret = get_errno(safe_openat2(dirfd, pathname, &how,
> +                                     sizeof(struct open_how_ver0)));
> +    }
> +
> +    fd_trans_unregister(ret);
> +    unlock_user(pathname, guest_pathname, 0);
> +    return ret;
> +}
> +

Thanks,
Laurent

Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] linux-user: add openat2 support in linux-user

[Laurent Vivier]

Le 19/09/2024 à 21:46, Michael Vogt a écrit :
> This commit adds support for the `openat2()` syscall in the
> `linux-user` userspace emulator.
> 
> It is implemented by extracting a new helper `maybe_do_fake_open()`
> out of the exiting `do_guest_openat()` and share that with the
> new `do_guest_openat2()`. Unfortunately we cannot just make
> do_guest_openat2() a superset of do_guest_openat() because the
> openat2() syscall is stricter with the argument checking and
> will return an error for invalid flags or mode combinations (which
> open()/openat() will ignore).
> 
> The implementation is similar to SYSCALL_DEFINE(openat2), i.e.
> a new `copy_struct_from_user()` is used that works the same
> as the kernels version to support backwards-compatibility
> for struct syscall argument.
> 
> Instead of including openat2.h we create a copy of `open_how`
> as `open_how_ver0` to ensure that if the structure grows we
> can log a LOG_UNIMP warning.
> 
> Note that in this commit using openat2() for a "faked" file in
> /proc will ignore the "resolve" flags. This is not great but it
> seems similar to the exiting behavior when openat() is called
> with a dirfd to "/proc". Here too the fake file lookup may
> not catch the special file because "realpath()" is used to
> determine if the path is in /proc. Alternatively to ignoring
> we could simply fail with `-TARGET_ENOSYS` (or similar) if
> `resolve` flags are passed and we found something that looks
> like a file in /proc that needs faking.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michael Vogt <mvogt@redhat.com>

And I think it's better if the "From:" address is the same as the S-o-b address.

Thanks,
Laurent