From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
To: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv5 4/5] seccomp: add spawn argument to command line
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 11:50:12 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2ebb2804-a613-0942-ee9b-aa900093ac98@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170908091027.9104-5-otubo@redhat.com>
On 08.09.2017 11:10, Eduardo Otubo wrote:
> This patch adds [,spawn=deny] argument to `-sandbox on' option. It
> blacklists fork and execve system calls, avoiding Qemu to spawn new
> threads or processes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
> ---
> include/sysemu/seccomp.h | 1 +
> qemu-options.hx | 9 +++++++--
> qemu-seccomp.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> vl.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/sysemu/seccomp.h b/include/sysemu/seccomp.h
> index 4a9e63c7cd..3ab5fc4f61 100644
> --- a/include/sysemu/seccomp.h
> +++ b/include/sysemu/seccomp.h
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> #define QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_DEFAULT (1 << 0)
> #define QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE (1 << 1)
> #define QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED (1 << 2)
> +#define QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_SPAWN (1 << 3)
>
> #include <seccomp.h>
>
> diff --git a/qemu-options.hx b/qemu-options.hx
> index 5c1b163fb5..2b04b9f170 100644
> --- a/qemu-options.hx
> +++ b/qemu-options.hx
> @@ -4018,6 +4018,7 @@ ETEXI
>
> DEF("sandbox", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_sandbox, \
> "-sandbox on[,obsolete=allow|deny][,elevateprivileges=allow|deny|children]\n" \
> + " [,spawn=allow|deny]\n" \
> " Enable seccomp mode 2 system call filter (default 'off').\n" \
> " use 'obsolete' to allow obsolete system calls that are provided\n" \
> " by the kernel, but typically no longer used by modern\n" \
> @@ -4025,10 +4026,12 @@ DEF("sandbox", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_sandbox, \
> " use 'elevateprivileges' to allow or deny QEMU process to elevate\n" \
> " its privileges by blacklisting all set*uid|gid system calls.\n" \
> " The value 'children' will deny set*uid|gid system calls for\n" \
> - " main QEMU process but will allow forks and execves to run unprivileged\n",
> + " main QEMU process but will allow forks and execves to run unprivileged\n" \
> + " use 'spawn' to avoid QEMU to spawn new threads or processes by\n" \
> + " blacklisting *fork and execve\n",
> QEMU_ARCH_ALL)
> STEXI
> -@item -sandbox @var{arg}[,obsolete=@var{string}][,elevateprivileges=@var{string}]
> +@item -sandbox @var{arg}[,obsolete=@var{string}][,elevateprivileges=@var{string}][,spawn=@var{string}]
> @findex -sandbox
> Enable Seccomp mode 2 system call filter. 'on' will enable syscall filtering and 'off' will
> disable it. The default is 'off'.
> @@ -4037,6 +4040,8 @@ disable it. The default is 'off'.
> Enable Obsolete system calls
> @item elevateprivileges=@var{string}
> Disable set*uid|gid system calls
> +@item spawn=@var{string}
> +Disable *fork and execve
> @end table
> ETEXI
>
> diff --git a/qemu-seccomp.c b/qemu-seccomp.c
> index 2bad16cafb..4c169febf8 100644
> --- a/qemu-seccomp.c
> +++ b/qemu-seccomp.c
> @@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ static const struct QemuSeccompSyscall blacklist[] = {
> { SCMP_SYS(setresgid), 4, QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
> { SCMP_SYS(setfsuid), 4, QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
> { SCMP_SYS(setfsgid), 4, QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_PRIVILEGED },
> + /* spawn */
> + { SCMP_SYS(fork), 8, QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_SPAWN },
> + { SCMP_SYS(vfork), 8, QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_SPAWN },
> + { SCMP_SYS(execve), 8, QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_SPAWN },
> };
>
>
> @@ -109,6 +113,14 @@ int seccomp_start(uint32_t seccomp_opts)
> }
>
> break;
> + case QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_SPAWN:
> + if (seccomp_opts & QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_SPAWN) {
> + break;
> + } else {
> + continue;
> + }
> +
Remove the above empty line?
Anyway, it's somewhat ugly that you need a switch-case statement here at
all. Couldn't you simply check it like this:
if (!(seccomp_opts & blacklist[i].set)) {
continue;
}
?
You then just have to invert the meaning of the
QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE bit in the second patch, so that this bit is
treated in the same way as the others (i.e. use
uint32_t seccomp_opts = QEMU_SECCOMP_SET_OBSOLETE;
instead of
uint32_t seccomp_opts = 0x00000;
in vl.c in the second patch).
Thomas
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-08 9:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-08 9:10 [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv5 0/6] seccomp: feature refactoring Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-08 9:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv5 1/5] seccomp: changing from whitelist to blacklist Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-08 9:31 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2017-09-08 9:43 ` Thomas Huth
2017-09-08 9:50 ` Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-08 9:52 ` Thomas Huth
2017-09-08 10:57 ` Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-08 9:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv5 2/5] seccomp: add obsolete argument to command line Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-08 9:31 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2017-09-08 9:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv5 3/5] seccomp: add elevateprivileges " Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-08 9:32 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2017-09-08 9:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv5 4/5] seccomp: add spawn " Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-08 9:33 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2017-09-08 9:50 ` Thomas Huth [this message]
2017-09-08 11:15 ` Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-08 11:31 ` Thomas Huth
2017-09-08 9:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv5 5/5] seccomp: add resourcecontrol " Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-08 9:33 ` Daniel P. Berrange
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=2ebb2804-a613-0942-ee9b-aa900093ac98@redhat.com \
--to=thuth@redhat.com \
--cc=otubo@redhat.com \
--cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).