[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 00/13] Fix VNC server unbounded memory usage

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 00/13] Fix VNC server unbounded memory usage

[Daniel P. Berrange]

In the 2.11 release we fixed CVE-2017-15268, which allowed the VNC websockets
server to consume arbitrary memory when a slow client was connected. I have
since discovered that this same type of problem can be triggered in several
other ways in the regular (non-websockets) VNC server. This patch series
attempts to fix this problem by limiting framebuffer updates and other data
sent from server to client. The mitigating factor is that you need to have
successfully authenticated with the VNC server to trigger these new flaws.
This new more general flaw is assigned CVE-2017-15124 by the Red Hat security
team.

The key patches containing the security fix are 9, 10, 11.

Since this code is incredibly subtle & hard to understand though, the first
8 patches do a bunch of independant cleanups/refactoring to make the security
fixes clearer.  The last two patches are just some extra cleanup / help for
future maint.

Daniel P. Berrange (13):
  ui: remove 'sync' parametr from vnc_update_client
  ui: remove unreachable code in vnc_update_client
  ui: remove redundant indentation in vnc_client_update
  ui: avoid pointless VNC updates if framebuffer isn't dirty
  ui: track how much decoded data we consumed when doing SASL encoding
  ui: introduce enum to track VNC client framebuffer update request
    state
  ui: correctly reset framebuffer update state after processing dirty
    regions
  ui: refactor code for determining if an update should be sent to the
    client
  ui: fix VNC client throttling when audio capture is active
  ui: fix VNC client throttling when forced update is requested
  ui: place a hard cap on VNC server output buffer size
  ui: add trace events related to VNC client throttling
  ui: mix misleading comments & return types of VNC I/O helper methods

 ui/trace-events    |   7 ++
 ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c |  16 ++-
 ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h |   5 +-
 ui/vnc-jobs.c      |   5 +
 ui/vnc.c           | 320 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 ui/vnc.h           |  28 ++++-
 6 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)

-- 
2.14.3

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 01/13] ui: remove 'sync' parametr from vnc_update_client

[Daniel P. Berrange]

There is only one caller of vnc_update_client and that always passes false
for the 'sync' parameter.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc.c | 11 +++--------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index 9f8d5a1b1f..7ba3297dfa 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ VncInfo2List *qmp_query_vnc_servers(Error **errp)
    3) resolutions > 1024
 */
 
-static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync);
+static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty);
 static void vnc_disconnect_start(VncState *vs);
 
 static void vnc_colordepth(VncState *vs);
@@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ static int find_and_clear_dirty_height(VncState *vs,
     return h;
 }
 
-static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync)
+static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
 {
     if (vs->disconnecting) {
         vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
@@ -1025,9 +1025,6 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync)
         }
 
         vnc_job_push(job);
-        if (sync) {
-            vnc_jobs_join(vs);
-        }
         vs->force_update = 0;
         vs->has_dirty = 0;
         return n;
@@ -1035,8 +1032,6 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync)
 
     if (vs->disconnecting) {
         vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
-    } else if (sync) {
-        vnc_jobs_join(vs);
     }
 
     return 0;
@@ -2863,7 +2858,7 @@ static void vnc_refresh(DisplayChangeListener *dcl)
     vnc_unlock_display(vd);
 
     QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(vs, &vd->clients, next, vn) {
-        rects += vnc_update_client(vs, has_dirty, false);
+        rects += vnc_update_client(vs, has_dirty);
         /* vs might be free()ed here */
     }
 
-- 
2.14.3

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 01/13] ui: remove 'sync' parametr from vnc_update_client

[Daniel P. Berrange]

Just cc'ing  qemu-devel back on the mail since it was accidentally dropped.

On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 07:26:29AM +0000, Darren Kenny wrote:
> Small nit on the subject s/parametr/parameter/
> 
> Otherwise, looks good.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Darren.
> 
> On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 07:12:16PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> > There is only one caller of vnc_update_client and that always passes false
> > for the 'sync' parameter.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > ui/vnc.c | 11 +++--------
> > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
> > index 9f8d5a1b1f..7ba3297dfa 100644
> > --- a/ui/vnc.c
> > +++ b/ui/vnc.c
> > @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ VncInfo2List *qmp_query_vnc_servers(Error **errp)
> >    3) resolutions > 1024
> > */
> > 
> > -static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync);
> > +static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty);
> > static void vnc_disconnect_start(VncState *vs);
> > 
> > static void vnc_colordepth(VncState *vs);
> > @@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ static int find_and_clear_dirty_height(VncState *vs,
> >     return h;
> > }
> > 
> > -static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync)
> > +static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
> > {
> >     if (vs->disconnecting) {
> >         vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
> > @@ -1025,9 +1025,6 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync)
> >         }
> > 
> >         vnc_job_push(job);
> > -        if (sync) {
> > -            vnc_jobs_join(vs);
> > -        }
> >         vs->force_update = 0;
> >         vs->has_dirty = 0;
> >         return n;
> > @@ -1035,8 +1032,6 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty, bool sync)
> > 
> >     if (vs->disconnecting) {
> >         vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
> > -    } else if (sync) {
> > -        vnc_jobs_join(vs);
> >     }
> > 
> >     return 0;
> > @@ -2863,7 +2858,7 @@ static void vnc_refresh(DisplayChangeListener *dcl)
> >     vnc_unlock_display(vd);
> > 
> >     QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(vs, &vd->clients, next, vn) {
> > -        rects += vnc_update_client(vs, has_dirty, false);
> > +        rects += vnc_update_client(vs, has_dirty);
> >         /* vs might be free()ed here */
> >     }
> > 
> > -- 
> > 2.14.3
> > 
> > 

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 01/13] ui: remove 'sync' parametr from vnc_update_client

[Gerd Hoffmann]

On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 07:12:16PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> There is only one caller of vnc_update_client and that always passes false
> for the 'sync' parameter.

Unused since commit 50628d3479e4f9aa97e323506856e394fe7ad7a6.
Good catch.

What is the state of this series btw (/me busy wading through my
email backlog ...) ?

cheers,
  Gerd

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 01/13] ui: remove 'sync' parametr from vnc_update_client

[Daniel P. Berrange]

On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 12:08:49PM +0100, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 07:12:16PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> > There is only one caller of vnc_update_client and that always passes false
> > for the 'sync' parameter.
> 
> Unused since commit 50628d3479e4f9aa97e323506856e394fe7ad7a6.
> Good catch.
> 
> What is the state of this series btw (/me busy wading through my
> email backlog ...) ?

Marc-André reviewed it, but I was assuming you would want to review and
(if acceptable) queue it, since you're the designated VNC maintainer.
There's just one nit-pick in the Subject of this mail so far.

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 01/13] ui: remove 'sync' parametr from vnc_update_client

[Gerd Hoffmann]

> > What is the state of this series btw (/me busy wading through my
> > email backlog ...) ?
> 
> Marc-André reviewed it, but I was assuming you would want to review and
> (if acceptable) queue it, since you're the designated VNC maintainer.
> There's just one nit-pick in the Subject of this mail so far.

Ok, queued, fixed $subject tyops, test builds running ...

thanks,
  Gerd

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 02/13] ui: remove unreachable code in vnc_update_client

[Daniel P. Berrange]

A previous commit:

  commit 5a8be0f73d6f60ff08746377eb09ca459f39deab
  Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
  Date:   Wed Jul 13 12:21:20 2016 +0200

    vnc: make sure we finish disconnect

Added a check for vs->disconnecting at the very start of the
vnc_update_client method. This means that the very next "if"
statement check for !vs->disconnecting always evaluates true,
and is thus redundant. This in turn means the vs->disconnecting
check at the very end of the method never evaluates true, and
is thus unreachable code.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc.c | 6 +-----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index 7ba3297dfa..869c75bbcf 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
     }
 
     vs->has_dirty += has_dirty;
-    if (vs->need_update && !vs->disconnecting) {
+    if (vs->need_update) {
         VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
         VncJob *job;
         int y;
@@ -1030,10 +1030,6 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
         return n;
     }
 
-    if (vs->disconnecting) {
-        vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
-    }
-
     return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.14.3

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 03/13] ui: remove redundant indentation in vnc_client_update

[Daniel P. Berrange]

Now that previous dead / unreachable code has been removed, we can simplify
the indentation in the vnc_client_update method.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index 869c75bbcf..a61fcbd20c 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -963,74 +963,76 @@ static int find_and_clear_dirty_height(VncState *vs,
 
 static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
 {
+    VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
+    VncJob *job;
+    int y;
+    int height, width;
+    int n = 0;
+
     if (vs->disconnecting) {
         vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
         return 0;
     }
 
     vs->has_dirty += has_dirty;
-    if (vs->need_update) {
-        VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
-        VncJob *job;
-        int y;
-        int height, width;
-        int n = 0;
-
-        if (vs->output.offset && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update)
-            /* kernel send buffers are full -> drop frames to throttle */
-            return 0;
+    if (!vs->need_update) {
+        return 0;
+    }
 
-        if (!vs->has_dirty && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update)
-            return 0;
+    if (vs->output.offset && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update) {
+        /* kernel send buffers are full -> drop frames to throttle */
+        return 0;
+    }
 
-        /*
-         * Send screen updates to the vnc client using the server
-         * surface and server dirty map.  guest surface updates
-         * happening in parallel don't disturb us, the next pass will
-         * send them to the client.
-         */
-        job = vnc_job_new(vs);
-
-        height = pixman_image_get_height(vd->server);
-        width = pixman_image_get_width(vd->server);
-
-        y = 0;
-        for (;;) {
-            int x, h;
-            unsigned long x2;
-            unsigned long offset = find_next_bit((unsigned long *) &vs->dirty,
-                                                 height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs),
-                                                 y * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs));
-            if (offset == height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs)) {
-                /* no more dirty bits */
+    if (!vs->has_dirty && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Send screen updates to the vnc client using the server
+     * surface and server dirty map.  guest surface updates
+     * happening in parallel don't disturb us, the next pass will
+     * send them to the client.
+     */
+    job = vnc_job_new(vs);
+
+    height = pixman_image_get_height(vd->server);
+    width = pixman_image_get_width(vd->server);
+
+    y = 0;
+    for (;;) {
+        int x, h;
+        unsigned long x2;
+        unsigned long offset = find_next_bit((unsigned long *) &vs->dirty,
+                                             height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs),
+                                             y * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs));
+        if (offset == height * VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs)) {
+            /* no more dirty bits */
+            break;
+        }
+        y = offset / VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs);
+        x = offset % VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs);
+        x2 = find_next_zero_bit((unsigned long *) &vs->dirty[y],
+                                VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs), x);
+        bitmap_clear(vs->dirty[y], x, x2 - x);
+        h = find_and_clear_dirty_height(vs, y, x, x2, height);
+        x2 = MIN(x2, width / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
+        if (x2 > x) {
+            n += vnc_job_add_rect(job, x * VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT, y,
+                                  (x2 - x) * VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT, h);
+        }
+        if (!x && x2 == width / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT) {
+            y += h;
+            if (y == height) {
                 break;
             }
-            y = offset / VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs);
-            x = offset % VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs);
-            x2 = find_next_zero_bit((unsigned long *) &vs->dirty[y],
-                                    VNC_DIRTY_BPL(vs), x);
-            bitmap_clear(vs->dirty[y], x, x2 - x);
-            h = find_and_clear_dirty_height(vs, y, x, x2, height);
-            x2 = MIN(x2, width / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
-            if (x2 > x) {
-                n += vnc_job_add_rect(job, x * VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT, y,
-                                      (x2 - x) * VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT, h);
-            }
-            if (!x && x2 == width / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT) {
-                y += h;
-                if (y == height) {
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
         }
-
-        vnc_job_push(job);
-        vs->force_update = 0;
-        vs->has_dirty = 0;
-        return n;
     }
 
-    return 0;
+    vnc_job_push(job);
+    vs->force_update = 0;
+    vs->has_dirty = 0;
+    return n;
 }
 
 /* audio */
-- 
2.14.3

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 04/13] ui: avoid pointless VNC updates if framebuffer isn't dirty

[Daniel P. Berrange]

The vnc_update_client() method checks the 'has_dirty' flag to see if there are
dirty regions that are pending to send to the client. Regardless of this flag,
if a forced update is requested, updates must be sent. For unknown reasons
though, the code also tries to sent updates if audio capture is enabled. This
makes no sense as audio capture state does not impact framebuffer contents, so
this check is removed.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index a61fcbd20c..f53eddb8e5 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (!vs->has_dirty && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update) {
+    if (!vs->has_dirty && !vs->force_update) {
         return 0;
     }
 
-- 
2.14.3

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 05/13] ui: track how much decoded data we consumed when doing SASL encoding

[Daniel P. Berrange]

When we encode data for writing with SASL, we encode the entire pending output
buffer. The subsequent write, however, may not be able to send the full encoded
data in one go though, particularly with a slow network. So we delay setting the
output buffer offset back to zero until all the SASL encoded data is sent.

Between encoding the data and completing sending of the SASL encoded data,
however, more data might have been placed on the pending output buffer. So it
is not valid to set offset back to zero. Instead we must keep track of how much
data we consumed during encoding and subtract only that amount.

With the current bug we would be throwing away some pending data without having
sent it at all. By sheer luck this did not previously cause any serious problem
because appending data to the send buffer is always an atomic action, so we
only ever throw away complete RFB protocol messages. In the case of frame buffer
updates we'd catch up fairly quickly, so no obvious problem was visible.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 3 ++-
 ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
index 23f28280e7..761493b9b2 100644
--- a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
+++ b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ long vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs)
         if (err != SASL_OK)
             return vnc_client_io_error(vs, -1, NULL);
 
+        vs->sasl.encodedRawLength = vs->output.offset;
         vs->sasl.encodedOffset = 0;
     }
 
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ long vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs)
 
     vs->sasl.encodedOffset += ret;
     if (vs->sasl.encodedOffset == vs->sasl.encodedLength) {
-        vs->output.offset = 0;
+        vs->output.offset -= vs->sasl.encodedRawLength;
         vs->sasl.encoded = NULL;
         vs->sasl.encodedOffset = vs->sasl.encodedLength = 0;
     }
diff --git a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h
index cb42745a6b..b9d8de1c10 100644
--- a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h
+++ b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct VncStateSASL {
      */
     const uint8_t *encoded;
     unsigned int encodedLength;
+    unsigned int encodedRawLength;
     unsigned int encodedOffset;
     char *username;
     char *mechlist;
-- 
2.14.3

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 06/13] ui: introduce enum to track VNC client framebuffer update request state

[Daniel P. Berrange]

Currently the VNC servers tracks whether a client has requested an incremental
or forced update with two boolean flags. There are only really 3 distinct
states to track, so create an enum to more accurately reflect permitted states.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
 ui/vnc.h |  9 +++++++--
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index f53eddb8e5..d3b04f1166 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -975,16 +975,17 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
     }
 
     vs->has_dirty += has_dirty;
-    if (!vs->need_update) {
+    if (vs->update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE) {
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (vs->output.offset && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update) {
+    if (vs->output.offset && !vs->audio_cap &&
+        vs->update != VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE) {
         /* kernel send buffers are full -> drop frames to throttle */
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (!vs->has_dirty && !vs->force_update) {
+    if (!vs->has_dirty && vs->update != VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE) {
         return 0;
     }
 
@@ -1030,7 +1031,7 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
     }
 
     vnc_job_push(job);
-    vs->force_update = 0;
+    vs->update = VNC_STATE_UPDATE_INCREMENTAL;
     vs->has_dirty = 0;
     return n;
 }
@@ -1869,14 +1870,14 @@ static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, int down,
 static void framebuffer_update_request(VncState *vs, int incremental,
                                        int x, int y, int w, int h)
 {
-    vs->need_update = 1;
-
     if (incremental) {
-        return;
+        if (vs->update != VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE) {
+            vs->update = VNC_STATE_UPDATE_INCREMENTAL;
+        }
+    } else {
+        vs->update = VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE;
+        vnc_set_area_dirty(vs->dirty, vs->vd, x, y, w, h);
     }
-
-    vs->force_update = 1;
-    vnc_set_area_dirty(vs->dirty, vs->vd, x, y, w, h);
 }
 
 static void send_ext_key_event_ack(VncState *vs)
diff --git a/ui/vnc.h b/ui/vnc.h
index 694cf32ca9..b9d310e640 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.h
+++ b/ui/vnc.h
@@ -252,6 +252,12 @@ struct VncJob
     QTAILQ_ENTRY(VncJob) next;
 };
 
+typedef enum {
+    VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE,
+    VNC_STATE_UPDATE_INCREMENTAL,
+    VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE,
+} VncStateUpdate;
+
 struct VncState
 {
     QIOChannelSocket *sioc; /* The underlying socket */
@@ -264,8 +270,7 @@ struct VncState
                            * vnc-jobs-async.c */
 
     VncDisplay *vd;
-    int need_update;
-    int force_update;
+    VncStateUpdate update; /* Most recent pending request from client */
     int has_dirty;
     uint32_t features;
     int absolute;
-- 
2.14.3

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 07/13] ui: correctly reset framebuffer update state after processing dirty regions

[Daniel P. Berrange]

According to the RFB protocol, a client sends one or more framebuffer update
requests to the server. The server can reply with a single framebuffer update
response, that covers all previously received requests. Once the client has
read this update from the server, it may send further framebuffer update
requests to monitor future changes. The client is free to delay sending the
framebuffer update request if it needs to throttle the amount of data it is
reading from the server.

The QEMU VNC server, however, has never correctly handled the framebuffer
update requests. Once QEMU has received an update request, it will continue to
send client updates forever, even if the client hasn't asked for further
updates. This prevents the client from throttling back data it gets from the
server. This change fixes the flawed logic such that after a set of updates are
sent out, QEMU waits for a further update request before sending more data.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index d3b04f1166..51fbf0449d 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
     }
 
     vnc_job_push(job);
-    vs->update = VNC_STATE_UPDATE_INCREMENTAL;
+    vs->update = VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE;
     vs->has_dirty = 0;
     return n;
 }
-- 
2.14.3

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 08/13] ui: refactor code for determining if an update should be sent to the client

[Daniel P. Berrange]

The logic for determining if it is possible to send an update to the client
will become more complicated shortly, so pull it out into a separate method
for easier extension later.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index 51fbf0449d..6ae002cd36 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -961,6 +961,25 @@ static int find_and_clear_dirty_height(VncState *vs,
     return h;
 }
 
+static bool vnc_should_update(VncState *vs)
+{
+    switch (vs->update) {
+    case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE:
+        break;
+    case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_INCREMENTAL:
+        /* Only allow incremental updates if the output buffer
+         * is empty, or if audio capture is enabled.
+         */
+        if (!vs->output.offset || vs->audio_cap) {
+            return true;
+        }
+        break;
+    case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE:
+        return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+
 static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
 {
     VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
@@ -975,13 +994,7 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
     }
 
     vs->has_dirty += has_dirty;
-    if (vs->update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (vs->output.offset && !vs->audio_cap &&
-        vs->update != VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE) {
-        /* kernel send buffers are full -> drop frames to throttle */
+    if (!vnc_should_update(vs)) {
         return 0;
     }
 
-- 
2.14.3

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 09/13] ui: fix VNC client throttling when audio capture is active

[Daniel P. Berrange]

The VNC server must throttle data sent to the client to prevent the 'output'
buffer size growing without bound, if the client stops reading data off the
socket (either maliciously or due to stalled/slow network connection).

The current throttling is very crude because it simply checks whether the
output buffer offset is zero. This check must be disabled if audio capture is
enabled, because when streaming audio the output buffer offset will rarely be
zero due to queued audio data, and so this would starve framebuffer updates.

As a result, the VNC client can cause QEMU to allocate arbitrary amounts of RAM.
They can first start something in the guest that triggers lots of framebuffer
updates eg play a youtube video. Then enable audio capture, and simply never
read data back from the server. This can easily make QEMU's VNC server send
buffer consume 100MB of RAM per second, until the OOM killer starts reaping
processes (hopefully the rogue QEMU process, but it might pick others...).

To address this we make the throttling more intelligent, so we can throttle
when audio capture is active too. To determine how to throttle incremental
updates or audio data, we calculate a size threshold. Normally the threshold is
the approximate number of bytes associated with a single complete framebuffer
update. ie width * height * bytes per pixel. We'll send incremental updates
until we hit this threshold, at which point we'll stop sending updates until
data has been written to the wire, causing the output buffer offset to fall
back below the threshold.

If audio capture is enabled, we increase the size of the threshold to also
allow for upto 1 seconds worth of audio data samples. ie nchannels * bytes
per sample * frequency. This allows the output buffer to have a mixture of
incremental framebuffer updates and audio data queued, but once the threshold
is exceeded, audio data will be dropped and incremental updates will be
throttled.

This unbounded memory growth affects all VNC server configurations supported by
QEMU, with no workaround possible. The mitigating factor is that it can only be
triggered by a client that has authenticated with the VNC server, and who is
able to trigger a large quantity of framebuffer updates or audio samples from
the guest OS. Mostly they'll just succeed in getting the OOM killer to kill
their own QEMU process, but its possible other processes can get taken out as
collateral damage.

This is a more general variant of the similar unbounded memory usage flaw in
the websockets server, that was previously assigned CVE-2017-15268, and fixed
in 2.11 by:

  commit a7b20a8efa28e5f22c26c06cd06c2f12bc863493
  Author: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
  Date:   Mon Oct 9 14:43:42 2017 +0100

    io: monitor encoutput buffer size from websocket GSource

This new general memory usage flaw has been assigned CVE-2017-15124, and is
partially fixed by this patch.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 ui/vnc.h |  6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index 6ae002cd36..a2699f534d 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static QTAILQ_HEAD(, VncDisplay) vnc_displays =
 
 static int vnc_cursor_define(VncState *vs);
 static void vnc_release_modifiers(VncState *vs);
+static void vnc_update_throttle_offset(VncState *vs);
 
 static void vnc_set_share_mode(VncState *vs, VncShareMode mode)
 {
@@ -766,6 +767,7 @@ static void vnc_dpy_switch(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
         vnc_set_area_dirty(vs->dirty, vd, 0, 0,
                            vnc_width(vd),
                            vnc_height(vd));
+        vnc_update_throttle_offset(vs);
     }
 }
 
@@ -961,16 +963,67 @@ static int find_and_clear_dirty_height(VncState *vs,
     return h;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Figure out how much pending data we should allow in the output
+ * buffer before we throttle incremental display updates, and/or
+ * drop audio samples.
+ *
+ * We allow for equiv of 1 full display's worth of FB updates,
+ * and 1 second of audio samples. If audio backlog was larger
+ * than that the client would already suffering awful audio
+ * glitches, so dropping samples is no worse really).
+ */
+static void vnc_update_throttle_offset(VncState *vs)
+{
+    size_t offset =
+        vs->client_width * vs->client_height * vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel;
+
+    if (vs->audio_cap) {
+        int freq = vs->as.freq;
+        /* We don't limit freq when reading settings from client, so
+         * it could be upto MAX_INT in size. 48khz is a sensible
+         * upper bound for trustworthy clients */
+        int bps;
+        if (freq > 48000) {
+            freq = 48000;
+        }
+        switch (vs->as.fmt) {
+        default:
+        case  AUD_FMT_U8:
+        case  AUD_FMT_S8:
+            bps = 1;
+            break;
+        case  AUD_FMT_U16:
+        case  AUD_FMT_S16:
+            bps = 2;
+            break;
+        case  AUD_FMT_U32:
+        case  AUD_FMT_S32:
+            bps = 4;
+            break;
+        }
+        offset += freq * bps * vs->as.nchannels;
+    }
+
+    /* Put a floor of 1MB on offset, so that if we have a large pending
+     * buffer and the display is resized to a small size & back again
+     * we don't suddenly apply a tiny send limit
+     */
+    offset = MAX(offset, 1024 * 1024);
+
+    vs->throttle_output_offset = offset;
+}
+
 static bool vnc_should_update(VncState *vs)
 {
     switch (vs->update) {
     case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE:
         break;
     case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_INCREMENTAL:
-        /* Only allow incremental updates if the output buffer
-         * is empty, or if audio capture is enabled.
+        /* Only allow incremental updates if the pending send queue
+         * is less than the permitted threshold
          */
-        if (!vs->output.offset || vs->audio_cap) {
+        if (vs->output.offset < vs->throttle_output_offset) {
             return true;
         }
         break;
@@ -1084,11 +1137,13 @@ static void audio_capture(void *opaque, void *buf, int size)
     VncState *vs = opaque;
 
     vnc_lock_output(vs);
-    vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU);
-    vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO);
-    vnc_write_u16(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO_DATA);
-    vnc_write_u32(vs, size);
-    vnc_write(vs, buf, size);
+    if (vs->output.offset < vs->throttle_output_offset) {
+        vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU);
+        vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO);
+        vnc_write_u16(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO_DATA);
+        vnc_write_u32(vs, size);
+        vnc_write(vs, buf, size);
+    }
     vnc_unlock_output(vs);
     vnc_flush(vs);
 }
@@ -2288,6 +2343,7 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
         break;
     }
 
+    vnc_update_throttle_offset(vs);
     vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_msg, 1);
     return 0;
 }
diff --git a/ui/vnc.h b/ui/vnc.h
index b9d310e640..8fe69595c6 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.h
+++ b/ui/vnc.h
@@ -298,6 +298,12 @@ struct VncState
 
     VncClientInfo *info;
 
+    /* We allow multiple incremental updates or audio capture
+     * samples to be queued in output buffer, provided the
+     * buffer size doesn't exceed this threshold. The value
+     * is calculating dynamically based on framebuffer size
+     * and audio sample settings in vnc_update_throttle_offset() */
+    size_t throttle_output_offset;
     Buffer output;
     Buffer input;
     /* current output mode information */
-- 
2.14.3

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 10/13] ui: fix VNC client throttling when forced update is requested

[Daniel P. Berrange]

The VNC server must throttle data sent to the client to prevent the 'output'
buffer size growing without bound, if the client stops reading data off the
socket (either maliciously or due to stalled/slow network connection).

The current throttling is very crude because it simply checks whether the
output buffer offset is zero. This check is disabled if the client has requested
a forced update, because we want to send these as soon as possible.

As a result, the VNC client can cause QEMU to allocate arbitrary amounts of RAM.
They can first start something in the guest that triggers lots of framebuffer
updates eg play a youtube video. Then repeatedly send full framebuffer update
requests, but never read data back from the server. This can easily make QEMU's
VNC server send buffer consume 100MB of RAM per second, until the OOM killer
starts reaping processes (hopefully the rogue QEMU process, but it might pick
others...).

To address this we make the throttling more intelligent, so we can throttle
full updates. When we get a forced update request, we keep track of exactly how
much data we put on the output buffer. We will not process a subsequent forced
update request until this data has been fully sent on the wire. We always allow
one forced update request to be in flight, regardless of what data is queued
for incremental updates or audio data. The slight complication is that we do
not initially know how much data an update will send, as this is done in the
background by the VNC job thread. So we must track the fact that the job thread
has an update pending, and not process any further updates until this job is
has been completed & put data on the output buffer.

This unbounded memory growth affects all VNC server configurations supported by
QEMU, with no workaround possible. The mitigating factor is that it can only be
triggered by a client that has authenticated with the VNC server, and who is
able to trigger a large quantity of framebuffer updates or audio samples from
the guest OS. Mostly they'll just succeed in getting the OOM killer to kill
their own QEMU process, but its possible other processes can get taken out as
collateral damage.

This is a more general variant of the similar unbounded memory usage flaw in
the websockets server, that was previously assigned CVE-2017-15268, and fixed
in 2.11 by:

  commit a7b20a8efa28e5f22c26c06cd06c2f12bc863493
  Author: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
  Date:   Mon Oct 9 14:43:42 2017 +0100

    io: monitor encoutput buffer size from websocket GSource

This new general memory usage flaw has been assigned CVE-2017-15124, and is
partially fixed by this patch.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c |  5 +++++
 ui/vnc-jobs.c      |  5 +++++
 ui/vnc.c           | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 ui/vnc.h           |  7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
index 761493b9b2..8c1cdde3db 100644
--- a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
+++ b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ long vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs)
 
     vs->sasl.encodedOffset += ret;
     if (vs->sasl.encodedOffset == vs->sasl.encodedLength) {
+        if (vs->sasl.encodedRawLength >= vs->force_update_offset) {
+            vs->force_update_offset = 0;
+        } else {
+            vs->force_update_offset -= vs->sasl.encodedRawLength;
+        }
         vs->output.offset -= vs->sasl.encodedRawLength;
         vs->sasl.encoded = NULL;
         vs->sasl.encodedOffset = vs->sasl.encodedLength = 0;
diff --git a/ui/vnc-jobs.c b/ui/vnc-jobs.c
index f7867771ae..e326679dd0 100644
--- a/ui/vnc-jobs.c
+++ b/ui/vnc-jobs.c
@@ -152,6 +152,11 @@ void vnc_jobs_consume_buffer(VncState *vs)
                 vs->ioc, G_IO_IN | G_IO_OUT, vnc_client_io, vs, NULL);
         }
         buffer_move(&vs->output, &vs->jobs_buffer);
+
+        if (vs->job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE) {
+            vs->force_update_offset = vs->output.offset;
+        }
+        vs->job_update = VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE;
     }
     flush = vs->ioc != NULL && vs->abort != true;
     vnc_unlock_output(vs);
diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index a2699f534d..4021c0118c 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -1021,14 +1021,28 @@ static bool vnc_should_update(VncState *vs)
         break;
     case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_INCREMENTAL:
         /* Only allow incremental updates if the pending send queue
-         * is less than the permitted threshold
+         * is less than the permitted threshold, and the job worker
+         * is completely idle.
          */
-        if (vs->output.offset < vs->throttle_output_offset) {
+        if (vs->output.offset < vs->throttle_output_offset &&
+            vs->job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE) {
             return true;
         }
         break;
     case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE:
-        return true;
+        /* Only allow forced updates if the pending send queue
+         * does not contain a previous forced update, and the
+         * job worker is completely idle.
+         *
+         * Note this means we'll queue a forced update, even if
+         * the output buffer size is otherwise over the throttle
+         * output limit.
+         */
+        if (vs->force_update_offset == 0 &&
+            vs->job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE) {
+            return true;
+        }
+        break;
     }
     return false;
 }
@@ -1096,8 +1110,9 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
         }
     }
 
-    vnc_job_push(job);
+    vs->job_update = vs->update;
     vs->update = VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE;
+    vnc_job_push(job);
     vs->has_dirty = 0;
     return n;
 }
@@ -1332,6 +1347,11 @@ static ssize_t vnc_client_write_plain(VncState *vs)
     if (!ret)
         return 0;
 
+    if (ret >= vs->force_update_offset) {
+        vs->force_update_offset = 0;
+    } else {
+        vs->force_update_offset -= ret;
+    }
     buffer_advance(&vs->output, ret);
 
     if (vs->output.offset == 0) {
diff --git a/ui/vnc.h b/ui/vnc.h
index 8fe69595c6..3f4cd4d93d 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.h
+++ b/ui/vnc.h
@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ struct VncState
 
     VncDisplay *vd;
     VncStateUpdate update; /* Most recent pending request from client */
+    VncStateUpdate job_update; /* Currently processed by job thread */
     int has_dirty;
     uint32_t features;
     int absolute;
@@ -298,6 +299,12 @@ struct VncState
 
     VncClientInfo *info;
 
+    /* Job thread bottom half has put data for a forced update
+     * into the output buffer. This offset points to the end of
+     * the update data in the output buffer. This lets us determine
+     * when a force update is fully sent to the client, allowing
+     * us to process further forced updates. */
+    size_t force_update_offset;
     /* We allow multiple incremental updates or audio capture
      * samples to be queued in output buffer, provided the
      * buffer size doesn't exceed this threshold. The value
-- 
2.14.3

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 10/13] ui: fix VNC client throttling when forced update is requested

[Marc-André Lureau]

Hi

On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 8:12 PM, Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
> The VNC server must throttle data sent to the client to prevent the 'output'
> buffer size growing without bound, if the client stops reading data off the
> socket (either maliciously or due to stalled/slow network connection).
>
> The current throttling is very crude because it simply checks whether the
> output buffer offset is zero. This check is disabled if the client has requested
> a forced update, because we want to send these as soon as possible.
>
> As a result, the VNC client can cause QEMU to allocate arbitrary amounts of RAM.
> They can first start something in the guest that triggers lots of framebuffer
> updates eg play a youtube video. Then repeatedly send full framebuffer update
> requests, but never read data back from the server. This can easily make QEMU's
> VNC server send buffer consume 100MB of RAM per second, until the OOM killer
> starts reaping processes (hopefully the rogue QEMU process, but it might pick
> others...).
>
> To address this we make the throttling more intelligent, so we can throttle
> full updates. When we get a forced update request, we keep track of exactly how
> much data we put on the output buffer. We will not process a subsequent forced
> update request until this data has been fully sent on the wire. We always allow
> one forced update request to be in flight, regardless of what data is queued
> for incremental updates or audio data. The slight complication is that we do
> not initially know how much data an update will send, as this is done in the
> background by the VNC job thread. So we must track the fact that the job thread
> has an update pending, and not process any further updates until this job is
> has been completed & put data on the output buffer.
>
> This unbounded memory growth affects all VNC server configurations supported by
> QEMU, with no workaround possible. The mitigating factor is that it can only be
> triggered by a client that has authenticated with the VNC server, and who is
> able to trigger a large quantity of framebuffer updates or audio samples from
> the guest OS. Mostly they'll just succeed in getting the OOM killer to kill
> their own QEMU process, but its possible other processes can get taken out as
> collateral damage.
>
> This is a more general variant of the similar unbounded memory usage flaw in
> the websockets server, that was previously assigned CVE-2017-15268, and fixed
> in 2.11 by:
>
>   commit a7b20a8efa28e5f22c26c06cd06c2f12bc863493
>   Author: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
>   Date:   Mon Oct 9 14:43:42 2017 +0100
>
>     io: monitor encoutput buffer size from websocket GSource
>
> This new general memory usage flaw has been assigned CVE-2017-15124, and is
> partially fixed by this patch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
> ---
>  ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c |  5 +++++
>  ui/vnc-jobs.c      |  5 +++++
>  ui/vnc.c           | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  ui/vnc.h           |  7 +++++++
>  4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
> index 761493b9b2..8c1cdde3db 100644
> --- a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
> +++ b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
> @@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ long vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs)
>
>      vs->sasl.encodedOffset += ret;
>      if (vs->sasl.encodedOffset == vs->sasl.encodedLength) {
> +        if (vs->sasl.encodedRawLength >= vs->force_update_offset) {
> +            vs->force_update_offset = 0;
> +        } else {
> +            vs->force_update_offset -= vs->sasl.encodedRawLength;
> +        }
>          vs->output.offset -= vs->sasl.encodedRawLength;
>          vs->sasl.encoded = NULL;
>          vs->sasl.encodedOffset = vs->sasl.encodedLength = 0;
> diff --git a/ui/vnc-jobs.c b/ui/vnc-jobs.c
> index f7867771ae..e326679dd0 100644
> --- a/ui/vnc-jobs.c
> +++ b/ui/vnc-jobs.c
> @@ -152,6 +152,11 @@ void vnc_jobs_consume_buffer(VncState *vs)
>                  vs->ioc, G_IO_IN | G_IO_OUT, vnc_client_io, vs, NULL);
>          }
>          buffer_move(&vs->output, &vs->jobs_buffer);
> +
> +        if (vs->job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE) {
> +            vs->force_update_offset = vs->output.offset;
> +        }
> +        vs->job_update = VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE;
>      }
>      flush = vs->ioc != NULL && vs->abort != true;
>      vnc_unlock_output(vs);
> diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
> index a2699f534d..4021c0118c 100644
> --- a/ui/vnc.c
> +++ b/ui/vnc.c
> @@ -1021,14 +1021,28 @@ static bool vnc_should_update(VncState *vs)
>          break;
>      case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_INCREMENTAL:
>          /* Only allow incremental updates if the pending send queue
> -         * is less than the permitted threshold
> +         * is less than the permitted threshold, and the job worker
> +         * is completely idle.
>           */
> -        if (vs->output.offset < vs->throttle_output_offset) {
> +        if (vs->output.offset < vs->throttle_output_offset &&
> +            vs->job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE) {
>              return true;
>          }
>          break;
>      case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE:
> -        return true;
> +        /* Only allow forced updates if the pending send queue
> +         * does not contain a previous forced update, and the
> +         * job worker is completely idle.
> +         *
> +         * Note this means we'll queue a forced update, even if
> +         * the output buffer size is otherwise over the throttle
> +         * output limit.
> +         */
> +        if (vs->force_update_offset == 0 &&
> +            vs->job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE) {
> +            return true;
> +        }
> +        break;
>      }
>      return false;
>  }
> @@ -1096,8 +1110,9 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
>          }
>      }
>
> -    vnc_job_push(job);
> +    vs->job_update = vs->update;

How is this going to match the buffer job in vnc_jobs_consume_buffer() ?

(isn't this potentially taking the next job to finish as a force-update?)

>      vs->update = VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE;
> +    vnc_job_push(job);
>      vs->has_dirty = 0;
>      return n;
>  }
> @@ -1332,6 +1347,11 @@ static ssize_t vnc_client_write_plain(VncState *vs)
>      if (!ret)
>          return 0;
>
> +    if (ret >= vs->force_update_offset) {
> +        vs->force_update_offset = 0;
> +    } else {
> +        vs->force_update_offset -= ret;
> +    }
>      buffer_advance(&vs->output, ret);
>
>      if (vs->output.offset == 0) {
> diff --git a/ui/vnc.h b/ui/vnc.h
> index 8fe69595c6..3f4cd4d93d 100644
> --- a/ui/vnc.h
> +++ b/ui/vnc.h
> @@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ struct VncState
>
>      VncDisplay *vd;
>      VncStateUpdate update; /* Most recent pending request from client */
> +    VncStateUpdate job_update; /* Currently processed by job thread */
>      int has_dirty;
>      uint32_t features;
>      int absolute;
> @@ -298,6 +299,12 @@ struct VncState
>
>      VncClientInfo *info;
>
> +    /* Job thread bottom half has put data for a forced update
> +     * into the output buffer. This offset points to the end of
> +     * the update data in the output buffer. This lets us determine
> +     * when a force update is fully sent to the client, allowing
> +     * us to process further forced updates. */
> +    size_t force_update_offset;
>      /* We allow multiple incremental updates or audio capture
>       * samples to be queued in output buffer, provided the
>       * buffer size doesn't exceed this threshold. The value
> --
> 2.14.3
>
>



-- 
Marc-André Lureau

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 10/13] ui: fix VNC client throttling when forced update is requested

[Daniel P. Berrange]

On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 06:57:23PM +0100, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
> Hi
> 
> On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 8:12 PM, Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
> > The VNC server must throttle data sent to the client to prevent the 'output'
> > buffer size growing without bound, if the client stops reading data off the
> > socket (either maliciously or due to stalled/slow network connection).
> >
> > The current throttling is very crude because it simply checks whether the
> > output buffer offset is zero. This check is disabled if the client has requested
> > a forced update, because we want to send these as soon as possible.
> >
> > As a result, the VNC client can cause QEMU to allocate arbitrary amounts of RAM.
> > They can first start something in the guest that triggers lots of framebuffer
> > updates eg play a youtube video. Then repeatedly send full framebuffer update
> > requests, but never read data back from the server. This can easily make QEMU's
> > VNC server send buffer consume 100MB of RAM per second, until the OOM killer
> > starts reaping processes (hopefully the rogue QEMU process, but it might pick
> > others...).
> >
> > To address this we make the throttling more intelligent, so we can throttle
> > full updates. When we get a forced update request, we keep track of exactly how
> > much data we put on the output buffer. We will not process a subsequent forced
> > update request until this data has been fully sent on the wire. We always allow
> > one forced update request to be in flight, regardless of what data is queued
> > for incremental updates or audio data. The slight complication is that we do
> > not initially know how much data an update will send, as this is done in the
> > background by the VNC job thread. So we must track the fact that the job thread
> > has an update pending, and not process any further updates until this job is
> > has been completed & put data on the output buffer.
> >
> > This unbounded memory growth affects all VNC server configurations supported by
> > QEMU, with no workaround possible. The mitigating factor is that it can only be
> > triggered by a client that has authenticated with the VNC server, and who is
> > able to trigger a large quantity of framebuffer updates or audio samples from
> > the guest OS. Mostly they'll just succeed in getting the OOM killer to kill
> > their own QEMU process, but its possible other processes can get taken out as
> > collateral damage.
> >
> > This is a more general variant of the similar unbounded memory usage flaw in
> > the websockets server, that was previously assigned CVE-2017-15268, and fixed
> > in 2.11 by:
> >
> >   commit a7b20a8efa28e5f22c26c06cd06c2f12bc863493
> >   Author: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
> >   Date:   Mon Oct 9 14:43:42 2017 +0100
> >
> >     io: monitor encoutput buffer size from websocket GSource
> >
> > This new general memory usage flaw has been assigned CVE-2017-15124, and is
> > partially fixed by this patch.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c |  5 +++++
> >  ui/vnc-jobs.c      |  5 +++++
> >  ui/vnc.c           | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> >  ui/vnc.h           |  7 +++++++
> >  4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
> > index 761493b9b2..8c1cdde3db 100644
> > --- a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
> > +++ b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
> > @@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ long vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs)
> >
> >      vs->sasl.encodedOffset += ret;
> >      if (vs->sasl.encodedOffset == vs->sasl.encodedLength) {
> > +        if (vs->sasl.encodedRawLength >= vs->force_update_offset) {
> > +            vs->force_update_offset = 0;
> > +        } else {
> > +            vs->force_update_offset -= vs->sasl.encodedRawLength;
> > +        }
> >          vs->output.offset -= vs->sasl.encodedRawLength;
> >          vs->sasl.encoded = NULL;
> >          vs->sasl.encodedOffset = vs->sasl.encodedLength = 0;
> > diff --git a/ui/vnc-jobs.c b/ui/vnc-jobs.c
> > index f7867771ae..e326679dd0 100644
> > --- a/ui/vnc-jobs.c
> > +++ b/ui/vnc-jobs.c
> > @@ -152,6 +152,11 @@ void vnc_jobs_consume_buffer(VncState *vs)
> >                  vs->ioc, G_IO_IN | G_IO_OUT, vnc_client_io, vs, NULL);
> >          }
> >          buffer_move(&vs->output, &vs->jobs_buffer);
> > +
> > +        if (vs->job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE) {
> > +            vs->force_update_offset = vs->output.offset;
> > +        }
> > +        vs->job_update = VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE;
> >      }
> >      flush = vs->ioc != NULL && vs->abort != true;
> >      vnc_unlock_output(vs);
> > diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
> > index a2699f534d..4021c0118c 100644
> > --- a/ui/vnc.c
> > +++ b/ui/vnc.c
> > @@ -1021,14 +1021,28 @@ static bool vnc_should_update(VncState *vs)
> >          break;
> >      case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_INCREMENTAL:
> >          /* Only allow incremental updates if the pending send queue
> > -         * is less than the permitted threshold
> > +         * is less than the permitted threshold, and the job worker
> > +         * is completely idle.
> >           */
> > -        if (vs->output.offset < vs->throttle_output_offset) {
> > +        if (vs->output.offset < vs->throttle_output_offset &&
> > +            vs->job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE) {
> >              return true;
> >          }
> >          break;
> >      case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE:
> > -        return true;
> > +        /* Only allow forced updates if the pending send queue
> > +         * does not contain a previous forced update, and the
> > +         * job worker is completely idle.
> > +         *
> > +         * Note this means we'll queue a forced update, even if
> > +         * the output buffer size is otherwise over the throttle
> > +         * output limit.
> > +         */
> > +        if (vs->force_update_offset == 0 &&
> > +            vs->job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE) {
> > +            return true;
> > +        }
> > +        break;
> >      }
> >      return false;
> >  }
> > @@ -1096,8 +1110,9 @@ static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
> >          }
> >      }
> >
> > -    vnc_job_push(job);
> > +    vs->job_update = vs->update;
> 
> How is this going to match the buffer job in vnc_jobs_consume_buffer() ?
> 
> (isn't this potentially taking the next job to finish as a force-update?)

Earlier in this method we check  vnc_should_update() and that only returns
true if  job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE (ie no currently processed
job in flight).

(this is the slight change from the previous patch version you looked at
off list where I allowed a force job to be queued even if a incremental
job was inflight. I decided that didnt really have any benefit from what
the client gets, and it complicated tracking)

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 11/13] ui: place a hard cap on VNC server output buffer size

[Daniel P. Berrange]

The previous patches fix problems with throttling of forced framebuffer updates
and audio data capture that would cause the QEMU output buffer size to grow
without bound. Those fixes are graceful in that once the client catches up with
reading data from the server, everything continues operating normally.

There is some data which the server sends to the client that is impractical to
throttle. Specifically there are various pseudo framebuffer update encodings to
inform the client of things like desktop resizes, pointer changes, audio
playback start/stop, LED state and so on. These generally only involve sending
a very small amount of data to the client, but a malicious guest might be able
to do things that trigger these changes at a very high rate. Throttling them is
not practical as missed or delayed events would cause broken behaviour for the
client.

This patch thus takes a more forceful approach of setting an absolute upper
bound on the amount of data we permit to be present in the output buffer at
any time. The previous patch set a threshold for throttling the output buffer
by allowing an amount of data equivalent to one complete framebuffer update and
one seconds worth of audio data. On top of this it allowed for one further
forced framebuffer update to be queued.

To be conservative, we thus take that throttling threshold and multiply it by
5 to form an absolute upper bound. If this bound is hit during vnc_write() we
forceably disconnect the client, refusing to queue further data. This limit is
high enough that it should never be hit unless a malicious client is trying to
exploit the sever, or the network is completely saturated preventing any sending
of data on the socket.

This completes the fix for CVE-2017-15124 started in the previous patches.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)

diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index 4021c0118c..a4f0279cdc 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -1521,8 +1521,37 @@ gboolean vnc_client_io(QIOChannel *ioc G_GNUC_UNUSED,
 }
 
 
+/*
+ * Scale factor to apply to vs->throttle_output_offset when checking for
+ * hard limit. Worst case normal usage could be x2, if we have a complete
+ * incremental update and complete forced update in the output buffer.
+ * So x3 should be good enough, but we pick x5 to be conservative and thus
+ * (hopefully) never trigger incorrectly.
+ */
+#define VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE 5
+
 void vnc_write(VncState *vs, const void *data, size_t len)
 {
+    if (vs->disconnecting) {
+        return;
+    }
+    /* Protection against malicious client/guest to prevent our output
+     * buffer growing without bound if client stops reading data. This
+     * should rarely trigger, because we have earlier throttling code
+     * which stops issuing framebuffer updates and drops audio data
+     * if the throttle_output_offset value is exceeded. So we only reach
+     * this higher level if a huge number of pseudo-encodings get
+     * triggered while data can't be sent on the socket.
+     *
+     * NB throttle_output_offset can be zero during early protocol
+     * handshake, or from the job thread's VncState clone
+     */
+    if (vs->throttle_output_offset != 0 &&
+        vs->output.offset > (vs->throttle_output_offset *
+                             VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE)) {
+        vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
+        return;
+    }
     buffer_reserve(&vs->output, len);
 
     if (vs->ioc != NULL && buffer_empty(&vs->output)) {
-- 
2.14.3

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 11/13] ui: place a hard cap on VNC server output buffer size

[Marc-André Lureau]

 Hi

On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 8:12 PM, Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
> The previous patches fix problems with throttling of forced framebuffer updates
> and audio data capture that would cause the QEMU output buffer size to grow
> without bound. Those fixes are graceful in that once the client catches up with
> reading data from the server, everything continues operating normally.
>
> There is some data which the server sends to the client that is impractical to
> throttle. Specifically there are various pseudo framebuffer update encodings to
> inform the client of things like desktop resizes, pointer changes, audio
> playback start/stop, LED state and so on. These generally only involve sending
> a very small amount of data to the client, but a malicious guest might be able
> to do things that trigger these changes at a very high rate. Throttling them is
> not practical as missed or delayed events would cause broken behaviour for the
> client.
>
> This patch thus takes a more forceful approach of setting an absolute upper
> bound on the amount of data we permit to be present in the output buffer at
> any time. The previous patch set a threshold for throttling the output buffer
> by allowing an amount of data equivalent to one complete framebuffer update and
> one seconds worth of audio data. On top of this it allowed for one further
> forced framebuffer update to be queued.
>
> To be conservative, we thus take that throttling threshold and multiply it by
> 5 to form an absolute upper bound. If this bound is hit during vnc_write() we
> forceably disconnect the client, refusing to queue further data. This limit is
> high enough that it should never be hit unless a malicious client is trying to
> exploit the sever, or the network is completely saturated preventing any sending
> of data on the socket.
>
> This completes the fix for CVE-2017-15124 started in the previous patches.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
> ---
>  ui/vnc.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
> index 4021c0118c..a4f0279cdc 100644
> --- a/ui/vnc.c
> +++ b/ui/vnc.c
> @@ -1521,8 +1521,37 @@ gboolean vnc_client_io(QIOChannel *ioc G_GNUC_UNUSED,
>  }
>
>
> +/*
> + * Scale factor to apply to vs->throttle_output_offset when checking for
> + * hard limit. Worst case normal usage could be x2, if we have a complete
> + * incremental update and complete forced update in the output buffer.
> + * So x3 should be good enough, but we pick x5 to be conservative and thus
> + * (hopefully) never trigger incorrectly.
> + */
> +#define VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE 5
> +
>  void vnc_write(VncState *vs, const void *data, size_t len)
>  {
> +    if (vs->disconnecting) {
> +        return;
> +    }
> +    /* Protection against malicious client/guest to prevent our output
> +     * buffer growing without bound if client stops reading data. This
> +     * should rarely trigger, because we have earlier throttling code
> +     * which stops issuing framebuffer updates and drops audio data
> +     * if the throttle_output_offset value is exceeded. So we only reach
> +     * this higher level if a huge number of pseudo-encodings get
> +     * triggered while data can't be sent on the socket.
> +     *
> +     * NB throttle_output_offset can be zero during early protocol
> +     * handshake, or from the job thread's VncState clone
> +     */
> +    if (vs->throttle_output_offset != 0 &&
> +        vs->output.offset > (vs->throttle_output_offset *
> +                             VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE)) {
> +        vnc_disconnect_start(vs);

It seems to me that the main source of data, the display, bypass this check.

The vnc_worker_thread_loop() uses a local VncState & buffer. The
result is moved to the vs->jobs_buffer, which is later moved in
vnc_jobs_consume_buffer() to the vs->output in bottom-half.

So in theory, it seems it would be possible for a client to make
several update-request (assuming guest display content changed), and
have several vnc jobs queued. In the unlikely events they would be
consumed together, they would not respect the hard cap. I am not sure
how the vnc-job queueing should be improved, just wanted to raise some
concerns around that code and the fact it doesn't really respect the
hard limits apparently. Am I wrong?

Perhaps the hard limit should also be put in vnc_jobs_consume_buffer()
? Then I can imagine synchronization issues if the hard limit changes
before the job buffer are consumed.

May be we should limit the amount of jobs that can be queued? If we
can estimate the max result buffer size of a job buffer,
vnc_should_update() could take that into account?

> +        return;
> +    }
>      buffer_reserve(&vs->output, len);
>
>      if (vs->ioc != NULL && buffer_empty(&vs->output)) {
> --
> 2.14.3
>
>



-- 
Marc-André Lureau

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 11/13] ui: place a hard cap on VNC server output buffer size

[Daniel P. Berrange]

On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 12:32:51PM +0100, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
>  Hi
> 
> On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 8:12 PM, Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
> > The previous patches fix problems with throttling of forced framebuffer updates
> > and audio data capture that would cause the QEMU output buffer size to grow
> > without bound. Those fixes are graceful in that once the client catches up with
> > reading data from the server, everything continues operating normally.
> >
> > There is some data which the server sends to the client that is impractical to
> > throttle. Specifically there are various pseudo framebuffer update encodings to
> > inform the client of things like desktop resizes, pointer changes, audio
> > playback start/stop, LED state and so on. These generally only involve sending
> > a very small amount of data to the client, but a malicious guest might be able
> > to do things that trigger these changes at a very high rate. Throttling them is
> > not practical as missed or delayed events would cause broken behaviour for the
> > client.
> >
> > This patch thus takes a more forceful approach of setting an absolute upper
> > bound on the amount of data we permit to be present in the output buffer at
> > any time. The previous patch set a threshold for throttling the output buffer
> > by allowing an amount of data equivalent to one complete framebuffer update and
> > one seconds worth of audio data. On top of this it allowed for one further
> > forced framebuffer update to be queued.
> >
> > To be conservative, we thus take that throttling threshold and multiply it by
> > 5 to form an absolute upper bound. If this bound is hit during vnc_write() we
> > forceably disconnect the client, refusing to queue further data. This limit is
> > high enough that it should never be hit unless a malicious client is trying to
> > exploit the sever, or the network is completely saturated preventing any sending
> > of data on the socket.
> >
> > This completes the fix for CVE-2017-15124 started in the previous patches.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  ui/vnc.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
> > index 4021c0118c..a4f0279cdc 100644
> > --- a/ui/vnc.c
> > +++ b/ui/vnc.c
> > @@ -1521,8 +1521,37 @@ gboolean vnc_client_io(QIOChannel *ioc G_GNUC_UNUSED,
> >  }
> >
> >
> > +/*
> > + * Scale factor to apply to vs->throttle_output_offset when checking for
> > + * hard limit. Worst case normal usage could be x2, if we have a complete
> > + * incremental update and complete forced update in the output buffer.
> > + * So x3 should be good enough, but we pick x5 to be conservative and thus
> > + * (hopefully) never trigger incorrectly.
> > + */
> > +#define VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE 5
> > +
> >  void vnc_write(VncState *vs, const void *data, size_t len)
> >  {
> > +    if (vs->disconnecting) {
> > +        return;
> > +    }
> > +    /* Protection against malicious client/guest to prevent our output
> > +     * buffer growing without bound if client stops reading data. This
> > +     * should rarely trigger, because we have earlier throttling code
> > +     * which stops issuing framebuffer updates and drops audio data
> > +     * if the throttle_output_offset value is exceeded. So we only reach
> > +     * this higher level if a huge number of pseudo-encodings get
> > +     * triggered while data can't be sent on the socket.
> > +     *
> > +     * NB throttle_output_offset can be zero during early protocol
> > +     * handshake, or from the job thread's VncState clone
> > +     */
> > +    if (vs->throttle_output_offset != 0 &&
> > +        vs->output.offset > (vs->throttle_output_offset *
> > +                             VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE)) {
> > +        vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
> 
> It seems to me that the main source of data, the display, bypass this check.
> 
> The vnc_worker_thread_loop() uses a local VncState & buffer. The
> result is moved to the vs->jobs_buffer, which is later moved in
> vnc_jobs_consume_buffer() to the vs->output in bottom-half.
> 
> So in theory, it seems it would be possible for a client to make
> several update-request (assuming guest display content changed), and
> have several vnc jobs queued. In the unlikely events they would be
> consumed together, they would not respect the hard cap. I am not sure
> how the vnc-job queueing should be improved, just wanted to raise some
> concerns around that code and the fact it doesn't really respect the
> hard limits apparently. Am I wrong?
> 
> Perhaps the hard limit should also be put in vnc_jobs_consume_buffer()
> ? Then I can imagine synchronization issues if the hard limit changes
> before the job buffer are consumed.
> 
> May be we should limit the amount of jobs that can be queued? If we
> can estimate the max result buffer size of a job buffer,
> vnc_should_update() could take that into account?

The vnc_should_update() already prevents there being more than 1
queued job for the worker thread. So even if the client reuqests
more updates, we won't start processing them until the worker
thread as copied the job_buffer into output in the vnc_jobs_consume_buffer
bottom half.  So no matter what the client requests, and how frequently
the guest display updates, we're still limiting output buffer size in
the vnc_update_client method.  This vnc_write protection only needs to
cope with non-display updates, for things like psuedo-encoding messages.

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 12/13] ui: add trace events related to VNC client throttling

[Daniel P. Berrange]

The VNC client throttling is quite subtle so will benefit from having trace
points available for live debugging.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/trace-events |  7 +++++++
 ui/vnc.c        | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

diff --git a/ui/trace-events b/ui/trace-events
index 1a9f126330..85f74f948b 100644
--- a/ui/trace-events
+++ b/ui/trace-events
@@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ vnc_client_connect(void *state, void *ioc) "VNC client connect state=%p ioc=%p"
 vnc_client_disconnect_start(void *state, void *ioc) "VNC client disconnect start state=%p ioc=%p"
 vnc_client_disconnect_finish(void *state, void *ioc) "VNC client disconnect finish state=%p ioc=%p"
 vnc_client_io_wrap(void *state, void *ioc, const char *type) "VNC client I/O wrap state=%p ioc=%p type=%s"
+vnc_client_throttle_threshold(void *state, void *ioc, size_t oldoffset, size_t offset, int client_width, int client_height, int bytes_per_pixel, void *audio_cap) "VNC client throttle threshold state=%p ioc=%p oldoffset=%zu newoffset=%zu width=%d height=%d bpp=%d audio=%p"
+vnc_client_throttle_incremental(void *state, void *ioc, int job_update, size_t offset) "VNC client throttle incremental state=%p ioc=%p job-update=%d offset=%zu"
+vnc_client_throttle_forced(void *state, void *ioc, int job_update, size_t offset) "VNC client throttle forced state=%p ioc=%p job-update=%d offset=%zu"
+vnc_client_throttle_audio(void *state, void *ioc, size_t offset) "VNC client throttle audio state=%p ioc=%p offset=%zu"
+vnc_client_unthrottle_forced(void *state, void *ioc) "VNC client unthrottle forced offset state=%p ioc=%p"
+vnc_client_unthrottle_incremental(void *state, void *ioc, size_t offset) "VNC client unthrottle incremental state=%p ioc=%p offset=%zu"
+vnc_client_output_limit(void *state, void *ioc, size_t offset, size_t threshold) "VNC client output limit state=%p ioc=%p offset=%zu threshold=%zu"
 vnc_auth_init(void *display, int websock, int auth, int subauth) "VNC auth init state=%p websock=%d auth=%d subauth=%d"
 vnc_auth_start(void *state, int method) "VNC client auth start state=%p method=%d"
 vnc_auth_pass(void *state, int method) "VNC client auth passed state=%p method=%d"
diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index a4f0279cdc..1b5a399dc0 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -1011,6 +1011,12 @@ static void vnc_update_throttle_offset(VncState *vs)
      */
     offset = MAX(offset, 1024 * 1024);
 
+    if (vs->throttle_output_offset != offset) {
+        trace_vnc_client_throttle_threshold(
+            vs, vs->ioc, vs->throttle_output_offset, offset, vs->client_width,
+            vs->client_height, vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel, vs->audio_cap);
+    }
+
     vs->throttle_output_offset = offset;
 }
 
@@ -1028,6 +1034,8 @@ static bool vnc_should_update(VncState *vs)
             vs->job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE) {
             return true;
         }
+        trace_vnc_client_throttle_incremental(
+            vs, vs->ioc, vs->job_update, vs->output.offset);
         break;
     case VNC_STATE_UPDATE_FORCE:
         /* Only allow forced updates if the pending send queue
@@ -1042,6 +1050,8 @@ static bool vnc_should_update(VncState *vs)
             vs->job_update == VNC_STATE_UPDATE_NONE) {
             return true;
         }
+        trace_vnc_client_throttle_forced(
+            vs, vs->ioc, vs->job_update, vs->force_update_offset);
         break;
     }
     return false;
@@ -1158,6 +1168,8 @@ static void audio_capture(void *opaque, void *buf, int size)
         vnc_write_u16(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO_DATA);
         vnc_write_u32(vs, size);
         vnc_write(vs, buf, size);
+    } else {
+        trace_vnc_client_throttle_audio(vs, vs->ioc, vs->output.offset);
     }
     vnc_unlock_output(vs);
     vnc_flush(vs);
@@ -1328,6 +1340,7 @@ ssize_t vnc_client_write_buf(VncState *vs, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
  */
 static ssize_t vnc_client_write_plain(VncState *vs)
 {
+    size_t offset;
     ssize_t ret;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
@@ -1348,11 +1361,19 @@ static ssize_t vnc_client_write_plain(VncState *vs)
         return 0;
 
     if (ret >= vs->force_update_offset) {
+        if (vs->force_update_offset != 0) {
+            trace_vnc_client_unthrottle_forced(vs, vs->ioc);
+        }
         vs->force_update_offset = 0;
     } else {
         vs->force_update_offset -= ret;
     }
+    offset = vs->output.offset;
     buffer_advance(&vs->output, ret);
+    if (offset >= vs->throttle_output_offset &&
+        vs->output.offset < vs->throttle_output_offset) {
+        trace_vnc_client_unthrottle_incremental(vs, vs->ioc, vs->output.offset);
+    }
 
     if (vs->output.offset == 0) {
         if (vs->ioc_tag) {
@@ -1549,6 +1570,8 @@ void vnc_write(VncState *vs, const void *data, size_t len)
     if (vs->throttle_output_offset != 0 &&
         vs->output.offset > (vs->throttle_output_offset *
                              VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE)) {
+        trace_vnc_client_output_limit(vs, vs->ioc, vs->output.offset,
+                                      vs->throttle_output_offset);
         vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
         return;
     }
-- 
2.14.3

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 13/13] ui: mix misleading comments & return types of VNC I/O helper methods

[Daniel P. Berrange]

While the QIOChannel APIs for reading/writing data return ssize_t, with negative
value indicating an error, the VNC code passes this return value through the
vnc_client_io_error() method. This detects the error condition, disconnects the
client and returns 0 to indicate error. Thus all the VNC helper methods should
return size_t (unsigned), and misleading comments which refer to the possibility
of negative return values need fixing.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c |  8 ++++----
 ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h |  4 ++--
 ui/vnc.c           | 29 +++++++++++++++--------------
 ui/vnc.h           |  6 +++---
 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
index 8c1cdde3db..74a5f513f2 100644
--- a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
+++ b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c
@@ -48,9 +48,9 @@ void vnc_sasl_client_cleanup(VncState *vs)
 }
 
 
-long vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs)
+size_t vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs)
 {
-    long ret;
+    size_t ret;
 
     VNC_DEBUG("Write SASL: Pending output %p size %zd offset %zd "
               "Encoded: %p size %d offset %d\n",
@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ long vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs)
 }
 
 
-long vnc_client_read_sasl(VncState *vs)
+size_t vnc_client_read_sasl(VncState *vs)
 {
-    long ret;
+    size_t ret;
     uint8_t encoded[4096];
     const char *decoded;
     unsigned int decodedLen;
diff --git a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h
index b9d8de1c10..2ae224ee3a 100644
--- a/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h
+++ b/ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ struct VncDisplaySASL {
 
 void vnc_sasl_client_cleanup(VncState *vs);
 
-long vnc_client_read_sasl(VncState *vs);
-long vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs);
+size_t vnc_client_read_sasl(VncState *vs);
+size_t vnc_client_write_sasl(VncState *vs);
 
 void start_auth_sasl(VncState *vs);
 
diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index 1b5a399dc0..b0e12ca4dd 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ void vnc_disconnect_finish(VncState *vs)
     g_free(vs);
 }
 
-ssize_t vnc_client_io_error(VncState *vs, ssize_t ret, Error **errp)
+size_t vnc_client_io_error(VncState *vs, ssize_t ret, Error **errp)
 {
     if (ret <= 0) {
         if (ret == 0) {
@@ -1315,9 +1315,9 @@ void vnc_client_error(VncState *vs)
  *
  * Returns the number of bytes written, which may be less than
  * the requested 'datalen' if the socket would block. Returns
- * -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
+ * 0 on I/O error, and disconnects the client socket.
  */
-ssize_t vnc_client_write_buf(VncState *vs, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
+size_t vnc_client_write_buf(VncState *vs, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
 {
     Error *err = NULL;
     ssize_t ret;
@@ -1335,13 +1335,13 @@ ssize_t vnc_client_write_buf(VncState *vs, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
  * will switch the FD poll() handler back to read monitoring.
  *
  * Returns the number of bytes written, which may be less than
- * the buffered output data if the socket would block. Returns
- * -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
+ * the buffered output data if the socket would block.  Returns
+ * 0 on I/O error, and disconnects the client socket.
  */
-static ssize_t vnc_client_write_plain(VncState *vs)
+static size_t vnc_client_write_plain(VncState *vs)
 {
     size_t offset;
-    ssize_t ret;
+    size_t ret;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
     VNC_DEBUG("Write Plain: Pending output %p size %zd offset %zd. Wait SSF %d\n",
@@ -1442,9 +1442,9 @@ void vnc_read_when(VncState *vs, VncReadEvent *func, size_t expecting)
  *
  * Returns the number of bytes read, which may be less than
  * the requested 'datalen' if the socket would block. Returns
- * -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
+ * 0 on I/O error or EOF, and disconnects the client socket.
  */
-ssize_t vnc_client_read_buf(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
+size_t vnc_client_read_buf(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
 {
     ssize_t ret;
     Error *err = NULL;
@@ -1460,12 +1460,13 @@ ssize_t vnc_client_read_buf(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
  * when not using any SASL SSF encryption layers. Will read as much
  * data as possible without blocking.
  *
- * Returns the number of bytes read. Returns -1 on error, and
- * disconnects the client socket.
+ * Returns the number of bytes read, which may be less than
+ * the requested 'datalen' if the socket would block. Returns
+ * 0 on I/O error or EOF, and disconnects the client socket.
  */
-static ssize_t vnc_client_read_plain(VncState *vs)
+static size_t vnc_client_read_plain(VncState *vs)
 {
-    ssize_t ret;
+    size_t ret;
     VNC_DEBUG("Read plain %p size %zd offset %zd\n",
               vs->input.buffer, vs->input.capacity, vs->input.offset);
     buffer_reserve(&vs->input, 4096);
@@ -1491,7 +1492,7 @@ static void vnc_jobs_bh(void *opaque)
  */
 static int vnc_client_read(VncState *vs)
 {
-    ssize_t ret;
+    size_t ret;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
     if (vs->sasl.conn && vs->sasl.runSSF)
diff --git a/ui/vnc.h b/ui/vnc.h
index 3f4cd4d93d..0c33a5f7fe 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.h
+++ b/ui/vnc.h
@@ -524,8 +524,8 @@ gboolean vnc_client_io(QIOChannel *ioc,
                        GIOCondition condition,
                        void *opaque);
 
-ssize_t vnc_client_read_buf(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t datalen);
-ssize_t vnc_client_write_buf(VncState *vs, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen);
+size_t vnc_client_read_buf(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t datalen);
+size_t vnc_client_write_buf(VncState *vs, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen);
 
 /* Protocol I/O functions */
 void vnc_write(VncState *vs, const void *data, size_t len);
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ uint32_t read_u32(uint8_t *data, size_t offset);
 
 /* Protocol stage functions */
 void vnc_client_error(VncState *vs);
-ssize_t vnc_client_io_error(VncState *vs, ssize_t ret, Error **errp);
+size_t vnc_client_io_error(VncState *vs, ssize_t ret, Error **errp);
 
 void start_client_init(VncState *vs);
 void start_auth_vnc(VncState *vs);
-- 
2.14.3

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 00/13] Fix VNC server unbounded memory usage

[Darren Kenny]

Hi Daniel,

For the series:

Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>

With one small nit on patch 1.

Thanks,

Darren.

On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 07:12:15PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
>In the 2.11 release we fixed CVE-2017-15268, which allowed the VNC websockets
>server to consume arbitrary memory when a slow client was connected. I have
>since discovered that this same type of problem can be triggered in several
>other ways in the regular (non-websockets) VNC server. This patch series
>attempts to fix this problem by limiting framebuffer updates and other data
>sent from server to client. The mitigating factor is that you need to have
>successfully authenticated with the VNC server to trigger these new flaws.
>This new more general flaw is assigned CVE-2017-15124 by the Red Hat security
>team.
>
>The key patches containing the security fix are 9, 10, 11.
>
>Since this code is incredibly subtle & hard to understand though, the first
>8 patches do a bunch of independant cleanups/refactoring to make the security
>fixes clearer.  The last two patches are just some extra cleanup / help for
>future maint.
>
>Daniel P. Berrange (13):
>  ui: remove 'sync' parametr from vnc_update_client
>  ui: remove unreachable code in vnc_update_client
>  ui: remove redundant indentation in vnc_client_update
>  ui: avoid pointless VNC updates if framebuffer isn't dirty
>  ui: track how much decoded data we consumed when doing SASL encoding
>  ui: introduce enum to track VNC client framebuffer update request
>    state
>  ui: correctly reset framebuffer update state after processing dirty
>    regions
>  ui: refactor code for determining if an update should be sent to the
>    client
>  ui: fix VNC client throttling when audio capture is active
>  ui: fix VNC client throttling when forced update is requested
>  ui: place a hard cap on VNC server output buffer size
>  ui: add trace events related to VNC client throttling
>  ui: mix misleading comments & return types of VNC I/O helper methods
>
> ui/trace-events    |   7 ++
> ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c |  16 ++-
> ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h |   5 +-
> ui/vnc-jobs.c      |   5 +
> ui/vnc.c           | 320 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> ui/vnc.h           |  28 ++++-
> 6 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
>
>-- 
>2.14.3
>
>

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 00/13] Fix VNC server unbounded memory usage

[Marc-André Lureau]

Hi

----- Original Message -----
> In the 2.11 release we fixed CVE-2017-15268, which allowed the VNC websockets
> server to consume arbitrary memory when a slow client was connected. I have
> since discovered that this same type of problem can be triggered in several
> other ways in the regular (non-websockets) VNC server. This patch series
> attempts to fix this problem by limiting framebuffer updates and other data
> sent from server to client. The mitigating factor is that you need to have
> successfully authenticated with the VNC server to trigger these new flaws.
> This new more general flaw is assigned CVE-2017-15124 by the Red Hat security
> team.
> 
> The key patches containing the security fix are 9, 10, 11.
> 
> Since this code is incredibly subtle & hard to understand though, the first
> 8 patches do a bunch of independant cleanups/refactoring to make the security
> fixes clearer.  The last two patches are just some extra cleanup / help for
> future maint.

I already reviewed the series privately, and in general, I'd ack it.

Did you manage to run some throttle tests? (I tried to trigger them manually by slowing artificially network or calling framebuffer_update_request() in gdb, I didn't manage yet :-/)

> 
> Daniel P. Berrange (13):
>   ui: remove 'sync' parametr from vnc_update_client
>   ui: remove unreachable code in vnc_update_client
>   ui: remove redundant indentation in vnc_client_update
>   ui: avoid pointless VNC updates if framebuffer isn't dirty
>   ui: track how much decoded data we consumed when doing SASL encoding
>   ui: introduce enum to track VNC client framebuffer update request
>     state
>   ui: correctly reset framebuffer update state after processing dirty
>     regions
>   ui: refactor code for determining if an update should be sent to the
>     client
>   ui: fix VNC client throttling when audio capture is active
>   ui: fix VNC client throttling when forced update is requested
>   ui: place a hard cap on VNC server output buffer size
>   ui: add trace events related to VNC client throttling
>   ui: mix misleading comments & return types of VNC I/O helper methods
> 
>  ui/trace-events    |   7 ++
>  ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c |  16 ++-
>  ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h |   5 +-
>  ui/vnc-jobs.c      |   5 +
>  ui/vnc.c           | 320
>  ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
>  ui/vnc.h           |  28 ++++-
>  6 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
> 

Series:
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>

> --
> 2.14.3
> 
> 

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 00/13] Fix VNC server unbounded memory usage

[Daniel P. Berrange]

On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 09:57:59AM -0500, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
> Hi
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> > In the 2.11 release we fixed CVE-2017-15268, which allowed the VNC websockets
> > server to consume arbitrary memory when a slow client was connected. I have
> > since discovered that this same type of problem can be triggered in several
> > other ways in the regular (non-websockets) VNC server. This patch series
> > attempts to fix this problem by limiting framebuffer updates and other data
> > sent from server to client. The mitigating factor is that you need to have
> > successfully authenticated with the VNC server to trigger these new flaws.
> > This new more general flaw is assigned CVE-2017-15124 by the Red Hat security
> > team.
> > 
> > The key patches containing the security fix are 9, 10, 11.
> > 
> > Since this code is incredibly subtle & hard to understand though, the first
> > 8 patches do a bunch of independant cleanups/refactoring to make the security
> > fixes clearer.  The last two patches are just some extra cleanup / help for
> > future maint.
> 
> I already reviewed the series privately, and in general, I'd ack it.
> 
> Did you manage to run some throttle tests? (I tried to trigger them manually
> by slowing artificially network or calling framebuffer_update_request() in
> gdb, I didn't manage yet :-/)

I used two approaches. First a MITM socket server that just throttles the
rate at which is reads from QEMU. Second, I wrote an intentionally malicious
VNC client to artificially exercise the codepaths & verify they are fixed.

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v1 00/13] Fix VNC server unbounded memory usage

[Marc-André Lureau]

On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 8:12 PM, Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
> In the 2.11 release we fixed CVE-2017-15268, which allowed the VNC websockets
> server to consume arbitrary memory when a slow client was connected. I have
> since discovered that this same type of problem can be triggered in several
> other ways in the regular (non-websockets) VNC server. This patch series
> attempts to fix this problem by limiting framebuffer updates and other data
> sent from server to client. The mitigating factor is that you need to have
> successfully authenticated with the VNC server to trigger these new flaws.
> This new more general flaw is assigned CVE-2017-15124 by the Red Hat security
> team.
>
> The key patches containing the security fix are 9, 10, 11.
>
> Since this code is incredibly subtle & hard to understand though, the first
> 8 patches do a bunch of independant cleanups/refactoring to make the security
> fixes clearer.  The last two patches are just some extra cleanup / help for
> future maint.
>
> Daniel P. Berrange (13):
>   ui: remove 'sync' parametr from vnc_update_client
>   ui: remove unreachable code in vnc_update_client
>   ui: remove redundant indentation in vnc_client_update
>   ui: avoid pointless VNC updates if framebuffer isn't dirty
>   ui: track how much decoded data we consumed when doing SASL encoding
>   ui: introduce enum to track VNC client framebuffer update request
>     state
>   ui: correctly reset framebuffer update state after processing dirty
>     regions
>   ui: refactor code for determining if an update should be sent to the
>     client
>   ui: fix VNC client throttling when audio capture is active
>   ui: fix VNC client throttling when forced update is requested
>   ui: place a hard cap on VNC server output buffer size
>   ui: add trace events related to VNC client throttling
>   ui: mix misleading comments & return types of VNC I/O helper methods
>
>  ui/trace-events    |   7 ++
>  ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c |  16 ++-
>  ui/vnc-auth-sasl.h |   5 +-
>  ui/vnc-jobs.c      |   5 +
>  ui/vnc.c           | 320 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
>  ui/vnc.h           |  28 ++++-
>  6 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
>

For the series:
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>




-- 
Marc-André Lureau