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From: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: "P J P" <ppandit@redhat.com>,
	"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	"Kevin Wolf" <kwolf@redhat.com>,
	"Peter Maydell" <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
	"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>,
	"Michael Roth" <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"Greg Kurz" <groug@kaod.org>,
	"Stefan Hajnoczi" <stefanha@redhat.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2020 11:45:50 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3491260.5YPxQhmjAg@silver> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <nycvar.YSQ.7.78.906.2007161428570.950384@xnncv>

On Donnerstag, 16. Juli 2020 11:21:55 CEST P J P wrote:
> +-- On Thu, 16 Jul 2020, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote --+
> 
> | > Failing to start (with a message that explains why) if one of the
> | > command
> | > line options is not covered by a specified security policy is not
> | > unreasonable (after all, we fail to start for other cases of
> | > incompatible
> | > command line options as well.)
> 
>   Yes, that's right.
> 
> | > However, we also need to cover dynamically-added devices. Aborting seems
> | > very bad there, just failing to add the device seems like what we'd
> | > want.
> | 
> | Yep, aborting is simply not an option for the inner code. It all has to
> | propagate to a proper Error **errp object. The ultimate entry-point at the
> | CLI vs QMP then decides whether to turn the error into an abort or feed
> | back to the client app.
> 
>   True, handling dynamic devices is tricky.
> 
> Though it seems kind of uniform workflow to check for '--security' flag at
> options parsing OR while handling dynamic devices at run time; It is a huge
> task to cover all options/use-cases for all QEMU emulators across various
> architectures.

My concern here is that just distinguishing between either 'low' or 'high' is 
a far too rough classification.

In our preceding communication regarding 9pfs, I made clear that a) we do care 
about security relevant 9pfs issues, and only b) the avarage use cases (as far 
we know) for 9pfs are above a certain trust level.

However b) does not imply 9pfs being 'unsafe', nor that we want users to 
refrain using it in a security relevant environment. So 9pfs would actually be 
somewhere in between.

Best regards,
Christian Schoenebeck




  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-07-16  9:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-14  8:36 [PATCH 0/1] MAINTAINERS: add security quotient field P J P
2020-07-14  8:36 ` [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or " P J P
2020-07-14  9:42   ` Peter Maydell
2020-07-14  9:52     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 10:12       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-07-14 10:22         ` Peter Maydell
2020-07-14 11:02           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-07-14 13:10             ` P J P
2020-07-16  6:55               ` Cornelia Huck
2020-07-16  8:36                 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16  9:21                   ` P J P
2020-07-16  9:39                     ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16  9:45                     ` Christian Schoenebeck [this message]
2020-07-16 10:01                       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 12:22                         ` Christian Schoenebeck
2020-07-16 12:54                           ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 13:30             ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 13:48               ` Kevin Wolf
2020-07-14 13:56                 ` Thomas Huth
2020-07-14 15:04                   ` Christian Schoenebeck
2020-07-14 14:02                 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-14 10:18   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-07-14 11:51   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-07-16  8:56   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-16  9:44     ` P J P
2020-07-16 10:09       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-16 10:43         ` Markus Armbruster
2020-07-14  9:46 ` [PATCH 0/1] MAINTAINERS: add " Michael S. Tsirkin

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