Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Add support for fd: protocol

[Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>]

On 05/20/2011 02:25 PM, Blue Swirl wrote:
> On Fri, May 20, 2011 at 9:48 PM, Corey Bryant<bryntcor@us.ibm.com>  wrote:
>> sVirt provides SELinux MAC isolation for Qemu guest processes and their
>> corresponding resources (image files). sVirt provides this support
>> by labeling guests and resources with security labels that are stored
>> in file system extended attributes. Some file systems, such as NFS, do
>> not support the extended attribute security namespace, which is needed
>> for image file isolation when using the sVirt SELinux security driver
>> in libvirt.
>>
>> The proposed solution entails a combination of Qemu, libvirt, and
>> SELinux patches that work together to isolate multiple guests' images
>> when they're stored in the same NFS mount. This results in an
>> environment where sVirt isolation and NFS image file isolation can both
>> be provided.
>
> Very nice. QEMU should use this to support privilege separation. We
> already have chroot and runas switches, a new switch should convert
> all file references to fd references internally for that process. If
> this can be made transparent, this should even be the default way of
> operation.

You mean, QEMU starts up, opens all disk images, reinvokes itself in a 
confined context, and then passes fds to the child?

Interesting idea.

Regards,

Anthony Liguori

>