From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([140.186.70.92]:36651) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1QNVai-0006MH-Cg for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 20 May 2011 15:42:33 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1QNVah-0003qc-ED for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 20 May 2011 15:42:32 -0400 Received: from mail-gy0-f173.google.com ([209.85.160.173]:52543) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1QNVah-0003qY-AU for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 20 May 2011 15:42:31 -0400 Received: by gyg4 with SMTP id 4so1662765gyg.4 for ; Fri, 20 May 2011 12:42:30 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <4DD6C424.1020104@codemonkey.ws> Date: Fri, 20 May 2011 14:42:28 -0500 From: Anthony Liguori MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <4DD6B777.9020800@us.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Add support for fd: protocol List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: Blue Swirl Cc: aliguori@us.ibm.com, Corey Bryant , Tyler C Hicks , qemu-devel@nongnu.org On 05/20/2011 02:25 PM, Blue Swirl wrote: > On Fri, May 20, 2011 at 9:48 PM, Corey Bryant wrote: >> sVirt provides SELinux MAC isolation for Qemu guest processes and their >> corresponding resources (image files). sVirt provides this support >> by labeling guests and resources with security labels that are stored >> in file system extended attributes. Some file systems, such as NFS, do >> not support the extended attribute security namespace, which is needed >> for image file isolation when using the sVirt SELinux security driver >> in libvirt. >> >> The proposed solution entails a combination of Qemu, libvirt, and >> SELinux patches that work together to isolate multiple guests' images >> when they're stored in the same NFS mount. This results in an >> environment where sVirt isolation and NFS image file isolation can both >> be provided. > > Very nice. QEMU should use this to support privilege separation. We > already have chroot and runas switches, a new switch should convert > all file references to fd references internally for that process. If > this can be made transparent, this should even be the default way of > operation. You mean, QEMU starts up, opens all disk images, reinvokes itself in a confined context, and then passes fds to the child? Interesting idea. Regards, Anthony Liguori >