From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
To: "Marc-André Lureau" <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>, Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 3/3] seccomp: set the seccomp filter to all threads
Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2018 11:07:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4a0122ad-52eb-d241-709b-76038e65a858@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMxuvawr-ooy91ZHTHx+aLYhgpH5gBoAKQz_pvF=kcHzadjLog@mail.gmail.com>
On 08/22/2018 10:58 AM, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
>> At this point you might as well not bother using seccomp at all. The
>> thread that is confined merely needs to scribble something into the
>> stack of the unconfined thread and now it can do whatever it wants.
>
> Actually, that message is incorrect, it should rather be "not all
> threads will be filtered" (as described in commit message).
>
>> IMHO we need to find a way to get the policy to apply to those other
>> threads.
>
> That's what the patch is about ;)
In other words, this patch is patching the gaping security hole that
already exists, but...
>>> +++ b/qemu-options.hx
>>> @@ -3864,6 +3864,8 @@ Disable set*uid|gid system calls
>>> Disable *fork and execve
>>> @item resourcecontrol=@var{string}
>>> Disable process affinity and schedular priority
>>> +@item tsync=@var{bool}
>>> +Apply seccomp filter to all threads (default is auto, and will warn if fail)
>>
>> IMHO this should never exist, as setting "tsync" to anything other
>> than "yes", is akin to just running without any sandbox.
>
> Then we should just fail -sandbox on those systems.
...leaving the backdoor open. Yes, we should instead fix things to hard
fail when -sandbox cannot fully protect the process, rather than adding
a tsync=off backdoor to permit execution in spite of the insecurity.
--
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3266
Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-22 16:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-22 14:29 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 0/3] seccomp fixes Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 14:29 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 1/3] seccomp: use SIGSYS signal instead of killing the thread Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 14:29 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 2/3] seccomp: prefer SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS if available Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 14:29 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 3/3] seccomp: set the seccomp filter to all threads Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 15:46 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-08-22 15:58 ` Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 16:06 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-08-22 16:37 ` Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 16:39 ` Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 16:46 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-08-22 16:51 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-08-22 16:07 ` Eric Blake [this message]
2018-08-22 16:19 ` Marc-André Lureau
2018-08-22 16:43 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-08-22 16:53 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-08-22 15:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 0/3] seccomp fixes Eduardo Otubo
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