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From: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
To: Tao Tang <tangtao1634@phytium.com.cn>,
	Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-arm@nongnu.org,
	Chen Baozi <chenbaozi@phytium.com.cn>,
	pierrick.bouvier@linaro.org, philmd@linaro.org,
	jean-philippe@linaro.org, smostafa@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Make Configuration Cache security-state aware
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2025 11:55:10 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4b90afba-d708-4628-a087-c16829ee0512@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250925162618.191242-8-tangtao1634@phytium.com.cn>



On 9/25/25 6:26 PM, Tao Tang wrote:
> This patch adapts the Configuration Cache (STE/CD caches) to support
> multiple security states.
>
> The cache key, previously just the SMMUDevice, is now a composite key
> of the SMMUDevice and the security index (sec_idx). This allows for
> separate cache entries for the same device when operating in different
> security states, preventing aliasing between secure and non-secure
> configurations.
>
> The configuration cache invalidation functions have been refactored to
> correctly handle multiple security states, ensuring that invalidation
> commands operate on the appropriate cache entries.
>
> Finally, checks have been added to the stream table's MMIO read/write
> logic to verify if the stream table is writable. This ensures that the
> Configuration Cache management is compliant with the architecture.
I think this patch shall be split too. I would suggest

- In a preliminary patch, add txattrs and as new members in SMMUTransCfg
+ the related changes (smmu_get_ste, smmu_get_cd, smmu_find_ste.
smmuv3_translate. Add their init in smmuv3_get_config while leaving the
current key as is.
- In a second patch, manage the new config key
- then there are a bunch of changes which does not relate to
configuration cache: smmu_writell, smmu_writel and
smmu_strtab_base_writable. I think this can go in a separate patch.

What do you think?

Eric

>
> Signed-off-by: Tao Tang <tangtao1634@phytium.com.cn>
> ---
>  hw/arm/smmu-common.c         | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  hw/arm/smmuv3.c              | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>  include/hw/arm/smmu-common.h | 14 ++++++
>  3 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/hw/arm/smmu-common.c b/hw/arm/smmu-common.c
> index 24db448683..bc13b00f1d 100644
> --- a/hw/arm/smmu-common.c
> +++ b/hw/arm/smmu-common.c
> @@ -30,6 +30,43 @@
>  #include "hw/arm/smmu-common.h"
>  #include "smmu-internal.h"
>  
> +/* Configuration Cache Management */
> +static guint smmu_config_key_hash(gconstpointer key)
> +{
> +    const SMMUConfigKey *k = key;
> +    return g_direct_hash(k->sdev) ^ (guint)k->sec_idx;
> +}
> +
> +static gboolean smmu_config_key_equal(gconstpointer a, gconstpointer b)
> +{
> +    const SMMUConfigKey *ka = a;
> +    const SMMUConfigKey *kb = b;
> +    return ka->sdev == kb->sdev && ka->sec_idx == kb->sec_idx;
> +}
> +
> +SMMUConfigKey smmu_get_config_key(SMMUDevice *sdev, SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx)
> +{
> +    SMMUConfigKey key = {.sdev = sdev, .sec_idx = sec_idx};
> +    return key;
> +}
> +
> +ARMSecuritySpace smmu_get_security_space(SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx)
> +{
> +    switch (sec_idx) {
> +    case SMMU_SEC_IDX_S:
> +        return ARMSS_Secure;
> +    case SMMU_SEC_IDX_NS:
> +    default:
> +        return ARMSS_NonSecure;
> +    }
> +}
> +
> +MemTxAttrs smmu_get_txattrs(SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx)
> +{
> +    return (MemTxAttrs) { .secure = sec_idx > SMMU_SEC_IDX_NS ? 1 : 0,
> +                          .space = smmu_get_security_space(sec_idx) };
> +}
> +
>  /* Global state for secure address space availability */
>  bool arm_secure_as_available;
>  
> @@ -237,7 +274,8 @@ static gboolean smmu_hash_remove_by_vmid_ipa(gpointer key, gpointer value,
>  static gboolean
>  smmu_hash_remove_by_sid_range(gpointer key, gpointer value, gpointer user_data)
>  {
> -    SMMUDevice *sdev = (SMMUDevice *)key;
> +    SMMUConfigKey *config_key = (SMMUConfigKey *)key;
> +    SMMUDevice *sdev = config_key->sdev;
>      uint32_t sid = smmu_get_sid(sdev);
>      SMMUSIDRange *sid_range = (SMMUSIDRange *)user_data;
>  
> @@ -255,6 +293,25 @@ void smmu_configs_inv_sid_range(SMMUState *s, SMMUSIDRange sid_range)
>                                  &sid_range);
>  }
>  
> +/* Remove all cached configs for a specific device, regardless of security. */
> +static gboolean smmu_hash_remove_by_sdev(gpointer key, gpointer value,
> +                                         gpointer user_data)
> +{
> +    SMMUConfigKey *config_key = (SMMUConfigKey *)key;
> +    SMMUDevice *target = (SMMUDevice *)user_data;
> +
> +    if (config_key->sdev != target) {
> +        return false;
> +    }
> +    trace_smmu_config_cache_inv(smmu_get_sid(target));
> +    return true;
> +}
> +
> +void smmu_configs_inv_sdev(SMMUState *s, SMMUDevice *sdev)
> +{
> +    g_hash_table_foreach_remove(s->configs, smmu_hash_remove_by_sdev, sdev);
> +}
> +
>  void smmu_iotlb_inv_iova(SMMUState *s, int asid, int vmid, dma_addr_t iova,
>                           uint8_t tg, uint64_t num_pages, uint8_t ttl)
>  {
> @@ -942,7 +999,9 @@ static void smmu_base_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
>          error_propagate(errp, local_err);
>          return;
>      }
> -    s->configs = g_hash_table_new_full(NULL, NULL, NULL, g_free);
> +    s->configs = g_hash_table_new_full(smmu_config_key_hash,
> +                                       smmu_config_key_equal,
> +                                       g_free, g_free);
>      s->iotlb = g_hash_table_new_full(smmu_iotlb_key_hash, smmu_iotlb_key_equal,
>                                       g_free, g_free);
>      s->smmu_pcibus_by_busptr = g_hash_table_new(NULL, NULL);
> diff --git a/hw/arm/smmuv3.c b/hw/arm/smmuv3.c
> index 2efa39b78c..eba709ae2b 100644
> --- a/hw/arm/smmuv3.c
> +++ b/hw/arm/smmuv3.c
> @@ -352,14 +352,13 @@ static void smmuv3_init_regs(SMMUv3State *s)
>  }
>  
>  static int smmu_get_ste(SMMUv3State *s, dma_addr_t addr, STE *buf,
> -                        SMMUEventInfo *event)
> +                        SMMUEventInfo *event, SMMUTransCfg *cfg)
>  {
>      int ret, i;
>  
>      trace_smmuv3_get_ste(addr);
>      /* TODO: guarantee 64-bit single-copy atomicity */
> -    ret = dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, addr, buf, sizeof(*buf),
> -                          MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED);
> +    ret = dma_memory_read(cfg->as, addr, buf, sizeof(*buf), cfg->txattrs);
>      if (ret != MEMTX_OK) {
>          qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>                        "Cannot fetch pte at address=0x%"PRIx64"\n", addr);
> @@ -404,8 +403,7 @@ static int smmu_get_cd(SMMUv3State *s, STE *ste, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
>      }
>  
>      /* TODO: guarantee 64-bit single-copy atomicity */
> -    ret = dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, addr, buf, sizeof(*buf),
> -                          MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED);
> +    ret = dma_memory_read(cfg->as, addr, buf, sizeof(*buf), cfg->txattrs);
>      if (ret != MEMTX_OK) {
>          qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>                        "Cannot fetch pte at address=0x%"PRIx64"\n", addr);
> @@ -699,8 +697,8 @@ static int smmu_find_ste(SMMUv3State *s, uint32_t sid, STE *ste,
>          l2_ste_offset = sid & ((1 << sid_split) - 1);
>          l1ptr = (dma_addr_t)(strtab_base + l1_ste_offset * sizeof(l1std));
>          /* TODO: guarantee 64-bit single-copy atomicity */
> -        ret = dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, l1ptr, &l1std,
> -                              sizeof(l1std), MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED);
> +        ret = dma_memory_read(cfg->as, l1ptr,
> +                              &l1std, sizeof(l1std), cfg->txattrs);
>          if (ret != MEMTX_OK) {
>              qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>                            "Could not read L1PTR at 0X%"PRIx64"\n", l1ptr);
> @@ -742,7 +740,7 @@ static int smmu_find_ste(SMMUv3State *s, uint32_t sid, STE *ste,
>          addr = strtab_base + sid * sizeof(*ste);
>      }
>  
> -    if (smmu_get_ste(s, addr, ste, event)) {
> +    if (smmu_get_ste(s, addr, ste, event, cfg)) {
>          return -EINVAL;
>      }
>  
> @@ -900,18 +898,21 @@ static int smmuv3_decode_config(IOMMUMemoryRegion *mr, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
>   *
>   * @sdev: SMMUDevice handle
>   * @event: output event info
> + * @sec_idx: security index
>   *
>   * The configuration cache contains data resulting from both STE and CD
>   * decoding under the form of an SMMUTransCfg struct. The hash table is indexed
>   * by the SMMUDevice handle.
>   */
> -static SMMUTransCfg *smmuv3_get_config(SMMUDevice *sdev, SMMUEventInfo *event)
> +static SMMUTransCfg *smmuv3_get_config(SMMUDevice *sdev, SMMUEventInfo *event,
> +                                       SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx)
>  {
>      SMMUv3State *s = sdev->smmu;
>      SMMUState *bc = &s->smmu_state;
>      SMMUTransCfg *cfg;
> +    SMMUConfigKey lookup_key = smmu_get_config_key(sdev, sec_idx);
>  
> -    cfg = g_hash_table_lookup(bc->configs, sdev);
> +    cfg = g_hash_table_lookup(bc->configs, &lookup_key);
>      if (cfg) {
>          sdev->cfg_cache_hits++;
>          trace_smmuv3_config_cache_hit(smmu_get_sid(sdev),
> @@ -925,9 +926,14 @@ static SMMUTransCfg *smmuv3_get_config(SMMUDevice *sdev, SMMUEventInfo *event)
>                              100 * sdev->cfg_cache_hits /
>                              (sdev->cfg_cache_hits + sdev->cfg_cache_misses));
>          cfg = g_new0(SMMUTransCfg, 1);
> +        cfg->sec_idx = sec_idx;
> +        cfg->txattrs = smmu_get_txattrs(sec_idx);
> +        cfg->as = smmu_get_address_space(sec_idx);
>  
>          if (!smmuv3_decode_config(&sdev->iommu, cfg, event)) {
> -            g_hash_table_insert(bc->configs, sdev, cfg);
> +            SMMUConfigKey *persistent_key = g_new(SMMUConfigKey, 1);
> +            *persistent_key = smmu_get_config_key(sdev, sec_idx);
> +            g_hash_table_insert(bc->configs, persistent_key, cfg);
>          } else {
>              g_free(cfg);
>              cfg = NULL;
> @@ -941,8 +947,8 @@ static void smmuv3_flush_config(SMMUDevice *sdev)
>      SMMUv3State *s = sdev->smmu;
>      SMMUState *bc = &s->smmu_state;
>  
> -    trace_smmu_config_cache_inv(smmu_get_sid(sdev));
> -    g_hash_table_remove(bc->configs, sdev);
> +    /* Remove all security-indexed configs for this device */
> +    smmu_configs_inv_sdev(bc, sdev);
>  }
>  
>  /* Do translation with TLB lookup. */
> @@ -1102,7 +1108,7 @@ static IOMMUTLBEntry smmuv3_translate(IOMMUMemoryRegion *mr, hwaddr addr,
>          goto epilogue;
>      }
>  
> -    cfg = smmuv3_get_config(sdev, &event);
> +    cfg = smmuv3_get_config(sdev, &event, sec_idx);
>      if (!cfg) {
>          status = SMMU_TRANS_ERROR;
>          goto epilogue;
> @@ -1182,7 +1188,7 @@ static void smmuv3_notify_iova(IOMMUMemoryRegion *mr,
>  {
>      SMMUDevice *sdev = container_of(mr, SMMUDevice, iommu);
>      SMMUEventInfo eventinfo = {.inval_ste_allowed = true};
> -    SMMUTransCfg *cfg = smmuv3_get_config(sdev, &eventinfo);
> +    SMMUTransCfg *cfg = smmuv3_get_config(sdev, &eventinfo, SMMU_SEC_IDX_NS);
>      IOMMUTLBEvent event;
>      uint8_t granule;
>  
> @@ -1314,6 +1320,38 @@ static void smmuv3_range_inval(SMMUState *s, Cmd *cmd, SMMUStage stage)
>      }
>  }
>  
> +static inline int smmuv3_get_cr0_smmuen(SMMUv3State *s,
> +                                        SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx)
> +{
> +    return smmu_enabled(s, sec_idx);
> +}
> +
> +static inline int smmuv3_get_cr0ack_smmuen(SMMUv3State *s,
> +                                           SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx)
> +{
> +    return FIELD_EX32(s->bank[sec_idx].cr0ack, CR0, SMMUEN);
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool smmuv3_is_smmu_enabled(SMMUv3State *s,
> +                                          SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx)
> +{
> +    int cr0_smmuen = smmuv3_get_cr0_smmuen(s, sec_idx);
> +    int cr0ack_smmuen = smmuv3_get_cr0ack_smmuen(s, sec_idx);
> +    return (cr0_smmuen == 0 && cr0ack_smmuen == 0);
> +}
> +
> +/* Check if STRTAB_BASE register is writable */
> +static bool smmu_strtab_base_writable(SMMUv3State *s, SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx)
> +{
> +    /* Check TABLES_PRESET - use NS bank as it's the global setting */
> +    if (FIELD_EX32(s->bank[SMMU_SEC_IDX_NS].idr[1], IDR1, TABLES_PRESET)) {
> +        return false;
> +    }
> +
> +    /* Check SMMUEN conditions for the specific security domain */
> +    return smmuv3_is_smmu_enabled(s, sec_idx);
> +}
> +
>  static int smmuv3_cmdq_consume(SMMUv3State *s, SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx)
>  {
>      SMMUState *bs = ARM_SMMU(s);
> @@ -1553,6 +1591,11 @@ static MemTxResult smmu_writell(SMMUv3State *s, hwaddr offset,
>      uint32_t reg_offset = offset & 0xfff;
>      switch (reg_offset) {
>      case A_STRTAB_BASE:
> +        if (!smmu_strtab_base_writable(s, reg_sec_idx)) {
> +            qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> +                          "STRTAB_BASE write ignored: register is RO\n");
> +            return MEMTX_OK;
> +        }
>          /* Clear reserved bits according to spec */
>          s->bank[reg_sec_idx].strtab_base = data & SMMU_STRTAB_BASE_RESERVED;
>          return MEMTX_OK;
> @@ -1637,14 +1680,29 @@ static MemTxResult smmu_writel(SMMUv3State *s, hwaddr offset,
>          }
>          return MEMTX_OK;
>      case A_STRTAB_BASE: /* 64b */
> -        s->bank[reg_sec_idx].strtab_base =
> -            deposit64(s->bank[reg_sec_idx].strtab_base, 0, 32, data);
> -        return MEMTX_OK;
>      case A_STRTAB_BASE + 4:
> -        s->bank[reg_sec_idx].strtab_base =
> -            deposit64(s->bank[reg_sec_idx].strtab_base, 32, 32, data);
> +        if (!smmu_strtab_base_writable(s, reg_sec_idx)) {
> +            qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> +                          "STRTAB_BASE write ignored: register is RO\n");
> +            return MEMTX_OK;
> +        }
> +
> +        data &= SMMU_STRTAB_BASE_RESERVED;
> +        if (reg_offset == A_STRTAB_BASE) {
> +            s->bank[reg_sec_idx].strtab_base = deposit64(
> +                s->bank[reg_sec_idx].strtab_base, 0, 32, data);
> +        } else {
> +            s->bank[reg_sec_idx].strtab_base = deposit64(
> +                s->bank[reg_sec_idx].strtab_base, 32, 32, data);
> +        }
>          return MEMTX_OK;
>      case A_STRTAB_BASE_CFG:
> +        if (!smmu_strtab_base_writable(s, reg_sec_idx)) {
> +            qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> +                          "STRTAB_BASE_CFG write ignored: register is RO\n");
> +            return MEMTX_OK;
> +        }
> +
>          s->bank[reg_sec_idx].strtab_base_cfg = data;
>          if (FIELD_EX32(data, STRTAB_BASE_CFG, FMT) == 1) {
>              s->bank[reg_sec_idx].sid_split =
> diff --git a/include/hw/arm/smmu-common.h b/include/hw/arm/smmu-common.h
> index cd61c5e126..ed21db7728 100644
> --- a/include/hw/arm/smmu-common.h
> +++ b/include/hw/arm/smmu-common.h
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include "hw/sysbus.h"
>  #include "hw/pci/pci.h"
>  #include "qom/object.h"
> +#include "hw/arm/arm-security.h"
>  
>  #define SMMU_PCI_BUS_MAX                    256
>  #define SMMU_PCI_DEVFN_MAX                  256
> @@ -53,6 +54,9 @@ typedef enum SMMUSecurityIndex {
>      SMMU_SEC_IDX_NUM,
>  } SMMUSecurityIndex;
>  
> +MemTxAttrs smmu_get_txattrs(SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx);
> +ARMSecuritySpace smmu_get_security_space(SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx);
> +
>  extern AddressSpace __attribute__((weak)) arm_secure_address_space;
>  extern bool arm_secure_as_available;
>  void smmu_enable_secure_address_space(void);
> @@ -150,6 +154,8 @@ typedef struct SMMUTransCfg {
>      /* Used by stage-2 only. */
>      struct SMMUS2Cfg s2cfg;
>      SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx; /* cached security index */
> +    MemTxAttrs txattrs;        /* cached transaction attributes */
> +    AddressSpace *as;          /* cached address space */
>  } SMMUTransCfg;
>  
>  typedef struct SMMUDevice {
> @@ -176,6 +182,11 @@ typedef struct SMMUIOTLBKey {
>      uint8_t level;
>  } SMMUIOTLBKey;
>  
> +typedef struct SMMUConfigKey {
> +    SMMUDevice *sdev;
> +    SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx;
> +} SMMUConfigKey;
> +
>  typedef struct SMMUSIDRange {
>      uint32_t start;
>      uint32_t end;
> @@ -251,6 +262,7 @@ SMMUTLBEntry *smmu_iotlb_lookup(SMMUState *bs, SMMUTransCfg *cfg,
>  void smmu_iotlb_insert(SMMUState *bs, SMMUTransCfg *cfg, SMMUTLBEntry *entry);
>  SMMUIOTLBKey smmu_get_iotlb_key(int asid, int vmid, uint64_t iova,
>                                  uint8_t tg, uint8_t level);
> +SMMUConfigKey smmu_get_config_key(SMMUDevice *sdev, SMMUSecurityIndex sec_idx);
>  void smmu_iotlb_inv_all(SMMUState *s);
>  void smmu_iotlb_inv_asid_vmid(SMMUState *s, int asid, int vmid);
>  void smmu_iotlb_inv_vmid(SMMUState *s, int vmid);
> @@ -260,6 +272,8 @@ void smmu_iotlb_inv_iova(SMMUState *s, int asid, int vmid, dma_addr_t iova,
>  void smmu_iotlb_inv_ipa(SMMUState *s, int vmid, dma_addr_t ipa, uint8_t tg,
>                          uint64_t num_pages, uint8_t ttl);
>  void smmu_configs_inv_sid_range(SMMUState *s, SMMUSIDRange sid_range);
> +/* Invalidate all cached configs for a given device across all security idx */
> +void smmu_configs_inv_sdev(SMMUState *s, SMMUDevice *sdev);
>  /* Unmap the range of all the notifiers registered to any IOMMU mr */
>  void smmu_inv_notifiers_all(SMMUState *s);
>  



  reply	other threads:[~2025-09-29  9:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-25 16:26 [PATCH v2 00/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Add initial support for Secure State Tao Tang
2025-09-25 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 01/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Fix incorrect reserved mask for SMMU CR0 register Tao Tang
2025-09-25 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 02/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Correct SMMUEN field name in CR0 Tao Tang
2025-09-26 12:27   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-25 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 03/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Introduce secure registers and commands Tao Tang
2025-09-27 10:29   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-28  4:46     ` Tao Tang
2025-09-25 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 04/14] refactor: Move ARMSecuritySpace to a common header Tao Tang
2025-09-28 13:19   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-25 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 05/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Introduce banked registers for SMMUv3 state Tao Tang
2025-09-28 14:26   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-29  7:22     ` Tao Tang
2025-09-25 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 06/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Add separate address space for secure SMMU accesses Tao Tang
2025-09-29  7:44   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-29  8:33     ` Tao Tang
2025-09-29  8:54       ` Eric Auger
2025-09-25 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 07/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Make Configuration Cache security-state aware Tao Tang
2025-09-29  9:55   ` Eric Auger [this message]
2025-09-29 10:38     ` Tao Tang
2025-09-25 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 08/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Add security-state handling for page table walks Tao Tang
2025-09-29 14:21   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-29 15:22     ` Tao Tang
2025-09-25 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 09/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Add secure TLB entry management Tao Tang
2025-09-29 14:57   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-29 15:29     ` Tao Tang
2025-09-25 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 10/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Add banked support for queues and error handling Tao Tang
2025-09-29 15:07   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-29 15:45     ` Tao Tang
2025-09-29 15:09   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-25 16:26 ` [PATCH v2 11/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Harden security checks in MMIO handlers Tao Tang
2025-09-29 15:30   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-29 15:56     ` Tao Tang
2025-09-30 13:13       ` Eric Auger
2025-09-26  3:08 ` [PATCH v2 12/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Use iommu_index to represent the security context Tao Tang
2025-09-26  3:08   ` [PATCH v2 13/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Add property to enable Secure SMMU support Tao Tang
2025-09-26  3:08   ` [PATCH v2 14/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Optional Secure bank migration via subsections Tao Tang
2025-09-29 15:33   ` [PATCH v2 12/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Use iommu_index to represent the security context Eric Auger
2025-09-29 16:02     ` Tao Tang
2025-09-26  3:23 ` [PATCH v2 13/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Add property to enable Secure SMMU support Tao Tang
2025-09-29 15:42   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-29 16:15     ` Tao Tang
2025-09-26  3:30 ` [PATCH v2 14/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Optional Secure bank migration via subsections Tao Tang
2025-09-29 15:47   ` Eric Auger
2025-09-30  3:35     ` Tao Tang
2025-09-26 12:24 ` [PATCH v2 00/14] hw/arm/smmuv3: Add initial support for Secure State Eric Auger
2025-09-26 14:54   ` Tao Tang
2025-09-26 16:12     ` Eric Auger
2025-10-11  0:31 ` Pierrick Bouvier

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