From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([208.118.235.92]:59136) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1TRpwR-0008AF-7p for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 26 Oct 2012 15:51:40 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1TRpwQ-0007FF-7N for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 26 Oct 2012 15:51:39 -0400 Received: from mail-ee0-f45.google.com ([74.125.83.45]:50101) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1TRpwP-0007El-RD for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 26 Oct 2012 15:51:38 -0400 Received: by mail-ee0-f45.google.com with SMTP id b47so1328279eek.4 for ; Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:51:37 -0700 (PDT) Sender: Paolo Bonzini Message-ID: <508AE9A6.4060304@redhat.com> Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 21:51:02 +0200 From: Paolo Bonzini MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <604401631.2277495.1351264128301.JavaMail.root@redhat.com> <871ugl44v5.fsf@codemonkey.ws> <508AB5C0.2000304@zytor.com> <508ADD66.5040909@redhat.com> <5ea4bbfb-b761-42ef-93f8-7c91fee0bb30@email.android.com> In-Reply-To: <5ea4bbfb-b761-42ef-93f8-7c91fee0bb30@email.android.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 0/6] add paravirtualization hwrng support List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Amit Shah , Anthony Liguori , Andreas Faerber , qemu-devel@nongnu.org Il 26/10/2012 21:07, H. Peter Anvin ha scritto: > This is surreal. Output from /dev/hwrng turns into output for /dev/random... it us guaranteed worse; period, end of story. Isn't that exactly what happens in bare-metal? hwrng -> rngd -> random. Instead here we'd have, host hwrng -> virtio-rng-pci -> guest hwrng -> guest rngd -> guest random. The only difference is that you paravirtualize access to the host hwrng to a) distribute entropy to multiple guests; b) support migration across hosts with different CPUs and hardware. > I don't know who the "agreement" is with, but it is ridiculous in this case. man 4 random: While some safety margin above that minimum is reasonable, as a guard against flaws in the CPRNG algorithm, no cryptographic primitive available today can hope to promise more than 256 bits of security, so if any program reads more than 256 bits (32 bytes) from the kernel random pool per invocation, or per reasonable reseed interval (not less than one minute), that should be taken as a sign that its cryptography is not skilfully implemented. Paolo